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SPIRIT 

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MILITARY  INSTITUTIONS, 


MA  USUAL  MARM/^NT, 


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Diivi.  of   i:.\<;i 


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KJiANK    SCIJAUJ- 


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wo  >• 


COL.  GEORGE  WASHINGTON  FLOWERS 
MEMORIAL  COLLECTION 


DUKE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
DURHAM.  N.  C. 


PRESENTED  BY 

W.  W.  FLOWERS 


J 


Cr>l^ù2^ 


THE 


SPIRIT 


OF 


MILITARY  INSTITUTIONS, 


BY 


MARSHAL  MARMONT, 

DUKE    OF    RAGUSA. 


Translated  from  the  last  Paris  edition   (1859),  and  augmented  by  Biographi- 
cal, Historical,  Topographical,  and  Military  Notes  ;  with  a  new  version 
of  General  Jomini's  celebrated  Thirty-fifth  Chapter,  of  Part  I, 
of  Treatise  on  Grand  Military  Operations. 


BY 

FEANK   SCHALLEE, 

Colonel  22d  Regiment  3Iississippi  Infantry,  Confederate  Army. 


COLUMBIA,  S.   C: 

EVANS    AND    COGSWELL 

1864. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1864,  by 

EVANS    &    COGSWELL,. 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Confederate  States  for  the  District 

of  South  Carolina. 

Printed  by  Evan»  ant>  Cogswell,  Colombia,  S.  C» 


INDEX. 


Dedication  to  President  Jefferson  Davis 7 

Letter  of  Colonel  Schaller  to  President  Davis 9 

Reply  of  President  Davi« H 

From  the  Translator 13 

List  of  Works  used  in  the  preparation  of  Notes 15 

Dedication  of  Marshal  Marniont's  work  to  the  Army  of  France 19 

Some  Introductory  Advice  to  the  Military  Student 21 

PART    FIRST. 

GENERAL  THEORY  OF  THE  MILITARY  ART. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Definitions 27 

CHAPTER  II. 

General  principles 31 

CHAPTER  III. 
Bases,  Lines  of  Operation,  and  Strategy 34 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Tactics 41 

CHAPTER  V. 
Manœuvres 44 

PART    SECOND. 

ORGANIZATION,    FORMATION,  AND    MAINTENANCE    OF    ARMIES. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Organization  and  formation  of  troops 47 

First  Section:  Infantry 47 

Second  Section:  Cavalry 56 


9 


44996 


4  in  hex. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Artillery 6S 

CHAPTER  III. 
Fortifications 9S 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Administration 114 

First  Section  :  Subsistence 115 

Second  Section  :  Hospitals , 118 

OHAPTBB  V.     ' 

Military  justice  aud  composition  of  courts 122 

PART    THIRD. 

DIVEItS    OPERATIONS    OP    WAR. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Employment  of  the  different  arms 128 

CHAPTER  II. 

Offensive  and  defensive  wars .141 

CHAPTER  III. 

Marches  and  encampments 147 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Grand  roconnoissances,  and  precautions  they  require 156 

CHAPTER  V. 

Detachments  in  presence  of  the  enemy — their  chances,    and  the 
dangers  which  accompany  them , 158 

CHAPTER  VI.                      , 
Battles 1 G2 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Conduct  of  the  general  the  day  following  the  victory 177 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Retreats 181 


INDEX,  5 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Night  attacks  and  surprises 185 

CHAPTER  X. 
Dcfonce  of  fortresses .200 

PART   FOURTH. 

PHILOSOPHY    OF    WAR. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Morale  of  soldier»,  and  how  to  form  them.     Former  armies,  and 
those  of  the  present  time 20 

CHAPTER  II. 

Military  spirit,  and  difficulties  of  commanding 223 

CHAPTER  III. 

Picture  of  a  general  who  answers  to  all  the  requirements  of  the 
command 232 

"CHAPTER  IV. 

Reputation  of  generals 260 

Conclusion 262 

APPENDIX. 

Exposition  of  the  general  principles  of  the  Art  of  War 26 


"44996 


THIS  VOLUME  IS  INSCRIBED 


TO 


His  Excellency 

JEFFERSON    DAVIS, 

PRESIDENT    OP    THE   CONPEDERATE  STATES   OF  AMERICA, 

AND 

Commander-in-Chief  op  their  Armies  and  Navies, 
with  sentiments  of  the  greatest 

ESTEEM. 


LETTER  OF  COLONEL  SMALLER  TO  MS  EXCELLENCY,  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. 

Columbia,  South  Carolina, 

November  10, '1S63. 
Hia  Excellency,  Preaident  Jefferson  Davis, 

Richmond,  Virginia. 

Mr.  President:  Every  soldier  of  the  Confederate  States  Army,  of 
whatever  grade,  who  is  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  advancement  and  emu- 
lation in  his  profession,  has  long  since  felt  the  want  of  the  material 
which  inigkt  serve  him  as  a  basis  for  both  the  study  of,  and  research 
into,  military  matters. 

Struggling  as  we  are — alone,  isolated,  and  without  any  exterior  aid 
from  any  quarter  of  the  world — presenting  the  greatest  moral  spectacle, 
and,  in  the  exhibition  of  our  unity  and  perseverance,  the  most  graphic 
instance  of  a  nation's  devotion  to  the  cause  of  liberty  history  has  ever 
furnished — the  soldiers  of  this  Confederacy,  amid  their  manifold  priva- 
tions, have  not  even  had  the  gratification  of  comparing  their  illustrious 
deeds  with  those  of  other  military  nations,  related  to  us  by  prominent 
military  writers,  and  the  study  of  whose  works  forms  so  important  a 
part  of  a  soldier's  education. 

The  want  of  a  work  on  the  art  of  war,  which  could  be  easily  compre- 
hended by.one  even  who  had  devoted  but  little  time  or  thought  upon 
military  matters,  and  which  yet  would  not  bo  beneath  the  consideration 
of  the  educated  soldier,  being  seriously  felt,  it  was  often  brought  to  the 
notice  of  the  writer. 

During  the  period  of  my  incapacity  to  «erve  in  the  field,  arising  from 
the  effects  of  severe  wounds,  I  have  sought  to  prosecute,  and  I  trust  to 
have  done  so  with  some  advantage,  the  study  of  military  matters. 

Consulting  those  of  my  professional  friends  to  whose  opinion  consid- 
eration must  be  accorded,  among  several  recent  French  and  German 
works  upon  the  military  art  at  my  disposal  none  struck  mo  as  worthier  of 
being  known  to  the  great  body  of  the  Confederate  Army  than  the  work 
of  Marshal  Marmont,  entitled  :  "Be  l'Esprit  des  Institutions  Militaires," 
Paris,  1859  ;  and  I  have,  in  consequence,  completed  a  translation 
thereof,  with  such  military,  historical,  and  topographical  notes  of  my 
own,  as  appeared  to  bo  necessary  for  its  complote  understanding. 

Concise,  and  of  comparatively  small  compass  for  so  extensivo  a  subject 
as  is  presented  by  the  consideration  of  the  Art  of  War,  it  nevertheless 
forms  a  complete  treatise  upon  it,  and  every  important  principle  of  that 


10 

art  "which  elevates  and  preserves  empires,"  and  through  the  agency  of 
which  we  will  have  to  achieve  our  independence,  is  clearly  and  fully  il- 
lustrated. 

It  is  proper  here  to  state  that  I  have,  in  my  notes,  carefully  abstained 
from  criticising  any  of  the  operations  of  any  of  our  generals,  although 
reference  has  been  made  to  illustrate,  through  the  events  of  our  own 
war,  yet  fully  impressed  upon  the  minds  of  our  own  soldiers,  the  princi- 
ples of  the  art. 

When  once  our  independence  is  achieved,  and  the  tableau  of  our  suc- 
cesses and  reverses  is  spread  before  us  in  all  its  glories  and  shadows, 
then,  and  only  then,  it  appears  to  me,  can  a  thorough  criticism  of  our 
military  operations  be  useful  to  the  country  and  beneficial  to  the  military 
student. 

To  you,  Mr.  President,  whose  genius  has  not  only  organized  an  army, 
but  has  achieved  the  still  greater  task  of  maintaining  and  strengthening 
it,  amid  circumstances  the  most  unfavorable,  until  it  has  become,  in 
numbers,  spirit,  devotion,  and  efficiency,  more  formidable  than  it  has 
ever  before  been,  even  after  a  period  of  over  thirty  months  of  active 
warfare — to  you,  then,  whose  great  achievements  in  this  respect  alone 
make  you  a  master  of  the  art  of  war,  I  have  proposed,  and  herewith 
most  respectfully  beg  permission,  to  dedicate  my  work.    *    •    * 

With  sentiments  of  the  hiehest  esteem, 

I  remain,  your  Excellency's 

Most  obedient  servant, 

FRANK  SCHALLER, 
Colonel  22d  Regiment  of  Mississippi  Infantry. 


REPLY  OF  HIS  EXCELLENCY,  PRESIDENT  DAVIS,  TO  COLONEL  SCHALLER. 

Confederate  States  op  America, 
Executive  Department, 

Richmond,  Va.,  Nov.  25,  1863. 
Dear  Sir  :  It  gives  me  pleasure  to  acknowledge  your  letter  of  the  10th 
inst.,  and  thank  you  for  the  personal  kindness  therein  expressed. 

The  work  of  Marshal  Marmont,  Duc  de  Ragusa,  "De  l'Esprit  des  Insti- 
tutions Militaires,"  is  an  interesting  one,  and  a  good  translation  of  it 
will  add  something  to  our  military  literature. 

In  the  1st  and  2d  volumes  of  the  United  Service  Journal,  published 
in  England  in  1845,  will  be  found  a  translation  of  this  work,  but  evi- 
dently by  one  not  skilled  in  the  knowledge  and  use  of  the  English 
language.     Another  translation,  therefore,  will  be  timely  and  useful. 

The  request  you  have  been  pleased  to  make  in  relation  to  the  dedica- 
tion, I  grant,  of  course,  with  pleasure. 

Very  truly  and  respectfully  yours, 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 
Colonel  F.  Schaller,  etc.,  Columbia,  S.  C. 


FROM  THE  TRANSLATOR. 


In  offering  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Confederate 
Army  this  little  volume,  I  refrain  from  making  any  excuses. 
Many  of  them  will  be  better  able  than  myself  to  judge  of  its 
intrinsic  merits. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  as  an  appendix,  I  have  incorporated  with 
it  the  lucid  and  justly  celebrated  chapter  of  General  Jomini, 
giving,  in  a  masterly  mauner,  the  exposition  of  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  the  art  of  war.  I  have  sought  to  preserve  its  original 
force  and  integrity  as  much  as  my  knowledge  of  the  English 
language  enabled  me  to  do,  and  I  believe  it  to.be  a  faithful  ver- 
sion. It  is  intended  to  be  the  forerunner  of  the  entire  work, 
which,  as  soon  as  the  labors  shall  be  finished,  will  appear  in  a 
form  worthy  of  the  illustrious  author.  Nothing  but  the  great 
want  of  material,  which  is  felt  so  much  by  our  officers,  has  deter- 
mined me  to  detach  it,  and  to  publish  it  in  advauce;  its  perusal 
will  be  attended  with  profit  to  soldiers  of  all  ranks. 

I  can  only  express  the  hope  that  my  companions-in-arms  may 
find,  in  this  Jittle  volume,  some  further  encouragement  steadfast- 
ly to  advance  in  the  glorious  contest  in  which  they  are  engaged, 
and  that  the  arms  of  the  Confederacy  may  soon  be  surmounted 
by  the  crown  of  Peace,  as  the  finishing  feature  of  their  laurel 
and  cypress-entwined  glories. 

For  the  defects  of  the  work,  as  chargeable  to  myself,  I  would 
bespeak  indulgence. 
2 


LIST  OF  WORKS  USED  IN  THE  PREPARATION  OP  NOTES. 

1.  Annales  des  Provinces  Unies,  par  Basnage.     A  la  Haye:  1726. 

2.  Traité  des  Grandes  Opérations  Militaires  ;  par  le  Lieutenant-Gé- 
néral Jomini.     Paris  :  1818. 

3.  History  of  the  War  in  France  and  Belgium  in  181  è  ;  by  W.  Siborne. 
London:  1818. 

4.  Histoire  Critique  et  Militaire  des  Guerres  de  la  Révolution;  par  le 
Lieutenant-Général  Jomini.     Paris  :  1820. 

5.  Atlas  des  plus  mémorabiles  Batailles,  Combats,  et  Sièges  ;  par  Fr. 
de  Kausler,  Major  à  l'Etat-Maj  or-Général  Wurtembergeois.  Carls- 
rouhe  et  Fribourg  :  1831. 

6.  History  of  the  late  Polish  Revolution;  by  Major  Joseph  Hordyn- 
ski,  Polish  Army.     Boston  :  1833. 

7.  Military  Technical  Dictionary;  by  Captain  Burn,  R.  Artillery. 
Woolwich:  1842. 

8.  A  View  of  the  Formation,  Discipline,  and  Economy  of  Armies  ;  by 
Robert  Jackson,  M.D.,  Inspector-General  of  Army  Hospitals.  London  : 
1845. 

9.  Géographie,  Physique,  Historique,  et  Militaire;  par  La  Vallée. 
Paris:  1850. 

10.  Military  Maxims  of  Napoleon;  translated  from  the  French,  by 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  G.  C.  D'Aguilar,  C.B.     London  :  1852. 

11.  Military  Encyclopaedia;  by  J.  H.  Stocqueler.     London:  1853. 

12.  On  Fire-arms;  by  Colonel  Chesney,  R.  Artillery.     London:  1853. 

13.  On  Cavalry;  by  Captain  Nolan,  15th  Hussars.     London:   1854. 

14.  History  of  Europe;  by  Sir  A.  Alison.     London:  1857. 

15.  Histoire  delà  Campagne  de  1815;  par  Lioutenant-ColonelCharras. 
Bruxelles:  1858. 

16.  U.  S.  House  of  Representatives,  35th  Congress,  2d  Session.  Ex. 
Doc.  No.  2.     Washington  :  1858. 

17.  Der  Italienische  Krieg,  1859;  von  W.  Riistow.     Zurich  :  1859. 

18.  L'Italie  Confédérée.  Histoire  Politique,  Militaire,  et  Pittoresque 
de  la  Campagne  do  1S59  ;  par  A.  de  Césena.     Paris  :  1859. 

19.  U.  S.  Senate,  36th  Congress,  1st  Session.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  2. 
Washington:  1860. 

20.  Hand-book  Dictionary;  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Percy  Scott,  Com- 
mandant Isle  of  Wight  Artillery.     London  :  1861. 


16  SPIRIT    OF    MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS. 

21.  Official  Reports  of  Battles:  published  by  order  of  Congress  C.  S. 
Richmond,  Va.:  1862. 

2" 2.  The  Practice  of  War;  by  C.  F.  Pardigon.  Richmond,  Va.  :  1863- 
[Translation.] 

23.  Histoire  et  Tactique  des  trois  Armes,  et  plus  particulièrement  de 
l'Artillerie  de  Campagne;  par  Ild.  Favé,  Capitaine  d'Artillerie.  Paris  : 
1853. 


THE  SPIRIT 


OF 


MILITARY  INSTITUTIONS. 


2* 


DEDICATION    OF    MARSHAL    MARMONT'S    WORK 
TO  THE  ARMY  OF  FRANCE. 

To  the  Army  I  dedicate  my  work.  It  has  been  my  cradle.  In  its 
ranks  I  have  passed  my  life.  I  have  constantly  partaken  of  its  hard- 
ships, and  more  than  once  I  have  shed  my  blood  during  the  heroic 
times,  the  memory  of  which  will  never  be  lost. 

Arrived  at  that  age  at  which  all  the  interests  arid  consolations  of  a 
lifetime  are  to  be  found  in  the  meditation  upon  the  past,  I  address  to 
the  army  this  last  souvenir. 

Those  soldiers,  my  companions  in  arms,  possessed  every  military 
virtue.  To  bravery  and  the  love  of  glory,  so  natural  to  Frenchmen, 
they  joined  great  respect  for  discipline,  and  boundless  confidence  in  their 
chief — the  first  elements  of  success. 

While  under  my  command,  and  when  opposed  to  equal  forces,  they 
have  never  been  beaten.  Often  victors,  despite  the  inferiority  of  num- 
bers, they  but  seldom  gave  way  to  immense  superiority  in  strength  and 
the  fatality  of  circumstances  ;  always  remaining  sufficiently  formidable 
to  make  the  enemy  almost  regret  his  victory. 

The  soldiers  of  the  present  time  worthily  follow  the  examples  of  their 
predecessors;  and  the  courage,  patience,  and  energy  they  unceasingly 
show  during  the  long  and  painful  African  wars,  prove  that  always,  and 
everywhere,  they  will  respond  to  the  wants  and  the  exigencies  of  the 
country. 

The -former  have  been  the  object  of  my  most  assiduous  cares  and  my 
liveliest  solicitude. 

The  latter,  as  long  as  I  shall  live,  will  have  my  most  ardent  sympa, 
thics. 

THE  MARSHAL,  DUKE  OF  RAGUSA. 


SOME  INTRODUCTORY  ADVICE  TO  THE  MILITARY 

STUDENT. 

Scarcity  of  military  works— Special  treatises  do  not  contain  the  principles  of  the 
subject— Character  of  ancient  writers— Polybius  and  Vegetius  more  curious  than 
useful— Character  of  actual  war— Difficulties  of  command  iu  modern  warfare — In 
what  it  consists— Alexander,  Hannibal,  Ca?sar— Dreams  of  Knight  Folard— Cnmp 
of  Rayeux— Experience  of  Dumesnil-Durand — General  Rogniat—  Particular  ob- 
ject of  this  book— Wealth  of  military  literature—Standard  works— Napoleon's 
writings— Archduke  Charles'  principles  of  strategy— Marshal  Gouvion  St.  Cyr— 
Twenty  campaigns,  and  fifty  years  of  experience. 

Notks.— 1.  Polybius.  2.  Vegetius.  3.  Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston,  Confederate  Army. 
4.  Chevalier  Folard.  5.  Lieu  tenant-General  Rogniat.  6.  Thersites.  7.  Memoirs 
of  Montholon.  8.  Archduke  Charles  of  Austria.  9.  Marshal  Gouvion  St.  Cyr 
10.  Ségur. 

No  modern  work  upon  the  art  of  war  or  military  institutions  contains 
a  complete  exposition  of  principles.  Several  special  treatises  upon  the 
different  arms  have  been  published,  but  the  principles  of  the  subject  at 
large  have  never  been  established  in  any.  Superficial  views,  technical 
■  and  minute  details,  without  any  sufficient  indication  of  the  aim  and  the 
means,  can  there  only  be  found. 

Ancient  writers  have  searched  into  military  questions  even  more  pro- 
foundly; but  what  remains  of  their  theories,  since,  through  the  discovery 
of  gunpowder,  military  science  has  been  so  completely  modified  ? 

Polybius1  and  Vegetius2  can  still  satisfy  our  curiosity ;  but  we  may 
no  longer  look  in  their  writings  for  any  useful  and  connected  instruc- 
tion. 

Ancient  and  modern  wars  have  no  point  of  resemblance,  their 
moral  affinity  perhaps  excepted,  or  that  sublime  part  of  the  art  which 
consists  in  the  knowledge  of  the  human  heart— a  knowledge  which,  at 
all  times,  is  so  necessary  in  directing  men,  and  which,  in  war,  exercises 
a  yet  more  prompt  and  decisive  influence. 

Everything  has  changed  in  the  form  and  proportions  of  arms;  their 
greater  range  keep3  the  combatants  at  greater  distances;  they  cause 
greater  terror,  and  contribute  materially  to  prodigious  results. 

To  this  may  be  added  the  smaller  number  of  combatants  in  former 

times. 

But  the  art  of  commanding  "tiers  nowadays  many  more  difficulties. 
With  the  ancients,  who  fought   always  with  the  hand,  the  army  was 


22  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

formed  in  a  compact  manner;  the  small  number  of  soldiers  occupied 
but  a  very  limited  space;  its  front  barely  equalled  that  of  one  of  our 
brigades.  If  a  general  could  not  himself  see  every  one,  he  was  at 
least  within  sight  of  all  of  his  men.  Operating  upon  so  small  a  scale, 
the  supreme  chief  could  hasten  everywhere;  he  was  a  combatant  him- 
self, giving  the  example,  sword  in  hand.  In  our  days,  the  general 
wages  war  by  means  of  Will  and  Thought;  his  skill  in  wielding  the 
sword  is  without  importance  ;  the  mind  embraces  quite  another  range 
than  is  apparent  to  our  perception;  and  a  general,  in  short,  is  nowa- 
days much  less  of  a  soldier,  although  he  should  now  and  then  be  one, 
but  rather  a  moral  being  who,  by  force  of  his  influence  upon  the 
understanding,  appears  to  govern  events  like  the  mysterious  powers 
of 'nature.3 

Thus,  actual  war  constitutes  an  entirely  novel  art,  for  which  neither 
model  nor  precept  could  be  found  in  the  wars  of  the  Greeks  and 
Romans. 

If  the  greatest  captains  of  antiquity,  Alexander,  Caesar,  or  Hannibal, 
could  return  to  this  earth,  and  come  suddenly  upon  a  field  of  battle, 
their  genius  would  comprehend  nothing  ;  and  they  would  have  need 
of  more  than  one  campaign  to  understand  completely  the  mechanism 
of  the  profession,  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  our  new  arms  and 
institutions. 

These  truths  are  so  evident  to  him  who  has  led  in  war,  that  it  may 
well  be  asked  how,  in  the  times  of  Louis  XIV,  the  reveries  of  Cheva- 
lier Folard4  could  have  been  seriously  entertained;  and  later,  the  still 
more  foolish  vagaries  of  Ménil-Durand,  who  was  on  the  point  of  estab- 
lishing a  special  camp  at  Bayeux  to  obtain  comparative  practical 
knowledge  of  formations  and  manœuvres.  It  will  be  still  more  aston- 
ishing that  a  general  of  our  epoch,  Lieutenant-General  Rogniat,5  of  the 
engineers,  an  officer  of  merit  in  his  special  arm,  should  have  written  a 
large  book  to  revive  and  enlarge  upon  these  vagaries  ;  and  if  he  did 
not  figure  among  combatants,  he  could  and  might  at  least  have  seen 
some  battles. 

I  propose  to  give  a  summary  of  the  principles  of  organization,  mili- 
tary institutions,  and  of  active  operations.  I  have  endeavored  to  show 
that  nothing  should  be  left  to  hazard  in  these  matters  ;  that  everything 
depends  upon  a  generating  principle,  from  which  the  necessary  conse- 
quences flow. 

A  principle  is  discovered  by  the  careful  consideration  of  the  end, 
and  by  seeking  the  best  means  to  attain  it. 

A  genius  applies  recognized  principles  ;  in  this  consists  the  whole 
art  of  war. 

I  have  deemed  it  useful  to  expose  them  in  the  simplest  manner,  and 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  23 

to  embrace,  in  a  treatise  on  the  rudiments  of  the  military  art,  all  the 
branches  of  that  art,  and  at  the  same  time  the  different  services  of 
armies,  by  stripping  them  of  the  technical  charlatanism  which  too 
often  accompanies  them. 

Yet  to  these  principles  the  studies  of  military  men  are  not  limited; 
they  should  read  attentively,  in  addition,  the  history  of  the  campaigns 
of  groat  generals — because  the  wholo  genius  of  these  superior  men  is 
to  be  found  in  their  application. 

In  this  respect  military  literature  i3  very  rich  ;  but  a  choice  must  be 
made.  It  is  preferable  to  go  back  to  the  source  ;  the  works  of  those, 
therefore,  who  have  commanded,  should  be  sought;  because  little  good 
is  to  be  gained  from  campaigns  described  by  subalterns,  who,  strangers 
to  all  the  difficulties  of  command,  and  often  to  the  very  first  notions  of 
the  profession,  set  themselves  up  for  masters  by  censuring  ;  they  are 
modern  Thersites,6  severe  in  languago  but  feeble  of  heart  and  arm, 
rather  made  to  talk  than  to  act.  Their  works  are  a  tissue  of  errors 
and  misrepresentations. 

Above  all  documents  deeply  to  be  studied,  the  papers  dictated  by  Na- 
poleon, and  published  under  the  title  of  "  Memoirs  of  Montholon,"'1  are 
recommended. 

In  every  line  the  superior  genius,  the  power  of  reasoning,  and  the  au- 
thority of  the  great  captain,  are  recognized.  His  decisions  and  explana- 
tions, though  sometimes  susceptible  of  controversy,  offer  the  most 
valuable  precepts;  he  who  knows  how  to  meditate  upon  and  comprehend 
them  will  have  the  instinct  of  war. 

An  older  work,  which  can  not  be  studied  too  much,  is  the  book  pub- 
lished by  the  Archduke  Charles  of  Austria,  under  the  title  of  "  Principles 
of  Strategy."8  In  it  the  application  of  these  principles  is  seen  in  his 
movomonts,  when  operating  in  1796  against  the  Armies  of  the  Rhine 
and  Sambre-and-Meuse;  it  is  an  exemplification  of  all  the  rules  of 
grand  warfare. 

The  Memoirs  of  Marshal  Gouvion  Saint  Cyr,9  and  The  History  of 
the  Russian  Campaign,10  by  Ségur,  will  likewise  be  read  with  advantage. 
From  such  sources  healthy  instruction,  or  the  most  correct  opinions,  can 
alone  be  drawn.* 

I  have  occupied  myself  with  the  constitution  of  the  different  arms,  and 
their  best  employment,  for  a  long  time  ;  and  I  believe  the  principles 
which  I  am  about  to  lay  down  to  be  true.     I  recommend  them  to  the 


*  I  visited,  in  1826,  during  an  entire  day,  the  field  of  battle  of  the  Moscowa,  with 
neveral  French  and  Russian  officers  who  had  participated  in  that  struggle;  upon 
the  ground  I  read  the  three  descriptions  by  Ségur.  Chitmbray,  and  Boutourlin  :  in 
my  opinion,  the  first  givos  tha  only  correct  account  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
events  must  hare  occurred. — Note  of  Jut  far. 


24  THE    SriRÎT    OF 

ardent,  intelligent,  and  valorous  youths  who  have  replaeod  us  ;    I  have 
written  for  them. 

The  work  I  publish  is  the  last  contribution  which,  at  the  decline  of 
my  life,  I  am  able  to  offer  for  the  benefit  of  a  science  I  have  always  cul- 
tivated with  ardor,  and  a  profession  to  which  I  am  passionately 
attached. 

In  the  moments  of  my  leisure  I  found  a  great  charm  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  this  resume  of  my  past  studies  and  recollections.  It  is  the  fruit 
of  my  meditations,  developed  by  long  and  frequent  conversations  with 
Napoleon,  tAventy  campaigns,  and  more  than  half  a  century  of  experi- 
ence. 

NOTES. 

1.  Polybius,  Greek  historian;  scholar  of  Philopromen  ;  friend  and  counsellor 
of  Scipio  JEmilianus  ;  commander  of  the  Achî^an  cavalry  ;  defender  of  Greek  in- 
dependence. Among  his  works  the  military  reader  will  find  a  treatise  of  the 
Roman  Art  of  War,  and  another  on  Tactics.  Died,  of  a  fall  from  his  horse.  B.C. 
121,  82  years  old.    His  works  have  been  translated  into  English  by  Hampton. 

2.  Vegetius,  Roman  military  writer  of  great  celebrity  under  the  reign  of  the 
Emperor  Valentinian,  A.D.  386.  His  works  may  be  found  in  S  vols.,  published 
at  Strasbourg,  1806. 

3.  A  general,  in  short,  is  nowadays  niuch  less  of  a  soldier,  al- 
though he  should  now  and  then  be  one.  This  should  be  understood  that 
a  general,  when  occasion  requires  it,  will  not  hesitate  to  perform  the  part  of  a  sol- 
dier by  joining  in  the  combat.  That  he  should  be  a  soldier,  in  the  sense  of  the 
term  ordinarily  applied,  is  presupposed.  Our  glorious  General  Albert  Sidney  John- 
ston, when  leading  Bowen's  brigade  to  the  charge  to  restore  the  wavering  fortunes 
of  the  battle,  at  a  moment  which  proved  to  be  the  turning-point  of  the  struggle 
(Shiloh,  April  C,  1802),  forcibly  illustrates  this  remark,  and  his  act  and  heroic  death 
•will  not  only  bo  one  of  the  most  magnificent  passages  of  our  history,  but  a  sublime 
precept  to  every  Confederate  general.     [Vide  Chapter  3,  l'art  TV.] 

4.  Chevalier  Charles  de  Folard,  born  at  Avignon  in  1GG9  ;  died  there  1752; 
second  lieutenant  in  the  regiment  of  Borry,  1688  :  distinguished  in  campaign  of 
1701  ;  thrice  wounded  in  the  Battle  of  Cassano,  in  1705,  gained  by  Louis,  Duke  of 
Vendôme,  over  the  Imperialists,  in  the  war  of  the  Spanish  succession.  In  1714  ho 
fousht  at  Malta  against  the  Turks  ;  joined  King  Charles  XII  of  Sweden,  re- 
maining with  him  to  his  death.  His  last  campaign  was  with  Marshal  Berwick 
against  Philip  V  of  Spain,  in  1719.  In  his  Commentaries  on  .Polybius  ho  has  given 
his  views  at  length,  especially  his  system  of  columns,  l'or  which  he  will  chiefly  be 
interesting  to  military  men.  His  other  principal  works  are  :  Nouvelles  Décou- 
vertes sur  la  Guerre;  Traité  de  la  Defense  des  Places,  and  Traité  de  la  Guerre  de 
Partisan. 

5.  Lieutenant-General  of  Engineers  Rogniat  has  published  a  very 
interesting  work,  entitled  "  Considérations  sur  l'Art  de  la  Guerre."  In  it  he  gives 
a  complete  exposition  of  the  Roman  art  of  war,  and  especially  treats  of  the  organi- 
zation and  tactical  formation  of  the  army  of  that  celebrated  military  people, 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  25 

recommending  the  legionary  formation  as  being  suited  for  our  times.  His  work  is 
written  in  a  very  philosophical  manner,  and  quite  interesting— in  some  respects, 
instructive. 

6.  Thersites,  one  of  the  Crocks  in  the  army  before  Troy,  Homer  describes 
him  as  equally  deformed  in  person  and  in  mind.  Such  was  his  propensity  to  indulge 
in  contumelious  language,  that  he  could  not  abstain  from  directing  it  against,  not 
only  the  chiefs  of  the  army,  but  even  Agamemnon  himself.  He  ultimately  fell  by 
the  hand  of  Achilles,  while  he  was  ridiculing  the  sorrow  of  that  hero  for  the  slain 
Penthesilea.  " 

7.  The  Memoirs  of  Montholon  (Mémoires  de  Napoléou,  diet,  au  Montho- 
lon  et  Gourgaud,  7  vols.,  London,  1823)  are  a  perfect  treasure  to  the  military  student, 
resplendent  with  the  genius  of  its  illustrious  author.  They  were  dictated  to  the 
two  generals,  Montholon  and  Gourgaud,  who  voluntarily  accompanied  the  emper- 
or to  St.  Helena,  and  are  generally  known  under  the  name  of  the  former. 

Count  Charles  Trist.am  dc  Montholon,  born  at  Paris,  1783.  One  of  the  noblest 
characters  the  period  in  which  he  lived  has  produced.  The  son  of  a  soldier,  and 
himself  on*  from  his  fifteenth  year,  he  servod  under  Bonaparte  on  the  ISth  Brumaire 
(8th  o:  November,  1799);  subsequently  aide-de-camp  to  Marshal  Berthior ;  distin- 
guished himself  at  Austerlitz,  Wagram,  Jena,  and  Friodland  ;  specially  attached  to 
Napoleon.  Commandant  of  the  Department  of  the  Loire,  1814;  general  in  1815; 
accompanies  the  emperor  to  St,  He.ena;  edits  his  memoirs;  accompanies  the' 
present  emperor  to  Boulogne  ou  the  Oth  of  August,  1840;  imprisoned  in  France, 

General  Gaspard  Gourgaud,  born  at  Versailles,  1783;  educated  at  Polytechnic 
School  ;  Teacher  of  Fortification  at  Chartres  and  Metz.  180],  enters  6th  regimen4 
artillery  ;  in  1S05,  wounded  at  Austerlitz;  distinguished  in  Battles  of  Jena,  1806- 
Poland,  1807;  Siege  of  Saragossa,  1808;  Battle?,  of  Abenshwrg,  Eckmilhl.  Ratisbon,' 
Ebersberg,  Esslingon,  and  Wagram,  1809.  Director  of  armory  at  Versailles;  in 
Russia,  1812;  at  Liitzen  and  Bautzen,  1813;  saved  the  emperor's  life  at  Brienne, 
1814;  distinguished  at  Nangis,  Laon,  and  Rheims;  with  the  Bourbons  until  their 
flight;  again  joins  Napoleon;  adjutant-general  after  the  Battle  of  Ligny;  oue  of 
the  last  at  Waterloo,  1S15;  accompanies  Napoleon  to  St.  Helena  ;  returns  in  1818, 
to  Europe  ;  publishes  an  account  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  for  which  arrested  and 
banished  ;  assist?,  on  15th  of  December,  1840,  at  the  reinterment  of  Napoleon  in  the 
Church  of  the  Invalides,  whore  Ik;  placed  the  hat  on  the  emperor's  coffin. 

8.  Archduke  Charles  ha?  given  to  the  military  student  two  works,  from 
which  the  greatest  benefit  may  be  derived.  They  are  :  ! .  QrundsaeUe  der  Strategic 
erhxwtert  durch  die  Darsiclhmg  du  Ftfdzugti  von  1796,  in  Deidschland.  (Princi 
plcsof  Strategy,  illustrated  by  the  Campaigns  of  1796,  iu  Germany.)  Vienna  ■  1813* 
Five  volumes,  with  a  map  of  thcïluutre  of  war,  and  eleven  plans.  And,  as  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  same,  2.  Die  Geschichte  des  Feldzttges  von  1799.  in  Dndschland 
und  in  der  Schweiz.  (History  of  the  Campaign  of  1799,  in  Germanv  and  Switz- 
erland.)   Vienna:  1819.    Two  volumes,  witli  an  atlas  in  folio. 

"  His  memoirs  are  model* of  lucid  and  authentic  military  history,  worthy  to  bo 
placed  beside  the  Commentant  of  Ofliuar  or  the  Reveries  of  Marshal  Saxe'.  The 
principles  of  strategy  on  a  great  scale,  to.  which  the  greatest  successes  or  revokes 
in  war  are  to  b*  ascribed,  never  were  more  profoundly  reflected  on,  or  lucidly  ex 
plained,  than  by  th,,  great  commander.  Like  th*  Dictator,  he  diaenaew  bU  own 
mesures  with  an  impartiality  which  is.  literally  spiking,  i  toute  preuve     To 


26  THE    SPIRIT   OF    MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS. 

the  merits  of  others,  and,  most  of  all,  his  opponents,  he  is  over  alive,  and  yields  a 
willing  testimony;  he  is  silent  only  on  the  praise  due  to  his  own  great  achieve- 
ments."— Alison. 

He  was  born  in  1771,  and  died  in  1847.  In  1793,  commands  in  Brabant  the  van- 
guard of  Prince  of  Cobourg;  Governor  of  the  Netherlands.  1796,  field-marshal  of 
the  German  empire  ;  beats  Moreau  ;  routs  Jourdan  at  Amberg,  WUrtzburg,  etc.; 
forces  Jourdan  and  Moreau  to  retreat  over  the  Rhine;  takes  possession  of  the 
fortress  of  Kehl,  in  winter  of  1797  ;  in  1799,  defeats  Jourdan  in  Suabia  ;  op- 
poses Massena  in  Switzerland;  1800,  Governor-General  of  Bohemia  ;  1801,  Minister 
of  War;  1805,  commands  against  Massena,  and  beats  him  at  Caldiero  ;  commander- 
in-chief  of  army  of  Austria;  1809,  is  beaten  by  Napoleon  in  Bavaria  ;  shortly  after 
bouts  Napoleon  at  Aspern;  is  beaten  at  Wagram  ;  1814,  Governor  of  Mentz  and 
Captain-General  of  Bohemia.    Lives  in  retirement  until  his  death. 

9.  The  works  which  Marshal  St.  Cyr  has  written  are:  1.  Guerres  de 
1792—1794.  4  vols.  Paris  :  1829.  2.  Histoire  Militaire,  1799— 1813.  4  vols.  Paris: 
1831.    3.  Guerre  en  Catalogne.    Paris  :  1829. 

He  was  born  at  Toul,  a  town  in  the  Department  of  Meurthe,  and  on  the  railroad 
from  Strasburg  to  Paris,  in  1784.  Enlisted  as  a  private  and  marched  to  tho  Rhine, 
and  rose  from  grado  to  grade.  General  of  division  in  1795  ;  with  Massena  in  Italy, 
1798  ;  appointed  to  succeed  Massena.  In  1799,  sent  to  the  Rhine  ;  commanda 
third  corps  under  Moreau.  1800,  tardy  at  Battle  of  Mœskirch  ;  beats  the  Austrians 
at  Biberach  ;  saves  Moreau  at  Memmingen  ;  retires  from  the  army  of  Moreau  ; 
fights  in  Italy.  1801,  ambassador  to  Madrid  ;  commands  Neapolitan  army  till 
1805.  1S05,  colonel-general  of  cuirassiers  ;  distinguished  in  campaigns  of  Prus- 
sia and  Poland.  1807,  Governor  of  Warsaw;  sent  into  Spain;  superseded  by 
Augereau  ;  exiled  two  years.  Greatly  distinguishes  himself  at  Polotsk  in  1812, 
and  is  made  a  marshal.  Commands  at  Dresden,  and  capitulates  in  1813.  Goes 
over  to  the  Bourbons  in  1814;  made  Peer  of  France;  retires  upon  return  of  Napo- 
leon from  Elba;  is  made  Minister  of  War  by  Louis  XVIII;  retires,  and  again 
Minister  of  War  in  1818.     Permanently  retires  in  1819.    Died  in  March,  1830. 

10.  The  work  of  Segur  is  entitled  :  Campagne  de  1812.  2  volumes.  Paris: 
1825. 

Although  Count  Segurwas  not  a  military  man,  he  has  yet  given  an  admirable 
military  history  of  the  disastrous  campaign  of  1812.  His  history  is  brilliant  in 
the  highest  degree,  and  well  worthy  to  bo  perused  by  tho  military  student. 


PART    FIRST. 


GENERAL  THEORY  OF  THE  MILITARY  ART. 


CHAPTER    I. 

DEFINITIONS. 

Art  of  war — Genius  of  war — Necessity  of  knowledge  of  the  human  heart — Why  a 
man  may  he  equal  to  ten,  and  ten  mon  worth  but  one — Mind  and  character — 
Military  arts — Strategy,  tactics,  artillery,  fortifications — Organization,  manoeu- 
vres, administration — Dangers — Physiognomy  of  battles — Sacrifice  of  life  to  some 
good  purpose — Profession  of  arms. 
Notes. — 1.  Licutenant-General  Jackson,  Confederate  Army.      2.   Rogniat  on 

Bravery. 

Before  entering  upon  the  subject  I  shall  begin  with  some  definitions  : 

The  Art  of  War  is  the  whole  of  the  necessary  knowledge  to  conduct 
a  mass  of  armed  men,  to  organize,  move,  and  lead  it  to  battle,  and  to 
give  the  greatest  valor  to  the  elements  composing  it,  while  watching 
over  their  preservation. 

The  Genius  of  War  consists  in  the  talent  to  apply  these  elements  at 
the  right  time  and  in  the  most  suitable  manner — to  devise  the  best  com- 
binations with  surety  and  promptitude,  in  the  midst  of  dangers  and 
critical  situations. 

The  genius  of  war  is  incomplete,  if  to  the  faculty  of  these  combina- 
tions, and  which  I  shall  call  technical,  a  general  does  not  join  the 
knowledge  of  the  human  heart — if  he  has  not  the  instinct  to  divine  what 
passes  in  the  souls  of  his  soldiers  and  those  of  the  enemy.  These  varia- 
ble inspirations  form  the  moral  aspect  of  war;  they  are  that  mysterious 
action,  which,  imparting  sudden  power  to  an  army,  makes  one  man 
worth  ten,  and  ten  men  worth  but  one.1 

Two  other  faculties  are  equally  necessary — authority  and  decision. 
They  are  both  gifts  of  nature. 

A  great  general,  then,  must  possess  vast  intelligence — but,  still  more, 
character.  His  character  directs  the  execution;  it  alone,  both  in  mod- 
ern times  and  in  antiquity,  has  made  generals  of  the  first  ordor. 

Militari/  Arts  consist  in  the  knowledge  of  scientific  or  mechanical 
transactions,  which  regulate  the  details  of  execution  and  the  employ- 
ment of  the  means. 


28  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

Thug,  strategy,  tactics,  artillery,  fortifications,  organisation,  and  the 
administration  of  armies,  arc  military  arts  with  which  a  general  should 
be  familiar.  Every  art  has  its  theory;  but  the  talent  of  employing  it 
with  advantage  demands  frequent  application  and  the  spirit  of  observa- 
tion. 

Of  all  human  events,  those  of  war  most  especially  claim,  without 
contradiction,  the  assistance  of  the  auxiliary  called  experience.  We 
must  try  to  accustom  ourselves  to  the  dangers  of  battle  presented  in 
such  various  forms.  Man,  born  bravo,  will  at  first  expose  himself  fear- 
lessly to  perils,  sometimes  with  pleasure  even;  but  time  alone  will  teach 
him  the  faculty  of  appreciating  the  most  useful  manner  in  which  to 
sacrifice  his  life.2 

Finally,  the  Profession  of  Anns  is  life  consecrated  to  military  labors  ; 
and  this  delinition  applies  particularly  to  those  who  execute. 

XOTES. 

1.  Lieutenant-General  Jackson,  Confederate  Army.— Our  own 
struggle  against  the  devastators  of  our  country  and  the  destroyers  of  the  great 
undamental  principle  of  self-government  has  produced  one  character  who  pos- 
sessed the  genius  of  war  in  a  remarkable  manner — Lieutenant-Général  Jackson. 
He  certainly  knew  how  to  throw  his  troops  upon  the  enemy  at  the  right  time  and 
in  the  most  suitable  manner.  If  wo  can  not  as  yet  determine  whether  the  original 
conception  of  his  various  able  movements  must  be  ascribed  to  him — a  question 
which  history  alone  must  establish — the  great  merit  is  due  him  now.  and  will 
hereafter,  in  all  times,  be  sutficient  to  illustrate  his  name — that  he  was  by  far  the 
greatest  executor  this  war  has,  as  yet,  brought  to  light.  Not  alone  did  he  carry  out 
all  of  his  movements  with  the  greatest  decision  and  vigor,  but  his  self-command  in 
the  midst  of  critical  dangers,  the  smoke  of  battle,  and  the  uncertainties  of  war,  was 
something  astonishing  and  assuring  to  all  around  liim.  His  adjutant-general, 
Doctor  Dabney,  a  Presbyterian  divine,  tells  us  that  he  found  himself  in  a  most 
critical  situation  at  Coal  Harbor  on  Friday  morning,  the  27th  June,  1SG2;  when 
moving  forward,  he  did  not  know  at  what  time  the  enemy  might  intercept  bis 
march,  and  thus  frustrate  the  wisest  combinations  of  the  gencral-in-chief.  Only  a 
Jackson  could  have  remained  as  steady  and  full  of  confidence  under  like  circum- 
stances. 

But,  however  high  we  must  place  him  as  an  able  strategist  and  master  of 
technical  combinations,  las  peculiar  gift  was  the  knowledge  of  the  human  heart 
It  is  believed  that  ho  was  one  of  the  strictest  disciplinarians  in  the  service;  his 
troops  have  made  as  hard  marches  and  goffered  as  great  privations  as  any,  and  yet 
did  we  ever  hear  that  any  of  them  did  complain  or  murmur?  It  is  only  a  genius 
who  can  bring  about  such  results;  those  who  fail  to  inspire  their  troops  with  a 
due  degree  of  love  and  veneration  are  but  ordinary  men. 

He  gained  the-  admiration  of  even  our  enemy.  A  fact  which  demonstrates  that, 
even  amid  nations  the  most  debased  and  corrupted,  a  spark  of  Godlike  virtue  will 
sometimes  call  forth  an  unwilling  acknowledgment! 

The  following  is  the  tribute  of  Governor  Letcher,  of  Virginia,  to  his  memory 
in  his  annual  nn-saage  to  the  legislature  : 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  29 

"  Since  tile  commencement  of  this  war  Virginia  has  been  called  upon  to  mourn 
over  the  loss  of  many  other  gallant  sons  ;  but  of  all  hev  jewels,  the-  most  brilliant 
was  the  illustrious  Lieutenant-General  Thomas  J.  Jackson — a  graduate  of  West 
Point — highly  distinguished  in  the  Mexican  war — and,  at  the  opening  of  the  pres- 
ent war,  a  quiet,  unpretending  professor  in  our  State  Military  Institute.  He  was 
called  from  the  professor's  chair  to  the  field  ;  and  his  sagacity,  his  energy,  and  the 
unparalleled  success  which  crowned  his  efforts,  won  for  him  a  reputation  that  made 
him  the  pride  of  his  own  state — endeared  him  to  the  people  of  the  Confederacy — 
attracted  to  him  the  attention  of  the  nations  of  the  earth,  and  compelled  the  re- 
spect and  admiration  even  of  those  heartless  enemies  who  have  drenched  our  laud 
in  blood,  and  brought  wailingand  lamentation  to  the  firesides  of  thousands  of  their 
own  misguided  people.  For  decision  of  character — for  stern  and  unbending  i-eso- 
lution — for  pure  and  elevated  patriotism — for  sound  and  inflexible  integrity,  and 
for  prompt  and  energetic  action,  ho  was  surpassed  by  no  man  of  his  times.  The 
record  of  his  achievements  will  constitute  some  of  the  brightest  pages  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  war,  when  that  history  shall  have  been  written.  His  reputation  as  a 
military  leader  of  the  highest  ability  and  merit  has  been  fairly  and  firmly  estab- 
lished in  the  judgment  of  the  army  and  the  country,  and  his  name  will  be  honored 
and  his  fame  will  be  cherished 

'  While  the  earth  bears  a  plant,  or  the  sea  rolls  a  wave.' 

"  General  Jackson  was  not  only  a  great  man,  but  he  was,  emphatically,  a  good 
man.  He  was  pure  and  upright,  earnest  and  honest,  conscientious  and  true  in  his 
intercourse  with  the  world.  In  all  the  relations  of  life — as  a  boh,  a  husband,  a 
father,  and  a- citizen — he  was  faithful  and  reliable  As  a  member  of  the  Presby- 
terian Church  his  '  walk  and  conversation'  attested  the  sincerity  of  his  profession. 
The  death  of  such  a  man,  and  at  such  a  time,  could  not  fail  to  produce  the  most 
profound  sensation  throughout  the  Confederacy.  He  had  won  the  confidences  of 
the  people  of  all  classes.  Their  affections  were  entwined  around  him — their  hopes 
centred  in  him — and  they  looked  to  him  as  one  of  the  great  instruments  pro- 
vided by  an  All-wise  Providence  for  their  deliverance,  and  for  the  establishment  of 
their  independence  upon  a  new  basis.  His  death  was  regarded  as  a  national 
calamity,  and  it  was  succeeded  by  manifestations  of  the  most  heartfelt  grief  and 
the  most  sincere  sorrow. 

"  He  has  passed  from  life,  but  his  example  is  still  left  to  encourage  and  stimulate 
us  to  greater  exertions  in  the  noble  cause  in  which  we  aro  engaged.  That  examplo 
cau  not  fail  to  exert  a  most  powerful  influence  iu  awaking  our  dormant  energies; 
in  rousing  us  up  to  greater  effort»;  in  inspiring  us  with  greater  zeal,  and  in  ani- 
mating us  with  a  nobler  spirit  and  a  more  determined  courage.  His  whole  soul 
was  in  the  cause,  and  ho  performed  his  duty  cheerfully  and  with  the  most  scrupu- 
lous fidelity.  The  redemption  of  tho  people  from  the  yoke  of  Yankee  tyranny  was 
the  object  nearest  his  heart,  and  to  its  accomplishment  he  directed  his  efforts- 
The  chcek8of  the  deserters,  and  stragglers,  and  laggards  should  burn  with  shame 
when  contemplating  his  devotion  aud  his  self-sacrificing  spirit.  They  should  ap- 
preciate surh  an  example,  and  should  resolve  at  once  to  emulate  it,  and  should 
return  to  tho  path  of  duty  with  a  fixed  purpose  to  relieve  their  land  from  the 
tread  of  the  invader,  or,  M  he  did,  sacrifice  thfir  lives  in  the  effort.  If  such  shall 
be  tin  result,  he  will  not  have  died  in  vain.  The  sacrifice,  great  as  it  was,  will 
Impress  upon  thf>  country  an  Invaluable  lesson  for  the  instruction  of  the  present 
and  future  generations.'' 


30  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

And  the  great  Thunderer,  the  English  Times,  thus  announces  his  death.  May  Mth, 

-Tin-  r'njif.  -ii.Tat"  lanreli  won  on  the  field  of  Chanceiiorsviiio  must  be  twined  with 
the  cypres».  Probahly  no  disaster  of  the  war  will  have  carried  such  grief  to  South- 
ern hearts  as  the  death  of  General  Jackson,  who  has  succumbed  to  the  wounds 
received  in  the  great  battle  of  the  8d  of  May.  Even  on  this  side  of  the  ocean  the 
gallant  soldier's  fate  will  everywhere  be  heard  with  pity  and  sympathy.  Not  only 
as  a  brave  man  fighting  for  his  country's  Independence,  but  as  one  of  the  most  con- 
summate geaerala  thai  bia  ooantry  has  produced,  ' StonewaQ '  Jackson  will  carry 
With  him  to  his  early  grave  the  regrets  of  all  who  Ban  admire  greatness  and  genius. 
From  the  earliest  days  of  the  war  he  has  been  conspicuous  for  the  most  remarkablo 
military  qualities.  That  mixture  of  daring  and  judgment,  which  is  the  mark  of 
*  heaven-born'  generals,  distinguished  him  beyond  any  man  of  his  time.  Although 
the  young  Confederacy  has  been  illustrated  by  a  number  of  eminent  soldiers,  yet  tho 
applause  and  devotion  of  his  countrymen,  confirmed  by  the  judgment  of  European 
nations,  have  given  the  first  place  to  General  Jackson.  The  military  feats  he  accom- 
plished moved  the  minds  of  the  people  with  an  astonishment  which  is  only  given  to 
the  highest  genius  to  produce.  The  blows  he  struck  at  the  enemy  were  M  terrible 
end  decisive  as  those  of  Bonaparte  himself.  Tho  march  by  which  he  surprised  the 
army  of  Pope  last  year  would  be  enough,  in  itself,  to  give  him  a  high  place  in  military 
history.  But,  perhaps,  the  crowning  glory  of  his  life  was  the  great  battle  in  which 
he  fell.  When  the  Federal  commander,  by  crossing  the  river  twelve  miles  above  his 
camp,  and  pressing  on,  as  he  thought,  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederates,  had  placed 
them  between  two  bodies  of  his  army,  he  was  so  confident  of  success  as  to  boast  tho 
enemy  was  the  property  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  reserved  to  Jackson,  by 
a  swift  and  secret  march,  to  fall  upon  his  right  wing,  crush  it,  and,  by  an  attack  un- 
surpassed in  fierceness  and  pertinacity,  to  drive  his  very  superior  forces  back  into  a 
position  from  which  he  could  not  extricate  himself  except  by  flight  across  the  river. 
In  the  battle  of  Sunday  Jackson  received  two  wounds,  one  In  the  left  arm.  the  other 
in  the  right  band.  Amputation  of  the  arm  was  necessary,  and  the  Southern  hero 
sank  under  the  effect  of  it,  supported  to  the  last  by  his  simple  and  noble  character, 
and  strong  religious  faith."' 

2.  Rogniat  on  Bravery. — Quite  in  opposition  to  Marshal  Marmont.  General 
Rogniat,  in  his  twelfth  chapter  of  his  highly  philosophical  work,  tells  us  that  man, 
far  from  being  born  brave,  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  coward  from  the  very  first,  and  that 
he  can  only  acquire  the  military  virtue  of  bravery  by  experience;  in  short,  that  it  is 
an  artificial,  not  an  innate,  quality.  He  furthermore  says:  "Nature  has  given  us 
instinctively  the  desire  to  preserve  life,  in  the  shape  of  a  feeling  of  fear  which 
evades  everything  that  might  become  dangerous  to  it;  and  that  courage  consists  in 
surmounting  and  conquering  this  sentiment." 

Passions,  he  maintains,  make  us  blind  to  dangers,  even  in  the  midst  of  the  most 
evident  perils;  and  they  force  us  to  brave  all.  in  spite  of  the  counsels  of  prudonce. 
Why,  then,  are  young  men  braver  than  the  old,  when  the  former  have  much  more  to 
lose  than  those  whose  course  in  life  is  nearly  oompleted?  Because  passion  influences 
the  first  more  powerfully  than  the  latter,  in  whose  bosoms  the  fires  of  youth  have 
given  way  to  the  icicles  of  old  age. 

Ignorance  dares  a  danger  for  a  moment.  But  experience  soon  enlightens,  and  fear 
succeeds  security.  Thus  he  saw  young  French  recruits  follow,  at  Ltltzen,  their 
officers  in  the  midst  of  perils  unshrinkingly,  and  with  less  hesitation  than  at  Baut- 
zen, only  a  few  days  later.    Experience  had  taught  them  the  danger. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  81 

CHAPTER  II. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 

Very  few — Infinite  variety  of  circumstance»  in  which  an  army  may  ho  fourni  — 
Combinations  resulting  therefrom  —  Hazard  to  be  considered  —  Disproportion 
between  the  genius  of  Napoleon  and  that  of  his  adversaries — With  equal 
chances,  victory  will  always  be  with  him  who  knows  how  to  make  himself 
superior  in  strength  at  a  given  moment  —  Inferiority  in  numbers  compensated 
by  the  qualities  of  troops  —  Barbarians  always  yield  to  disciplined  troops  less 
numerous — After  a  first  success,  the  spirit  of  troops  replaces  the  weight  of 
arms  —  Greeks  and  Persians  —  Marathon  and  Plataea —  Conquests  of  Alexander 
—  Romans  against  Germans  and  Gauls  —  French  against  Turks  —  Advantages  of 
taking  the  initiative  — Campaign  of  Italy  in  1796  and  1797 —  Axiom. 

Notes. — 1.  Battle  of  Marathon.    2.  Battle  of  Platam.    3.  General  Wurmser. 

There  arc  but  few  general  principles  for  the  conduct  of  armies,  but 
their  application  calls  forth  a  host  of  combinations  which  can  neither 
be  foreseen  nor  classified  as  rules. 

The  conditions  in  which  an  army  may  find  itself  vary  infinitely; 
the  principal  points  of  importance  are  the  mass  of  the  elements  com- 
posing it,  the  relative  state  of  the  two  armies,  the  nature  of  the  thoatre 
of  war  and  of  the  adjoining  countries,  the  part  to  be  assumed,  either 
defensive  or  offensive,  and  the  reputation  and  character  of  the  general 
against  whom  the  field  is  taken,  etc. 

An  immense  field  is  open  to  combinations  by  divers  circumstances — 
so  much  so,  that  the  vastest  mind  would  not  be  able  to  embrace  them 
all.  Hence,  the  greatest  generals  have  committed  faults  ;  the  beût 
generals  are  those  who  have  been  guilty  of  the  least  number.  The 
more  elements  are  admitted  in  calculating  these  circumstances,  tho 
better  will  events  be  controlled  ;  generals  should  foresee  the  probable 
83  much  as  the  possible;  even  accidental  risks  ought  to  be  guarded 
against.  Thus,  when  the  period  of  reverses  is  at  hand,  great  catas- 
trophes can  bo  prevented. 

This  foresight  was  ono  of  Napoleon's  highest  faculties  during  tho 
period  of  his  fortune;  his  adversaries  being  almost  destitute  of  it, 
results  were  obtained  by  him  at  the  time  which  astonished  the  world. 

I  shall  establish  some  principles  by  which  a  general's  conduct 
should  always  be  regulated.  The  aim  I  may  indicate,  but  the  means 
of  accomplishing  the  same  must  always  be  subordinate  to  circum- 
stances. 

Whenever  two  armies,  nearly  of  equal  strength  and  in  tho  same 
moral  condition,  engage  each  other,  their  chances  of  success  are  alike. 
To  render  them  more  favorable,  movements  are  planned  to  deceive  the 


ol  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

enemy,  and  through  fear  he  is  led  to  divide  his  forces.  Then  the 
general  who  is  most  skilful  will  promptly  réassemble  his  forces  to 
overthrow  bis  adversary's;  any  temporary  superiority  thus  acquired 
will  greatly  facilitate  his  victory. 

Numerical  superiority,  at  tho  moment  of  battle,  is  of  extreme  im- 
portance. Undoubtedly  the  quality  of  troops  is  to  be  considered 
more  than  the  number;  but,  La  the  presont  state  of  European  armies, 
numbers  and  the  concentration  of  means  contribute  powerfully  to 
success.  It  is  different  when  barbarians  .ire  to  be  met,  who,  devoid  of 
organization  and  without  discipline,  form  no  compact  body;  they 
operate  without  unity  and  harmony;  i\ey  are  afways  inferior,  at  any 
time,  when  opposed  to  the  weakest  but  well-united  body.  Two  repeat- 
ed attacks  without  success,  and  often  a  single  charge,  will  scatter  the 
less  brave;  tho  others  follow  the  contagion  of  tho  example,  and  soon 
all  will  be  dispersed.  Then  the  spirit  of  the  troops  replaces  the  arms. 
The  wars  of  the  Greeks  against  the  Persians,  the  Battles  of  Marathon1 
ami  Platioa,-  the  conquests  of  Alexander,  the  triumphs  of  small  Roman 
armies  against  the  Turks  despite  the  disproportion  of  numbers,  can  all 
be  cited  and  explained  in  this  connection. 

When  aiming  to  disperse  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  those  points 
necessary  for  his  security  should  be  particularly  harassed  :  and  when- 
ever he  gives  way  to  appearances  he  must  be  attacked  upon  a  weak 
point  with  superior  forces.  This  is  precisely  what,  in  fencing,  is  termed 
a  feint,  when,  sword  hi  hand,  we  are  engaged  in  single  combat.  Two 
or  three  partial  advantages  prepare  the  way  for  more  considerable 
successes,  which,  in  the  end,  will  decide  the  fate  of  the  campaign. 

It  will,  therefore,  be  seen  how  important  it  is  for  a  geueral  to  take 
the  iuitiative  in  his  movements;  he  will  then  control  tho  mind  of  his 
adversary,  and  a  first  chance  oftentimes  gives  an  ascendency  never 
again  lost.  The  favorable  moment  must  be  spied.  A  too  great  dis- 
proportion in  forces  and  the  different  auxiliaries  may  be  an  insur- 
mountable obstacle;  in  that  case  we  must  wait  until  the  confidence  of 
the  enemy  leads  him  to  commit  some  fault.  Diligently  improving  the 
occasion,  a  skilful  general  can  obtain  advantages  which  will  permit 
him  to  change  rôles,  and  to  pass  from  a  defensive  to  an  offensive  atti- 
tude. 

A  notable  instance  of  this  kind  took  place  in  1796,  during  the 
immortal  Italian  campaign.  The  French  army,  having  reached  the 
frontiers  of  the  Tyrol  in  a  defensive  attitude,  found  itself  greatly 
inferior  to  the  Austrian  army,  reinforced  and  led  by  \Vurmscrs  in 
person.  When  the  hostile  general  attacked,  his  forces  were  divided; 
the  French  general  united  his,  and  soon  a  first  success  permitted  him, 
in  his  turn,  to  assume  the  offeusive.     Then  began  a  series  of  victories, 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  33 

in  which  the  French  army  maintained  its  ascendency  in  number,  upon 
almost  every  field  of  battle. 

To  resume,  in  a  single  word,  this  part  of  the  art  of  war,  which 
relates  to  the  general  movements  of  an  army,  it  is  to  be  observed  that, 
in  every  instance,  it  rests  upon  a  calculation  as  to  the  time  required, 
the  distance,  and  celerity  of  movement. 

XOTES. 

1.  The  Battle  of  Marathon  was  fought  by  the  Persians  and  Athenians,  near 
the  seacoast  of  Greece,  not  far  from  Athena,  B.C.  490.  The  Persians,  as  is  most 
generally  supposed,  had  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  infantry  and  ten  thousand 
cavalry;  the  Greeks  only  eleven  thousand  men.  Rather  than  endure  the  uncer- 
tainties and  horrors  of  a  siege,  the  Greek  general,  Miltiades,  resolved  to  meet  the 
enemy  and  attack  nim  in  the  plains  of  Marathon.  Taking  a  position  at  the  loot  of 
a  mountain  to  guard  hie  roar,  he  felled  trees  on  both  extremities  of  his  wing*  to 
make  the  enemy's  cavalry  useless.  At  the  expense  of  his  centre,  the  wings  had 
been  considerably  strengthened,  and  after  the  first  onset  of  the  Greeks,  which  was 
bravely  received  by  the  Persians  under  Dotis,  the  latter  took  advantage  of  the 
apparent  mistake  of  Miltiades.  and  endeavored  to  break  his  centre.  But  the  Greeks, 
having  foreseen  this  manœuvre,  themselves  gave  way  in  the  centre,  and  wheeling 
both  of  then-  wings,  attacked  the  enemy  simultaneously  in  front  and  rear,  routine 
him  completely.  The  loss  of  the  Persian,  was  six  thousand  four  hundred;  that  of 
the  Greeks  not  two  hundred. 

2.  The  Battle  of  Platœa  was  fought  between  the  Persians,  under  Mardo- 
niUB,  some  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  strong,  and  the  Creeks,  about  seventy 
thousand,  under  the  Spartan.  Pausanias.  near  the  city  from  which  it  derive,  its  name 
m  the  province  of  Bœotia,  in  Hellas.  We  have  no  intelligible  account  of  the  tactics 
employed  m  this  battle,  which  freed  Greece  forever  from  Persian  aggression;  and  it 
appears  that  the  battle  was  rather  gained  by  a  judicious  use  of  the  ground  than  by 
any  extraordinary  bravery  or  skill  of  the  Greeks.  The  latter,  rent  by  internal  dis- 
sensions  m  their  army,  arising  from  jealousies  against  the  commander-in-chief  were 
besides,  disheartened  by  the  want  of  water,  and  the  continual  harassing  of  thé 
Persian  troopers  in  an  exposed  country.  Pausanias,  therefore,  resolved  to  retreat 
toward  the  city  of  Plata».  It  being  construed  by  the  Persian  general  into  a  flight' 
he  eagerly  pressed  forward,  was  led  into  an  unfavorable  position,  and  being  at  first 
chafed  by  a  gallant  band  of  Spartans,  the  remainder  of  the  Greek  army  were  reas- 
sured^ an.l  the  Persians  no.  only  were  thoroughly  beaten,  hut  so  massacred  by  the 
infuriated  conquerors  that  not  three  thousand  of  .  hem  are  said  to  have  remained- 
Mardonius  himself  gallantly  felling,  while  striving  to  restore  the  equilibrium  of  his 
roups.  This  ha. tie  teaches  tour  lessons  :  1.  That  everything  in  war  depends  up.,:,  a 
"■'",l"-  ''""<•  -'"1  that  there  is  no  cause  for  despair  while  Vet  an  amy  remains. 

8.  How  eaj  er  an  enemy  is  to  fell  into  a  trap,  when  he  once  Imagines  that  tl PPoa> 

■">'*  '''■ r:'1;z"'-    :;-  The  importance  of  the  select] f  the  ground  and  a 

thorough  knowledge  of  the  topography  of  the  country  in  which  we  operate,  and  the! 
a  retn-,t  or  abandonment  of  ground  is  sometimes  the  prelude  t.,  rictory     1  That 
only  «  i.h  :,  total  rout  of  the  invader,  such  as  the  PewUuw  experienced,  may  we  I 
to  put  an  end  to  this  war. 

3.  General  Wurmser.-lt  was  this  geni  ;  tune  to  be  placed  again; 


34  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

a  young  giant.  Napoleon,  when  he  was  already  seventy-two  years  of  age.  Raised 
under  Frederick  the  Great's  tuition,  thmigii  on  the  Austrian  side,  he  OOOld  not  fail 
to  possess  considerable  talent.  His  operations  in  Italy,  and  his  firmness  in  advei>it j \ 
BOffldently  show  that  he  was  not  a  general  of  ordinary  merit.  Born  1724;  serves 
during  the  seven  yeaiVwar;  heats  the  Prussians  at  Ilalielschword,  1779;  crosses 
the  Rhine.  March  31,1793;  compelled  to  rectOM,  dose  of  1793;  captures  Manheim, 
November  22,  1795;  commands  Army  of  Italy.  179G;  throws  himself  into  Mantua, 
September  30,  1796;  capitulates,  1797  ;  soon  after  dies  of  exhaustion  at  Vienna. 


CHAPTER  III. 

BASES,  LINES  OF  OPERATION,  AND  STRATEGY. 

Base  of  operation — Line  of  operation — Strategic  points — Strategic  lines — Chess- 
board of  Napoleon — Consequences  of  violation  of  principles  at  Marengo — Mo- 
rcau's  strategy — His  tactics — Hohenlinden — Character  of  that  battle — To  whom 
belongs  the  victory — General  Richepanse — Importance  of  mobility  in  an  army — 
Usage  of  Russians — Independence  of  reserves — Necessities  relative  to  lines  of 
operation — Liberty  of  communications — Base  of  operation — Its  extent  influenc- 
ing line  of  operation — Fundamental  axiom  of  Napoleon — Great  success  due  its 
observance  in  1805,  1806,  1809 — Parallelism  of  bases  of  operations  of  opposed 
armies — March  of  1812 — Absence  of  base  of  operation — Admiral  TchitcliHkoff  and 
General  Kaptzievitch — Examples  of  useful  changes  of  line  and  base  of  operation 
— 1797,  Austrian  army  after  reduction  of  Mantua — 1814,  Marshal,  Duke  of  Dal- 
matia,  at  Toulouse — Two  principles. 

Notes — 1.  Moreau.  2.  March  of  French  army.  3,  Campaign  of  1806.  4.  For- 
tress of  Mayence.  5.  Bale.  6.  Beresina.  7.  Generals  A.  S.  Johnston,  J.  E.  John- 
ston, and  B.  Bragg.  8.  Mantua.  9.  Soult.  10.  Adour.  11.  Toulouse.  12.  Bor- 
deaux. 

The  base  of  operation  of  an  army  is  the  country  the  forces  protect, 
which  furnishes  their  necessaries,  which  every  day  sends  thcin  the 
articles  of  all  kinds  they  consume  in  men,  horses,  provisions,  and  am- 
munition, and  which  receives  their  sick  and  wounded,  etc. 

The  line  of  operation  is  determined  by  the  general  direction  of  the 
march,  which  indicates  the  object  of  operation  or  the  point  to  be  at- 
tained. 

General  movements,  executed  beyond  the  sight  of  the  enemy  and  be- 
fore the  battle,  are  called  strategy. 

Strategic  points  are  those  which  it  is  important  to  occupy,  be  it  to 
menace  the  communications  of  the  enemy,  or  to  cover  our  own.  They 
should  be  chosen  so  as  to  facilitate  the  combinations  of  movements  of 

\ 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  35 

the  different  columns  of  an  army.  Generally,  a  spot  where  many  roads 
cross  is  a  strategic  point;  in  a  mountain  country,  the  spot  whore  several 
valleys  meet  is  a  strategic  point. 

Strategic  lines  are  those  which  unite  divers  strategic  points,  and 
which  are  used  in  the  movements  executed  between  the  latter  ;  they 
should  be  as  short  as  possible. 

The  judicious  choice  of  strategic  points  and  lines  is  the  safety  of 
armies  in  reverses,  and  the  cause  of  the  greatest  results  in  successes. 

Napoleon  particularly  possessed  the  genius  of  strategy  ;  no  general 
has  ever  surpassed  him  in  this  respect  ;  none  knew  better,  beforehand, 
how  to  find  the  point  where  it  was  necessary  to  strike. 

A  large  army  is  composed  of  several  columns  ;  they  are  necessarily 
separated  in  order  to  subsist  and  to  move  with  facility.  The  most  dis- 
tant parts  should  be  able  to  arrive  in  time  for  the  battle,  either  to  take 
part  in  the  conflict,  or  to  serve  merely  as  a  reserve.  The  object  of 
strategy  is  to  regulate  the  march  for  the  promptest  reunion  upon  the 
same  point,  be  it  at  the  centre  or  upon  one  of  the  wings.  A  march  thus 
regulated  is  what  Napoleon  was  in  the  habit  of  calling  his  chess-board. 
All  of  his  first  campaigns  havo  had  this  character,  except  at  Marengo, 
where,  deviating  from  this  principle,  he  was  about  to  succumb  ;  upon 
the  day  of  action  he  is  always  seen  to  reassemble,  upon  the  field  of 
battle,  all  the  forces  he  could  reasonably  dispose  of. 

Moreau,1  on  the  contrary,  whose  talents  have  been  so  highly  praised, 
understood  nothing  of  strategy.  His  skill  consisted  in  the  application 
of  tactics.  Personally  very  brave,  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  he 
handled  troops  well  when  they  occupied  a  field  which  his  view  could 
embrace  ;  but  his  principal  battles  he  only  fought  with  a  part  of  his 
forces. 

At  Hohenlinden,  where  the  success  was  so    overwhelming,  Moreau 
ought  to  have  been  defeated,  and  he  probably  would  have  been,  if  the 
Austrians  had  not  manoeuvred  with  a  carelessness  unexampled.     The 
French  army  was  composed  of  twelve  divisions  ;  the  three  of  the  right 
were  commanded  by  General  Lecourbe,  and  the  three  of  the  left,  Gener- 
al Sainte-Suzanne  commanding,  did  not  assist  in  the  battle.     The  Aus- 
trian army  was  united,  but  marched  unconnectedly  ;'the  centre  column, 
which  encountered  no  obstacle,  and  followed  the  main  road,  with  almost 
all  the  artillery,  was  open  to  an  isolated  attack,  and  not  even  formed; 
it  was  liable,  at  any  moment,  to  be  assailed  in  flank.     This  remarkable 
fortuno  was  not  due  to  the  dispositions  of  General  Moreau.     General 
Richepanse,  a  man  of  mind  and  courage,  finding  himself  with  his  divis- 
ion surrounded  by  the  Austrians,  who  began  to  organize,  faced  about, 
and  seized  one  hundred  piece»  of  cannon,  marching  by  column  upon 
the  high  road. 


36  THE   SPIRIT   OF 

The  reunion  of  an  army  at  the  moment  of  tho  conflict  being  the  ob- 
ject, and  the  rapidity  of  marches  the  means  to  obtain  it,  tho  divisions, 
which  are  the  units,  should  be  able  to  combine  promptly,  and,  to  that 
effect,  be  susceptible  of  very  rapid  movements.  An  army  will  have, 
under  all  circumstances,  a  slow  inarch,  but  the  rapidity  should  bo  im- 
parted to  the  elements  which  compose  it.  Therefore  the  divisions 
should  not  be  too  much  burdened  with  artillery  and  army  stores.  I  do 
not  approve  tho  custom  of  the  Russians,  who  encumber  them  with  ord- 
nance. The  great  reserves  of  material  and  army  stores  of  every  kind 
should  have  an  independent  march,  able  to  defend  themselves,  and, 
when  required,  be  escorted  by  special  troops.  It  is  tho  duty  of  the 
general-in -chief  to  keep  them  always  within  reach  of  the  point  where 
they  can  be  most  useful,  according  to  their  destination. 

There  is  another  object  which  should  call  forth  the  greatest  solici- 
tude of  a  general  ;  he  should  have  his  line  of  operation  covered  perfect- 
ly, whilst  menacing  that  of  the  enemy.  Free  communications  arc  nec- 
essary for  the  maintenance  of  an  army;  once  lost,  tho  moral  condi- 
tion is  compromised.  Confidence — this  powerful  element  of  tho  mind, 
which  nothing  in  the  world  can  supply  in  troops — does  not  always  resist 
such  a  trial. 

Hence  the  necessity  of  a  large  base  of  operation.  If  a  fortress  and 
several  fortified  points  are  situated  upon  this  base,  or  if  a  river  forms 
part  of  it,  great  advantages  may  result.  The  more  this  base  is  extend- 
ed, the  better  is  the  line  of  operation  covered.  This  was  one  of  Napo- 
leon's fundamental  axioms;  he  never  violated  it  with  impunity.  In 
his  splendid  campaigns  of  1805,  1806,  and  1809,  he  has  given  great 
examples,  and  profited,  with  skill,  by  favorable  circumstances  result- 
ing from  the  position  of  our  frontier. 

Two  armies,  which  have  parallel  bases  of  operation  equal  in  extent, 
are  in  like  condition;  and  one  of  them,  in  turning  the  other,  is  also 
necessarily  turned.  But  it  is  not  the  same  when  two  bases  of  opera- 
tion have  different  lengths,  or  are  inclined  toward  each  other. 

In  1S05,  the  French  army,  after  the  tine  march  from  the  shores  of  La 
Mancha  to  Germany,'2  was  directed  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
Austriau  army  which  had  invaded  Bavaria.  One  battle  lost  upon  the 
Danube  would  have  thrown  it  back  upon  the  Rhine;  one  battle  gained 
overthrew  the  hostile  arms. 

Id  1 S063  the  French  army,  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  found 
itself  upon  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  army;  its  communications  with 
France  from  Mayeuce*  to  Bale5  were  not  the  less  free;  they  were,  be- 
sides, so  well  assured  that  a  reverse  could  not  have  had  any  serious 
consequences,  and  one  single  victory  brought  about  the  results  so  well 
known. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  37 

In  1812,  when  Napoleon  withdrew,  without  limitation,  from  his  point 
of  departure  (for  it  is  necessary  to  remark  that  the  dimension  of  a  base 
of  operation,  to  satisfy  the  requirements,  is  not  absolute,  but  relative  to 
the  length  of  the  line  of  operation),  his  base  disappeared.  Established 
from  the  first  upon  the  position  of  divers  nnny  corps,  the  base  would 
have  been  sufficient,  if  the  army  had  remained  nearer  the  frontier.  But 
these  corps  were  abandoned  to  themselves  upon  the  march,  a  prey  to 
the  chances  of  war;  and  meeting  bodies  of  the  enemy  of  at  least  equal 
strength,  the  sequel  was,  that  the  army  lost  all  its  communications. 
Arrived  upon  the  banks  of  the  Beresina,0  Napoleon  should  have  been 
thoroughly  beaten,  and  the  remnants  of  his  army  ought  to  have  been 
annihilated,  since  there  was  no  miracle  required,  and  Admiral  Tchit- 
chakoff  and  General  Kaptzievitch  could  have  attributed  to  themselves 
no  credit  whatever  in  that  case. 

But  there  are  circumstances  where  it  is  useful  and  salutary  to  change, 
in  the  midst  of  a  campaign,  the  direction  of  the  lino  of  operation,  and 
to  choose  another  base;  and  although  the  most  natural  idea  and  the 
most  habitual  usage  would  be  to  take  a  position  in  advance  of  the  coun- 
try to  be  defended,  it  yet  sometimes  happens  that  its  security  is  in  the 
most  efficacious  manner  assured  by  taking  a  line  of  operation  which 
appears  to  abandon  it  to  the  enemy.7 

When,  in  1797,  after  the  reduction  of  Mantua,8  the  French  army 
marched  upon  Vienna,  the  Austrian  army,  which  fouud  itself  in  an  in- 
ferior conditiou  to  give  battle,  retired  in  the  direction  of  the  capital. 
If,  instead  of  operating  thus,  it  had  taken  position  in  tho  Tyrol,  the 
natural  obstacles  presented  in  that  country  would  have  established  a 
kind  of  equilibrium  between  the  respective  forces  ;  the  troops,  consisting 
of  new  levies  from  Hungary  «and  Croatia,  which  could  not  serve  with 
utility  on  the  day  of  battle,  would  have  been  sufficient  to  cover  the 
frontier  of  Friuli,  to  hold  in  check  a  French  corps,  and  paralyze  its  ac- 
tion, despite  the  excellence  of  its  troops  (because  the  French  army  was 
composed  of  troops  of  like  nature).  Furthermore,  the  Austrian  army, 
in  taking  this  line  of  operation,  would  havo  met  efficient  reinforcements, 
which  it  could  have  only  received  by  the  borders  of  the  Rhine.  Lastly, 
if  the  war  had  brought  the  belligerent  armies  into  Suabia  and  Bavaria, 
all  the  Austrian  forces,  reunited  upon  the  centre  of  operations,  would 
have  been  able  to  manœuvre  under  the  most  advantageous  circum- 
stances. The  Austrian  army  committed,  then,  a  great  mistake  in  adopt- 
ing this  line  of  operation. 

Here  is  another  example  :  In  1814  the  marshal,  Duke  of  Dalmatia,9 
after  having  operated  upon  the  Adour,1"  was  obliged  to  leave  the  basin 
of  that  river,  and  directed  his  line  of  operation  upon  Toulouse.11  In 
this»  ho  acted  wisely,  because  he  thus-  removed  tho  English  army  from 


# 

38  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

the  contre  of  France  more  surely  than  by  retiring  upon  Bordeaux,12 
•where  it  would  have  followed  him;  a  small  body  of  troops,  sustained 
by  the  national  guards,  placed  in  rear  of  the  heaths  and  covering  Bor- 
deaux, would  have  defended  that  city,  provided  the  spirit  of  the  epoch 
and  internal  political  complications  had  not  rendered  these  wise  dispo- 
sitions useless. 

Reviewing  the  matter,  strategy  has  a  twofold  aim  : 

1.  To  reunite  all  the  troops,  or  tho  greatest  number  possible,  upon  the 
point  of  conflict,  if  the  enemy  has  there  but  a  portion  of  his;  in  other 
terms,  to  manage  to  secure  a  numerical  superiority  for  the  day  of  battle. 

2.  To  cover  and  assure  one's  own  communications,  while  all  tho  time 
menacing  those  of  the  enemy. 

NOTES. 

1.  Moreau,  born  at  Morlaix.  Bretagne,  1763;  brigadier-general,  179*;  general  of 
division,  1794;  commander  of  Army  of  the  Rhine;  retreats  into  France;  commanda 
Army  of  Italy,  1798;  beaten  by  Buwarrow;  commands,  1799,  Army  of  Danube  and 
Rhine;  passes  the  Danube  and  Rhine;  gives  battles  at  Mœskirch,  Engen,  Meminin- 
geu,  Biberach,  Hochstaedt,  Nordlingen,  etc.;  beats  the  Austrians  at  Hohenlinden, 
December  3, 1800;  accused  and  tried  for  conspiracy;  exiled;  goes  to  America;  Bet- 
ties  at  Morrisville,  on  Delaware  river,  1805;  returns  to  join  the  Allies;  is  mortally 
wounded  hefore  Dresden;  dies,  September  1, 1813;  buried  at  St.  Petersburg. 

2.  March  of  the  French  army  from  the  shores  of  La  Mancha  to 
Germany. — An  army  of  one  hunched  and  eighty  thousand  marched,  in  from  seven- 
teen to  twenty-two  days,  from  Cherbourg,  on  the  British  channel,  to  the  Rhine,  to 
concentrate  near  Ulm,  in  Germany.  The  distance  from  Cherbourg  to  the  Rhine  is 
some  five  hundred  miles.  This  was  the  splendid  army  which  fought  the  campaign 
of  Austerlitz,  and  was  composed  of  ten  corps,  commanded  by  Bernadotte,  Marmont, 
Davoust,  Soult,  Lannes,  Ney,  Augereau,  Murat  (cavalry),  guards  (Mortier  and 
Bessières),  and  "Wrede  (Bavarians). 

3.  The  Campaign  of  1806  ended  with  the  victories  of  Jena  and  Auerstaedt 
over  the  Prussians.  The  line  from  Mayence,  in  Germany,  to  Bale,  in  Switzerland,  iH 
of  exceeding  importance. 

4.  Mayence,  or  Mainz  (the  ancient  Maguntiacum  metropolis  of  Germania 
Prima),  is  on  the  left  bank,  in  the  basin  of  the  Middle  Rhine,  a  very  strong  place  in 
form  of  a  semicircle,  of  which  the  Rhine  is  the  diameter,  covered  by  three  fortified 
fronts  to  the  north,  the  west,  and  the  south,  which  include  fourteen  bastions  and  a 
double  rampart,  defended  by  six  forts — the  most  considerable  of  which  is  Hauptstein, 
commanding  all  tho  environs;  the  isles  of  the  Rhine  are  fortified,  as  well  as  the 
suburbs  of  Cassel,  on  the  right  bank.  Mainz  was  formerly  the  capital  of  an  eccleiskis- 
tical  electorate;  it  was  taken  by  the  French  in  1792,  retaken  by  the  King  of  Prussia 
in  1793,  ceded  to  France  by  the  treaty  of  Campo  Formio,  and  remained  in  the 
possession  of  the  latter  till  181-1,  when  it  was  given  up  to  the  Grand-Duko  of  Hesse- 
Darmstadt,  and  declared  a  fortress  of  the  Germanic  Confederation. 

5.  Bale,  a  city  in  the  basin  of  the  Uppor  Rhino,'  built  on  both  sides  of  tho  river, 
capital  of  a  Swiss  canton,  centre  of  the  routes  from  Southern  Germany  into  France, 


MILITARY   INSTITUIONS.  39 

and  .having  now  a  railroad  to  Dijon,  another  to  Strasbourg,  both  in  France,  and  a 
third  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  through  Freybourg,  Kehl.  Carlsruhe,  and 
Manheim,  to  Frankfort-on-the-Main,  and  on  to  Cassel.  Bale  is  the  true  gate  into 
France,  and  which  is  kept  closed  only  by  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland.  Passage  of 
the  Allies  here  in  1814  and  1815. 

6.  The  Beresina,  an  affluent  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Dneiper,  rises  in  the 
marches  of  Dokchitsky,  traverses  a  country  of  forests  and  bogs,  where  there  is  no 
advancing  but  upon  raised  causeways;  flows  past  Studzianka,  celebrated  for  tin- 
disastrous  passage  of  the  French  army  on  the  26th  of  November,  1812,  and  for  the 
double  battle  which  they  fought  on  that  occasion  with  the  Russians,  on  both  banks 
of  the  river.  Borisow,  a  town  situated  on  the  road  from  Wilna,  by  Minsk,  to 
Smolensk,  and  the  possession  of  which  by  the  Russians  compelled  the  French  to  seek 
a  passage  at  Studzianka.  After  leaving  this  place  the  Beresina  receives  an  affluent, 
which  passes  by  Minsk,  a  town  situated  in  the  midst  of  extensive  fo/ests,  on  the 
road  from  Warsaw  to  Smolensk,  and  the  possession  of  which  by  the  Russians,  in 
1812,  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  disaster  of  the  Beresina.  Had  Napoleon  directed 
his  retreat  upon  Vitebsk,  as  he  at  first  intended,  and  which  he  certainly  would 
have  done  notwithstanding  the  reported  bad  state  of  the  roads,  had  he  known  of 
Tchitchakoffs  proximity  to  the  Beresina,  while  he  himself  was  at  Oreha,  the  passage 
of  the  Beresina  would  have  never  been  attempted.  The  passage  of  this  stream  cost 
the  French  twelve  thousand  killed  and  drowned,  and  sixteen  thousand  prisoners; 
and  if  Kutusoff  had  been  more  expeditious,  and  Admiral  Tchltchakoff  more  predent 
it  is  probable  that  neither  Napoleon  himself,  nor  a  single  man  of  his  army,  would 
have  escaped. 

7.  Generals  A.  S.  Johnston,  J.  E.  Johnston,  and  B.  Bragg.— This 

remark  is  forcibly  illustrated  by  three  events  in  our  own  war:  1.  The  splendid  retro- 
grade movement  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston  from  the  heart  of  Kentucky  to  the 
confines  of  the  State  of  Mississippi,  in  February  and  March,  1862,  which  culminated 
in  the  Battle  of  Shiloh.  2.  The  withdrawal  of  General  J.  E.  Johnston's  army  from 
the  lines  of  Manassas  to  the  lines  of  Richmond,  which  culminated  in  the  Battle  of 
Seven  Pines,  May  31, 1862,  so  glorious  to  the  Confederate  arms.  3.  The  abandonment 
of  Tennessee  by  General  Bragg,  which  resulted  in  the  Battle  of  Chiclcamauga. 

8.  Mantua,  situated  among  three  small  marshy  and  unhealthy  lakes  on  the 
Mincio.  It  is  the  ancient  capital  of  a  sovereign  duchy,  and  is  now  one  of  the  strong- 
est places  in  Europe.  Its  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Po  invests  it  with  a  degree 
of  importance  equal  to  that  which  attaches  to  Alexandria,  on  the  right  bank.  It 
communicates  with  the  mainland  by  five  causeways,  which  are  defended  by  five 
fortresses:  the  first  of  these,  called  La  Favorita— battle  here  of  1797,  gained  by  Na- 
poleon over  tho  Austrian* — leads  to  Verona;  the  second,  named  Santa  Georgia — 
battle  in  1797,  gained  by  Napoleon  over  the  Austrians — leads  to  Legnano;  the  third, 
called  Del  Pietoli,  skirts  the  Lower  Mincio,  and  leads  to  Governolo;  the  fourth, 
called  the  Ccrese.  leads  to  Guastalla;  and  the  fifth,  called  De  la  Pradella,  leads  to 
Cremona.  From  the  lakes  of  Mantua  a  canal  is  drawn  off  to  the  south-west,  which 
joins  the  Po,  and  forms,  with  the  two  streams,  a  triangular  island  of  admirable 
fertility,  which  is  called  the  .Seraglio.  This  island  is  the  great  resource  of  the  garri- 
son of  Mantua,  which  draws  its  provisions  from  it.  ami.  l>y  means  of  it.  remains 
mistress  of  the  course  of  the  Po.  Tho  most  celebrated  of  the  many  sieges  which 
Mantua  has  experienced  was  that  of  1796,  in  which  Napoleon  waa  obliged  to  de- 


40  TÎIE    SPIRIT    OF 

stroy  successively  tin  •■  Lustrian  armies  before  he  could  render  himself  master  of  the 
in  A;iril.  1848,  Charles  Albert,  Sing  of  Sardinia,  blockaded  it.  but  was 
obliged  to  raise  the  siege;  invested  it  again  on  the  13th  of  July,  1S4S.  but  was 
compelled,  on  the  20th  of  July,  by  the  able  movements  of  Radetzky.  to  abandon  it. 
Is  now  incorporated  with  the  Kingdom  of  [taly. 


9.  Marshal  Soult  fought,  on  the  loth  of  April.  ISU.  the  Batth^of  Toulouse 
against  "Wellington,  the  last  which  was  fought  amid  the  tottering  \^Wk  of  the  Na- 
poleonic dynasty.  His  admirable  firmness  and  fidelity  amid  the  universal  gloom  is 
above  all  praise.  Military  writers  have  censured  him  for  taking  the  position  of 
Toulouse,  instead  of  that  at  Bordeaux,  forgetting  the  political  disturbances  in  the 
latter  city  at  the  time,  and  the  necessity  of  surrender  had  he  been  unsuccessful  in  its 
defence. 

10.  The  A.dour,  a  river  of  France,  rises  in  Mount  Tourmatel,  in  the  Pyrenoes; 
falls  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  north  of  Bayonne. 

11.  Toulouse,  head-quarters  of  the  tenth  military  division:  not  now  fortified; 
surrounded  by  an  old.  very  thick  wall,  with  Hanking  towers,  only  accessible  from 
the  snith  :  situated  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Garonne.  It  has  upon  the  left  bank 
its  suburb  of  St.  Cyprien,  built  upon  a  creek,  surrounded  by  a  strong  brick  wall, 
which  constitutes  a  good  tête  de  pont.  It  is  the  point  of  convergence  of  the  roads 
from  Spain — the  strategic  position  of  the  entire  south  of  France.  Occupying  the 
middle  between  the  two  extreme  points  of  invasion,  it  prevents  the  junction  of  the 
two  corps  d'orwt'i',.  which  may  have  debouched  by  Bayonne  and  Perpignan,  and 
enables  the  French  to  manoeuvre  upon  both  banks  of  the  Garonne  as  far  as  the 
Pyrenees. 

12.  Bordeaux,  chief  town  of  the  Department  of  the  Gironde;  head-quarters  of 
the  twelfth  military  division;  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Garonne,  which  is  crossed 
by  a  magnificent  bridge  one  thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-eight  feet  long:  its 
port  can  accommodate  twelve  hundred  vessels,  each  of  six  hundred  tons  burden. 
Two  forts  Médoc  and  Pate,  and  a  citadel,  defend  it  about  twelve  miles  below.  Still 
lower  are  the  forts  of  Boyan  and  Pointe  de  Grave. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  41 

CHAPTER    IV. 

TACTICS. 

In  what  it  consists— Easy  theory — Difficulties  of  practice — What  is  required  of  a 
genera]  at  the  head  of  a  large  army — Living  providence — Necessity  of  tactical 
talent  for  subordinate  generals — Author  at  camp  <>f  Zeist — Comparisons  of  strat- 
egy with  tactics — In  what  consists  genius  of  war,  in  regard  t<>  both — Skill  of 
Napoleon — Liitzen,  sudden  battle — Historic  detail — Battle  not  at  Starsiedel — 
Battle  of  the  Moskowa — llefuse  of  reserve — Napoleon  untrue  to  Ins  principles 
of  war — Uselessness  <>f  fresh  troops  the  day  after  hat  tie — Why? — Waterloo — 
Guard  ordered  too  late. 

Notes. — 1.  Zeist.    2.  Battle  of  Borodino. 

Tactics  are  the  art  of  handling  troops  upon  a  field  of  battle,  and  to 
make  theni  march  without  confusion.  They  treat  of  the  art  to  main- 
tain order  in  the  midst  of  apparent  disorder,  produced  by  that  multitude 
of  men,  horses,  and  machines,  the  union  of  which  composes  an  army, 
and  to  draw  the  greatest  possible  advantage  from  it. 

Tactics  are  the  science  of  the  application  of  manœuvres.  A  man  can 
be  great  in  manoeuvres  without  possessing  any  genius,  the  perfection 
in  which  is  only  attained  after  much  practice;  nothing  is  easier  to  un- 
derstand than  the  theory,  but  the  practice  is  not  without  difficulties. 
The  general  must  be  familiar  with  the  means  provided  and  calculated 
upon  by  the  orders,  that,  with  a  moment's  glance  of  the  eye,  he  should 
know  how  to  judge  the  ground  upon  which  he  will  be  engaged  ;  he  must 
know  how  to  calculate  distances,  determine  the  precise  direction,  ap- 
preciate the  details,  and  to  knit  the  links  of  circumstances  into  a  chain. 

This  kind  of  merit  was  incomplete  in  Napoleon,  which  is  explained 
by  the  first  portion  of  his  career. 

Simply  an  officer  of  artillery,  until  the  moment  when  he  was  called 
to  the  head  of  armies,  he  has  never  commanded  either  a  regiment, 
brigade,  division,  or  corps  d'armée.*  Ho  could  not  have  acquired  this 
faculty  of  moving  troops  upon  a  given  ground,  which,  by  varying 
incessantly  the  combinations,  developes  the  skill  with  every  day's  move. 
The  wars  of  Italy  scarcely  ever  offered  to  him  any  application  of  this 
nature,  because  generally  the  actions  were  reduced  to  conflicts  for 
posts,  the  attack  and  defence  of  defiles,  and  to  operations  in  the  moun- 
tains. 

Later,  when  he  had  assumed  supreme  power,  the  strength  of  the 
armies  which  he  conducted    requiring   their  organization   into   army 

*  It  was  Brigadier-Genera]  Chanee,  commanding  at  Paris  during  the  winter  of 
1795— '96,  who  taught  the  manoeuvres  to  General  Bonaparte,  then  general-in-chief  of 
the  Arm]  Of  the  Interior. — Note,  of  Author. 

4# 


4V2  the  spirit  op 

corps,  rendered  skill  in  manœuvres  still  less  necessary.  A  general,  at 
the  head  of  eighty,  one  hundred,  or  one  hundred  and  fift}-  thousand 
men,  gives  but  the  impulse;  he  fixes  the  principal  points  of  move- 
ments, issues  orders  concerning  the  general  circumstances  of  the  army, 
and  provides  for  the  great  accidents  which  occur;  he  is  the  living  prov- 
idence of  the  army.  Generals  who  manceuvro  and  lead  are  those 
who*  command  thirty  thousand  men  and  the  generals  under  their 
orders  ;  they  must  be  familiar  with  tactics.  If  I  have  had  some  repu- 
tation in  this  respect,  I  owe  it  to  my  long  sojourn  at  the  camp  of 
Zeist,1  where,  for  more  than  a  year,  I  have  been  constantly  occupied 
with  the  instruction  of  excellent  troops,  and  sought  to  instruct  myself 
with  that  emulation  and  fervor  which  a  first  command-in-chief  gives 
in  the  beautiful  years  of  youth. 

Tactics  have  the  same  aim  as  strategy,  but  upon  a  smaller  scale  and 
a  different  theatre.  Instead  of  operating  upon  a  vast  country  and 
during  entire  days,  the  action  is  upon  a  battle-field  which  the  eye  can 
overlook,  and  where  the  movements  are  accomplished  in  a  few  hours. 
The  base  of  combinations,  the  proposed  aim,  is  alwa3rs  to  be  stronger 
than  the  enemy  upon  a  certain  point  of  the  field.  The  talent  is  to 
bring  suddenly  upon  the  most  accessible  and  most  important  positions 
the  means  to  break  the  equilibrium  and  to  gain  the  victory  ;  and  finally, 
to  execute,  with  promptitude,  the  movements  which  disconcert  the 
enemy,  and  which  take  him  unawares. 

To  effect  this,  it  is  essential  that  the  reserves  be  employed  at  the 
right  time;  and  this  is  the  genius  of  war.  It  will  be  carefully  avoided 
to  engage  them  too  soon  or  too  late;  too  soon,  is  to  employ  uselessly 
one's  means,  and  to  miss  them  at  the  moment  when  they  will  be  most 
necessary  :  too  late,  is  either  to  permit  the  victory  to  remain  incom- 
plete, or  the  reverses  to  thicken  until  they  become  irreparable. 

Every  one  should  be  obliged  to  expend  the  total  amount  of  the  ener- 
gy he  possesses  ;  but  when  the  moment  of  exhaustion  comes — and  it 
is  that  moment  which  to  recognize  is  so  important — theu  it  is  urgent 
to  send  succor;  finally,  do  not  fail  to  ask  for  them  some  time  in  ad- 
vance of  the  urgency. 

Napoleon  was  very  skilful  in  this  respect;  he  knew  precisely  when 
the  turning  point  of  the  battle  was  at  hand.  At  Liitzen  he  furnished 
mo  with  a  striking  example.  The  battle  was  begun  unexpectedly. 
Believing  that  the  enemy  was  retreating,  the  emperor  had  left  Leipzig 
with  two  corps  d'armée,  and  had  prescribed  to  me  to  make  a  strong 
reconnaissance  upon  Pegau.  Sotting  out  from  Wippach,  where  I  had 
passed  tho  night,  I  thought  it  prudent  to  move  by  the  right  of  the 
ravine,  although  that  road  was  longer;  I  did  not  wish  to  compromise 
my  communications  with  the  main  body  of  the  army,  which  owed  it» 


MILITARY    INSTITUTION  S. 


43 


safety  to  this  circumstance.  I  arrive!  at  Starsiedel,  perfectly  formed, 
at  the  precise  nioniout  when  the  enemy,  having  surprised  the  third 
corps,  was  about  to  surround  and  to  destroy  it.  I  had  time  partly  to 
cover  it  and  to  protect  its  right  while  it  hastened  to  arms.  The  battle 
opened  instantly  ;  immense  masses  of  troops,  an  enormous  cavalry,  and 
considerable  artillery,  attacked  me.  While  the  third  corps  sustained  at 
Kaya  a  very  obstinate  conflict  with  the  infantry,  Napoleon  fell  upon 
that  point.  The  forces  which  were  in  my  front  not  ceasing  to  aug- 
ment, I  scut  to  him  to  demand  reinforcements  ;  he  replied  that  the 
battle  was  at  Kaya  and  not  at  Starsiedel;  and  he  was  right.  I  had 
prevented  that  tho  battle  was  not  lost  in  the  beginning,  but  it  was 
gained  by  him  in  the  centre. 

On  other  occasions  Napoleon  determined  loss  judiciously. 

On  the  Moskowa'2  he  showed  a  sad  want  of  circumspection  in  refus- 
ing to  orfler  his  guard  to  march,  although  General  Belliard  asked  for  it 
at  two  o'clock.  The  Russian  army  was  then  in  the  greatest  confusion; 
immense  results  would  have  been  obtained  with  fresh  troops  ;  one  hour 
of  respite  saved  the  enemy. 

Napoleon  thus  was  untrue  to  one  of  his  favorite  principles,  which  I 
have  heard  him  pronounce:  "Those  who  retain  fresh  troops  for  the  day 
after  the  battle  are  nearly  always  beaten."  He  added  :  "  If  useful 
the  last  man  should  be  given,  because  the  day  after  a  complete  suc- 
cess there  are  no  other  obstacles  ahead;  prestige  alone  assures  new 
triumphs  to  the  conqueror." 

Alike,  at  Waterloo,  Napoleon  gave  his  guard  too  late.  If  it  had 
marched,  while  the  cavalry  performed  prodigies,  the  English  infantry 
would  probably  have  been  overthrown,  and  the  French  army,  rid  of 
the  English,  would  have  been  able  to  receive,  fight,  and  conquer  the 
Prussians. 

In  review,  tactics  can  thus  be  defined:  the  art  of  movements,  exe- 
cuted in  presence  of  the  enemy,  with  that  formation  offoring  most 
advantages,  and  which  is  most  in  harmony  Avith  the  circumstances. 

NOTES. 

1.  Zeist.— A.  village  in  tho  Netherlands,  in  the  province  of  Utrecht. 

2.  Battle  of  Borodino.— This  battle,  which  is  also  called  the  Battle  of  the 
Moskowa.  was  fought  on  the  6th  of  September,  1812,  and  opened  Napoleon  the  way 
into  the  City  of  Moscow.  The  Village  of  Dorodino  is  seventy-five  miles  west-south- 
west of  this  ancient  capital  of  the  Russian  empire,  and  in  the  centre  of  an  ex- 

Hngly  strong  )>  >-itiun.  hilly  and  full  of  ravines,  traversed  by  tho  river  Kolots- 
cha,  an  affluent  of  the  Moskowa.  In  this  position,  protected  by  strong  redoubts 
and  extensive  field-works,  the  Russians,  under  KutusofT,  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
two  thousand  strong,  with  pix  hundred  Bad  forty  cannon,  essayed  to  bar  Napoleon's 
march  upon  their  capital,  who  was  advancing  with  part  of  his  forces,  quite  as 


44  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

strong,  however,  as  Kutusoff,  yet  Laving  sixty  cannon  the  Leas.  It  an  enemy's 
strength,  posted  behind  such  fortifications  as  the  Russians  had,  and  th>-  remains  "t" 
which  can  be  traced  to  this  very  day,  is  thereby  doubled  or  even  tripled,  then 
Napoleon's  victory,  although  one  of  direct  attacks,  may  be  classed  among  the  most 
remarkable,  and  certainly  the  most  sanguine  he  ever  fought. 

On  the  day  preceding  the  battle  a  strong  advanced  work  had  been  carried  by  tlie 
French  with  great  slaughter.  Davoust  propositi  to  Napoleon  to  march  during  that 
eight,  with  forty  thousand  men,  around  the  extreme  left  of  the  Russians,  and  by 
Ney  simultaneously  attacking  in  the  centre,  to  carry  consternation  into  their  ranks. 
Had  Davoust's  suggestion  been  followed,  and  had  the  emperor  evinced  more  vigor 
and  resolution  individually,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Russians  would  have  been 
thoroughly  beaten.  After  a  most  frightful  carnage,  the  Russians  having  lost  thirty- 
three  generals,  fifteen  thousand  killed,  and  forty  thousand  wounded,  and  the  French 
thirty-five  generals,  thirteen  thousand  killed,  and  thirty-seven  thousand  wounded, 
the  Russian  army  remained  intact,  and  slowly  retreated  upon  Moscow.  In  this 
battle  four  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  at  one  time  directed  against  a  single 
redoubt.  Napoleon  attacked  in  echelons,  with  the  right  under  Davoust  in  front. 
There  Marshals  Ney  and  Davoust  earned  immortal  glory. 


CHAPTER   V. 

MANŒUVRES. 

Means  of  tactics— March  and  battle  order— Formations  for  both— Deployment  mixed 
with  columns— Example— March  in  the  plains  of  the  Tagliamento  in  1797— At- 
tack of  position — Skirmishers  in  advance  of  columns— They  cover  the  deployment 
— Formation  in  square— Its  speciality— Their  difficulties— Squares  formed  on 
march — Example  in  Egypt — Two  special  causes  indicated  this  formation — Forma- 
tion of  six  ranks  became  superfluous,  and  is  abandoned — Difficulties  of  formation 
in  squares  for  march. 

Note. — The  Tagliamento. 

Manœuvres  are  the  means  of  tactics.  They  consist  in  the  art  of 
moving  masses,  and  to  pass  them,  without  confusion,  but  with  rapidity, 
from  the  order  of  march  to  the  order  of  battle,  even  in  the  midst  of  fire, 
and  reciprocally. 

The  battle  and  the  march  can  be  executed  with  all  the  formations  ; 
but  there  are  preferable  formations,  both  for  the  battle  and  the  march; 
and,  again,  those  for  the  battle  vary  according  to  circumstances. 

Thus,  the  deployment  is  used  when  the  enemy  is  to  be  received  in  po- 
sition and  when  he  marches,  in  order  to  subject  him  to  the  greatest 
fire  ;    otherwise,  he  would  approach  scarcely  without  any   danger.     I 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  45 

troops  march  against  him,  the  deployment  can  still  be  used,  but  not 
without  great  dangers,  by  reason  of  the  wavering  which  the  march  in 
line  of  battle  always  occasions,  and  from  the  disorder  which  results 
therefrom.  It  is  then  preferable  to  have  only  a  part  of  the  troops  de- 
ployed, and  to  intermix  them  with  columns,  which  are  so  many  com- 
pact points  where  the  authority  of  the  officers  experiences  less  trouble  to 
maintain  order.  In  this  formation  the  right  and  centre  of  the  French 
Army  of  Italy  traversed,  in  1797,  the  vast  plains  of  the  Tagliamento, 
and  in  presence  of  the  Austrian  army. 

The  attack  of  a  position  roquires  the  most  rapid  march,  and  the 
ground  to  be  run  over  being  often  bristling  with  obstacles,  the  troops 
should  always  be  formed  in  columns  by  battalions.  These  small  masses 
are  easily  moved;  they  traverse  all  defiles  without  any  effort  :  the  rear, 
less  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy  than  tho  head,  pushes  the  latter, 
and  the  column  arrives  sooner. 

In  order  to  complete  this  disposition,  numerous  skirmishers  should 
precede  the  columns  and  march  in  a  direction  corresponding  with  the 
intervals  of  battalions,  so  as  to  divide  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  and,  if  nec- 
essary, to  cover  the  deployment,  without,  however,  masking  the  heads 
of  the  columns,  which  can  immediately  commence  firing.  Skirmishers 
thus  placed  have  points  of  support;  their  rallying  places  are  designated 
and  within  their  reach,  so  that  they  can  never  be  compromised. 

The  formation  by  square  can  only  be  accidental,  and  to  resist  the  at- 
tack of  a  numerous  cavalry  in  an  open  country.  As  it  is  very  difficult 
to  move  in  that  formation,  especially  when  engaged  with  infantry,  the 
troops  should  bo  accustomed  to  pass  in  the  quickest  possible  manner 
from  the  deployed  into  the  deep  order,  and  reciprocally. 

Still,  in  Egypt,  we  have  seen  troops  marching  by  squares,  and  during 
entire  days.  But  this  was  owing  to  two  causes  :  to  accustom  the  soldiers 
to  the  impetuous  attacks  of  a  new  enemy,  and  to  cover  the  sick,  tho 
wounded,  and  the  artillery.  The  squares  were  even  formed  unnecessarily 
and  almost  ridiculously  heavy,  by  placing  the  men  in  six  ranks.  It 
is  true  that  this  was  suppressed  as  soon  as  it  became  apparent  that 
these  precautions  were  exaggerated,  and  squares  of  three  and  even  two 
ranks  were  considered  sufficient,  and  then  the  formation  was  only  em- 
ployed at  the  moment  when  an  immediate  charge  of  the  enemy  could  be 
foreseen.  • 

Generally,  the  march  in  square  is  detestable;  however  short,  it  leads 
to  disorders  ;  because  the  rules  of  the  march  are  not  the  same  upon  the 
different  sides  of  the  square — two  march  in  lino  of  battle,  and  the  others 
by  the  flank. 


4G  THE    SPIRIT    OF    MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS. 

NOTE. 

The  Tagliamento  descends  from  the  mountains  which  enclose,  the  upper 
course  of  the  Piavc,  and  taking  a  course  from  the  north-west  to  south-east,  it 
washes  Tolmezzo.  defended  by  a  fort  :  receives  the  Fella,  which  comes  from  the  Gorgo 
of  Tarvis,  and  bathes  Chiusa-Veneta,  a  fortified  position;  flowing  thence,  from 
north  to  south,  it  passeB  Osopo,  a  fortified  place  Of  great  Importance  to  the 
defence  of  the  road  from  Italy  into  Austria;  forms  a  multitude  of  islands  and 
canals;  bathes  Valvasone.  near  which,  in  1797.  Napoleon  defeated  the  Archduke 
Charles,  and  finishes  its  course  in  the  lagunes.  This  river  is  very  Important  00 
account  of  the  road  which  it  opens  into  Germany,  and  which  was  that  followed  by 
the  French  in  1797, 1S05,  and  1S09. 


PAKT  SECOND 


ORGANIZATION,  FORMATION,  AND  MAINTENANCE  OF  AR- 
MIES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ORGANIZATION  AND  FORMATION  OF  TROOPS. 

Both  consist  of  the  faculties  of  the  man  and  the  nature  of  the  arm.    Order  and 
obedience. 

Tho  organization  and  formation  of  troops  are  no  arbitrary  matters  ; 
their  aim  being  to  form  a  compact  mass  from  an  assemblage  of  men 
and  to  make  a  whole  of,  them,  and  a  unit  which  is  movable;  the  regu- 
lations to  be  adopted  repose  upon  conditions  determined  by  the  facul- 
ties of  the  man,  and  by  the  nature  of  the  weapons  he  uses. 

To  form  troops,  order  must  first  be  established  and  obedience  be  as- 
sured. With  this  aim,  a  classification  and  successive  bands  have  been 
created,  which,  with  skill  combined,  oblige  a  large  mass  of  individuals 
to  submit  to  the  action  of  authority. 

FIRST  SECTION. 

INFANTRY. 

In  squal,  unit  is  the  man — In  company,  squad  forms  uuit — In  battalion,  com- 
pany— In  army,  battalion — Company  for  organization  and  administration — Bat- 
talion for  manœuvre  and  battle — True  limits  of  battalion — Conditions  of  bat- 
talion— Necessity  to  form  it  with  regard  to  reach  of  voice — One  officer  for 
forty  soldiers — Strength  of  battalions  in  Austrian  and  English  armies — In- 
conveniences and  advantages  of  number  in  the  battalion — French  battalions- 
Limit  indicated  by  author — Necessary  diminutions  of  the  entire  strength — Ita 
greatest  reduction  when  arrived  before  the  enemy — Strength  of  battalion  accord- 
ing to  adopted  formation — Three  ranks — Two  ranks — Fire  of  three  ranks — 
Purely  theoretical — Inevitable  fusion  of  third  rank  into  the  two  first — Cause  of 
disorganization — Object  of  formation  in  three  ranks — Modifications  to  ba  made 
in  formation  of  two  ranks— How  this  formation  becomes  best — Formation  of 
regiment — Is  ttrbitrary — Question  of  administration  and  economy— Keginaent s 
nith  strong  bnttalions — Their  great  advantages — Economy,  spirit  of  corps,  facill- 


48  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

ty  of  echelons-— Qualities  of  colonel— Order,  justice,  and  firmness— Special  corps 
/—Principles  applied— Regiments  of  light  infantry  in  France  and  Russia— Only 
so  in  name— Chasseurs  of  Tincennes — Austrian  chasseurs— English  chaasenrs— 
Voltigeurs — Their  application  with  strong  advance  guards  and  in  mountain  war- 
fare— Necessity  of  strong  companies — Particular  inst  ruction,  strength,  and  youth 
—Good  garrison  battalions  for  guard  of  places— Dangers  of  confiding  the  guard 
to  bad  corps — The  point  of  support  of  the  army  in  the  field  escapes  at  moment 
of  need — Examplo  :  garrison  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo — Major  Aubert. 

Note. — Remarks  on  Confederate  infantry. 

In  the  beginning  a  small  aggregation,  easily  governed,  was  formed  ; 
several  of  these  aggregations  were  united,  and  their  chiefs  submittod  to 
a  superior  chief;  in  that  case  the  unit  was  no  longer  man,  but  a  union 
of  men. 

Thus  a  squad,  composed  of  eighteen  to  twenty  men,  obeys  a  sergeant, 
aided  by  corporals;  the  squads  united  form  a  company,  which  the  captain 
commands,  aided  by  officers  ;  aud  several  companies  form  another  mass, 
which  is  called  battalion.  The  chief  comes  into  contact  with  only  four, 
six,  or  eight  men,  and  he  commands  through  their  intervention,  and  acts 
thus  upon  the  whole. 

The  company  is  the  element  of  organization,  discipline,  and  adminis- 
tration ;  the  battalion  is  the  true  military  element  in  infantry,  and  the 
unit  for  battle  ;  the  movements  and  manœuvres  are  by  battalion,  and 
by  battalion  the  battle  is  delivered. 

As  to  strength,  the  battalion  can  vary,  but  in  certain  limits,  deter- 
mined by  the  nature  of  the  organizations  themselves.  The  proverb 
should  not  be  understood  literally:  The  God  of  armies  is  with  (he  heavi- 
est battalions — a  proverb  which  undoubtedly  has  been  also  applied  to 
large  armies,  designating  a  part  for  the  whole.  Two  conditions  must 
be  observed  in  the  numerical  composition  of  the  battalion  :  it  must  be 
movable;  and  when  deployed,  the  voice  which  commands  must  be  heard 
at  the  two  extremities  of  the  line.  Within  these  limits  tho  number  of 
companies  composing  a  battalion,  and  the  strength  of  each,  can  more  or 
less  be  increased. 

A  proportion  must  be  established  between  the  number  of  officers  and 
soldiers.  That  indicated  by  experience  as  agreeing  best  with  the  econ- 
omy of  a  well-established  service  is  one  officer  for  forty  soldiers,  or 
twenty-five  officers  for  a  battalion  of  one  thousand. men.  It  must  be, 
however,  understood  that  a  large  number  of  officers  has  but  one  incon- 
venience— that  of  costing  too  much  to  the  state;  in  every  other  respect 
it  is  useful,  be  it  in  multiplying  the  means  of  action,  of  surveillance,  and 
of  examples  of  courage,  or  in  facilitating  rewards  by  a  more  rapid  ad- 
vancement. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  49 

The  effective  of  the  organization  varies  with  the  different  nations. 
The  strongest  battalions  are  in  Austria;  England  has  the  weakest. 

The  total  in  Austria  exceeds  twelve  hundred  men  ;  this  is  too  much 
for  a  good  servico  ;  such  a  number  can  not  be  moved  with  order  and 
facility. 

I  see,  however,  an  advantage  in  this  disposition  ;  since  the  losses 
during  war  continually  take  place,  and  when  reinforcements  have  not 
yet  arrived,  a  battalion  of  such  strength  can  resist  longer;  a  large  dimi. 
nution  of  strength  does  not  unfit  it  for  service. 

In  France  weak  battalions  are  habitually  employed,  and  their  effec- 
tive strength,  evon  upon  the  entrance  of  a  campaign,  is  still  almost 
always  below  tho  complement  of  organization. 

I  shall  put  one  thousand  men  as  tho  limit  for  the  strength  of  a  bat- 
talion, because  even  this  number  is  not  always  maintained  during 
peace,  and  at  tho  moment  when  it  leaves  the  garrison  to  take  the  field. 
After  constant  observation  I  have  found  that  the  best  administered  bat- 
talion is  the  strongest  one;  and  assuming  a  diminution  of  one-fifth  for 
hospital  details,  workmen  who  remain  with  the  depots,  those  required 
for  the  trains,  etc.,  etc.,  a  battalion  of  one  thousand  men  will  then  have 
but  eight  hundred  men  under  arms;  after  several  months  of  active  ser- 
vice it  is  reduced  to  five  hundred — a  force  still  sufficient  to  face  the 
enemy. 

The  formation  adopted  for  battalions  influences  their  numerical  com- 
position also. 

In  all  armies  of  the  Continent,  infantry  is  formed  in  three  ranks;  it  is 
formed  in  two  in  England.  This  last  formation  appears  to  me  far  pref- 
erable.    Nothing  justifies  a  third  rank. 

Without  entering  into  the  detail  of  fires,  I  will  appeal  to  experience. 
On  drill  the  fire  may  be  delivered  in  three  ranks,  but  not  in  war.  Tho 
French  regulations  prescribe  that  the  weapon  be  passed  to  the  third 
rank,  which  is  uniformly  required  to  load  it.  This  theory  is  not  ap- 
plicable before  the  enemy,  and  long  practice  has  demonstrated  its  in- 
utility. The  battle  is  fought  by  firing  when  in  position.  The  best 
formation,  then,  is  that  which  mostly  facilitates  firing,  gives  it  a  better 
direction,  and  the  greatest  development;  in  fact,  the  third  rank  will 
soon  be  confounded  with  tho  two  first,  because  instinct  teaches  the  most 
advantageous  formation  ;  but  this  change  being  against  orders,  it 
brings  about  a  kind  of  disorganization  ;  it  is,  therefore,  better  to  sanc- 
tion this  formation  at  once,  and  make  it  permanent. 

In  placing  troops  in  three  ranks,  the  object  has  undoubtedly  been  to 
give  greater  consistence  to  the  march  in  line  of  battle  ;  but  this  msans 
is  not  sufficient.  Even  with  three  ranks,  a  line  moving  is  but  little 
solid;  and  for  the  march  in  lino  of  battle  I  should  prefer  a  less  heavy 
formation. 
5 


50  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

With  a  slight  modification,  tho  formation  in  two  ranks  is  equal  to  all 
requirements.     Thus  : 

In  position,  the  troops,  when  formed  in  two  ranks,  have  for  action  a 
front  by  one-half  greater  than  thoy  would  have  were  they  formed  in 
three  ranks.  In  the  march  in  line  of  battle,  ploy  the  first  and  fourth 
divisions  in  rear  of  the  second  and  third,  and  you  will  have  four  ranks; 
and  at  the  moment  of  halting  you  will  present  a  front,  it  is  true,  less 
by  one-fifth  than  that  of  the  actual  formation  (four  divisions  in  line  of 
battle,  each  composed  of  three  ranks),  but  in  two  minutes  it  will  be 
doubled.  Here  is,  then,  a  solid  and  compact  formation  for  tho  march, 
which  permits  a  battalion  to  fire  everywhere  in  case  of  a  sudden  charge 
of  the  surrounding  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  by  a  simple  about-face,  exe- 
cuted by  the  first  and  fourth  divisions,  which  double  the  second  and 
third. 

The  formation  in  two  ranks,  with  this  disposition  introduced  into  the 
march  by  line  of  battle,  appears  to  me  incontestably  the  best. 

After  the  formation  of  the  battalion  comes  that  of  the  regiment. 
Here  everything  is  arbitrary,  and  depends  upon  the  caprices  of  those  in 
power  ;  the  regiment  may  be  two  or  three,  or  from  four  to  five  and  six 
battalions  strong  ;  it  is  only  a  question  of  administration  and  economy, 
numbers  of  men  ;  there  are  less  staff  officers,  and  the  advantages  arising 

Regiments  composed  of  many  battalions  are  less  costly,  with  equal 
from  living  together  are  given  to  a  greater  number  of  men.  Generally, 
these  regiments  are  in  better  moral  condition  and  have  a  more  energetic 
esprit  de  corps,  because  a  larger  number  of  individuals  partake  of  its 
reputation  and  glory.  The  consciousness  of  their  ability  to  distinguish 
themselves  is  more  powerfully  developed — so  much  so,  that  they  would 
cheerfully  endeavor  to  execute  tho  most  heroic  deeds.  In  wars  of  in- 
vasion, in  the  occupation  of  vast  countries,  regiments  thus  constituted 
are  able  to  form  echelons  to  assemble  the  men  who  have  remained  in 
the  rear.  These  intervening  corps  receive  the  recruits,  drill  them,  and 
strengthen  the  battalions  which  are  in  face  of  the  enemy.  Thus  a  great 
economy  in  men  is  obtained — an  economy  which  is  not  less  important 
than  that  of  money. 

In  general,  the  regiment  is  an  essentially  administrative  formation; 
it  again  acquires  a  kind  of  social  constitution,  animated  by  a  love  equal 
to  that  of  country  and  of  home. 

The  colonel  is  the  chief  of  this  social  assembly — its  father  and  magis- 
trate ;  and  certainly,  without  wishing  to  depreciate  his  courage,  the  first 
military  virtue,  the  essential  qualities  of  a  colonel,  and  those  which 
chiefly  influence  the  efficiency  of  hi3  regiment,  are  less  an  extraordinary 
intrepidity,  than  the  spirit  of  order,  of  justice,  and  great  firmness.  Tho 
best  corps  are  those  thus  commanded. 

It  should  be  a  principle  to   instruct  a  regiment  of  infantry  in  all 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  51 

branches  of  the  service,  and  the  exigencies  of  war  point  to  the  light  in- 
fantry as  the  most  proper  organization.  However,  special  corps  have 
been  considered  useful,  and  I  partake  of  this  opinion.  For  advanced 
guards,  and  detachments  in  broken  and  mountain  countries,  men  are 
required  who  have  been  endowed  with  a  particular  instruction — who 
know,  by  instinct,  how  to  surmount  all  obstacles — and  who,  trained 
with  the  greatest  address,  can  make  their  fire  terribly  murderous. 

But,  as  far  as  I  am  informed,  the  true  principles  have  not  been  ap- 
plied in  every  country. 

In  France  and  Russia  there  are  regiments  of  light  infantry  ;  theso 
corps  differ  from  ordinary  regiments  of  the  line  only  in  name  and  uni- 
form. 

The  Chasseurs  de  Vincennes  have  recently  been  established  in 
France.  The  institution  is  good,  but  incomplete,  as  long  as  the  battal- 
ions which  compose  this  corps  are  not  divided  into  field  and  garrison 
battalions,  according  to  the  principles  I  hereafter  shall  lay  down. 

In  Austria  there  are  battalions  of  chasseurs  ;  in  England,  companies, 
belonging  to  a  regiment,  which  never  leave  the  depot.  These  two*  or- 
ganizations are  superior  to  ours  ;  but  they  stand  yet  in  need  of  being 
modified. 

The  regiments  of  infantry  have  their  voltigeurs  ;  in  this  respect  an 
immodiate  necessity  is  satisfied.  In  recruiting  the  voltigeurs  of  the 
centre  companies,  men  can  always  be  chosen  capable  of  performing 
good  service. 

Special  corps  of  light  infantry  should  have  a  force  proportionate  to 
the  necessities  of  heavy  vanguards  and  mountain  warfare.  Regiments 
of  several  battalions  are  too  strong  for  this  service  ;  and  since  it  neces- 
sitates an  extremely  great  division  of  the  men,  a  chief  can  only  command 
a  small  number.  An  organization  should,  then,  be  adopted  which  pre- 
sents to  the  enemy  only  a  strong  battalion. 

In  this  case  the  companies  should  be  very  strong.  I  should  wish  to 
see  a  battalion  of  light  infantry  twelve  hundredrmen  strong,  composed 
of  six  companies  of  two  hundred  men  each,  commanded  by  five  officers. 
But  the  particular  instruction  and  the  special  formation  of  these  troops 
is  not  the  only  thing  required  ;  they  should  have  more  strength,  and 
should  be  younger  than  other  troops  ;  the  choice  of  the  men  is  most  im- 
portant. 

If  a  new  corps  is  formed,  it  can  be  constituted  in  the  most  satisfactory 
manner;  but.  at  the  expiration  of  several  years,  there  will  be  found, 
for  the  training  and  perfection  of  young  soldiers,  nothing  but  heavily 
moving  skeletons,  and  tho  corps  will  have  lost  all  its  former  agility. 

Light  infantry  corps  should  be  composed  of  two  battalions — one  of 
twelve  hundred  men,  to  be  always  maintained  at  its  full  complement 
and  constantly  ready  for  war:    the  other  of   four  companies,  composed 


52  TIIE    SPIRIT   OF 

of  six  or  eight  hundred  men,  which  I  will  call  garrison  battalion,  de- 
signed to  instruct  the  recruits,  and  to  receive  all  men  still  fit  for  service, 
but  who  are  no  longer  suitable  for  outpost  duty,  which  requires  so 
much  strength  and  youth. 

I  see  another  advantage  in  this  disposition  ;  excellent  troops  arc 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  a  general,  with  which  he  can  either  garrison 
fortresses  or  protect  fortified  posts  menaced  by  the  enemy. 

I  know  that  the  resolution  is  very  hard  to  place  in  a  fortress  a  good 
regiment,  or  a  part  of  one,  which  is  able  to  go  into  the  field  ;  but,  never- 
theless, it  is  absurd  and  sad  to  confide  the  guard  and  the  defence  to 
bad  corps.  They  surrender  the  place  at  the  fir3t  attacks  of  the  enemy, 
and  the  general  sees  the  point  of  support  upon  which  ho  counted  vanish 
at  the  moment  when  most  necessary  to  him. 

I  have  twice  painfully  experienced  this  in  Spain.  General  Dorsenno 
had  formed  the  garrison  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  with  negligence;  and  this 
fortress,  which  had  held  out  for  twenty-five  days  of  opened  trenches 
against  the  French  army  and  the  most  powerful  material,  wag  taken  in 
four  days  by  the  English,  while  the  Army  of  Portugal  was  hastening  to 
its  succor. 

Later,  I  had  with  the  greatest  care  fortified  the  passage  of  the  Tagus 
at  Almaras,  in  order  to  render  sure  the  communication  of  the  Army  of 
Portugal  with  that  of  Southern  Spain.  Works  strengthened  with  ma- 
sonry and  defended  by  small  redoubts  covered  the  left  bank,  and  ad- 
vanced forts  disputed  the  only  passages  by  which  the  enemy's  artillery 
could  debouch.  This  post  of  Almaras  was  of  great  importance,  and  I 
had  placed  in  it  garrisons  of  sufficient  strength.  But  these  troops  were 
mixed,  and  the  bad  ones  had  the  majority — especially  a  German  bat- 
talion, called  Prussian.  The  good  troops  occupied  the  outposts 
defending  the  Pass  of  Miravette.  The  enemy  appeared  suddenly  ;  the 
English  column,  with  which  the  artillery  marched,  stopped,  and  could 
not  pass.  But  another  column,  having  traversed  by  foot-paths  the  girdle 
of  rocks  which  border  the  plateau,  arrived  with  ladders,  and  mounted 
to  the  assault.  The  slightest  resistance  was  sufficient  to  repulse  an  at- 
tack so  audacious,  executed  in  full  daylight.  The  commandant  of  the 
fort,  Major  Aubert,  a  very  brave  soldier,  mounted  the  parapet  to  en- 
courage his  intimidated  troops  ;  he  was  killed  ;  his  death  spread  terror 
among  his  men,  and  the  garrison  fled  to  the  other  bank  of  the  Tagus, 
abandoning  the  fort  to  the  enemy,  who  retired  after  having  destroyed 
the  means  of  defence. 

NOTES. 

Remarks  on  Confederate  Infantry.— I  believe  our  system  of  regiments 
with  ten  companies  to  be  unwieldy  ;  and  that  of  two  battalions,  each  of  six  hun- 
dred and  forty  men,  divided  into  four  companies,  with  sixteen  line-officers,  and  com- 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  53 

manded  by  the  lieutenant-colonel  and  major  respectively,  the  whole  to  be  directed 
by  the  colonel,  to  be  much  more  effective  ;  because  : 

1.  Six  hundred  and  forty  men,  in  but  four  companies,  will  move  better,  more 
quickly  ;  and  straggling,  especially  in  long  marches,  will  be  less  frequent. 

2.  The  lieutenant-colonel  and  major  would  take  more  interest  in  their  respective 
commands,  since  they  Mill  have  the  consciousness  of  being  in  command  in  reality 
and  always.  They  would  be  thus  forced  to  take  greater  interest,  even  if  thoy  did 
not  have  tho  desire.  As  now,  the  duties  of  these  field-officers  are  not  sufficiently 
defined.  It  is  true,  in  battle  they  have  charge  of  the  right  and  loft  wings  respec- 
tively, but  in  many  cases  this  appears  the  entire  performance  of  their  position. 

Colonels  are  not  always  willing  to  divide  their  important  duties  with  officers  in 
whom  they  do  not  repose  entire  confidence.  Such  a  thing  may  not  happen  in 
regular  armies,  established  for  centuries,  but  it  is  of  daily  occurrence  in  an  army 
called  into  existence  as  ours  has  been,  and  where  reliance  in  an  officer's  desire  for 
improvement  and  strict  performance  of  his  duties  had  to  take  the  place  of  the 
requirements  necessary  for  his  official  position,  which  it  was  supposed  he  would  bo 
anxious  to  secure.  If  it  is  voluntary  on  the  part  of  a  colonel  to  assign  such  duties 
to  his  field-officers  as  he  may  think  fit,  he  will  often  only  yield  to  the  demands  of 
necessity,  whenever  he  is  so  overworked  as  to  make  assistance  absolutely  requisite— 
from  no  other  motive,  but  that  what  he  himself  does  he  knows  to  be  done  properly. 

But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  organization  of  an  army  is  such  as  to  give  to  the 
two  subordinate  field-officers  the  powers  of  the  colonel,  as  now  possessed,  their 
sense  of  duty  will  be  stimulated;  because  they  then  will,  in  reality,  have  specific 
services  to  perform,  the  neglect  of  whichthey  know  will  subject  them  to  ignominy 
and  punishment. 

3.  Then  the  colonel's  position  would  be  more  important  and  becoming  to  his 
rank.  lie  would  no  longer  be  the  commanding  officer  of  a  battalion,  but  that  of  a 
regiment  consisting  of  two  battalions;  performing  the  duties,  on  a  smaller  scale,  of  a 
general  of  brigade  ;  and  better  fitted  to  assume  the  latter  command,  as  colonels  now 
generally  are,  whenever  the  casualties  of  war  call  them  to  some  temporary  or  per- 
manent command  of  the  kind.  A  colonel,  moreover,  no  longer  fettered  by  small 
duties  of  every  kind,  would  have  more  time  left  for  the  perfection  of  his  regiment, 
and  the  majority  of  brigade  manoeuvres  could  be  performed  by  his  regiment  at  any 
time. 

4.  One  line-officer  to  every  thirty-ono  men  appears  more  than  sufficient.  An  offi- 
cer can  easily  manage  forty  men. 

5.  Whenever  a  portion  of  such  a  regiment  would  bo  required  for  separate  duty,  it 
would  still  feel  itself  an  efficient  body,  and  have  reliance  as  such,  since  it  would 
still  preserve  a  regular  organization,  having  another  battalion  around  which  to 
rally,  which  is  not  the  case  if  four  companies  are  taken  away  from  ten.  For  this 
reason  independent  battalion»  of  less  than  ten  companies  cau  not  be  effective.  This 
is  a  matter  worthy  of  consideration,  especially  on  account  of  the  requirements  of 
the  field  of  battle. 

6.  Brigades  could  then  be  efficiently  regulated;  and  a  brigadier  ought  never  to 
command  more  than  three  of  such  regiments,  which  would  give  to  him  a  front  of 
battle  of  six  battalions,  or  two  battalions  for  each  division  (right,  centre,  left) 
of  the  line,  consisting  in  all  of  three  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty  men  under 
anus. 

7.  It  would  reduce  the  number  of  officers:  an  important  consideration,  whenever 
it  is  admitted  that  it  be  the  duty  of  a  country  to  provide  for  those  officers  who 
become  disabled  in  the  service. 

6« 


54  THE   SPIRIT   OF 

8.  A  beneficial  emulation  would  be  excited  between  the  two  battalions  of  tho 
regiment. 

If  mobility,  corps  d'esprit,  and  economy  are  important  considerations,  I  believe 
they  are  attained  by  a  like  organization.  The  following  conditions,  however,  are 
inseparable  : 

1.  The  battalions  must  never  be  permitted  to  fall  below  an  effective  of  two-thirds, 
that  is,  four  hundred  men  under  arms.  Below  that  number  a  downward  course 
commences  which  nothing  can  check.  To  gain  this  point,  the*  distribution  of 
rocruits  Bhould  be  more  just  than  it  has  been  in  many  cases.  The  general  com- 
manding alone,  it  appears  to  me,  could  equitably  determine  which  regiments  may 
be  entitled  to  the  first  recruits — for  it  must  be  owned  there  is  a  difference  between 
regiments  which  have  become  depleted  through  the  bad  management  of  their 
colonels  and  insufficient  attention  of  their  sanitary  officers,  or  those  whose  corps 
d'esprit  is  not  sufficiently  established  to  prevent  desertions  en  force,  and  those 
whoso  thin  ranks  are  to  be  ascribed  to  their  valor  upon  the  field  of  battle. 

To  keep  up  regiments  in  a  proper  strength  is  so  important  that  it  deserves  the 
most  serious  attention.  I  believe  that  the  bravest  man  will  fight  better  when  he 
knows  he  can,  in  ca«e  of  need,  rely  upon  some  succor.  Soldiers  of  those  regiments 
will  fight  best  who  can  yet  boast  of  a  becoming  strength  of  their  commands,  and 
when  they  are  conscious  that  they  will  not  be  permitted  to  waste  themselves  away 
without  reinforcements  ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  they  will  be  upheld  as  long  as  their 
country  has  yet  a  name.  Those  brigades  will  fight  best  who,  by  reason  of  equal 
dimensions  of  their  commands,  have  the  additional  weight  which  superior  mobility, 
impulsion,  and  spirit  confers. 

Justice  demands  that  they  be  upheld  in  strong  numbers,  because,  in  tho  eyes  of 
the  world,  and,  alas!  in  those  of  many  commanders,  a  regiment  is  a  regiment,  and 
expected  to  perform  equally  heavy  duties  with  the  strongest.  The  pride  of  these 
glorious  old  regiments  will  never  lead  them  to  complain  of  hardships.  They  have 
learned,  upon  many  a  hard-fought  field,  that  it  is  valor,  combined  with  obedience, 
which  gives  victory,  and  that  the  country's  independence  is  never  won  by  com- 
plaints. Their  bravery  will  be  the  same  when  marching  to  death  with  but  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty-five  men,  conscious  that  not  one-half  of  them  will  issue  from  tho 
smoke  of  battle  ;  but  it  is  rather  the  bravery  of  despair — like  that  of  the  Last  Ten 
of  the  Fourth  regiment  of  Poland. 

If  we  look  at  the  percentage  of  the  killed  and  wounded  of  the  différent  regiments 
engaged  in  a  given  battle,  we  will  find  that  where  small  regiments  lose  fifty  per 
cent,  of  their  number,  strong  bodies  pass  the  ordeal  with  a  loss  of  but  twenty-five 
per  cent.  To  properly  estimate  their  services  upon  the  field  of  battle,  the  losses 
of  regiments  must  be  compared  with  their  previous  effective  strength. 

This  appears,  beyond  controversy,  to  be  established  through  the  consideration  of 
the  killed  and  wounded  during  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  the  materials  for  which  I  have 
taken  from  the  "  Official  Reports  of  Battles,  published  by  order  of  Congress,  in 
1862." 

General  Bragg  had •. 13,5S9  men 

Lieutenant-General  Polk  had 9,136    " 

Li  eu  tenant-General  Hardee  had 6,789    " 

Major-General  Breckinridge  had 6,439    " 

And,  in  the  ratio  of  their  effective  strength,  it  appears  that  the  percentage  of  killed 
and  wounded  increases  with  smaller  corps. 

These  percentages  of  loss  are  : 

Bragg-'s  corps  lost 22.04  per  oent. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  55 

Polk's  corps  lost n,  an 

„     ,    ,  ,  ■      •. 25.60  per  cent. 

Hardee  s  corps  lost 3003    u      u 

Breckinridge's  corps  lost  32  9g    „      {i 

or  precisely  ten  men  more  from  every  one  hundred  mc7iha^d  General  Braga,  xoho 
commanded  the  strongest  corps.  *>rwJih  who 

Gardner's  cavalry,  In  killed,  wonnded,  and  m issing- which  latter  are  not  included 
in  the  previous  calculation-lost  6.86  per  cent.,  but  they  were  hardly  engaged. 

The  Battle  of  Shiloh  furnishes  a  very  fine  example,  because  the  troops  were 

commanded.  A  more  uniform  battle,  in  almost  every  respect,  can  hardly  be  con 
ceived.  The  brigades  of  Cleburne  and  of  the  gallant  Statham-in  which  latte,  r y 
regiment  had  the  honor  to  serve-lost,  it  appears  from  the  same  report,  heavier  than 
any  others  upon  the  field-the  first  nine  hundred  and  seventy-eight  men,  and   he 

*z:;z^ *  ■?  sir four  men- statham,s  *«**>*  •»  °-  °<  *££ 

est,  barely  numbering  two  thousand  men. 

2.  It  is  a  question  to  be  determined  by  the  Department  of  War  how  long  it  may 
be  expedient  to  permit  conscripts,  especially  those  who  have  withdrawn  their  ser 
nee  from  the  cause  of  the  country  so  long,  to  volunteer.  After  a  certain  indul- 
gence this  boon  no  longer  belongs  to  them. 

col'Jd^Tv  78t7,0f  C°nSoIidation'  *■**  "P™  the  just  foundation  of  the 
17  >\      Z  P    yed  byth6  differeDt  regiments  and  th(?ir  exploits,  can  alone 

a ve  the  efficiency  of  the  army,  and  to  carry  out  any  good  system  of  reorganization 
it  is  absolutely  necessary.  The  unanimous  and  spontaneous  re-enlistments  of  our 
noble «armies  in  the  field  show  that  no  sacrifice  will  be  too  great  for  such  men. 
Soldiers  are  the  very  first  to  see  the  necessity  of  reform.  Tlfe  following  basis  for 
consohdation  appears  to  me  a  just  one  : 

Let  those  regiments  be  preserved  fir*  who  enlisted  for  the  war  at  the  beginning 
of  the  struggle.  a  ° 

Second.  Those  who  enlisted  for  three  years. 

Third.  Those  who  unanimously  re-enlisted,  according  to  General  Orders  No  1 
Adjutant  and  Inspector-General's  office.  January  1, 1862 

Kurth  Regiments  established  from  such  fragments"  of  one  year  regiments  as 
declined  to  re-enlist  entire. 

Fifth  and  last.  Those  regiments  which  were  organized  afterward 

Under  the  restriction,  however,  that  each  and  every  regiment  which  shall  have 
been  found  to  be  wanting  in  corps  d'esprit  and  bravery  be  disbanded 

Such  a  basis  rests  upon  good  conduct  and  patriotism,  and  no  other  consideration 
can  be  admitted. 

4.  We  have,  then,  to  increase  the  number  of  non-commissioned  officers  Upon 
their  efficiency  the  discipline  of  a  regiment  mainly  depends. 

5.  Each  battalion  must  then  have  a  separate  non-commissioned  staff.  The  com- 
mwioned  staff,  as  now  existing,  is  deemed  sufficient,  and.  if  necessary,  two  subal- 
terns of  the  line  may  be  detailed  in  rotation  to  the  field-officers  commanding 
battalions,  to  act  as  adjutants. 

6  The  number  of  officers  of  the  line  and  field  must  then  be  continually  at  it* 
full  complement.  To  effect  this,  the  establishment  of  a  reserve  list  is  the  most 
eflective  measure.  As  soon  as  the  absence  of  an  officer,  from  any  legitimate  cause, 
exceeds  a  certain  period,  disorganization  commences;  because,  and  especially  i„  our 
own  service,  what  is  called  f"  electioneering,"  a  remnant  nf,,„i  it  ical  ,„act  ices,  berins- 
a  practice  which  sulli,*  ft«  honor  of  every  officer  engaged  therein.  Hence  it  i, 
important  that  their  place,  be  filled  at  once.    This  practice  arose  from  the  volun- 


56  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

teer  system,  but  it  is  fast  disappearing  before  the  rigors  of  executive  jti-t i«-»v,  mili- 
tary honor,  and  discipline. 

SECOND  SECTION. 

CAVALRY.1 

Fire-arms  are  accessory — Its  speciality  In  the  combat  of  corps  by  corps — Impetuoei- 
ty  of  it*  movements — Superiority  of  French  cavalry — Its  exploits  in  Italy — 
Scarcity  of  good  commanders — Three  counted  in  twenty  years  of  warfare — Their 
names — Indispensable  qualities  of  a  cavalry  general — Promptitude  in  survey- 
ing condition  of  affairs — Rapidity  of  decision — Prodigality  and  dash  in  the  at- 
tack— Conservation  and  minute  attention  to  needs  before  battle — Employ  with- 
out reserve  at  the  given  moment — Particular  character  of  Murat — The  march  of 
column  without  object  before  the  enemy — Why — Necessity  of  formation  in  two 
ranks — Squadron  unit  of  combat — Mobility  combined  with  regularity;  basis  of 
its  strength — Best  reputed  formation — Unit  of  combat  same  as  unit  of  adniinis 
tration — Faulty  organization  under  the  Empire,  reformed  at  peace — Line  of  caval- 
ry in  battles;  divers  formations  of  the  French,  Germans,  and  Russians — Part  of 
cavalry — Sees  and  hears  for  the  army — Gains  tho  victor}- — Liitzen  and  Bautzen — 
Incomplete  victories — Cavalry  in  battle — Two  objects  to  accomplish — Heavy  cav- 
alry— Lances  and  sabres — Light  cavalry — Fire-arms,  carbines,  and  pistols — Dra- 
goons— Mounted  infantry — Speciality  of  that  arm — Beliefs  and  convictions — Ne- 
cessity to  employ  small  horses — Shoeing  and  clothing — Armament  of  cavalry  in 
general — Lances,  sabres,  pistols,  and  carbines — Lance  in  particular — Little  suited 
for  light  cavalry — Its  origin — True  arm  of  cavalry  of  the  line — Sabre  and  lanco 
compared — Lance  at  Dresden — Cuirassiers  repulsed — Breach  made  by  hfty  lances — 
Prejudices  of  routine — Cossacks — Their  aptitude — Formed  by  nature — Cossacks  of 
the  Don — Degenerated — Cossacks  of  Asia,  of  Kouban — Russian  hussars  and  chas- 
seurs, cavalry  of  the  line — How  Austria  might  have  Cossacks — France  will  havo 
hers — How — Defensive  arms  as  suited  for  cavalry — The  best — Should  be  also  ap- 
plied  to  infantry — Instruction  of  cavalry — Its  time  object — Horse  and  rider — 
Equitation — Accustomed  to  charge — Promptly  rallied — Inconvenience  of  light 
charges  when  instructed — Sad  education  of  the  animal — New  indications  given 
by  the  author. 

Notes. — 1.  Remarks  on  Confederate  cavalry.    2.  Marshal  Murat.    3.  General  Nan- 

souty. 

In  cavalry  as  in  infantry,  above  all,  the  object  should  bo  tho  attain- 
ment of  order,  obedience,  and  mobility;  but  tho  mannor  of  combating 
and  the  nature  of  weapons  not  being  the  same,  everything  is  different 
in  tho  application  of  that  arm. 

Fire-arms  are  with  cavalry  an  almost  superfluous  accessory  ;  most 
frequently  they  only  serve  as  means  for  signals. 

Cavalry  is  destined  to  fight  body  to  body;  it  must  cross  swords  with 
the  enemy,  dash  at  him,  overthrow,  and  pursue  him.  The  pursuit  of 
the  enemy  is  its  habitual  office  ;  for  but  rarely  two  parties  engage  in 
a  hand-to-hand  encounter.  At  tho  moment  of  their  meeting  the  less 
confident  one  stops  and  flies. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  57 

Tho  movements  of  this  arm  must  always  be  rapid  and  impetuous  ; 
sometimes  even,  but  with  small  bodios  only,  it  should  fight  with  a  hardi- 
hood bordering  on  imprudence. 

For  the  conflict  the  French  cavalry  is  the  best  in  the  world  ;  it  al- 
ways charges  with  the  utmost  impetuosity.  It  will  sometimes  become 
the  victim  of  rash  enterprises  ;  but,  in  general,  what  favorable  results 
are  secured  through  this  habit  of  headlong  boldness  !  In  our  first  im- 
mortal campaigns  of  Italy,  how  many  thousands  of  prisoners  we  owed 
to  a  handful  of  horsemen  ! 

To  command  cavalry,  and  to  direct  considerable  masses,  superior 
qualities  and  particular  merit  are  required.  Nothing  is  more  rarely 
met  with  than  a  man  who  knows  how  to  handle  and  to  conduct  these 
masses  so  as  to  employ  them  at  the  right  time  and  in  the  proper  man- 
mer.  But  three  can  bo  enumerated  in  the  French  armies  during  a  pe- 
riod of  twenty  years  of  warfare  :  Kellermann,  Montbrun,  and  Lasalle. 

Tho  necessary  qualities  of  a  general  of  cavalry  are  of  a  nature  so 
varied  and  so  rarely  united  in  the  same  person,  that  they  almost  ap- 
pear an  isolated,  particular  gift. 

Above  all,  the  talent  is  required  to  survey,  with  one  glance  of  the 
eye,  the  situation,  surely  and  promptly  ;  a  rapid  and  energetic  decision, 
which,  however,  does  not  exclude  prudence,  is  next  ;  because  an  error 
or  a  fault  committed  at  the  beginning  of  a  movement,  are  irreparable, 
by  reason  of  the  limited  time  which  remains  for  execution.  It  is  oth- 
erwise with  infantry,  the  march  of  which,  compared  with  that  of  a  gener- 
al and  his  aides-do-camp,  is  always  slow. 

Tho  general  of  cavalry  should  study  to  shelter  his  troops  from  tho 
fire  of  the  enemy  as  long  as  they  are  in  position  ;  but  when  the  moment 
of  launching  them  against  the  enemy  arrives,  he  should  be  prodigal. 
Upon  the  eve  of  a  battle,  and  until  they  aro  called  upon  to  engage  tho 
enomy,  he  should  administer  to  the  comfort  of  men  and  horses  with  tho 
minutest  care;  he  should  keep  his  forces  in  the  highest  condition,  both 
physically  and  morally;  but,  at  the  arrival  of  the  proper  moment,  he 
should  expend  this  cavalry  without  regard  to  the  chances  of  loss,  with 
the  «ole  purpose  of  achieving  the  greatest  advantage. 

A  general  scarcely  ever  satisfies,  in  the  same  degree,  these  two  require- 
ments. One,  an  excellent  administrator,  preserves  his  cavalry;  but, 
too  much  occupied  with  this  thought,  he  does  not  dare  to  launch  it 
against  the  enemy,  and  when  tho  day  of  battle  comes  it  is  useless. 
Another,  always  ready  to  go  into  action,  takes  so  little  care  of  it  dur- 
ing tho  campaign,  that  his  troops  perish  miserably  before  they  see  an 
enemy.     To  cite  two  examples:  This  defect  of  careful  treatment  will 

be  charged  upon  Murat,2  and  the  contrary  excess  upon  General 5, 

who  commanded  tho  cavalry  of  the  Imperial  guard  at  Wagram  after 
Bessières  was   wounded.     If  ho  had   charged   at  the  moment   when 


58  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

Macdonald  mado  his  offensive  movement,  sustained  by  the  artillery  of 
the  Imperial  guard,  and  when  he  had  overthrown  the  Austrian  right, 
twenty  thousand  prisoners  would  have  fallen  into  our  hands. 

Before  the  cavalry  charges  the  enemy  and  the  men  fight  against  each 
other,  it  should  never  attack  in  columns.  This  formation  will  serve  to 
facilitate  the  march,  but  at  the  instant  the  enemy  is  approached  the 
deployment  should  begin.  A  column  of  cavalry,  once  surrounded,  is 
soon  destroyed,  because  there  are  but  few  soldiers  who  then  can  make 
use  of  their  arms.  The  cavalry  should  deploy  in  two  ranks,  so  as  to 
arrest  the  disorders  which  happen  in  the  first — formerly  it  was  de- 
ployed in  three  ;  it  will  not  be  difficult  to  recognize  the  evil  of  this 
formation. 

The  unit  of  combat  is  the  squadron  ;  the  rule  to  determine  its 
strength  is  to  combine  the  greatest  mobility  with  maintenance  of  order. 

A  squadron  having  too  large  a  front  will  be  easily  put  into  disorder 
by  the  smallest  obstacle,  and  every  troop  in  disorder  is  half  conquered. 
According  to  experience,  the  best  formation,  and  that  which  joins  the 
greatest  strength  and  consistence  with  great  mobility,  is  a  squadron  of 
forty-eight  files,  divided  into  four  platoons  of  twelve  each.  Platoons 
of  sixteen  and  eighteen  files  are  also  suitable  at  the  beginning  of  a  cam- 
paign, especially  of  light  troops,  when  more  active  service  and  numer- 
ous detachments  weaken  the  corps. 

The  less  number  of  men  and  horses  permits  that  in  cavalry  which 
would  be  impossible  in  infantry,  namely:  the  unit  of  combat  is  the 
same  as  the  unit  of  administration.  ' 

The  perfection  of  the  service,  generally,  would  demand  such  an  or- 
ganization of  all  the  arms  as  could  both  be  applied  to  the  combat  and 
the  daily  existence — that  is,  to  the  police  of  barracks,  for  the  purposes  of 
administration  and  manoeuvres  ;  an  organization  which  constantly 
keeps  the  troops  under  the  hands  of  the  same  chiefs,  and  which  ^thus 
would  impart  greater  stability  and  power. 

Formerly  squadrons  were  composed  of  two  companies.  One  of  the 
captains  found  himself  subordinate  to  the  other — a  vicious  combination. 
He  who  commands  must  have  a  social  superiority,  constant  and  deter- 
mined, over  those  who  obey;  such  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  mili- 
tary subordination.  Still  wo  have  made  war  with  squadrons  thus 
formed;  but,  since  peace,  a  profound  discussion  has  united  all  factions  ; 
the  company-squadron  has  been  adopted,  and  the  soldiers,  whatever 
their  position  and  the  circumstances,  are  governed  by  one  chief.* 

*Lieutenant-General  Préval,  who,  under  the  Restoration,  was  member  of  the 
Council  of  War,  and  one  of  its  luminaries,  is  the  author  of  the  principal  ameliora- 
tions which  have  been  brought  about  in  the  organization  of  the  cavalry. — Note  of 
Author. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  59 

There  is  a  difference  in  the  manner  of  the  French,  German,  and  Rus- 

WithTieth  "  regrdS   \  f°rmati0n  °f  the  CaVaIr^  iD  line  of  battle. 
With   u     the  squadrons  have  regular  intervals;  with   those   foreign 

armie8  they  are  joined  by  twos,  and  form  a  division  without  intervals. 
This  formation,  while  preserving  the  same  degree  of  mobility  in  the 
reZr^  glVeS™n8i8tence  k°  eaeh  point  of  the  line,  and,  in  that 
respect  it  has  some  advantage  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  Freneh 
formation,  there  is  a  line,  the  front  of  which  is  larger,  with  an  ooual 
num  er  of  combatants,  which  gives  a  greater  expansion  to  the  Tn" 

orlwWk    71 ,"L fegard  t0  thCS6  tW°  formatio->  the  advantages  and 
drawbacks  of  which  appear  to  me  equally  balanced 

Cavalry  is  necessary  in  war  to  disclose  and  give  news  of  the  enemy. 

Such  is   especially,  the  duty  of  the  light  cavalry  ;  it  is  the  eye  and  the 

ear  of    he  army  ;  without  it  a  general  is  always  surrounded  with  peril 

wfthln 7  1S'1fUrtherm0re'  U3eful  for  co^  and  to  profit  from  victory. 
Without  cavalry,  a  gained  battle  gives  no  decisive  result 

«i,iPr0°/pf  thi.8  Caa  ^  Cited'  IU  1813'  nfter  haviQg  *>eaton  the  Rus- 
ons and  Prussians  at  Lutzen  and  Bautzen  with  infantry  alone,  as 
far  as  the  moral  condition  of  the  army  was  concerned  these  victories 
were  of  great  importance,  but  no  real  advantages  resulted  from  them 
A  flying  enemy  can  always  rally,  if  he  is  not  rapidly  followed  up  at  the 
moment  of  disorder.  ^ 

Cavalry  in  battle  has  a  twofold  object  :  1.  To  engage  theenemy's  nav- 
al y  and  to  pnrsne  the  beaten  army.  2.  T„  engage  the  infantry  which 
may  throw  itself  in  the  way. 

To  engage  infantry,  heavy  and  iron-clad  cavalry  is  necessary,  which 
sufficiently  protected  and  sheltered  from  the  fire,  so  as  to  confront  it 
fearlessly.  It  should  be  armed  with  lances  and  sabres  ;  each  man  will 
be  armed  with  a  pistol;  no  other  fire-arms  are  necessary  except  a  cer- 
tain number  of  carbines  per  squadron,  so  that  each  regiment  have  the 
means  of  clearing  itself,  should  it  be  isolated. 

There  is  a  fourth  kind  of  mounted  troops,  a  very  old  institution,*  and 
which  has  been  misapplied-it  is  not  known  why  ;  I  speak  of  the  dra- 

In  principle  they  were  entirely  mounted  infantry;  they  ought  always 
to  have  preserved  this  character.  In  that  capacity  dragoons  can  ren- 
der in  a  thousand  circumstances,  immense  services-such  as  detach- 
monta  for  surprises  in  retrograde  movements,  and,  above  all,  in  pursuits. 
But  it  would  be  necessary,  in  conformity  to  their  institution,  to  mount 
hem  upon  horses  too  small  to  be  placed  in  line  ;  otherwise  the  aspira- 
tions and  pretensions  of  colonels  will  soon  convert  them  into  cavalry 
ancTthey  will  then  become  both  bad  infantry  and  cavalry. 

•Marshal  Briaaac,  in  the  10th  century,  during  the  Plodm^wo  warn,  miaod  th. 
flrBt  corp.  of  dragoon,,  and  u.od  it  to  great  advantag*.--^/^,.' 


60  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

A  body  of  troops  should  have  its  beliefs,  its  convictiong,  and  its  faith, 
resulting  from  sanctioned  principles,  and  even  prejudices,  inculcated  in 
the  minds.  But  the  intelligence  of  the  soldiers  must  not  bo  confused 
by  the  profession  of  différent  opinions;  so  as  to  say,  for  instance,  in  a 
solemn  manner,  when  exercising  them  on  horseback,  that  cavalry 
should  always  triumph  over  infantry;  and  when  the  moment  of  exer- 
cises on  foot  arrives,  to  teach  them  per  contra,  how  good  infantry  is 
invincible  by  cavalry.  With  their  application  the  axioms  recur  to  the 
minds  of  tho  soldier,  and  almost  generally  in  a  reverse  manner.  As  a 
foot-soldier  he  recollects  how  redoubtable  the  cavalry  is  ;  as  a  horseman, 
he  never  forgets  how  much  the  infantry  is  to  bo  dreaded  by  tho  cavalry. 

I  repeat,  that  no  institution  is  moro  useful  than  that  of  the  dragoons; 
but  it  must  not  be  falsely  employed.  Let  the  horses  be  small,  as  al- 
ready said  ;  let  their  harness  and  equipment  of  men  and  horses  be  uni- 
formly calculated  for  tho  commodious  and  rapid  service  of  a  true  infan- 
try corps,  armed  with  good  guns  and  bayonets,  and  well  supplied  with 
ammunition.  Let  the  dragoons,  lastly,  bo  shod  and  clad  for  easy  and 
rapid  marches. 

As  for  the  regular  cavalry,  cavalry  of  the  line,  and  cuirassiers,  I 
would  compose  their  armament  of  lances  and  half-curved  sabres,  suit- 
ed for  the  double  purpose  of  cutting  and  thrusting,  and  of  a  pistol; 
each  squadron  should  have  twenty  breech-loading  carbines. 

In  another  work  I  have  considered  the  question  of  the  lance.  Not  to 
leave  the  matter  of  which  I  am  speaking  incomplete,  I  will  here  repro- 
duce the  arguments  recommending  that  weapon,  according  to  the 
expression  of  the  Marshal  of  Saxe  :   The  queen  of  arms. 

I  will,  then,  commence  at  once  by  remarking  that  it  is  totally  unfit  for 
light  cavalry,  which,  having  to  defend  itself  against  several  enemies  at 
the  same  time,  should  be  provided  with  fire-arms  and  sabres.  Yet  the 
light  infantry  has  been  armed  with  the  lance  in  those  countries  in 
which  it  was  introduced. 

But  it  is  known  with  what  facility  now  usages  are  adopted  ;  in  the 
most  civilized  countries  the  authority  of  example  leads  to  a  blind  con- 
fidence. The  origin  is  never  traced,  nor  the  circumstances  which  ex- 
plain it  ;  essential  differences  are  not  taken  into  account,  and  from  this 
dates  the  beginning  of  faulty  and  inconsiderate  applications. 

From  whence  comes,  then,  the  false  employment  of  the  lance  in  tho 
arming  of  mounted  troops  ?  From  the  example  given  by  warlike  hordes, 
such  as  the  Cossacks  and  Arabs.  These  hordes  inhabit  plains  whore 
horses  are  abundant;  they  fight  without  instruction  and  rules,  and 
employ  the  lance  in  a  wonderful  manner.  Therefore  it  has  been  said, 
by  considering  them  light  troops;  the  lance  should  be  of  service  to  light 
cavalry. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  61 

And  neither  bas  it  been  sought  to  ascertain  tho  origin  of  this  weapon, 
nor  why  these  hordes  employ  it  30  skilfully. 

In  a  barbarous  country,  whcro  no  kind  of  industry  has,  as  yot,  pene- 
trated, where  neither  manufactories  nor  magazines  of  arms  exist,  nor 
money  to  buy  tho  lattor  abroad,  a  man  mounts  a  horse  and  looks  about 
fora  weapon;  ho  cuts  along  limb  of  light  wood,  sharpens  a  point, 
hardens  it  near  tho  fire,  and  ho  has  a  lance.  Afterward  ho  procures 
a  nail,  puts  it  in,  and  his  weapon  is  more  dangerous.  Finally,  this 
staff  is  clad  with  iron  regularly  fashioned,  and  he  has  a  lance  such  as 
has  been  adopted  for  troops. 

The  Cossacks  and  Arabs  did  not  arm  themselves  in  such  a  manner 
by  choice,  but  by  necessity;  and  if  they  have  become  redoubtable  for 
their  skill  in  handling  the  lance,  it  is  becauso  they  have  exercised  with 
it  from  infancy. 

Nothing,  then,  can  be  drawn  from  such  examples  for  light  troops, 
specially  organized  in  a  civilized  country. 

The  lance  is  the  weapon  of  the  cavalry  of  the  line,  and  principally 
destined  to  combat  infantry.  Tho  sabre  can  not  take  its  place;,  what 
use  will  cavalry  make  of  sabres  if  the  infantry  remains  firm,  and  is  not 
afraid?  The  horsemen  can  not  sabre  the  foot-soldier,  because  the  bayo- 
nets keep  the  horse  at  too  great  a  distance.  On  tho  other  hand,  if 
the  horse,  which  remains  the  only  offensive  arm  of  the  horseman,  be 
killed,  it  falls  and  makes  a  breach,  and  this  breach  gives  to  those  who 
are  near  it  the  means  to  penetrate.  On  the  whole,  tho  advantage  of 
the  struggle  then  is  with  the  infantry.  On  the  contrary,  suppose  the 
same  line  of  cavalry,  furnished  with  a  range  of  pikes  preceding  tho 
horses' by  four  feet,  and  tho  chances  of  success  will  be  entirely  different. 

But  for  light  troops  the  sabre  is  better  suited  than  the  lance  ;  in  hand- 
to-hand  conflicts  a  short  weapon  is  managed  with  more  facility,  and  is 
more  advantageous,  than  a  long  one.  All  things  being  equal,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  a  hussar  or  a  chasseur  will  beat  a  lancer  ;  they  have  the  time  to 
parry  and  thrust  again  before  the  lancer,  who,  beset  by  them,  will  bo 
obliged  anew  to  resume  the  dofensivo. 

The  sabre,  destined  for  light  troops,  should  be  slightly  curved  ;  the 
perfectly  straight  sabre  is  less  suited  for  single  combat. 

The  same  troops  should,  in  addition,  bo  supplied  with  fire-arms, 
cither  to  increase  their  power  of  resistance  or  to  be  able  to  announco 
their  approach  to  troops  which  they  arc  ordered  to  warn  or  to  sustain. 

As  regards  cuirassiers  and  the  entire  cavalry  of  tho  line,  it  would  bo 
suitable  that  they  have  both  the  lance  and  the  straight  sabre.  The 
lir.-trank  would  charge  with  the  lance;  the  second  sabre  in  hand.  The 
shock  once  produced  and  the  ranks  broken»  the  sabres  of  the  second 
rank  will  complete  their  work. 

In  times  •  I     '  i<    Irj  I  Iweya  l  v  the  iront,  and  the 

0 


62  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

stroke  came  direct;  the  long  weapon  then  would  havo  been  preferable. 
This  oxplains  to  us  the  use  of  the  lance  by  the  knights. 

Tn  support  of  my  opinion,  I  will  cite  a  fact  in  regard  to  the  manner 
Qf  employing  the  lance  and  obtaining  great  effects  from  it. 

In  lSlo,  at  the  Battle  of  Dresden,  our  cuirassiers  had  several  times 
charged  the  infantry,  abandoned  by  the  cavalry,  upon  the  left  erf  the 
Austrian  army.  The  infantry  always  resisted  ;  it  repulsed  our  attacks, 
although  the  rain  had  prevented  almost  all  the  muskets  being  fired. 

This  resistance  was  not  overcome  until  the  cuirassiers  were  preced- 
ed by  fifty  lancers,  forming  the  escort  of  General  La  Tour  Maubourg. 
The  lancers  made  a  breach;  the  cuirassiers  were  able  to  penetrate,  and 
destroyed  all.  It  is  true  the  infantry  fired  but  few  shots;  but  under  every 
other  circumstance  the  question  would  not  have  been  uncertain  had 
the  cuirassiers  been  armed  with  the  redoubtable  lance. 

The  lance  is  equally  victorious  in  cavalry  engagements,  line  against 
line,  and  when  the  enemy  has  only  sabres.  It  is  admirable  at  the  mo- 
ment of  attack;  and  it  is  not  less  suitable  for  pursuit. 

To  resume.  I  am,  then,  authorized  in  saying  that  the  lance  should  bo 
the  principal  weapon  of  the  cavalry  of  the  line,  and  the  sabre  only  an 
auxiliary  one  ;  and  that  the  armament  of  light  troops  should  consist  in 
sabres  and  fire-arms.  Undoubtedly,  routine  and  contrary  prejudices 
will  yet,  for  a  long  time,  combat  these  principles,  whose  truth  seems  to 
me,  however,  to  be  perfectly  demonstrated. 

The  Russian  army  has  an  immense  advantage  over  all  other  European 
armies.  The  Cossacks  serving  in  it  compose  a  light,  admirable,  inde- 
fatigable, and  intelligent  cavalry  ;  they  know  with  precision  what  to  do, 
and  where  they  are;  they  reconnoitre  the  country  well,  observo  every- 
thing, and  can  perfectly  rely  upon  themselves.  They  can  not  bo  com- 
pared with  any  systematically  instructed  light  cavalry;  nature  has 
formed  them  for  this  service;  their  intelligence  is  developed  through 
the  daily  necessities  to  which  they  are  subjected.  I  speak  of  the  Cos- 
acks  of  the  frontiers,  who,  continually  at  war  with  their  neighbors,  al- 
ways in  the  presence  of  an  enterprising  and  tricky  enemy,  are  obliged 
to  watch  unceasingly  for  their  own  security. 

The  Cossacks  of  the  Don,  who  wero  formerly  admirable,  have  become 
less  efficient  and  intelligent  since  their  country  is  surrounded  by  sub- 
jugated provinces.  Still,  numerous  tribes  of  Cossacks  remain  to  guard 
the  frontiers  of  Asia,  especially  those  on  the  Kouban,  upon  the  line, 
and  Terek,  and  to  the  east  of  the  Caspian  sea.  During  a  war,  Rus- 
sia can  dispose  of  and  bring  to  Germany  more  than  fifty  thousand  of 
this  cavalry,  which  leaves  the  regular  cavalry  in  careful  preservation 
for  the  day  of  battle.  This  circumstance  permits  Russian  hussars  and 
chasseurs  to  be  considered  cavalry  of  the  line,  and  prevents  them  from 
being  employed  as  light  troops  ;  because,  on  account  oY  their  different 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  63 

instruction  and  non-employment  as  light  troops,  they  understand 
scarcely  anything  of  those  duties  which  the  Cossacks  perform  so  ad- 
mirably. 

Austria  could  have  something  analogous  to  the  Cossacks,  but  not  on 
so  large  a  scale.  She  could  easily  procure  ten  thousand  troops  of  this 
kind  by  forming  a  corps  of  five  hundred  horse  in  each  frontier  regi- 
ment. I  do  not  understand  why,  in  a  country  where  everything  is 
combined  with  such  care,  and  where  the  organizations  are  so  well  con- 
sidered, something  resembling  it  has  not,  as  yet,  been  introduced. 

France,  when  she  shall  have  conquered  Algeria,  can  without  any 
trouble  levy  Arab  troops  which,  in  times  of  war,  will  render  her  in- 
calculable service.  The  attainment  of  this  object  calls  for  the  unre- 
mitting attention  of  the  government;  and  to  arrive  at  this  end,  it  would 
be  well  at  once  to  increase  the  native  troops  as  much  as  possible,  so  as 
to  have  a  host  of  men  attached  to  the  glory  of  our  arms,  accustomed  to 
unite  their  interests  with  ours,  to  rejoice  with  our  success,  and  to  be 
able  to  furnish  good  non-commissioned  officers,  whose  want  will  be  felt 
in  proportion  as  the  organization  extends  itself. 

The  cavalry  being  destined  to  fight  body  against  body,  it  may  be 
asked,  why  the  question  has  not  been  considered,  to  secure  it  from  the 
blows  of  the  enemy  ?     Little  would  suffice  to  guard  it  from  a  sabre  cut, 
a  thrust  of  the  lance,  and  even  to  deaden  a  musket  ball,'  fired  from  a 
short  distance,   or  a  pistol-shot.     The  Orientals,   whose  conflicts  are 
always  melees,  have  had  this  foresight  at  all  times,  and  are  often  clad 
with  mailed  coats.     The  bust  could  be  guarded  by  a  coat  of  mail  of 
buffalo-skin,  such  as  the  Castilian  .peasants  wear;  as  for  the  head,  the 
shako  could  be  lined  within  by  two  crossed  pieces  of  wood,  as  if  is 
sometimes  used;  the  limbs  should  be  protected  by  one  or  two  light  iron 
plates,  placed  on  the  outside  of  the  sleeves  and  pantaloons.     This  dou- 
ble cuirass  of  buffalo-skin,  trimmed  and  ornamented,  would  make  an 
elegant  dress,  resembling  that  of  the  Roman  soldiers;  and  this  light 
and  comfortable  attire  might,  perhaps,  be  equally  suited  for  infantry  of 
the  line,  and  which,  favorable  to  health,  would  protect  the  soldiers  from 
the  grievous  effects  of  a  change  of  clothing  to  suit  the  temperature. 
The  dress  would  then  bo  reduced  to  a  sort  of  vest,  like  that  of  the  cuiras- 
siers ;  and   the   dress  of  buffalo-skin,   worn   only  when   under   arms, 
would  be  the  insignia  of  service. 

I  will  add  one  word  concerning  the  instruction  of  the  cavalry,  which 
has  always  appeared  to  me  to  be  incomplete.  Too  much  attention  can 
never  be  bestowed  upon  equitation,  and  to  make  the  horseman  a  perfect 
master  of  his  animal.  Man  and  horse  should  make  but  one  individual— 
thus  realizing  the  centaurs  of  fabulous  memory. 

Horsemanship  is  everything.  It  subjugates  and  breaks  the  horse. 
Manoeuvres  will  always  be  performed  with  sufficient  correctness  when 


64  THE    SPTRTT    OP 

the  soldiers  are  good  horsemen.  Encouragement  of  all  kind  should  ho 
given  to  obtain  this  result.  The  troops  must,  furthermore,  be  instructed 
to  charge  thoroughly,  without  occupying  themselves  particularly  with 
preserving  order,  which  this  impetuous  manner  of  the  movement  would 
render  impossible,  and  which  is  the  best  means  to  beat  the  enemy;  but, 
at  the  same  time,  they  must  be  accustomed  to  rally  at  the  first  signal 
with  promptness  and  dexterity.  They  must  be  constantly  reminded  of 
this,  and  prepared  for  it  with  all  means.  The  apparent  disorder  of  the 
charge  will  not  then  influence  their  moral  state. 

On  the  contrary,  if  the  charges  are  made  njodcrate  in  instruction, 
being,  in  consequence,  still  less  lively  before  the  enemy,  they  will  never 
overthrow  him  ;  at  the  first  disorder  the  soldiers  will  believe  themselves 
lost.  But  instructed,  as  I  have  before  said,  they  will  consider  this  dis- 
order an  habitual  circumstance,  easily  repaired,  and  without  any  danger. 

The  following  mode  is  often  employed  in  drill,  in  great  manoeuvres, 
and  in  sham-battles  :  The  infantry  is  charged  by  the  cavalry,  and, 
bearing  in  mind  that  it  is  only  a  sham-fight,  the  cavalry  stops  before 
having  reached  the  infantry,  or  escapes  through  the  intervals.  Noth- 
ing is  worse  than  such  an  education  of  horses  ;  by  thus  accustoming 
them  to  avoid  obstacles,  they  will  never  be  brought  to  confront  them, 
because  their  habits  will  accord  with  their  instinct,  and,  perhaps,  with 
that  of  the  rider's.  This  practice  is  pernicious;  it  should  be  banished 
from  the  exercises,  and  replaced  by  perfectly  opposite  lessons.  The  re- 
sults will  be  immense  in  war.     I  conceive  it  in  the  following  manner  : 

A  line  of  infantry  is  placed  to  face  a  line  of  cavalry;  the  files  of  both 
lines  are  so  divided  that  a  horse  and  man  can  easily  pass  through  the 
intervals.  At  first,  the  cavalry  moves  off  at  a  pace,  and  rides  through 
the  infantry  ;  this  is  repeated  several  times  at  the  trot  and  gallop,  until  the 
horses  execute  this  movement,  so  to  speak,  by  themselves.  It  is  then 
accompanied  by  several  shots,  which  fire  is  extended  along  the  entiro 
line,  and  which  gradually  becomes  heavier  ;  and,  if  it  be  wished  that  the 
noise  be  still  greater,  files  of  infantry  of  six  ranks  may  be  formed,  and 
the  actual  shock  of  the  fire  of  an  entire  battalion  is  produced. 

After  several  days  of  like  exercise,  such  cavalry  will  be  more  suited 
to  attack  infantry  than  any  other;  and  the  horses  being  drilled  and  ac- 
customed to  throw  themselves  upon  heavy  discharges  in  their  very  front, 
they  will  carry  their  riders  by  themselves,  even  if  the  latter  were  en- 
deavoring to  moderate  their,  ardor. 

NOTES. 

1.  Kemax'ks  on  Confederate  Cavalry. — That  we,  with  such  magnificent 
material,  should  see  our  cavalry  occupying  the  third  place  among  the  three  arms, 
in  both  efficiency  or  usefulness,  must  be  owing  either  to  some  radical  defect  in  our 
system  of  organization,  or  to  our  want  of  experienced  cavalry  officers — to  which, 
in  particular,  I  do  not  feel  prepared  to  decide. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  G5 

In  all  modern  wars  cavalry  has  played  a  great  rôle.  It  is  the  only  weapon  wliich 
can  take  advantage  of  a  beaten  enemy,  pursue,  and  rout  liim.  Hence  it  has  been 
fostered  and  trained  in  every  well-regulated  military  system.  Frederic  the  Great 
owes  his  most  signal  victories  to  the  Impetuous  attacks  of  his  hussars.  Napoleon 
lurried  his  masses  of  heavy  cavalry  against  the  decisive  point,  and  felt  assured  of 
victory.     The   Polish  lancers  dashed  into  many  a.  Russian  square  in  1830  and  1631. 

The  cavalry  charges  of  Inkennan  and  Balaklava  are  immortel.    On  the  plains  of 

Italy  both  French  and  Austrian  horsemen,  in  the  late  war,  performed  prodigies. 
And  all  these  blight  deeds  of  arms  were  performed  by  men  who  had  to  be  taught 
to  ride  after  they  were  twenty  years  of  age,  and  upon  horses  that  had  been  broken  by 
riding-masters  who  themselves  xvould  not  have  dared  to  mount  a  luihl  young  horse, 
as  our  eitvalrists  do. 

There,  severe  application  gives,  In  a  small  degree,  what  our  national  customs 
richly  bestow  upon  us;  and  yet,  what  immense  disparity  in  the  achievements! 

The  fact  is,  that  we  content  ourselves  with  proudly  pointing  to  OUT  valorous  young 
men  upon  fine  horses,  and  to  say:  "Look  at  our  cavalry!"  ami  the  great  majority 
of  the  officers,  not  knowing  themselves  how  to  handle  a  sabre,  can,  of  course,  not  im- 
part its  use  to  their  men.  Thus  dash,  valor,  and  horsemanship  aro  absolutely  thrown 
away  as  soon  an  the  revolver  ha^been  emptied  of  its  loads,  and  skilful  swordsmen 
are  closing  upon  them.  It  may  be  easy  to  say  that  such  things  will  not  occur, 
because  wo  have  to  contend  against  enemies  who  do  not  even  know  how  to  ride,  and 
the  nature  of  our  country  forbids  our  ever  employing  large  bodies  in  an  actual 
charge  in  battle;  but  is  it  less  necessary  to  be  prepared  against  an  inferior  antago- 
nist, or  is  it  less  requisite  to  be  as  skilful  in  all  the  requirements  of  a  horseman 
upon  the  scout,  the  pursuit,  and  in  grand  reconnaissances  ? 

The  fact  is,  that  a  majority  of  the  officers  in  higher  commands  in  the  cavalry  ser- 
vice appear  not  to  be  impressed  with  the  importance  of  their  arm,  and  are  cither 
too  indolent,  or  do  not  know  how  to  instruct.  Nor  has  our  cavalry,  in  general,  a« 
yet  been  reduced  to  that  degree  of  subordination  and  discipline,  without  which 
nothing  important  can  bo  achieved.  Otherwise,  Ave  ought  to  have  a  magnificent 
cavalry,  after  three  years  of  warfare,  as  we  have  splendid  infantry  and  artillery. 

An  important  step  has  been  taken  in  organizing  dur  cavalry  into  divisions. 
Larger  bodies  of  cavalry  are  thus  brought  together,  and  emulation  is  excited;  the 
duties  of  each  regiment,  moreover,  become  less  burdensome.  If  it  is  true — of 
which  I  am  by  no  means  persuaded — that  we,  on  aocount  of  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  have  to  let  our  infantry  and  artillery  alone  sustain  the  shock  of  battle,  and 
thus  must  give  up  the  best  part  of  a  victory,  we  might  just  as  well  dismount  tho 
greater  part  of  our  cavalry  force,  and  employ  the  rest  in  scouting  and  piqueting 
alone:  because  then  even  grand  reconnaissances  would  become  dangerous.     With 

this  organization  into  divisions,  a  step  has  1 n  taken  in  the  right  direction,  and 

we  may.  perhaps,  soon  hope  to  seo  tho  cavalry  perform  an  efficient  part  in  tho 
shock  of  the  great  battle. 

"With  these  Strictures  it  is  not  intended  to  say  that  our  cavalry  has  done  nothing. 
No  man  could  be  more  sensible  of  its  achievements  under  such  leaders  as  Van  l>"in, 

Stuart.  Morgan,  Hampton,  she  Lees,  Wharton,  Wheeler,  Forrest,  sod  others,  than 

is  tin-  writer:   but  the  07*01  and  MOff  in  ngn  if  mil  duty  of  cavalry,  the  routing  of  a 

beaten  enemy,]  yet  been  accomplished.    No  Instances  are  oooesiary  of 

what  cavalry  emi  do:  history  furnishes  thousand»  of,  them  J  and  if  one  would  con- 
ten,)   that   the   nature  of  the  -round  witli   us  h  Midi    M  toi,, ibid  anything  like  a 

charge  or  affective  pursuit,  he  shows  but  Ignorance  as  to  Hie  topography  of  Bwo- 

pean  battle-fields. 

6* 


60  THE    b'l'iHlT   OJ 

One  fact  should  always  be  before  the  Confederate  cavnlry  officer,  namely:  that  ho 
has  under  his  oosnmand  m  fine  riders  and  aa  splendid  ^hots  ,-is  the  world  prednoM — 
that  he  ought  to  perfect  Uiis  men  in  discipline,  the  use  of  the  sabre,  and  to  precision 
in  drill  :  and  then  I  sincerely  believe  that  he  might  outstrip  the  most  renowned 
exploits  of  the  arm. 

And  here  I  beg  to  say  one  word  in  favor  of  the  "  queen  of  arms1'— the  lance.  Ono 
of  my  friends,  a  master  oi  the  sword  and  a  skilful  handler  of  the  lance,  has  essayed 
to  draw  attention  to  the  weapon  and  to  form  a  body  of  lancers,  and  he  has  failed,  a» 
I  understand.  Furthermore,  from  high  authority,  I  heard  that  some  of  our  supe- 
rior officers  serving  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
tried  to  introduce  the  weapon,  and  that  they  also  failed,  because  the  troops  did, not 
favor  it.  While  we  have  tin's  aversion  for  a  formidable  weapon,  our  enemies,  it  is 
said,  are  now  actually  organizing  a  strong  body  of  lancers.  This  latter  fact  will, 
perhaps,  more  surely  than  anything  else  lead  us  to  inquire  whether  it  be  not  pos- 
sible to  arm  the  Confederate  cavalry  with  lances. 

If  our  men  have  no  desire  to  employ  either  the  sword  or  the  lance,  it  is  not 
because  they  dislike  to  use  it,  but  because  they  feel  that  it  ia  a  harmless  tool  in 
their  hands,  since  they  arc  not  taught  how  to  use  it.  Did  we  leave  the  choice  of  tho 
weapon  to  our  infantry  and  artillery,  I  have  no^loubt  that  a  good  many  infantry 
soldiers  would  prefer  the  light  fowling-piece  to  the  heavy  musket,  and  the  artillery- 
men would  never  bother  themselves  about  heavy  guns.  I  believe,  on  tho  contrary, 
that  our  men  would  like  the  lance,  were  its  utility  and  efficiency  once  shown  to 
them  practically,  as  a  man  becomes  attached  to  his  sword  as  soon  as  lie  feels  him- 
self a  master  of  it.  It  would,  I  believe,  be  a  beneficial  move  if  a  good  officer  of 
cavalry  could  obtain  authority  to  take  live  hundred  young  volunteers  from  the  dif- 
ferent cavalry  regiments,  and,  by  a  system  of  thorough  drill  and  discijilinc,  mako 
them  a  body  of  perfect  lancers.  Neither  artillery  nor  squares  have  stood  before 
them.  Stationed  on  our  coasts,  especially,  where  the  features  of  the  ground  favor 
their  charging  and  pursuing,  I  believe  them  to  be  invincible.  In  a  mi'h'e  the  lance 
is  replaced  into  the  receptacle  near  the  left  stirrup,  and,  by  means  of  the  straps, 
secured  to  the  person  of  the  lancer  in  such  a  manner  that  it  doe-  aot  interfere  with 
the  u«<e  of  the  sword,  which  then  does  its  work.  Then  carbines  and  revolvers  aro 
useless,  because  they  can  not  be  reloaded. 

Its  manufacture  is  very  easy.  Every  blacksmith  can  fashion  a  pike,  and  the 
trooper  can  himself  fasten  it  to  the  staff.  And  the  little  Hag,  waving  and  lluttering 
in  the  breeze,  alone  has  caused  many  a  body  of  cavalry  to  turn  upon  the  approach 
of"  lancers.  An  actual  charge  of  lancers  must  be  seen  to  appreciate  what  terriblo 
effect  this  magnificent  weapon  has  upon  the  steadiness  of  the  horses  and  the  morale 
of  the  men. 

I  believe  it  to  be  u  matter  worthy  of  inquiry  : 

1.  Whether  the  tactics  of  cavalry  should  not  bo  simplified  as  much  as  possible? 

2.  Whether  the  iron  scabbard  ought  not  to  be  abolished?  since  both  the  rattling 
it  occasions,  and  the  constant  blunting  of  the  sword's  edge  in  a  scabbard  of  metal, 
make  it  objectionable.  Wooden  scabbards  might  be  substituted.  A  cavalrist  might 
just  as  well  carry  a  poker  as  a  blunt  sabre,  for  both  are  equally  harmless.  Another 
matter  threatens  to  destroy  the  efficiency , of  the  cavalry  service  entirely:  the 
hardship  imposed  upon  cavalry  soldiers,  and  all  mounted  officors,  to  furnish  their 
own  horses,  which  daily  is  becoming  more  difficult,  and  will  soon,  save  to  a  favored 
lew,  be  impossible.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  government  should  furnish  to  all 
mounted  men  and  officers  their  horses,  as  is  the  case  in  all  well-regulated  military 
establishments. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  67 

The  List  Congress  was  urged  to  provide  for  this  emergency  by  the  Honorable 
Secretary  of  War,  in  his  very  able  report  to  the  President,  of  November  26,  1803, 
hill  lias  failed  to  do  anything. 

It  will  be  one  of  the  most  Important  duties  of  the  coming  Congress  to  save  the 
cavalry  service,  which  will  soon  boewmo  utterly  inefficient  unless  something  is 
done  in  the  matter.  ^ 

2.  Marshal  Murât. — Joachim  Murat,  ex-King  of  Naples,  was  boi*n  at  a  villago 
in  I'irigord  in  the  year  17(>7,  his  father  being  an  aubergiste,  or  country  innkeeper. 
Trior  to  that,  the  father  of  Joachim  had  bee.n  a  steward  to  one  of  the  Talleyrands, 
and,  through  the  influence  of  that  distinguished  family,  young  Murat  was  placed  at 
the  College  of  Chaors,  and  intended  for  the  Church.  His  character,  however,  little 
fitted  him  for  that  profession,  and  he  enlisted  into  a  regiment  of  chasseurs.  From 
this  he  was,  within  a  brief  period,  dismissed  for  insubordination.  He  returned  to  his 
native  village,  and  took  charge  of  his  father's  horses  until  the  breaking  out  of  tho 
Revolution,  when  he  entered  the  constitutional  guard  of  Louis  XVI,  from  which  he 
passed,  as  sub-lieutenant,  into  a  regiment  of  chasseurs.  During  the  Reign  of  Terror 
he  professed  himself  an  enthusiastic  champion  of  equality,  and  rose  to  the  rank  of 
colonel  ;  but  these  predilections  did  not  prevent  him  from  making  himself  useful  to 
Bonaparte  in  1795,  and  ho  was  rewarded  by  being  placed  on  the  personal  staff  of  the 
foture  emperor  in  the  Italian  campaign  of  '96.  From  that  hour  the  fortunes  of  Murat 
closely  followed  those  of  his  patron.  The  fiery  valor  which  the  handsome  swordsman, 
as  he  was  called,  showed  in  a  hundred  fights,  the  splendid  though  somewhat 
fantastic  costumein  which  he  delighted  to  figure,  and  the  love  of  daring  achievement, 
which  drew  an  air  of  ancient  romance  over  all  his  actions,  invested  him,  in  the  eyes 
of  his  admiring  fellow-soldiers,  with  the  renown  of  some  paladin  of  old;  and  his  en- 
terprising talents  in  the  field  obtained  for  him  the  graver  distinction,  in  the  cool 
judgment  of  Napoleon  himself,  of  "Tho  best  cavalry  officer  in  Europe."  He  com- 
manded that  arm  in  the  campaigns  of  Egypt,  Italy,  Austria,  and  Prussia;  and  in  all 
— at  Aboukir,  Marengo,  Austerlitz,  Jena,  Eylau,  and  Friedland — his  services  were 
brilliantly  conspicuous.  After  the  Egyptian  campaign  he  obtained  the  hand  of  Caro- 
line, youngest  sister  of  Napoleon  ;  and  in  1806  was  raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  sovereign 
prince,  and  recognized  by  the  Continental  powers  as  Grand-Duke  of  Berg  and  Cleves. 
In  1808  he  commanded  the  French  army  in  Napoleon's  invasion  of  Spain,  from  which 
country  he  was  recalled  and  sent  to  Naples  to  ascend  the  throne  of  that  kingdom, 
vacated  by  the  elevation  of  Joseph  Bonaparte  to  the  Spanish  crown.  Tn  181-  he 
accompanied  Nnpoleon  on  the  expedition  to  Russia,  in  the  command  of  the  eavalry  of 
the  grand  army — the  most  numerous  and  splendid  body  of  horse,  perhaps,  which  the 
world  has  ever  leen  arrayed  in  the  ages  of  civilized  warfare.  At  the  Battle  of  Boro- 
dino Murat  performed  prodigies  of  valor;  at  the  same  time.  Napoleon  (who  was 
Standing  on  a  scaffold,  which  gave  him  a  complete  view  of  Urn  champ  de  ba taille)  htul 
his  misgivings  as  to  the  over-impetuosity  of  his  brother-in-law.  That  battle,  one  of 
the  meal  ensanguined  on  record,  opened  the  way  to  Moscow.  Bat  this  city  was  a 
fatal  possession  t"  the  French — driven  out  of  it.  n*  they  were,  by  Ore,  t>>  experience 

nil  the  horrors  of  the  Russian  winter.  Mm  at  served  1 1  i  •  •  emperor  again  in  the  cam- 
paign of  1813;  but.  after  the  illsastllHM  Battle  "f  Leipzig,  finally  deserted  him  in  his 
fallen  fortunes,  and  became  the  aUj  of  his  bas.    This  nnpàrdonable  ad  of  weakness 

and  treachery  w:>-i  followed  l>y  another.     Though  he  had  saved  his  throne  for  a  time, 

the  hesitation  of  the  I  VitigniT<  "t  Viens  i  to  at  knou  ledge  his  regality  alarmed  him  ; 
and  when  Nap  Aeon  reappeared  la  France,  u  im.">.  ha  aned  his  ntmoal  smleavors  to 

induce  the  Italians  tj  arm  for  their  national  independence.     Rut  in  this  he  most 


(jS  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

aignally  foiled,  and  was  compelled  to  fly.  In  :i  fit  <>f  desperation  he  again  landed  In 
arms  "ii  the  c  >as1  of  Calabria,  with  a  handful  of  followers,  and  was  captured  and 
[gnominkrasly  shot  by  sentence  of  a  Neapolitan  oourt-martial — a  base  and  most 
unwarrantable  art.  but  worthy  < >f  its  perpetrators.    The  people  of  Naples  loved  him 

much,  fbf  hi'  was  always  milil  and  merciful  BS  a  BOVereign.     That  he  was  one  of  the 

ivalry  officers  of  modern  times  there  can  nol  he  a  doubt;  hut  it  is  equally 
certain  that  lie  was  wholly  unfit  for  a  chef  a? armée.  He  was  a  strange  mixture — 
brave,  vacillating,  faithless,  vain,  wholly  devoid  of  public  principle,  with  a  warm 

heart  and  kindly  feelings.  • 

3.  General  Nansouty  was  the  general  alluded  to  by  Marshal  Marmont.  The 
French  army  was  unfortunate,  at  the  crisis  of  the  Battle  of  Wagram,  in  losing  the 
services  of  the  gallant  Bessières.    General  Nansonty  permitted  the  Austrians  to 

retire  in  the  most  perfect  order.  Napoleon,  although  this  victory  laid  prostrate 
before  him  the  Austrian  empire,  in  a  fit  of  ill  humor  exclaimed  :  "  Was  ever  any- 
thing seen  like  it?  We  have  gained  neither  any  guns  nor  prisoners.  The  day  will 
be  without  any  decisive  result!" 


CHAPTER    II. 

ARTILLERY. 

Importance — Simplest  the  best — In  what  perfection  should  consist — Necessity  to 
restrain  number  of  calibres — Character  of  siege  artillery,  and  for  defence  of 
places — Inutility  of  16-pounders — Field  artillery — Conditions — t'>-ponnders — 
.Made  the  wars  of  the  Empire — 8-poumlers.  principal  inconvenience — 12-pounders, 
their  object — Batteries  of  24-pounders — Services  upon  battle-field — Hollow  pro- 
jectiles— Large  mortars — Mortars  Marmont  d  la  Yillantroy — Mountain  artillery 
— Rockets  à  la  Congrèvc — Wall-pieces — Dimensions — Weight— How  determined 
— Theory  of  explosion — How  range  is  diminished — Friction,  expansion — Long 
pieces  and  heavily  charged — Experience  with  35-poundcrs — Maximum  of  range — 
What  length— Inconvenience  of  length,  giving  greatest  range— Length  of  23,  88, 
24-pounders — Inconveniences  of  instantaneous  inflammation  of  powder — Particu- 
lar phenomenon— Powder  of  General  Rutti — Extraordinary  force — In  two 
schools  destroying  all  pieces — Causes  of  this  fact— Better  the  enemy  of  good — 
Weight  of  pieces — Force  of  recoil — Analogy — Experience  of  1802  and  1803 — 
Founded  the  system — Artillery  of  the  Empire — Comparative  weight  of  cannon 
and  ball — Lightness  of  English  pieces — Uniformity  of  construction  of  material — 
Importance— M.  de  Gribauval — His  principles  badly  understood— Twenty-two 
kinds  of  wheels  reduced  to  five — Unit  of  combat— Composition  of  battery — Its 
three  elements— Importance  of  mobility — Its  actual  perfection— Work  of  M. 
Vallée— Artillery  drivers— Made  all  campaigns  of  the  republic — Artillery  train, 
creation  of  author— System  perfected  under  tho  Restoration — Artillery  of 
now  invention — General  considerations — Congrèvc  rockets — Views  of  author 
upon  their  employment — New  combination  of  arms  for  battle — Two  infantries — 
Proportion  of  arms— Infantry— Artillery— Its  importance  when  cannon  can  not 
be  employed— Mountain  warfare— War  on  the  plain— Effects  of  rockets  in  the 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  CO 

first  kind  of  warfare — Experience  to  follow — Necessity  to  be  prepared  for  their 
employ — Revolution  in  the  art  of  war — Paixhans'  artillery — Character  of  heavy 
artillery — Swiftness  compared  with  mass — System  preferred — Distinction — 
Mobile  artillery — Fixed  artillery — Analysis  of  advantages  of  Paixhans'  artillery 
— Resistance  of  air — Quantity  of  motion — Destructive  action — Paixhans'  cannon 
in  the  défonce  of  places — Will  change  marine  system — Ship  of  the  line  compared 
with  frigato — Historical  of  Paixhans'  guns — Influence  of  author  upon  their 
adoption. 

Notes. — 1.  Remaria  on  Confederate  artillery.  2.  Armstrong,  Whitworth,  and 
Rlakely  guns.  3.  Brass  ordnance.  4.  Deflection  of  Armstrong  guns.  5.  Projec" 
tiles  for  Armstrong  gOlfS.  6.  Restraining  the  recoil  of  the  Armstrong  gun.  7. 
Shrapnel  or  spherical  case.  ~8.  Double-shotting.  9.  Penetration.  10.  Ricochet 
fire.  11.  Salvo.  12.  Spiking  and  unspikiiig  guns.  13.  Glass  hand-grenades.  14. 
Grummet  and  jnnk  wads.  15.  Gun  cotton  or  pyroxyle.  16.  Carcass.  17.  Lasso 
harness.  18.  Slow-matches.  19.  Ice.  20.  Passage  of  rivers.  21.  Pontoons.  22. 
Distance  by  sound.  23.  Tactics  of  English  artillery.  24.  Present  artillery  tactics 
of  the  French.  25.  Napoleon's  organization  for  offensive  warfare  and  plan  of  at- 
tack. 26.  Tablo  showing  the  personnel  and  materiel  of  a  Prussian,  Austrian,  Rus- 
sian, French,  and  English  light  battery. 

The  third  arm  which  has  become  indispensable  in  warfare  is  artillery. 
It  is  of  capital  importance;  but  its  efficiency  depends  particularly  upon 
its  organization,  and  the  principles  upon  which  the  latter  is  based. 

I  will  endeavor  to  establish  these  principles  and  to  develop  their 
consequences.  I  shall  first  commence  with  the  material,  and  will  then 
pass  to  the  means  necessary  to  make  the  best  employment  of  it. 

The  most  simple  artillery  is  the  best.  If  one  calibre  could  satisfy  all 
requirements,  and  if  the  same  carriage  could  serve  for  all  different 
transports,  the  perfection  of  artillery  would  be  attained. 

But  it  is  not  thus.  Artillery  must  produce  many  different  effects  ; 
these  effects  being  determined,  it  is  necessary  to  find  the  calibres  which 
can  produce  them,  while  limiting  their  number  to  strict  necessity  ; 
because,  so  soon  as  one  calibre  can  serve  for  the  same  object,  there  is  ono 
too  many,  and  it  becomes  prejudicial,  on  account  of  the  complications  it 
leads  to  in  regard  to  ammunition,  changes,  and  repairs. 

Artillery  should  be  of  three  kinds  :  siege  and  fortress  artillery,  field 
artillery,  and  mountain  artillery.  In  each  of  these  divisions,  and 
despite  the  difference  which  necessarily  exists  in  the  weight  and  dimen- 
sions of  the  several  pieces,  yet,  as  much  as  possible,  the  same  calibres 
should  bo  adopted,  that  tho  same  ammunition  may  be  used. 

In  sieges  and  the  defence  of  places,  pieces  are  necessary  which  kill 
the  men,  dismount  the  cannon  of  the  enemy,  and  which  are  of  great 
range.  Experience  has  demonstrated  that  12-poundcrs  attain  this 
object  perfectly  well. 

In  this  species  of  warfare  it  is,  besides,  requisite  to  destroy  the  ram- 
parts, crumble  them  to  pieces,  and  to  open  a  practicable  way  to  penetrate 


70  THE    SPIRIT    OF  . 

into  the  stronghold.  Here  artillery  is  no  longer  a  deadly  weapon,  but 
simply  a  tool,  a  machine — the  battering-ram  of  the  ancients;  it  has  only 
become  more  powerful  and  expeditious.  To  obtain  this  effect,  24-pound- 
er8  are  absolutely  indispensable.  Sixteen-pounders,  formerly  used, 
have,  therefore,  become  superfluous — insufficient  in  one  case,  and  exces- 
Bive  in  the  other. 

Field  artillery  should  follow  the  troops  in  all  their  movements,  and, 
promptly  arriving  upon  a  fixed  point,  should  crush  the  enemy.  A  light, 
easily  transported  material  is,  then,  necessary,  which  being  of  the  great- 
est mobility,  need  not  stop  before  an}7  obstacle  the  field  may  present. 
I  believe  6-pounders,  used  all  over  Europe,  and  which  I  adopted  when 
at  the  head  of  the  French  artillery,  are  sufficient  for  this  purpose.  With 
this  calibre  all  the  wars  of  the  Empire  have  been  fought.  The  8-pound- 
ers  have  been  again  introduced.  There  is  no  doubt  that  their  superiority 
gives  some  advantages  ;  but  it  is  a  great  inconvenience  to  augment  the 
weight  of  the  ammunition  by  one-third,  thus  requiring  more  considera- 
ble means  of  transportation — means  which  are  always  wanting  in  war. 

A  second  object  in  field  manœuvres  is  to  produce  great  effects  with 
the  aid  of  powerful  reserves;  to  silence  the  fire  of  fiold-works  upon 
which  the  enemy  supports  himself;  to  arm  those  which  have  been  con- 
structed ;  to  open  non-terraced  walls,  and  to  protect  the  passage  of 
rivers.  For  this,  12-pounders  are  required,  but  less  heavy  than  those 
employed  in  sieges  or  in  the  defence  of  places.  Finally,  every  army 
should  be  accompanied  by  one  or  two  batteries  of  short  24-pounders,  to 
bo  fired  with  a  less  charge  than  one-third  of  the  weight  of  the  ball,  and 
which,  in  a  thousand  cases,  will  render  the  greatest  services  on  the 
day  of  battle. 

The  calibres,  as  just  considered,  should  then  be  in  accordance  with  the 
eflects  to  be  produced  ;  and  notwithstanding  their  great  number,  they 
can  be  reduced  to  three,  by  varying  the  dimension  and  the  weight  of 
pieces. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Hollow  projectiles,  bombs,  and  howitzer  shells  are 
also  used  ;  it  has  been  sought  to  adapt  their  calibre  as  much  as  possible 
to  that  of  cannon,  and  no  difficulty  has  been  experienced. 

The  shell  of  a  diameter  of  five  inches,  five  lines,  which  has  the  same 
diameter  as  the  24-pounder,  is  used  everywhere,  with  the  advantage  of 
being  equally  suited  for  cannon  and  howitzer.  A  heavier  calibre  has 
been  found  useful  for  siege  howitzers,  and,  in  accordance  with  system,  a 
diameter  of  eight  inches  has  been  given  ^o  them,  which  permits  the  em- 
ployment of  these  shells  in  the  8-inch  mortars,  so  useful  in  the  attack 
and  defence  of  places. 

We  come  now  toother  mortars  of  superior  calibre.  Here  the  great- 
er the  calibre,  the  greater  the  effect.  The  expense  and  difficulty  of  the 
transportation  of  ammunition   are  the   only  argumeuts  against  their 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  71 

use.  Tho  mortars  destined  to  receive  a  very  heavy  charge,  cast  upon 
a  plate  which  supports  them,  and  which  wero  formorly  called  after  me, 
as  well  as  those  called  Villantroy  mortars,  are  only  applicable  for  coast 
defence,  on  account  of  their  immense  weight,  and  because  their  particu- 
lar object  is  to  obtain  a  very  great  range,  which  is  useless  in  sieges  and 
in  the  defence  of  places. 

Later,  I  shall  spoak  of  a  newly-invented  artillery,  which,  while  pre- 
serving tho  principle  of  unity  of  calibre,  can  be  employed  to  produce 
different  effects. 

The  calibres  of  which  I  have  just  spoken  are,  then,  the  only  ones 
which  siege  and  field  artillery  requires. 

Finally,  we  como  to  artillery  suitable  for  mountain  warfare.  With- 
out entering  into  details,  I  will  remark  that  it  should  be  composed  of 
pieces  light  enough  to  bo  carried  on  the  back  of  mules  ;  heavier  pieces, 
which  are  transported  upon  carriages,  are  more  embarrassing  than  use- 
ful. Congrève  rockets  are  also  eminently  suited  for  mountain  warfare. 
I  shall  speak  of  this  invention  hereafter. 

There  exists  yet  another  weapon  which  could  be  most  advantageous- 
ly employed  ;  it  is  the  wall-piece,  but  recontly  introduced,  which  is 
charged  at  the  breech,  and  throws  balls  of  several  ounces  weight  with 
great  accuracy,  ranging  equally  with  pieces  of  small  calibre.  These 
guns,  distributed  to  the  number  of  ten  or  twelve  in  each  regiment, 
and  placed,  with  their  ammunition, %upon  a  single  carriage,  would  occa- 
sionally be  of  extreme  utility. 

After  having  spoken  of  the  calibre  of  guns  and  the  motives  of  their 
choice,  it  is  proper  to  say  a  word  as  to  the  other  dimensions  of  pieces, 
and  their  weight.  Their  determination  is  not  arbitrary  ;  it  is  derived 
from  positive  circumstances,  which  directly  influence  a  good  service. 

The  length  of  a  cannon  depends  upon  the  charge  which  is  used.  Ex- 
periments have  not  shown  tho  precise  limit  for  the  greatest  range;  it 
has  not  been  obtained  in  order  to  avoid  other  drawbacks,  but  it  is  pret- 
ty nearly  determined.  The  gas  which  is  formed  by  the  ignition  of  the 
powder,  and  the  explosion  of  which  produces  the  force  which  pushes 
the  ball,  operates  as  a  spring  does  when  set  free  ;  or,  in  proportion  of 
its  action  upon  tho  ball  in  movement,  it  augments  the  force  which  pro- 
pols  it,  and  consequently  the  range.  This  action  is  the  result  of  ignition. 
If  tho  ignition  is  not  complete  when  the  ball  has  left  the  cannon,  thero 
is  a  diminution  of  range  ;  if  it  is  completed  prematurely,  and  the  ball 
has  received  the  whole  impulsion  before  having  traversed  the  whole 
length  of  the  cannon,  there  is  also  a  diminution  of  range  ;  but  then  it 
is  the  friction  which  occasions  it.  The  quantity  of  the  powder  must 
be  such  that  this  expansion  of  the  gas  which,  it  produces  when  inflam- 
ing, accompanies  (lie  ball  fmrn  the  bottom  of  the  breech  to  tho  mouth, 
peithcr  more  nor  lull  ;  UuM,  with  loo  -  trongtr  charge?  arc  no 

sary,  and  with  SO  iter  piece*  weaker  charge?  mutt  bo  used. 


72  THE    SI'IRIT    OF 

In  France,  a  uniform  charge  for  cannon  has  hecn  adopted,  represent- 
ed by  ono-third  of  the  weight  of  the  ball.  "With  this  charge,  a  series  of 
experiments  for  the  determination  of  the  length  which  gives  the  great- 
est range  has  been  made,  and  pieces  of  thirty-five  calibres  in  length 
have  been  cast. 

After  having  noted  the  range  obtained,  the  chace  of  the  gun  has 
been  diminished  by  sawing  off  the  length  of  one  calibre,  and  the  range 
was  found  to  be  greater.  The  operation  was  renewed,  and  the  result 
always  the  same,  until  roaching  twenty-seven  calibres  ;  and,  when  pass- 
ing this  limit,  to  twenty-six  calibres,  the  range  decreased.  It  was  then 
concluded  that,  with  a  piece  of  twenty-soven  calibres  in  length  and  a 
charge  of  one-third  of  the  weight  of  tho  ball,  the  maximum  range  was 
obtained. 

But,  with  such  a  length,  the  manoeuvring  of  pieces  is  dilficult,  and 
to  remain  within  the  mean  of  the  limits  for  siege  and  fortress  pieces, 
that  of  twenty-two  has  been  adopted.  For  field-pieces,  which  require 
yet  easier  and  more  prompt  manoeuvring,  this  length  has  been  reduced 
to  eighteen  calibres  ;  in  foreign  countries  it  has  been  fixed  at  fourteen. 

I  do  not  speak  of  howitzers,  an  arm  particularly  designed  for  rico- 
chet firing,  established  upon  different  principles,  and  required  to  fulfil 
different  conditions. 

I  will  now  make  a  remark  founded  upon  a  well-established  fact,  the 
application  of  which  is  important,  and  which  will  be  a  matter  of  aston- 
ishment. Powder  should  inflame  with  rapidity,  but  not  instantaneous- 
ly ;  otherwise  the  inert  force  (vis  inertix)  occasions  a  shock  of  such  vio- 
lence as  to  destroy  tho  gun  itself.  Its  action  must  bo  successive.  A 
particular  fact  has  given  me  the  means  to  examine  this  phenomenon. 

General  Rutti,  an  officer  of  great  merit,  and  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  Department  of  Powder  and  Saltpetre,  had  succeeded  in  manufac- 
turing powder  of  extraordinary  strength,  and  he  believed  to  havo  ob- 
tained a  very  important  object.  Five  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  this 
particular  powder  had  already  been  mado,  and  it  was  determined  to 
preserve  it  as  a  precious  article  for  times  of  war.  Luckily,  circum- 
stances changed  this  destination.  The  new  powder  was  ordered  to  be 
consumed  for  the  exercises  of  the  guard  in  1828.  In  two  schools  all 
the  cannon  were  burst  and  unfitted  for  service.  These  facts  ascertain- 
ed, I  sought  their  cause,  and  no  other  explanation  but  that  which  I  havo 
given  could  be  obtained.  In  this  case  the  adage  may  woll  be  repeat- 
ed :  "Better  is  the  enemy  of  good." 

As  to  the  weight  of  pieces,  it  can  bo  diminished  very  considerably 
and  without  inconvonience,  with  regard  to  resistance  ;  but  the  gun-car- 
riages suffer  by  it,  and  are  easily  broken.  The  force  of  the  recoil,  oper- 
ating upon  too  light  a  mass,  produces  a  brisk  shock,  and  destroys  it. 
After  the  weight  of  tho  piece  haa  reached  a  certain  limit,  whatever  the 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  73 

excess  of  the  weight  of  the  metal,  the  gun-carriage  should  be  strength- 
ened to  that  extent. 

This  fact  will  be  understood  through  the  following  examplo,  which 
any  one  might  see  at  any  day:  A  juggler  places  upon  his  breast  a  stone 
of  great  weight,  and  braves  tho  effect  of  a  blow  with  a  club,  while,  should 
this  blow  fall  upon  a  smaller  stono,  he  would  bo  wounded. 

In  1802  and  1803,  when  I  was  engaged  in  establishing  tho  new  system 
of  artillery,  which  has  served  during  the  whole  period  of  the  empire, 
experiments  which  I  ordorcd  upon  tho  weight  of  the  metal  demonstrat- 
ed that  that  which  satisfies  equally  the  requirements  of  mobility  and 
conservation  is  a  weight  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  pounds  per  pound 
of  the  weight  of  the  ball,  well  propelled  by  a  charge  of  one-third  of  the 
weight  of  the  ball;  so  that  a  6-pounder  gun,  for  instance,  should  weigh 
6X120=720  pounds. 

The  English  have  attached  great  importance  to  the  lightness  of  field 
artillery.  They  do  not  give,  at  least  they  did  not  give,  thirty  years  ago, 
more  than  ninety  pounds  per  pound  of  the  weight  of  the  ball  ;  but  they 
had  likewise  diminished  the  charge  to  one-fourth  instead  of  one-third. 
Another  word  upon  the  material.  Gun  and  other  carriages  are  neces- 
sary elements  for  artillery  service  ;  their  use  alters  and  destroys  them, 
and  replacements  become  constantly  necessary.  Hence  tho  immense 
advantage  of  a  perfectly  uniform  construction.  M.  de  Gribauval,  first 
inspector-general  of  artillery,  author  of  the  first  regular  system,  has 
had  the  glory  of  establishing  this  uniformity.  Thus  the  remains  of  a 
carriage  constructed  at  Auxonne  or  at  Toulouse  can  serve  to  repair  a 
like  carriage  constructed  at  Strasbourg.  But,  loft  to  the  influence  of 
the  officers  of  the  workmen,  their  pedantry  led  to  useless  divisions  and 
subdivisions  in  the  construction  of  material,  thus  occasioning,  in  a 
systematic  manner,  renewed  great  embarrassments,  almost  equivalent 
to  the  confusion  from  which  the  servico  had  just  escaped. 

To  give  an  idea,  I  will  cite  but  one  fact  which  has  remained  in  my 
memory.  There  were,  as  well  as  I  can  recollect,  twenty-two  kinds  of 
wheels  in  his  system  of  artillery.  In  the  system  of  1803  I  reduced 
them  to  ten.  Nowadays  four  or  five  arc  only  used;  and  I  believe  that 
no  material  has  ever  attained  a  like  perfection.  In  the  first  war  fifty 
pieces  of  cannon,  well  commanded,  had  more  effect  than  one  hundred, 
such  as  they  were  formerly.* 

From  the  praise  I  have  accorded  to  modern  artillery,  I  only  except 
the  calibre  of  eight,  which  has  been  again  introduced,  and  its  exagger- 
ated weight  for  field-pieces  has  again  been  fixed  at  one  hundred  and 
fifty  pounds  per  pound  of  the  ball. 

♦Marshal  Y  alée,  formerly  central  LMpeetor  "f  artillery  under  tbo  Restoration, 
i^  thfl  author  of  the  fine  syptem  of  artillery,  in  persoand  ànd  M  m  adopt- 

ed in  ttêm  -■     Xntchy  Authnr 
7 


74  THE    sriRIT    OF 

But  the  best  material  in  the  world  producos  but  an  indifferent  effect, 
if  it  i3  not  placed  in  the  hands  of  men  who  can  proporly  manage  it; 
and  however  remarkable  the  instruction  of  the  corps  of  artillery  has 
always  been  in  France,  many  things  were  still  wanting;  its  organiza- 
tion was  very  imperfect. 

The  most  glaring  faults  have  been  successively  remedied,  and  to-day 
the  requirements  of  a  well-established  sorvice  appear  to  have  been  sat- 
isfied. 

The  unit  of  combat  in  artillery  is  the  battery.  It  is  composed  of  from 
six  to  eight  pieces,  always  marching  together,  with  their  ammunition, 
and  placed  under  the  same  command.  It  is  in  artillery  what  the  bat- 
talion is  in  infantry — the  squadron  in  cavalry.  This  body  must,  then,  be 
homogeneous  and  compact;  the  elements  which  compose  it  must  be 
organized  in  the  same  spirit,  and  be  accustomed  to  act  together. 

There  are  three  distinct  elements  :  the  material,  or  the  guns,  properly 
speaking,  those  who  serve  them,  and  those  who  conduct  them.  If 
these  elements  do  not  thoroughly  accord,  then  artillery  is  imperfect. 

The  first  merit  of  artillery,  after  the  bravery  of  the  cannoniers,  is 
accuracy  of  fire  and  mobility.  It  is,  then,  easily  seen  of  what  impor- 
tance is  the  management  of  the  horses  charged  with  drawing  the 
cannon. 

Formerly,  everything  was  divided;  the  cannon  remained  in  the 
arsenal  or  in  park  until  the  moment  of  an  engagement;  the  horses  bo- 
longed  to  a  contractor,  and  the  conductors  were  his  servants,  treated 
without  consideration,  having  no  prospects  of  fortune  whatever,  and 
called  drivers  of  artillery. 

With  this  monstrous  organization  the  whole  Republican  campaigns 
were  made. 

Under  the  Consulate  and  during  the  Empire  this  service  was  raised, 
and  the  corps  of  artillery  trains,  with  its  non-commissioned  officers  and 
officers,  was  formed.  Thus  the  prospect  of  advancement  was  held  out, 
and  the  name  driver  was  replaced  by  that  of  soldier  of  the  train.  My 
influence  acted  directly  upon  this  organization — it  was  mostly  my 
work;  and,  in  order  not  to  offend  the  rights  of  grades  for  the  command, 
I  took  care  to  give  to  the  officors  of  the  train  only  very  inferior  grades 
in  comparison  with  those  of  the  corps  of  artillery. 

Thus  was  prevented  (which  is  indispensable),  namely  :  all  embarrass- 
ment and  conflict  in  the  relations  of  chief  officers  of  batteries  and  those 
who  conducted  them.  Tho  latter,  on  account  of  their  inferior  instruction, 
should  never  have  superior  authority,  and  this  difference  in  the  grades 
placing  them  properly  upon  the  list  of  military  gradation,  kept  awako 
the  spirit  of  duty  and  obedience.  This  organization  lastod  during  the 
entire  period  of  tho  Empire.  At  the  end  of  the  Restoration  the  Council 
of  War,  of  which  I  was  ono  of  the  vice-presidents  under  tho  Dauphin, 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  75 

changed  the  organization  of  the  corps  of  artillery.  It  was  divided  into 
batteries,  having  their  material,  cannon,  and  horses  conducted  by  can- 
noniers  of  the  second  class,  who  were  at  the  same  time  instructed  to 
manoeuvre  and  serve  tho  cannon,  and  which  were  called  cannoniers — 
conductors.     This  organization  has  certainly  attained  perfection. 

During  the  last  few  years  two  kinds  of  cannon  have  been  invented, 
whose  effect,  according  to  my  understanding,  will  be  wonderful,  if  they 
are  properly  employed  in  the  first  war  :  tho  Congrèvo  rockets  for  field 
service,  and  guns  called  Paixhans  for  the  defence  of  coasts  and  for- 
tresses. I  firmly  beliove  that  the  resistance  of  the  latter  wiïfr  be  increas- 
ed. The  conduct  of  war  and  the  organization  of  armies  will,  likewise, 
experience  a  great  modification.  But  these  two  objects  merit  particular 
development.        \ 

The  part  which  Vrtillery  plays  in  warfare  has  acquired,  with  every 
day,  more  importance,  not  only  by  reason  of  its  augmentation,  but  also 
on  account  of  its  great  mobility,  which  permits  its  movements  to  be 
infinitely  combined.  However,  there  are  limits  to  that  mobility  which 
gives  the  means  of  assembling  upon  a  given  point  a  great  amount  of 
artillery.  The  number  of  cannon  which  can  be  carried  into  war  is 
equally  limited,  on  account  of  the  expenses  and  embarrassments  an  ex- 
cess of  material  would  produce — embarrassments  of  such  extent  upon 
marches,  as  to  greatly  surpass  any  advantages  to  be  derived  from  their 
use  in  the  moment  of  action.  Experience  has  demonstrated  that  tho 
maximum  should  be  four  pieces  for  one  thousand  men  :  besides,  this  pro- 
portion will,  after  a  few  months  of  a  campaign,  be  greatly  exceeded, 
since  the  material  is  not  subjected  to  the  same  causes  of  diminution  as 
the  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  the  personnel  of  artillery  being  less  nu- 
merous and,  therefore,  more  easily  kept  at  its  proper  complement. 

But  the  Congrève  rockets,  which  have,  by  degrees,  arrived  at  great  per- 
fection, and  which  are  now  directed  with  sufficient  accuracy,  make  an 
artillery  which,  through  the  development  susceptible  in  their  applica- 
tion, may  becoino  a  principal  arm. 

Indeed,  when  tho  weapon  only  consists  of  projectiles  ;  when  no  ma- 
chine i3  any  longer  necessary  to  throw  them,  and  whon  no  longer  any 
surface  is  presented  to  the  enemy  upon  which  ho  can  direct  his  shots; 
when,  finally,  by  means  of  very  simple  dispositions,  an  instantaneous 
fire  can  so  be  developed  as  to  cover  the  whole  front  of  a  regiment  with 
a  shower  of  balls,  representing  tho  firo  of  a  battery  of  one  hundred 
pieces  of  cannon — then  the  means  of  destruction  are  such  as  to  make 
any  attack,  such  as  tho  rules  ami  principles  of  actual  warfare  havo  pre- 
scribed it.  an  utter  impossibility. 

I  would  conceive  tin-  employment  of  the  Congrève  rockets  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner:  I  would  instruct  fivo  or  six  hundred  men  in  each  regi- 
ment in  the  service  of  this  new  arm.     Two  chariot?  would  suffice  to  car- 


70  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

ry  one  hundred  rocket-frames  such  as  the  Austrians  have  adopted,  and 
at  the  word  of  command  these  one  hundred  rocket-frames,  each  served 
by  three  or  four  men,  would  develop  such  a  fire  as  can  hardly  be  con- 
ceived. 

To  a  fire  like  this  could  you  oppose  masses,  evon  troops  in  line  of 
battle,  upon  several  parallel  lines  ?  Assuredly  not.  But  the  gain  of  the 
battle  consists  in  making  the  enemy  recoil  ;  the  space  which  separates 
us  from  him  must  then  be  traversed  by  marching,  and  to  do  this  with 
the  least  possible  danger,  that  arm  must  be  employed  which  can  run 
over  the  distance  with  the  greatest  celerity.  Hence  cavalry  suits  best  ; 
and  this  cavalry  even  will  bo  subjected  to  a  new  mode  of  manoeuvring, 
in  order  to  face  the  enemy's  fire  with  the  least  chances  of  destruction. 
Therefore  it  must  be  scattered  as  skirmishers,  ready,  however,  to  unite 
at  a  given  signal,  to  prepare  for  the  shock  which  must  follow  the  charge. 
Infantry  then  changes  roles  ;  it  becomos  the  auxiliary  of  the  Congrève 
rockets,  or  rather  these  rockets  become  its  weapon,  and  guns  are  only 
accessory. 

In  this  new  system  infantry  will  have  need  of  an  entirely  different 
instruction.  It  will  be  divided  into  two  parties  :  the  first  charged  with 
the  service  of  the  rockets  ;  the  second,  in  order  to  support  the  former, 
and  to  serve  for  its  rallying  point  the  moment  it  will  come  into  immedi- 
ate contact  with  the  enemy.  The  proportion  of  the  arms  must  then  be 
changed;  more  cavalry  than  infantry  will  be  needed  ;  a  cavalry  which 
is  drilled  in  a  special  manner,  and  an  infantry -artillery,  if  I  may  ex- 
press myself  thus,  whose  employment  will  be  limited  to  the  service  of 
the  rockets,  to  sustain  and  protect  them,  to  occupy  entrenched  posts,  to 
defend  fortresses,  and  to  carry  on  mountain  warfare. 

But  this  new  artillery  assumes  great  importance  in  a  thousand  situa- 
tions where  cannon  are  of  no  use  whatever.  In  mountains,  a  few  pieces 
with  great  difficulty  are  now  carried,  which  produce  but  little  effect.  With 
rockets  we  have  a  long  range  weapon,  which  can  be  everywhere  estai - 
lished  in  great  profusion,  upon  the  crest  of  rocks  as  well  as  upon  less 
elevated  positions.  In  perfect  plains  every  edifice  is  transformed  into 
a  fortress,  and  every  village  church  roof  becomes  at  will  the  platform 
for  a  formidable  battery.  In  a  word,  this  invention,  such  as  it  is,  and 
as  improvements  will  make  it,  lends  itself  to  everything,  is  suited  for 
all  circumstances  and  combinations,  and  ought  to  have  an  immense 
ascendency  over  the  destiny  of  the  world. 

Served  by  a  special  corps,  and  considered  purely  as  artillery,  the  em- 
ployment of  the  rockets  would  be  necessarily  rare,  and  would  produce 
but  little  effect.  An  immense  development  is  the  only  way  to  make 
them  useful,  powerful,  and  a  matter  of  astonishment  ;  they  should,  then, 
properly  speaking,  become  the  arm  of  the  army. 

The  nature  of  things  is  but  slowly  considered.     Routine  acts  a  long 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  77 

time  without  employing  itself  with  any  possihlo  modification?  and  ameli- 
orations; therefore  the  power  of  Congrève  rockets  will  not  he  appre- 
ciated hut  in  a  long  period.  But  if,  in  the  first  war,  a  skilful  and 
calculating  general  would  consider  the  question  in  all  its  hearings  and 
consequences,  if  he  would  quietly  prepare  his  means  to  display  them 
upon  the  battle-field,  he  will  obtain  such  successes  as  defy  all  resistance 
until  the  enemy  would  employ  the  same  means.  At  the  moment  of  this 
grand  trial  the  personal  genius  of  the  chief  will  have  a  great  ascen- 
dency over  the  issue  of  the  war. 

However  seemingly  rational  the  result  may  be  which  I  predict,  ex- 
perience alone  will  incontestably  establish  the  merit  of  this  new  inven- 
tion. The  wise  man  will  feel  no  absolute  conviction  until  facts  have 
realized  his  expectations,  so  many  are  the  unforeseen  circumstances 
modifying  the  deepest  calculations  and  the  most  seducing  probabilities. 

Taking  everything  into  consideration,  appearances  are  such  that  a 
skilful  and  enlightened  general  should,  in  the  first  war,  prepare  to 
employ  this  new  arm  to  astonish  the  enomy  by  its  effects.  If  he  uses 
it  altogether,  ho  will  probably  be  master  of  the  campaign;  if  his  adver- 
sary has  been  as  vigilant  as  himself  ho  will,  at  least,  guard  himself 
from  defeat.  But  his  foresight  should  embrace  all  consequences  of 
this  new  agent,  considering  its  relations  to  the  other  arms — their  pro- 
portions, manœuvres,  and  manner  of  being  served. 

After  the  successful  employment  of  Congrève  rockets  during  a  cam- 
paign, it  is  evident  that  they  will  be  adopted  by  all  armies;  then  the 
equilibrium  will  be  re-established,  and  none  will  have  an  exclusive  ad- 
vantage But  the  art  of  war  will  be  powerfully  modified.  More  lively 
actions  and  their  greater  moral  effect  will  make  the  battles  shorter,  and 
diminish  the  effusion  of  blood — since  it  is  not  the  number  of  killed  which 
gives  victory,  but  that  of  those  who  can  be  frightened. 

I  repeat  that  Congrùve  rockets  should  create  a  revolution  in  the  art 
of  war,  and  they  will  be  the  first  success  and  glory  of  him  who,  before 
any  other,  has  developed  their  importance  and  the  advantages  to  be  de- 
rived from  them. 

I  come  now  to  the  Faixhnns  guns. 

Heavy  artillery,  to  fulfil  its  purpose,  should  have  great  range,  and 
the  projectiles  it  carries  a  great  quantity  of  motion.  To  obtain  the  lat- 
ter, ono  of  two  things  is  necessary:  either  the  velocity  must  bo  very 
great  and  the  projectile  less  heavy,  or  the  projectile  must  be  very  heavy 
and  have  less  velocity — since  the  quantity  of  motion  of  a  body  is  equal 
to  its  mass,  multiplied  by  its  velocity. 

Until  now,  a  less  heavy  ball  with  considerable  velocity  has  been  pre- 
ferred, on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  transporting  projectiles.  But  if 
this  was  right  during  when  the  means  have  to  be  transported 

in  a  short  and  fixed  period,  it  was  wrong  under  different  circumstances, 
7* 


78  THE  srtitiT  OP 

where  sufficient  time  could  be  given  to  make  transportation  easy,  what- 
ever the  weight  of  the  material.  For  the  defence  of  fortresses,  tho 
armament  of  coasts,  and  marine  service,  this  artillery  possesses  immense 
advantages,  which  I  will  analyze  in  a  succinct  manner: 

1.  The  resistance  of  the  air  to  the  motion  of  bodies  being  in  propor- 
tion to  the  square  of  the  velocity,  it  is  much  less  with  these  projectiles, 
and  hence  both  range  and  accuracy  of  fire  are  greater.  Supposing  a 
velocity  of  twelve  hundred  feet  per  second  to  be  that  of  the  ordinary 
ball,  and  four  hundred  feet  that  of  the  Paixhans  ball,  the  resistance  of 
the  air  will  be  as  nine  to  one. 

2.  The  quantity  of  motion  of  a  twenty-four  pound  ball  with  a  velocity 
of  twelve  hundred  feet,  will  be  represented  by  the  number  28,808; 
while  the  Paixhans  ball,  of  the  12-inch  calibre,  or  of  one  hundred  and 
forty  pounds  weight,  with  four  hundred  feet  of  velocity,  will  be  ex- 
pressed by  56,000 — nearly  double;  that  of  a  thirty-six  pound  ball,  with 
the  same  velocity  of  twelve  hundred  feet,  will  bo  43,000 — consequently 
much  more  feeble. 

3.  The  action  of  destruction  being  like  the  surfaces  of  the  square  of 
the  diameters,  the  proportion  will  be  one  to  four. 

4.  Finally,  the  thirty-six  pound  ball  traverses  the  breastwork  of  an 
earthwork,  or  the  sides  of  a  vessel,  or  it  buries  itself.  Wherever  it 
may  lodge,  it  causes  no  damage  :  and  if  it  penetrates  a  plank,  the  hole 
is  easily  stopped  up  ;  but  the  Paixhans  projectile  produces  different 
ravages.  By  its  great  diameter  and  the  slowness  of  its  movement, 
with  an  equal  quantity  of  motion,  the  effect  is  contrary  to  that  pro- 
duced by  great  velocity;  it  demolishes  a  larger  surface,  makes  an  im- 
mense breach,  and  if  a  battery  is  struck,  it  must  be  reconstructed  ;  if  a 
vessel,  it  sinks,  without  any  possibility  of  being  saved. 

The  defence  of  a  place,  supported  by  such  means,  raises  it  almost  to 
the  moral  strength  of  attack;  and  the  employment  of  this  arm  upon 
the  sea  against  vessels  will  cause  the  disappearance  of  squadrons,  and 
especially  that  of  large  vessels.  The  superiority  of  a  ship  of  the  lino 
against  a  vessel  of  inferior  class  has  two  causes  :  the  ship  carries  artil- 
lery against  which  the  thickness  of  timber  of  a  frigate  can  offer  no 
resistance;  and  the  latter  carries  artillery  of  insufficient  calihre  to 
affect  a  ship  of  tho  line.  Thus  a  frigate  is  unable  to  make  the  slightest 
attack  upon  a  vessel  of  the  line,  since  tho  fire  of  the  former  has  only 
danger  for  the  crew,  and  influences  the  manœuvres,  while  the  fire  of 
the  ship  of  the  line  destroys,  besides,  the  opposing  vessel  itself,  and  can, 
in  a  moment,  send  it  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea. 

But  now  a  small  ship,  either  steam  or  sail,  of  but  inconsiderable 
strength,  can  carry  one  or  two  pieces,  a  single  ball  of  which  suffices  to 
destroy  the  largest  vessels  ;  ten  small  vessels,  each  armed  with  two 
heavy  guns,  can  quickly  surround  a  vessel  and  make  an  end  of  it.     In 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  79 

this  case,  vessels  costing  as  much  as  1,500,000  francs,  offer  no  guaran- 
tee of  security  or  exploits.  The  Paixhans  artillery  is,  then,  the  destruc- 
tion of  navies  as  now  constituted. 

During  the  Restoration,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Paixhans,  an  officer  of 
great  distinction,  conceived  the  idea  of  proposing  this  artillery.  Louis 
XVIII  nominated  a  commission  of  generals  and  admirals  to  examine 
it,  over  which  I  presided.  The  exposition  o.f  this  system  struck  me  by 
its  novelty  and  just  conclusions,  and  I  became  its  declared  partisan. 

Experiments  were,  however,  necessary  to  determine  the  range,  great- 
est accuracy  of  fire,  and  manner  of  manoeuvring  this  ordnance  most 
easily.  They  were  made  at  Brest,  and  succeeded  perfectly,  surpass- 
ing the  expectations  of  the  author.  From  thence  date  those  changes 
in  artillery  which  have  immensely  modified  war  upon  the  seas,  in 
rendering  large  vessels  superfluous  ;  the  defence  of  coasts  has  become 
easier  and  surer;  and  on  this  account,  it  appears  to  me,  the  de- 
fence of  fortresses  will  be  much  prolonged.  But  the  adoption  of  this 
new  arm  should  not  disponse  with  the  employment  of  hollow  projectiles, 
fired  from  36  and  24-pounders — since  their  effects,  though  less  power- 
ful, are  still  formidable  against  an  enemy,  and  favorable  for  defence. 

NOTES. 

1.  Remarks  on  Confederate  Artillery.— Hereafter,  artillery  officors  of 
our  service  will  have  to  give  important  testimony  as  to  the  determination  of  ques- 
tions which  are  now  being  inquired  into  amid  the  shock  of  battle. 

The  increased  range  of  artillery,  still  on  the  ascendency,  and,  in  the  case  of 
heavy  guns,  apparently  destined  to  assume  a  fabulous  extent,  and  their  relative 
effects  upon  armieR  and  fortifications  of  all  kinds,  with  the  artillery  officer  ;  the 
best  mode  of  resisting  the  effects  of  modern  artillery  by  means  of  earth,  stone, 
and  iron,  and  those  of  iron-clad  navies,  with  the  engineer  officer;  and  the  influ- 
ence of  the  improved  small-arms  upon  men,  courage,  and  tactics,  with  the  officers 
of  all  arms — are  still  points  susceptible  of  controversy;  and  our  officers  will  be 
peculiarly  apt  to  give  opinions  thereon  worthy  of  consideration,  since  whatever 
science  and  military  skill  can  bring  to  bear  on  the  Issue  of  the  strngglo  is  now 
being  practically  tested. 

And,  in  view  of  these  important  questions  at  issue,  it  is  gratifying  to  know  that 
our  officers  of  artillery  appear  to  be  fitted  in  a -high  degree  for  that  dnty.  The 
artillery  service  of  the  Confederate  States,  more  than  any,  has  won  laurels  in  this 
war.  No  one  can  witness  the  performances  of  our  corps  of  artillery  without  bo- 
Ing  impressed  most  favorably.  And  because  artillery  officers  feel  at  OOC*  that  they 
must  study  and  attend  to  their  duties,  or  else  their  weapon,  instead  of  achieving 
its  high  mission  of  breaking  the  confidence  of  the  advancing  enemy,  becomes  an 
encumbrance,  they  have  earned  the  first  place  among  the  arms  of  the  Confeder- 
ate States;  and  any  unbiassed  critic,  who  has  had  the  opportunity  of  seeing  the 
achievements  of  European  artillerists,  must  say  that  those  of  our  army  are  not 
surpassed  hy  any  in  DOthl  of  mobility,  Hccuracy  of  fire,  and  bravery  of  the  men. 

A  dilicreul  organisation  of  OOr  artillery  into  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions, 

so  as  to  Rive  r  mon  rapid  proniotton  to  ill--  oorps,  appears  to  be  Jail  and  neeapaai  y. 

Now.  a  captain  of  artillery  lia*  t ti *•  Broq  bin  of  being  acaptuin  as  long 


80  the  âlPiitiT  of 

as  the  war  lasts,  except  ho  he  fortunate  enough  to  be  selected  by  his  commanding 
general  as  the  chief  of  artillery,  with  the  rank  of  major  or  lieutenant-colonel. 

It  will  he  perceived  that  Marshal  Marmont's  chapter  OH  artillery  does  not  <m- 
brace  that  which  would  he  most  acceptable  to  artillery  officers  of  the  present  day, 
namely  :  a  treatise  on  rifled  guns  and  siege  pieces  of  all  kinds.  It  is  hoped  that 
some  of  our  artillery  officers  will  think  it  worthy  of  bringing  this  chapter  to  the 
present  day. 

2.  Armstrong,  Whitworth,  and  Blakely  Guns.— From  the  results  of 
a  very  extensive  course  of  experiments  made  at  Woolwich,  in  the  latter  part  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  Dr.  Huttou  was  enabled,  with  a  view  to  the  increasing  of 
the  velocities  and  ranges  of  projectiles,  to  recommend  their  being  cast  of  a  shape 
offering  less  resistance  to  tho  atmosphere  than  that  of  the  spherical  balls  then  in 
universal  use — namely,  shot  of  a  long  form — a  hint  adopted  and  improved  upon 
by  the  modern  artillerist  inventor.  The  above  celebrated  mathematician  also 
proved  by  these  experiments  that  there  is  no  sensible  difference  caused  in  tho  ve- 
locity and  range  of  projectiles  by  varying  the  weight  of  tho  gun.  nor  by  the  use 
of  wads,  nor  by  different  degrees  of  ramming;  that  velocity,  with  equal  charges, 
always  increases  as  the  gun  is  longor,  though  the  increase  in  velocity  is  but  vory 
small  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  the  length  of  the  bore  ;  and  tho  range  in- 
creases in  a  much  lower  ratio  than  tho  velocity,  the  gun  and  elevation  being  the 
same.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  we  gain  extremely  littlo  in  the  range  by  a  great 
increase  in  the  length  of  the  piece. 

Our  time  is  emphatically  an  age  of  progress  in  art  and  invention.  Tho  French 
now  boast  that  they  possess  a  muzzle-loading  8-pounder  rifled  cannon,  for  moun- 
tain service,  weighing  onlj'  two  hundred  pounds,  with  which  shot  can  be  projected 
five  and  a  half  miles  ;  and  the  following  tabular  record  of  Mr.  Whitworth's  prac- 
tice with  his  3,  12,  and  80-poundars,  at  different  degrees  of  elevation,  shows  mar- 
vellous results  both  as  regards  range  and  accuracy  : 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS. 


81 


Summary  of  experiments  with  Whitworth' s  rifled,  breech-loading  cannon,  at  South- 
port,  showing  the  mean  range  and  deviation  of  all  the  shots  fired  at  each  experi- 
ment. 


A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

Date. 

Calibre  of 
gun. 

Elevation. 

Number  of 
shots  fired. 

Range. 

Longitudi- 
nal deviation 

Lateral  de- 
viation. 

Feb'ry. 

Degrees. 

Yards. 

Yards. 

Yards. 

22 

3-pound  or 

3 

10 

1.579 

12 

.52 

15 

'• 

10 

5 

4,174 

27 

1.17 

16 

14 

10 

5 

4,190 

87 

5.50 

23 

« 

10 

10 

3,842 

48 

3.23 

15 

" 

20 

4 

6,793 

58 

4.83 

16 

« 

20 

4 

6,960 

69 

8.58 

22 

" 

20 

5 

6.647 

109 

7.40 

22 

« 

20 

4 

6,421 

94 

4.25 

23 

a 

20 

11 

6,663 

33 

3.83 

15 

a 

35 

4 

9,015 

96 

10.92 

16 

m 

35 

5 

9,580 

81 

19.33 

22 

12-pouuder 

2 

5 

1,247 

24 

.85 

16 

'• 

5 

6 

2,324 

11 

1.57 

22 

M 

5 

10 

2,336 

16 

1.08 

23 

K 

5 

10 

2,219 

22 

2.09 

21 

«(. 

7 

4 

3.049 

17 

.50 

21 

M 

7 

4 

3.098 

9 

.54 

16 

« 

10 

5 

4,027 

50 

3.31 

23 

H 

10 

10 

3,774 

37 

3.10 

15 

80-pounder 

5 

2 

2.575 

36 

2.33 

... 

M 

5 

2 

2,574 

30 

1.66 

23 

(( 

7 

4 

3.493 

8 

.58 

16 

(( 

10 

2 

4.700 

30 

.50 

22 

(. 

10 

4 

4,409 

50 

5.17 

Remarks. — Column  A  shows  the  number  of  shots  fired  at  each  experiment  ;  B 
shows  their  average  range  in  yards;  C  their  average  longitudinal,  and  D  their 
average  lateral,  deviation  from  a  central  point,  according  to  the  systom  adopted 
at  Hythe. 

• 

All  these  experiments,  be  it  remembered,  were  conducted  from  first  to  last  by 
amateur  gunners,  without  iiccident  or  delay  of  any  kind,  and  during  the  preva- 
lence of  wind  and  weather  both  about  the  most  unfavorable  that  could  well  be 
imagined  for  obtaining  good  average  results  of  range  alone. 

Since  the  great  success  of  the  Whitworth  gun  was  first  published  in  the  Timet, 
that  gentleman  has  continued  to  demonstrate  the  scientific  principles  on  which 
his  ordnance  are  constructed,  by  eliciting  from  fresh  experiments  a  regular  pro 
gressive  increase  of  range  and  accuracy.  Mr.  Sidney  Herbert  has,  therefore,  stated 
in  the  House,  that  as  the  'Whitworth  gun  had  exceeded  the  Armstrong  in  range, 
and  very  nearly,  as  far  as  could  be  judged  from  the  rough  experiments,  equalled 
it  in  accuracy,  the  government  were  prepared  to  take  the  usual  steps  to  give  both 
a  competitive  trial  at  Shoeburyness. 

A  clever  writer,  in  the  Army  and  Navy  Gazette,  discusses  the  merits  of  the  Arm- 
strong gun  thus: 

"  So  far  as  accuracy  is  concerned,  Armstrong's  gun  shoots  to  perfection.  At 
three  thousand  yards,  with  a  field-piece,  you  may  go  through  a  six-foot  target  to  a 
certainty.  If  you  miss,  blame  the  gunner,  not  the  gun.  There  is  nothing  moro 
to  be  desired  in  range  :  fur  over  an  undnlatory  and  unknown  country  there  is  not 
one  man  out  of  ten  whose  sight  and  judgment  at  that  distance  can  be  depended  on. 


82  THE    SPIRIT    OP 

"Nevertheless,  there  are  serious  blots  in  this  celebrated  cannon.  First  and  fore- 
most, it  can  not  be  used  without  water,  and  plenty  of  water  too.  The  Minister  of 
War  mentioned  in  the  Uouse  that  this  difficulty  has  been  overcome.  With  all  re- 
spect, I  bog  to  say  he  is  in  error.  The  greasing  wad  has  improved  matters,  and 
that  is  all. 

"  In  consequence,  sponging  is  excessive,  and  takes  long  to  accomplish — far  longer 
than  a  field-gun  can  afford  in  action.  It  must  be  thoroughly  well  done  with  water, 
or  it  is  of  no  use  at  all,  from  the  difficulty  of  inserting  the  bristles  of  the  sponge  in 
the  grooving  where  the  fouling  lodges.  Can  you  always  depend  on  water  in  the 
field  of  battle  ?     I  think  not. 

"  But  what  I  think  will  bo  a  fatal  objection  to  these  guns  in  action,  is  the  expos- 
ure of  the  great  breech-screw  when  loading.  The  male  and  femalo  threads  of  this 
screw  fit  with  beautiful  precision  ;  when  untwisted  in  louding,  the  male  threads  are 
exposed  to  all  the  dust  and  grit  which  horses,  men,  shot,  and  other  contingencies 
in  action,  will  surely  cause.  If  it  hitches  in  screwing  up  again,  no  power  on  earth 
will  move  it,  and  the  gun  must  be  abandoned  or  dragged  out  of  action.  I  saw  a 
breech-screw  once  so  misbehave  without  any  apparent  provocation,  and  when  com- 
fortably shedded  at  Shoebury  all  the  artificers  failed  to  stir  it;  so  it  was  sent  to 
Newcastle  to  be  expanded  by  heat;  but,  alasl  we  can  not  carry  Newcastles  on  a 
campaign. 

u  Compared  with  old  field-guns  the  whole  affair  is  complicated,|and  will  require 
unremitting  attention  from  officers  and  men. 

u  This  applies  to  field-pieces  only;  for  heavy  guns  on  board  ship  the  disadvantages 
vanish;  there  dust  and  grit  can  be  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  water  is  ever  plen- 
tiful. This  is  the  field  for  Sir  William.  I  long  to  see  a  frigate  fitted  with  his 
heavy  guns.    Woe  betide  her  adversary  in  the  fearful  day  of  battle." 

It  is  alleged,  by  the  supporters  of  the  Armstrong  gun,  that  Mr.  Whitworth  has 
only  obtained  greater  range  by  reducing  the  diameter  of  his  projectile,  and,  of 
course,  therefore,  the  boro  of  the  cannon  itself;  quite  forgetting  that,  as  long  as 
that  gentleman  can  prove  that  a  great  improvement  is  brought  about  by  the  adop- 
tion of  certain  principles,  the  public  and  the  military  authorities  will  care  very 
little  whether  the  principles  themselves  are  new  or  old.  By  Mr.  Whitworth's  plan 
of  reducing  the  diameter  of  the  shot,  and,  therefore,  the  boro  of  the  gun,  he  con- 
tends that  not  only  are  the  range  and  accuracy  increased,  but  the  gun  itself  can 
be  constructed  of  the  same  relative  strength  of  metal,  though  nearly  two-thirds 
lightor  than  the  ordinary  brass  guns.  The  value  of  this  reduction  in  weight,  by 
allowing  fewer  horses  and  fewer  men  to  manœuvre  heavier  guns  at  greater  speed» 
must  be  apparent  to  any  one,  more  especially  to  those  who  have  seen  what  a  very 
little  way  the  largest  transports  in  the  service  go  toward  transporting  two  or  three 
ordinary  field  batteries,  with  their  present  complement  of  twenty-one  wagons  and 
carriages,  two  hundred  and  fifty  horses,  and  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  men. 

The  colebrated  3-pounder  gun  of  Whitworth,  with  carriage  and  limber  complete, 
could  bo  brought  into  action,  and  manoeuvred  and  served  with  the  utmost  rapidity, 
by  two  horses  and  two  men  only.  In  this  respect,  however,  the  Whitworth  gun  has 
no  advantage  over  that  of  Armstrong;  on  the  contrary,  as  far  as  we  have  yet  seen, 
the  Armstrong  large  guns  are  much  lighter. 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  Armstrong  70-pounders  can  be  worked  by  five  men  as 
easily  as  the  old  smooth-bore  68-poundor  by  seventeen;  and  the  precision  of  fire 
attainable  by  it  is  alleged,  by  competent  authority,  to  be  fifty  times  greater  than 
that  obtained  with  the  ordinary  servico  gun,  throwing  solid  shot  of  equal  weight, 
each  at  a  distance  of  ono  thousand  yards  ;  indeed,  it  is  said  to  be  six  times  more 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  83 

accurate  at  three  thousand  than  the  ordinary  smooth-bore  gun  at  one  thousand 
yards. 

With  reference  to  range,  however,  Sir  William  Armstrong  himself  states  that, 
beyond  a  certain  distance,  range,  for  general  purposes,  has  no  practical  value,  and 
that  as  for  artillerymen  firing  in  the  field  at  objects  five  miles  distant,  without  any 
clue  to  guide  them  but  their  eye,  they  might  as  well  firo  at  the  moon.  It  is  not 
only  a  question  of  which  shot  goes  furthest,  but  what  the  shot  effects  when  it  does 
roach  the  mark.  The  formation  of  his  gun,  ho  states,  has  not  been  his  chief  or  only 
object— which,  in  fact,  has  boon  as  much  directed  to  inventing  the  most  destructive 
projectile. 

To  secure  this  all-important  object  he  has  been  compelled  to  give  up,  toacertain 
extent,  the  attainment  of  an  immense  range,  and  increase  the  diameter  of  his  gun 
in  order  to  enable  it  to  carry  the  Armstrong  shell,  which,  for  terrible  destructive- 
ness,  deserves  to  be  almost  moro  celebrated  than  the  gun  itself.  Thus  he  states 
that,  as  yet,  no  fair  comparison  can  be  drawn  between  the  results  he  has  achieved 
While  trying  only  for  destructive  effect,  and  the  results  obtained  by  a  gun  which 
was  merely  fired  for  range. 

The  real  test  as  to  their  merits,  both  ho  and  Mr.  Whitworth  very  justly  maintain, 
can  only  bo  got  by  putting  the  two  guni  side  by  side,  and  trying  them  under 
similar  conditions  for  range,  accuracy,  and,  above  all,  for  destructive  effect. 
.  The  introduction  into  the  service  of  either  the  Armstrong  or  the  Whitworth 
effective  and,  comparatively,  light  guns,  will  probably  prove  a  check  to  experiments 
for  the  construction  of  huge  pieces  of  ordnance,  such  as  Mallet's  two  thirty-six  inch 
mortars,  which,  it  is  said,  were  made  at  a  cost  of  £40,000,  and  one  of  them  was  dis- 
abled by  a  charge  of  forty  pounds  of  powder,  although  the  full  charge  should  have 
been  four  hundred  pounds/  These  would  seem,  however,  to  be  mere  pocket-pieces 
compared  with  one,  the  proper  material  for  the  construction  of  which  was  alluded 
to  by  Captain  Blakely,  R.A.,  in  a  lecture  delivered  at  the  Royal  United  Service 
Institution.  Tho  monster  mortar  contemplated  by  this  gallant  officer  was  to  be  of 
sixty  inches  calibre,  to  throw  seven  tons  ten  miles! 

Sir  W.  Armstrong  claims  to  have  constructed  his  gun  on  certain  fundamental 
principles;  these  Mr.  Whitworth  disregards,  and  forms  his  gnu  as  unlike  Sir  Wil- 
liam's in  principle  as  two  guns  can  well  be. 

The  Whitworth  gun,  as  distinguished  from  the  Armstrong,  is  bored  from  one 
solid  cylinder  of  homogeneous  iron.  There  is  no  rifling,  as  is  generally  understood 
by  the  term,  in  the  bore,  which  is  a  plain  hexagon,  making  one  complete  turn, 
which  varies  witli  the  diameter  of  the  gun.  Thus  there  is  one  turn  in  about  eight 
feet  in  the  largest  guns  (from  50  to  120-pounders),  one  complete  turn  in  five  feet  in 
the  medium-sized  ordnance  (12  to  .TJ-pounders^and  one  complete  turn  in  three  feet 
four  inches  in  the  small  guns,  or  from  3  to  12-pounders.  All  the  guns  above  18- 
pounders  are  hooped  round  with  rings  of  iron  forced  on  by  hydraulic  pressure — an 
additional  strength  which  is  apparently  not  required,  and  which,  in  weight,  gives 
the  Armstrong  guns,  of  the  same  calibres,  a  most  important  advantage.  The 
breech-loading  arrangement  is  a  hinge  at  the  end  of  the  gun  supporting  a  hoop  of 
iron,  in  which  is  the  breech  <>r  rap.  which  screws  on  to  the  end  of  the  piece.  The 
shot  is  of  cast-iron,  and  in  form  precisely  like  a  nincpin.  with  its  thickest  part  at 
the  middle  pared  off.  to  fit  with  mechanical  precision  tho  hexagonal  nid«s  of  the 
bore.     Thus  the  projectile  haï  a  hnarillf  surface  on  the  whole  of  the  barrel,  and 

runs  fit'cly  in  or  out  of  the  mm.  so  thai   in  H f  an  enemy's  shot  striking  the 

breech  and  jamming  the  «crew,  or  othei  injury  to  it.  the  gun  could  be  used  an  a 
muzzle-loader  with  the  HUM  fi'ility  as  an  ordinary  smooth  bore  field-piece.     We 


84  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

need  scarcely  say  that  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  Armstrong;  anything  happening 
to  the  arrangement  of  the  breech  at  once  rendering  the  gun  useless,  till  another 
breech  is  fitted  on  at  the  factories  at  Elswick  or  Woolwich. 

With  the  Whit  worth  gun  there  is  no  chamber  for  the  reception  of  shot  and  pow- 
der— an  advantage  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  Armstrong  chamber  adds  to  the 
length  of  the  gun,  without  being  rifled,  or  assisting  in  impelling  the  shot  in  any 
way.  With  the  Whitworth,  the  gun  is  rifled  throughout  its  entire  length  from 
end  to  end,  and  every  inch  is  used  to  aid  the  flight  and  give  rotation  to  the  pro- 
jectile. From  the  chamber  in  the  Armstrong  being  of  a  certain  size,  it  follows 
that  only  shot  of  a  certain  length  can  be  used.  In  the  Whitworth,  on  the  con- 
trary, it  is  contended  that  shots  of  any  length,  or  a  charge  of  powder  of  any 
strength,  can  be  used  indifferently.  Thus  the  3,  12  and  80-pounders  are,  in  fact, 
only  guns  of  the  calibre  we  mention,  as  long  as  they  are  required  to  throw  a 
distance  of  five  or  five  and  a  half  miles.  Reduce  this  enormous  range  to  the  dis- 
tance at  which  long  range  guns  are  generally  used — say  three  thousand  yards — 
and  the  length  of  the  projectiles  of  these  ordnance  may  be  more  than  doubled: 
the  3-pounder  used  for  nine  pound  shot,  the  12-pounder  for  thirty-two  pounds,  and 
the  80-pouuder  for  a  shot  of  even  two  hundred  pounds.  In  naval  warfare,  great 
weight  must  be  attached  to  these  advantages.  12-pounder  boat  guns  could  be  used 
as  12-pounders  or  36-pounders,  according  to  the  distance  at  which  they  chose  to 
engage,  while  ships  could  double-shot  or  even  treble-shot  their  broadsido  guns  as. 
they  closed  with  an  enemy.  The  only  limit,  in  fact,  to  the  number  of  shots  with 
which  the  Whitworth  can  be  loaded  when  engaged  at  close  quarters,  is  the  limit  to 
the  strength  of  the  powder  to  eject  them.  Thus,  in  the  course  of  the  experiments 
tried  to  ascertain  this  fact,  it  was  found  that  the  3-pounder  got  rid  of  ten  shots» 
placed  one  over  another,  at  one  discharge,  but  failed  to  eject  eleven,  when  all  the 
powder  in  the  charge  burnt  out  like  a  squib  through  the  touchhole,  leaving  the 
Bhots  in  the  gun. 

Captain  TMakely  has  lately  advanced  a  claim  to  a  portion  of  the  world-wide  fame 
which  Sir  W.  Armstrong  and  Mr.  Whitworth  have  achieved  for  themselves  by  the 
invention  of  their  wonderful  ordnance.  Ho  has  constructed  a  new  cannon  eight 
and  a  half  feet  long,  and  weighing  only  forty-eight  hundred  woight,  which  projects 
shells  of  fifty-eight  pounds  weight  to  a  distance  of  upwards  of  a  mile  and  a  half, 
with  only  five  degrees  of  elevation — beating,  it  is  alleged,  Mr.  Whitworth's  80- 
ponnder  solid  shot  gun,  weighing  eighty-four  hundred  weight,  by  one  hundred 
yards,  at  the  same  elevation.  It  has  also  been  asserted  that  as  Captain  Blakely's 
gun  is  six  inches  in  bore,  and  Mr.  Whitworth's  only  four  and  a  half,  the  initiatory 
velocity  of  the  shells  from  the  former  must  be  vastly  superior,  and  their  advan- 
tages at  shorter  ranges  still  greater  than  at  the  distance  chosen  for  experiment. 

We  subjoin,  as  a  further  illustration,  a  debate  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  con- 
troversy between  the  Armstrong  and  Whitworth  guns,  on  February  9, 1864,  which 
will  prove  of  interest  to  artillery  officers: 

"The  Earl  of  Hardwicke  wished  to  know  whether  Hor  Majesty's  ships  were  sup- 
plied with  any  guns  or  projectiles  that  could  penetrate  the  iron  plates  of  a  ship's 
side  four  inches  and  a  half  thick.  This  question  had  a  most  important  bearing  upon 
the  warlike  power  of  this  country.  By  modern  improvements  the  range  of  mus- 
ketry had  been  so  extended  that  field  artillery  was  commanded  by  it.  Inventors 
then  set  about  devising  means  to  meet  this  altered  state  of  musketry  range,  and 
one  invention  was  produced  which  excited  the  wonder  of  artillerists  by  length  of 
range  and  precision  of  aim.  He  was  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  to  whom  the  inven- 
tion was  made  known,  and  after  the  most  careful  consideration  of  the  experiments 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS. 


85 


made  and  the  results  obtained,  the  government  entered  into  negotiations  with  Sir 
W.  Armstrong  to  superintend  the  manufacture  of  guns  on  his  principle  for  the  pub- 
lic service.  The  government  then  in  power  was  careful  to  limit  the  manufacture 
to  field  guns,  and  he  believed  those  guns  wore  now  regarded  as  very  valuable 
weapons.  By  the  peculiar  mode  of  rifling  adopted  by  Sir  W.  Armstrong,  and  the, 
exact  fitting  of  the  projectile  to  the  bore  of  the  gun.  breech-loading  was  necessary, 
and  in  that  shape  the  Armstrong  gun  was  undoubtedly  an  excellant  weapon: 

«  Soon  after  a  rival  appeared  to  the  gun  in  the  form  of  iron  plating  for  ships.  Ex- 
periments were  made,  the  result  of  which  was  to  prove  that  the  old  68-pounder  gun 
was  the  most  destructive  weapon.  Immediately  afterward  appeared  another  in- 
vention of  cauuon  and  projectiles  upon  a  wholly  different  principle.  Ho  did  not 
think  the  government  had  done  justice  to  themselves  nor  to  the  inventor  by  the 
course  they  had  pursued,  although  it  was  not  unnatural  when  another  inventor 
had  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the  government  manufactory  of  cannon,  and  had 
expended  about  two  and  a  half  millions  of  money  in  producing  weapons  upon  his 
principle.  The  Armstrong  guns  were  found  to  be  ineffective  against  iron  plating, 
but  nevertheless  they  formed  a  portion  of  the  armament  of  our  ships-of-war^ 
together  with  68-pounder  guns  of  the  old  pattern. 

"It  appeared  that  Mr.  Whitworth  had  not  been  permitted  to  carry  out  his 
experiments  exactly  in  the  mannor  he  wished,  although  he  was  well  known  as  a 
man  who  had  devoted  much  attention  to  the  subject  of  the  manufacture  of  guns, 
and  in  1857  had  taken  out  a  patent  to  secure  his  invention.  At  last  Mr.  Whitworth 
was  permitted  to  make  some  experiments,  and  the  House  would  understand  the 
reason  for  the  question  he  was  about  to  put  when  ho  stated  that  Mr.  Whitworth  had 
never  failed  to  penetrate  the  iron  plating  to  which  his  guns  were  opposed,  thus 
rendering  our  iron-plated  ships  no  better  than  the  old  wooden  ships.  That  fact 
should  Induce  the  government  to  allow  Mr.  Whitworth  to  show  all  that  he  could 
do;  and  if  that  gentleman  succeeded  in  all  that  he  undertook  to  do  the  result  would 
be  to  relieve  this  country  from  a  great  expenditure,  and  to  give  us  again  a  fleot  of 
ships  which  could  fight  and  float  in  the  severest  weather. 

"In  May,  1860,  an  experiment  took  plan-,  of  which  he  believed  the  noble  duke  was 
a  witness.  One  of  Mr.  Whitworth's  guns  was  fired  against  the  Trusty,  a  ship  plated 
with  four-inch  iron,  originally  built  for  harbor  defence.  The  result  of  the  experi- 
ment was  that  every  shot  from  the  Whitworth  gun  passed  clean  through  the  iron 
plating.  He  then  brought  a  heavier  gun,  and  the  result  was  the  same.  Since  then 
there  had  been  important  experiments  at  Shoeburyness  against  targets  made 
exactly  to  represent  ships'  sides.  Mr.  Whitworth  brought  a  70-pounder  gun  and 
also  a  12-ponnder,  and  the  effect,  he  understood,  was  marvellous.  At  every  dis- 
charge his  shot  went  clean  through  the  target,  and  there  could  be  no  hesitation  as 
to  the  result  of  his  gun  on  a  ship's  side. 

"He  had  spoken  of  sol  id  projectiles:  he  now  turned  to  shell.  In  1862  Sir  William 
Armstrong  Stated  to  B  scientific  society  at  Sheffield:  <It  .nay  certainly  he  said  that 
the  shells  are  of  no  avail  against  iron-plated  ships,  and  that  neither  a  68-pounder 
nor  a  HOpOunder  gun  with  solid,  round,  or  conical  shot  is  effective  against  them.' 
In  Hay,  1800,  the  experiments  against  the  Trusty  took  place,  and  he  might  con- 
clude, from  what  Sir  William  Armstrong  said,  that  there  was  no  shell  firing  then. 
But  Mr.  Whitworth's  shell  went  right  through  the  target  as  if  it  hid  been  paper- 
maklng  frightful  haw of  the  interior  lining  of  the  ship.    This  distinguished  aan- 

omctnrei  had  a*w«d  ■  1'""  vvh:,t  '"  ha,i  '  '  ''"■ iUlfl  if  he  h*'1  failed  in  any 

Instance  it  wa*  h*c.u,*n  ho  had  b**n  w^rkinc  with  frld  c^t  iron  gun»  rifled  by 

himself. 

c 


86  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

"Tho  armamont  of  the  sea  service  Armstrong  gun  might  not  be  useful  on  board 
ship,  and  would  not  bear  the  charge  required  for  heavy  artillery.  The  machinery 
was  so  delicate,  and  tbe  fitting  of  the  vent-piece  so  nicely  adjusted  to  prevent  the 
escape  of  gas,  that  a  gun  with  anything  like  a  quick  discharge  became  useless  in 
two  or  three  rounds.  Under  these  circumstances  he  had  thought  it  his  duty  to  put 
thrs  question  to  the  noble  lord.  It  was  time  that  the  talent»  of  such  inventors  as 
Mr.  Whitworth  should  be  made  available  by  the  country,  and  if  his  gun  and  pro- 
jectile were  such  as  he  believed  them  to  be,  the  more  rapidly  they  were  brought 
into  the  use  of  the  public  tho  better.  The  question  was,  whether  Her  Majesty's 
ships  were  supplied  with  a  gun  and  projectile  which  at  once  would  penetrate  a 
ship's  side  plated  with  iron  four  and  a  half  inches  thick?" 

"The  Duke  of  Somerset,  who  was  heard  with  great  difficulty,  said,  as  his  noble 
friend's  question  immediately  related  to  tbe  navy,  it  might  be  more  convenient 
that  be  should  reply  to  it,  having  from  the  first  been  acquainted  with  and  taken 
part  in  these  experiments.  When  the  present  government  came  into  office,  in 
1859,  they  found  a  record  in  the  department  strongly  approving  and  praising  tho 
gun  of  Sir  William  Armstrong,  and  one  of  his  guns  had  been  ordered  to  be  made. 
He  was  very  anxious,  as  the  public  also  was,  that  the  navy  should  be  sup- 
plied with  a  rifled  gun  ;  he  therefore  communicated  with  tbe  late  Lord  Herbert 
on  the  subject.  A  70-pounder  gun  was  sent  to  them  in  November.  It  was  sent 
to  sea  under  charge  of  Sir  W.  Wiseman,  who  was  to  report  upon  it.  In  point  of 
accuracy,  and  every  other  quality  required,  it  was  pronounced  excellent  for  all 
purposes.  Accordingly,  a  certain  number  of  those  guns,  which  were  to  be  100- 
pounders,  were  ordered.  In  the  meantime  it  was  true,  as  the  noble  earl  had  % 
stated,  that  the  question  of  armor-plates  arose;  and  it  was  found  when  tried  at 
Shoeburyness  that  the  gun,  of  which  the  accuracy  and  power  against  wooden 
ships  was  tremendous,  had  not  sufficient  power  against  iron  plates.  Neither  the 
68-pounder  nor  the  110-pounder  could  penetrate  the  iron  plates.  If  anything,  the 
68-pouuder  struck  the  beavier  blow. 

"  He  then  saw  Mr.  Whitworth,  who  said  to  him  that  he  could  produce  a  gun  and 
projectile  that  should  penetrate  the  iron  plates.  The  projectile,  he  said,  raudt  be 
of  a  very  peculiar  manufacture,  but  it  could  be  done.  He  accordingly  communi- 
cated with  Lord  Herbert,  who  said  he  was  most  anxious  to  try  tho  experiment. 
They  went  down  the  river  to  the  Nore,  and  had  the  Trusty  anchored  two  hundred 
yards  off.  The  gun  was  fired,  and  undoubtedly  the  bolt  went  right  through  into 
the  vessel,  and  had  they  gone  on  with  two  or  three  shots  more  they  would  have 
sunk  the  vessel.  He  proposed  to  Lord  Herbert  that  they  should  buy  that  gun  ; 
they  paid  Mr.  Whitworth  a  large  sum  for  it,  and  they  continued  to  try  some  other 
experiments.  The  misfortune  was,  that  in  some  of  their  trials  the  gun  was  found 
to  have  a  flaw,  and  eventually  it  burst.  Still,  he  was  in  hopes  that  they  should 
have  some  more  guns  supplied.  They  frequently  tried  to  obtain  other  guns  from 
Mr.  Whitworth.  He  could  assure  the  noble  earl,  so  far  from  favoring  any  one 
manufacturer— Sir  W.  Armstrong  or  any  one  else— they  wore  only  anxious  to  get 
a  gun  that  would  answer  for  the  navy. 

"Rather  more  than  a  year  ago  he  had  further  communication  with  Mr.  Whit- 
worth, who  said  the  difficulty  was  as  to  the  material,  to  get  coiled  homogeneous 
metal;  for  the  gun  produced  was  made  at  the  royal  factory  at  Woolwich..  He 
repeated  to  him  that  they  were  most  anxious  to  make  a  trial  of  his  gun  against 
that  of  Sir  William  Armstrong.  From  that  day  to  this  they  had  never  got  tho 
gun. 

"Mr.  Whit  worth's  inventions  were,  he  admitted,  very  clever,  and  he  certainly 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS. 


87 


had  no  favoritism  for  one  inventor  over  another.    AU  he  desired  was  to  get  a  good 
gun  for  the  service.    Whatever  was  the  quantity  of  powder  they  put  into  tho 
gun,  if  they  fired  with  cast-iron  shot,  the  effect  was  very  trifling.    Indeed,  they 
might  almost  as  well  fire  mud  at  the  target,  unless  the  projectile  was  of  a  very 
hard  substance.    No  sooner,  however,  had  they  obtained  a  hard  projectile  than 
not  only  Mr.  Whitworth's,  but  Sir  W.  Armstrong's,  gun  could  fire  a  shot  that 
would  penetrate  an  iron  plate.    The  iron  plate  committee,  which  had  watched 
these  experiments,  had  not  reported  that  the  flat  end  was  of  the  least  importance 
to  the  projectile.    Yet  they  had  been  left  in  great  difficulty  as  regarded  the  navy, 
because,  although  thoy  had  130  and  150-pounders  which  would  send  a  shot  through 
an  iron  plate,  they  had  not  got  a  broadside  gun  that  would  answer  their  purpose. 
"  About  a  year  ago  he  communicated  with  his  noble  friend  at  the  head  of  the 
War  department,  and  with  his  concurrence  sent  for  Sir  W.  Armstrong,  and  told 
him  that  while  they  were  going  on  with  their  experiments  and  trying  various 
schemes  for  rifling,  which  might  occupy  their  attention  for  months,  and  it  might 
be  for  years,  the  Admiralty  would  never  get  a  gun;  that  thoy  really  wantod  a 
plain  gnu  in  the  meantime  for  the  use  of  the  navy,  which  they  might  charge  with 
from  twenty-five  to  thirty  pounds  of  powder.    Sit  W.  Armstrong  said  that  that 
could  easily  be  furnished;  and  while  such  a  gun  was  making  he  also  suggested 
that  the  War  department  or  Sir  W.  Armstrong  should  make  a  gun  of  from  six  to 
six  and  a  quarter  tons  weight  for  the  navy,  for  practical  convenience  required 
some  limit  to  be  put  upon  the  weight.    Accordingly  that  gun  was  produced  in 
September  or  October  last,  and  tho  results  were  very  satisfactory.    The  practice 
made  at  from  one  thousand  to  twelve  hundred  yards  was  accurate.    At  twenty-six 
hundred  yards  the  practice  was  still  good,  although  inferior  to  that  made  by  the 
rifled  110-pounder.    The  concussion  between  the  deck*  did  not  appear  to  be  ob- 
jectionable; they  found  no  difficulty  in  training  the  gun,  and  when  tried  in  a 
gunboat  it  was  as  easily  controlled  as  the  68-pounder.    The  gun  was  considered 
superior  for  service  against  iron-plated  ships  to  any  gun  they  had. 

"The  smooth-bore  110-pounder,  with  a  charge  of  twenty-five  pounds  of  powder, 
penetrated  through  and  through  a  five  and  a  half  inch  iron  plate  with  round  shot. 
That  showed  that,  after  all  the  talk  about  punch-headed  shot,  what  they  wanted 
was  a  good,  hard,  solid  shot.  The  result,  as  far  as  it  went,  was  perfectly  satisfac- 
tory in  regard  to  the  broadside  gun.  A  quantity  of  these  guns  had  been  made 
while  the  experiments  going  on  were  in  progress,  and  some  of  them  would  be 
delivered  in  a  very  few  weeks.  As  there  was  no  complexity  in  their  construction, 
no  breech-loading  or  rifling,  they  could  be  made  very  fast.  At  the  same  time 
'that  was  not  all  that  they  wanted.  They  required  a  rifled  gun  of  about  the  same 
weight.  When  they  got  that  they  would  see  whether  they  lost  any  advantage 
by  the  rifled  gun.  One  advantage  they  must  lose  was  that  they  must  have  a  lower 
calibre,  and.  instead  of  having  a  9-inch  bore,  they  would  have  one  of  about  seven 
inches.  They  had,  therefore,  got  a  rifled  gun  of  the  same  weight,  and  were  only 
waiting  for  projectiles  to  be  made  for  it.  The  greater  nicety  in  the  projectiles 
used  for  the  rifled  gun  caused  some  delay  ;  but  ho  hoped  in  a  few  weeks  to  be 
able  to  give  the  House  more  precise  details  as  to  these  experiments. 

«  TlH"°noble  lord  would  see  that  although  the  guns  with  which  tbfl  navy  was 
provided  were  no  more  than  tho  68-pounder  and  the  110-pounder  of  Sir  W.  Arm- 
strong, yet  that  they  wore  in  the  way  of  making  a  gun  which  would  answer 
broadside  pnrpoM-,  and  also  of  getting  a  gun  with  rifling.  The  truth  was  that 
tho  whole  question  of  the  manufacture  of  iron  was  now  in  a  state  of  transition. 
Every  dav  they  would  see  new  experiments  with  guns  and  projectile,  and  for 


88  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

this  reason  they  wanted  a  projectile  that  would  go  through  iron  plates  at  a 
reasonable  cost.  There  were  many  qualities  of  iron,  but  they  found  that  only  the 
very  best  steel  would  pierce  a  plate  satisfactorily.  There  was  little  doubt  that  in 
a  short  time  they  would  be  able  to  send  spherical  projectiles  through  iron-plated 
ships. 

"But  when  the  noble  lord  said  that  wooden  ships  would  therefore  be  as  good  as 
iron  ones,  he  could  not  agree  with  him.  He  was  afraid  that,  whatever  they  might 
do,  they  must  still  keep  to  iron-plated  vessels,  because,  although  shots  might  pass 
through  them,  yet  the  inevitable  destruction  of  wooden  ships  by  shells  would  be 
such  that  warfare  by  such  ships  against  iron-clads  would  be  out  of  the  question. 
Therefore,  while  they  were  increasing  the  force  of  their  guns,  they  were  also 
increasing  the  strength  of  their  ship's  sides.  The  last  specimen  of  a  ship's  side 
which  they  had  was  very  considerably  stronger  than  those  thoy  had  before;  and 
he  hoped  that  the  vessels  so  constructed  would  be  able  to  go  to  sea  and  keep  the 
sea  in  all  weathers. 

"  He  thought,  tnen,  that  they  had  made  all  the  progress  in  their  power.  He  was 
sure  that  no  pains  had  been  spared  to  do  so.  The  subject  was  naturally  an  inter- 
esting one,  and  no  one  could  take  it  up  without  desiring  to  see  the  progress  made 
in  it.  Many  highly  intelligent  minds  were  engaged  upon  it,  and  were  continually 
sending  in  new  inventions;  and  although  the  government  were  so  overrun  with 
new  projects  that  if  they  attended  to  them  all  endless  delay  would  ensue,  they, 
nevertheless,  desired  not  to  overlook  any  valuable  practical  improvement. 

"  The  Earl  of  Hardwicke  did  not  think  that  what  had  fallen  from  the  noble  duke 
at  all  contradicted  what  he  had  stated.  It  really  appeared  that  Mr.  Whitworth 
had  long  since  succeeded  ift«doing  all  that  the  noble  duke  was  about  to  do  with 
his  gun.  In  Mr.  "Whitworth  they  had  a  man  who  could  produce  a  weapon  and  a 
projectile. to  penetrate  a  four  and  a  half  inch  plate,  and  though  they  saw  the 
effect  of  his  shot  and  shell,  tho  government  declined  to  employ  him.  The  noble 
dnke  had  himself  turned  inventor,  and  found  a  smooth-bore  gun  which  sent  a 
spherical  shot  through  an  iron  plate.  But  Mr.  Whitworth's  projectile  was  one  of 
a  most  wonderful  description,  and  with  a  raking  broadside  against  an  iron-cased 
ship  it  would  bo  almost  as  effective  as  against  a  wooden  one. 

"  He  would  earnestly  caution  the  government  against  putting  into  the  broadside 
of  a  ship  a  gun  weighing  six  tons.  Their  lordships  would  observe  that  his  ques- 
tion had  brought  out  an  important  fact,  viz  :  that  at  the  present  moment,  not- 
withstanding an  enormoiïs  expenditure  continued  during  ten  years,  the  royal  navy 
was  not  provided  with  a  single  gun  capable  of  penetrating  an  irou-plated  ship. 

"  Earl  De  Grey  and  Ripon  thought  the  noble  earl  had  somewhat  misrepresented 
the  relations  between  the  government  and  Mr.  TVhitworth.  At  an  early  period, 
as  their  lordships  had  been  informed,  the  noble  duke  at  the  head  of  the  Admiralty 
put  himself  in  communication  with  Mr.  Whitworth,  and  the  gun  which  had  been 
so  successful  against  tho  Trusty  was  purchased  by  the  government.  Some  very 
important  experiments  were  made  with  it  in  tho  autumn  of  1862.  The  most 
remarkable  one  took  place  at  Shoeburyness,  when,  in  September,  Mr.  'Whit- 
worth threw  his  shells  through  the  Warrior  target.  Almost  immediately  after 
that  experiment,  the  communication  between  the  government  and  Mr.  Whitworth 
still  continuing,  it  was  proposed  by  the  noble  duke  at  the  head  of  the  Admiralty 
and  the  late  Sir  George  Lewis  that  a  fresh  committee,  composed  of  persons  who 
had  not  dealt  with  the  question  previously,  and  against  whom  Mr.  Whitworth 
could  urge  no  objection  on  the  score  of  prejudice,  should  be  appointed  to  consider 
the  merits  of  the  Armstrong  and  Whitworth  guns. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  93 

Institution  there  is  a  glass  hand-grenade  which  was  found  ill  the  Redan,  Sebasto- 
pol,  on  the  10th  of  September,  1855. 

15.  Grummet  and  Junk  "Wads. — The  grummet  wad  is  used  in  loading 
with  cold  shot  when  the  elevation  of  the  gun  is  under  3°.  It  is  formed  by  taking 
a  piece  of  1}<"  or  2"  rope,  and  making  a  rough  circle  rather  loss  in  diameter  than 
the  bore  of  the  gun  it  is  intended  for,  fastening  two  cross  pieces  or  diameters  of 
the  same  sized  rope  upon  it,  these  cross  pieces  projecting  a  little  over  the  grum- 
met, so  that  when  in  the  bore  of  the  gun  they  shall  rub  orbite  upon  it, and  pre- 
vent the  shot  from  moving  when  the  guu  is  being  run  up. 

Grummet  wads  are  preferable  to  junk  wads  for  cold  shot. 

Junk  wads  are  made  of  old  junk  beaten  into  a  cylindrical  form,  and  shaped  and 
strengthened  by  rope  yarns  passed  round  them.    They  are  used  in  firing  hot  shot. 

16.  Gun  Cotton,  or  Pyroxyle,  was  discovered  accidentally  by  Schoenbein, 
and  appeared  at  first  to  have  so  many  advantages  over  gunpowder  that  it  was 
supposed  it  would  in  a  great  measure  supersede  it.  This  s  ubstance  results  from 
the  saturation  of  clean  cotton  (or  paper  prepared  without  size,  and  chemically 
clean)  in  a  mixture  of  equal  parts  of  concentrated  nitric  and  sulphuric  acid,  for 
about  a  quarter  of  an  hour.  It  is  then  squeezed  out,  well  washed  in  water,  and 
dried  carefully,  when  it  is  found  to  have  entirely  altered  its  nature,  and  to 
have  become  an  explosive  material,  having  about  four  times  the  force  of  gunpow- 
der, weight  for  weight.  There  is  little  or  no  smoke  when  gun  cottou  explodes,  and 
the  temperature  at  which  it  ignites  is  so  low  (356°  Fahrenheit)  that  it  may  bo 
fired  on  the  top  of  a  small  heap  of  gunpowder  without  igniting  the  latter.  A 
heavy  blow  on  an  anvil  ignites  pyroxyle  by  the  heat  thus  generated,  but  it  can  not 
be  fired  by  friction  like  the  fulminates,  and  it  does  not  appear  to  be  injured  by 
damp.  There  are  many  objections,  however,  to  the  use  of  this  material  :  for  artil- 
lery, its  action  is  too  sudden,  and  the  gases  generated  injure  the  metal  of  the  gun, 
while  its  bulk  and  the  uncertainty  attending  its  manufacture  (two  samples  seldom 
corresponding  in  strength  or  the  facility  of  ignition),  have  caused  its  abandonment 
by  the  miner  also,  and  gunpowder  still  bears  the  palm  among  explosive  agents. 
Paroxyline,  which  is  the  same  as  gun  cotton,  only  that  the  proportions  of  the  acids 
are  slightly  altered,  is  the  substance  now  used  so  extensively  in  photography;  it 
is  dissolved  in  alcohol  and  ether,  and  it  isthcu  called  collodion. 

The  preparation  of  the  explosive  cotton  is  not  attended  with  any  danger  of  ex- 
plosion, is  most  simple,  and  so  quick  that,  within  twenty-four  hours  at  tho  most, 
the  whole  operation  is  gone  through  and  finished.  The  arrangements  far  that 
preparation  are  equally  of  the  most  simple,  description  and  little  exp< 

17.  Carcass.-'-A  carcass  is  a  strong  spherical  shell,  pioived  with  three  holes, 
tûled  with  an  extremely  powerful  composition,  which  burns  with  intense  power 
from  eight  to  ten  minutes,  and  the  flame  issuing  from  the  hélai  nets  fire  to  every- 
thing OOmbltttlbto  within  its  reach:  it  is  consequently  use, 1  in  h..ml.anlments, 
setting  fin-  tn  shipping,  etc.,  and  projected  from  ordnance  like  a  common  shell. 

The  competition  for  tilling  carcasses  is  as  follows — ttieyrupoftum*  aieexpressed 
decimally  by  weight: 

Saltpetre     Sulphur.     Antimony.     Rosin.     Turpentine.     Tallow. 
T9.0  MM)  6.8  14.7  l.'.i  4.9 

The  dry  ingredients  ate  to  lie  well  mixed;  the  tallow  and  turpentine  an  then 
t..  be  placed  in  an  iron  pot.  which  fits  into  a  OOppCX  containing  oil.  the  tempera- 


94  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

ture  of  which  is  raised  sufficiently  to  melt  the  tallow.  The  dry  ingredients  are 
then  to  be  added,  and  the  whole  to  be  stirred  until  it  is  formed  into  a  pasty  mass. 
Corks  are  then  put  into  two  of  the  holes,  and  the  carcass  filled  with  the  composi- 
tion, which  must  be  well  pressed  in.  When  the  carcass  is  full  the  corks  are 
removed,  and  wooden  plugs  forced  a  to  the  composition  nearly  to  the  centre,  and 
allowed  to  remain  there  till  the  coi.  position  has  set;  after  which  the  plugs  are 
removed  and  the  cavities  driven  with  fuse  composition,  and  primed  with  quick- 
match.    The  fuse  holes  are  then  covered  with  canvas  patches. 

18.  Lasso  Harness  consists  of  a  brown  leather  surcinglé  and  one  trace. 
The  surciugle  is  rather  wider  than  a  common  girth,  and  is  composed  of  two  pieces 
(joined  together  by  rings),  one  of  which  is  placed  over  the  saddle,  and  the  other 
i-ound  the  belly  of  the  horse.  There  are  also  rings  at  the  end  of  the  surcingle, 
which  is  drawn  very  firmly  round  the  horse,  and  fastened  tight  by  lapping  a 
white  leather  thong  (fixed  at  one  end  of  the  surcingle)  through  the  rings.  There 
are  two  descriptions  of  traces,  one  being  eight  and  the  other  twelve  feet  long.  They 
have  hooks  at  each  end,  and,  when  the  lasso  harness  is  made  use  of  by  cavalry, 
etc.,  to  assist  draught  horses  in  moving  very  heavy  carriages,  or  in  dragging  guns, 
etc.,  up  steep  hills,  one  of  these  hooks  is  fastened  to  a  ring  in  the  surcingle,  and 
the  other  to  the  carriage,  etc. 

Lasso  harness  may  be  advantageously  employed  with  all  horses;  even  those 
unaccustomed  by  draught  having  been  found  perfectly  tractable  and  efficient  the 
first  time  they  were  required  by  means  of  the  lasso.  When  two  horses  are  in 
draught,  the  traces  must  be  inside,  and  each  rider  should  keep  his  horse's  croup  a 
little  outward. 

In  the  Russian  army  the  aid  of  cavalry,  with  lasso  harness,  is  made  available 
for  rapidly  moving  and  concentrating  their  heavy  batteries  of  reserve,  as  was 
witnessed  in  their  attack  upon  Eupatoria,  during  the  Crimean  campaign. 

19.  Slow-Matches  are  prepared  from  hemp  slightly  twisted  and  soaked  in 
a  solution  of  lime-water  and  saltpetre. 

The  Gibraltar  slow-match  consists  of  sheets  of  strong  blue  paper  dipped  in  a 
solution  of  eight  ounces  of  saltpetre  to  a  gallon  of  water,  just  made  to  boil  over 
a  slow  fire,  and  hung  up  to  dry;  when  dry,  each  sheet  is  divided  into  two  parts, 
rolled  up  tight,  and  the  edges  pasted  down  ;  one  half  sheet  thus  made  will  burn 
three  hours. 

20.  Ice,  three  inches  thick,  will  support  infantry  passing  over  it  in  file;  four 
to  six  inches  will  bear  cavalry  and  light  artillery;  and  beyond  that  the  passage  of 
heavy  guns  and  carriages  over  it  may  be  accomplished  without  danger. 

The  following  mode  of  strengthening  young  ice  has  been  suggested  :  when  the 
water  is  sufficiently  frozen  to  bear  a  man,  straw  six  inches  thick  should  be  laid 
across  the  river,  and  water  poured  over  it.  As  soon  as  the  whole  mass  is  frozen 
together,  planks  are  laid  over  it.  It  will  bear  field  artillery.  Ice  eight  inches 
thick  will  bear  with  safety  half  a  ton  weight  upon  a  square  foot. 

21.  Passage  of  River3.— A  ford,  to  be  passable  for  infantry,  should  not 
exceed  three  feet  in  depth.  Cavalry  can  pass  a  ford  four  feet  deep,  but  carriages 
with  ammunition  can  not  pass  a  greater  depth  than  two  feot  four  inches  without 
the  risk  of  wetting  the  ammunition.  The  best  precaution  for  crossing  a  ford  is 
to  drive  two  rows  of  pickets  at  certain  distances,  to  mark  the  best  lino  of  direc- 
tion, and  to  pass  strong  ropes  along  each  row,  with  a  turn  round  each  picket. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  95 

22.  Pontoons. — Blanchard's  pontoons  are  at  present  the  standard  pattern  in 
Europe,  They  are  of  two  kinds.  The  larger,  with  hemispherical  ends,  are  22'  Z" 
in  length,  and  1'  8"  in  diameter;  the  smaller,  with  conical  ends,  15'  in  length, 
and  1'  8"  in  diameter. 

The  weight  of  two  of  the  largest  to  form  a  raft  is  8  cwt.  7  lb.  ;  weight  of  the 
superstructure,  18  cwt.  2  qrs.  At  the  full  interval  of  twenty-four  feet  from  cen- 
tre to  centre  of  rafts,  this  bridge  will  carry  infantry  four  deep,  marching  at  ease, 
cavalry  two  deep,  and  light  field  guns  ;  at  16',  heavy  guns.  A  raft  of  three  cylin- 
ders, at  close  intervals,  will  support  siege  ordnance. 

Five  of  the  small  or  infantry  pontoons  weigh  5  cwt.  1  qr.,  12  lb.  ;  superstruc- 
ture, 7  cwt.  1  qr.  The  pontoons  at  5'  4"  from  centre  to  centre,  will  support  infan- 
try three  deep,  and  with  care,  light  field  guns  or  carriages. 

Great  attention  and  caution  are  required  in  passing  over  pontoon  bridges,  the 
vibratory  motion  of  which  is  very  dangerous,  and  should  be  lessened  by  every  • 
possible  means. 

The  troops,  in  passing,  should  not  preserve  an  equal  pace.  There  should  be  no 
liait  on  the  bridge.  As  soon  as  the  bridge  is  perceived  to  rock,  the  passage  of  the 
troops  must  be  stopped.  Cattle  should  be  driven  over  in  very  small  numbers  at 
a  time. 

23.  Distance  by  Sound. — To  ascertain  the  distance  of  an  object  by  the 
report  of  fire-arms,  bear  in  mind  that  the  velocity  of  sound  through  the  air  is  at 
the  rate  of  about  eleven  hundred  and  twenty-five  feet  per  second,  at  the  tempe- 
rature of  sixty-two  degrees;  at  the  freezing  temperature  it  is  only  about  one 
thousand  and  ninety  feet  per  second;  and,  by  observing  the  number  of  seconds 
that  elapses  between  the  flash  and  the  report  of  the  gun,  and  multiplying  the 
number  by  eleven  hundred  and  twenty-five,  the  product  will  be  the  distance  in 
feet,  with  tolerable  accuracy. 

Another  calculation  is,  that  by  multiplying  the  number  of  seconds  between  the 
flash  and  the  report  by  eleven  hundred,  the  product  will  be  the  distance  in  feet, 
with  sufficient  accuracy  for  ordinary  purposes. 

It  is  obvious  that  different  degrees  of  temperature,  at  the  several  periods  of 
making  the  calculations,  will  occasion  discrepancies  in  the  results. 

24.  Tactics  of  English  Artillery.— The  English  artillery  tactics  may  b« 
sketched  in  the  four  following  points: 

1.  Artillery,  acting  with  other  troops,  always  covers  the  troops  when  advancing, 
retiring,  or  deploying  into  line. 

2.  When  the  line  retires  by  alternate  companies,  wings,  or  battalions,  the  artil- 
lery remains  with  that  part  of  it  which  is  nearest  the  enemy;  retiring  with  the 
polonge,  and  halting  when  it  arrives  at  the  halted  part  of  the  line* 

3.  When  the  troops  are  in  column,  the  artillery  is  on  the  flank. 

•4.  When  the  line  of  troops  wheels  backward  into  column,  the  artillery  break 
into  column  and  close  to  the  reverse  flank,  so  as  not  to  interrupt  the  line  of 
pivots. 

25.  Present  Artillery  Tactics  of  the  French.— The  tactics  of  the 
French  differ  from  the  artillery  manœuvres  of  the  English.  With  the  former, 
the  artillery  tXMJ  be  said  to  direct  the  battle — the  infantry  conforming,  in  every 
instance,  to  the  manœuvres  of  the  artillery — coming  up  in  support  wherever  the 
artillery  place  themsolYOB,  without  attending  in  any  way  to  the  infantry  forma- 


96  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

tions.  This  principle  is  one  which  the  Emperor  of  the  French  acted  upon  with  sin- 
gular success  throughout  the  late  Italian  campaign,  and,  in  doing  so,  only  followed 
the  example  of  Napoleon  I,  whose  artillery  manoeuvres  will  be  uoticed  at  length 
in  the  succeeding  lines. 

26.  Napoleon's  Organization  for  Offensive  "Warfare  and  Plan 
of  Attack. — In  adopting  a  system,  as  it  were,  of  separate  centralization,  Napo- 
leon gave  to  his  corps  d'armée  the  means  of  acting  by  itself.  Each  had  its 
reserve  and  park  of  artillery;  and,  not  having  any  fixed  place  in  the  order  of 
battle,  could  move  independently  to  accomplish  any  particular  object,  and  after- 
ward take  any  special  position  that  might  be  desirable  to  enable  it  to  share  in 
the  battle.  Such  an  arrangement  gave  a  manifest  advantage  over  the  extended 
order  of  battle  of  other  Continental  armies,  since  Napoleon  could,  even  with 
inferior  forces,  vigorously  assume  the  offensive,  and,  by  breaking  through  some 
part  of  the  enemy's  line  with  a  superior  force,  attack  him  in  rear  and  nark,  and 
also  continue  this  attack  against  another  division,  without  giving  time  for  the 
adversary  to  be  aware  of  the  check  he  had  received,  or  to  perceive  the  danger  of 
his  retreat  being  cut  off,  by  having  more  hostile  troops  poured  throuçh  the  inter- 
val thus  made.  A  battle  of  this  kind  was  not  general  along  the  whole  line,  but 
became  a  series  of  engagements  at  particular  points,  often  distant  from  one 
another;  and  the  course  followed  by  Napoleon  to  obtain  a  key  to  the  enemy's 
position,  previous  to  a  general  attack,  appears  to  have  been  different  to  that 
which  has  been  imagined  from  the  apparent  eagerness  with  which  he  fought. 

Before  forming  his  plan  of  the  intended  battle,  he  allowed  that  portion  of  his 
army  which  was  nearest  to  the  enemy  almost  to  commence  a  general  engagement, 
in  order  that  the  exact  position  and  purpose  of  the  adversary  might  be  ascer- 
tained. The  reinforcements  which  were  frequently  importunately  demanded  by 
his  generals  at  this  juncture  were  often  withheld,  and  the  temporary  success  of 
the  enemy  was  disregarded.  But  when  there  was  no  longer  any  do\ibt  as  to  tho 
position  and  force  of  the  enemy,  Napoleon's  plan  of  attack,  which  was  then 
speedily  formed  and  energetically  executed,  generally  depended  upon  a  great 
effort  to  carry  one  or  two  points  under  a  preponderating  fire  of  artillery.  But 
instead  of  employing  his  whole  force,  the  attack  was  commenced  by  a  portion  of 
his  troops  only,  which  he  continued  to  strengthen  until  the  enemy's  reserve  had 
become  engaged.  The  decisive  moment  having  then  arrived.  Napoleon's  reserve 
was  brought  up  fresh,  and  having  passed  through  the  opening  in  the  enemy's 
line,  one  portion  attacked  him  in  the  flank  in  rear,  while  another  endeavored  to 
cut  off  his  retreat.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the  whole  French  army  assumed 
the  offensive,  and  the  victory  was  frequently  gained  when  perhaps  three-fourths 
of  the  line  were  ignorant  how  it  had  been  accomplished. 

As  the  basis  of  decisive  attacks,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that  the  artillery 
service  should  tinite  efficiency  to  such  rapidity  of  movement  as  would  enable  this 
arm  to  share  in  the  most  difficult  and  complicated  manœuvres  of  battle;  and 
when  thus  organized  it  can  rarely  fail  to  secure  the  success  of  an  attack  made  on 
any  particular  point,  or  to  recover  lost  ground,  if  this  arm  is  brought  up  in  a 
mass  to  act  at  a  critical  moment,  such  as  during  the  first  part  of  the  celebrated 
action  of  Marengo.  The  battle  commenced  by  opening  a  fire  from  one  hundred 
pieces  of  cannon,  which  proved  irresistible;  and  the  French  army,  being  broken 
and  defeated,  had  already  retreated  before  twenty-seven  thousand  imperialist» 
under  General  Melas,  when  the  engagement,  then  actually  lost  by  tho  French, 
was  renewed  under  altered  circumstances. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS. 


97 


Napoleon,  perceiving  the  approach  of  Desaix,  opportunely  brought  up  fifteen 
guns  under  Marmont,  which,  having  opened  a  destructive  fire,  checked  the 
advance  of  an  Austrian  column,  and  at  this  moment,  taking  advantage  of  a 
defile,  he  first  rallied  his  flying  troops,  and  thon  becamo  the  assailant.  This  hap- 
pened at  the  very  moment  when  some  Austrian  cavalry  had  been  detached  on  an- 
other service,  while  the  infantry,  being  then  at  some  distance  from  the  main  body 
of  artillery,  were  actually  preparing  to  avail  themselves  of  the  opening  supposed 
to  have  been  made  through  the  enemy,  to  continue  their  march  to  join  General 
Wucassartch  on  the  Adige.  Thus  the  laurels  which  General  Melas  had  apparently 
won,  were  snatched  from  his  brow  by  the  presence  of  mind  and  daring  intrepidity 
of  his  skilful  opponent. 


27.  Table  showing  the  Personnel  and  Materiel  of  a  Prussian, 
Austrian,  Russian,  French,  and  English  Light  Battery. 


Prussia. 


Huns 

Howitzers....: 

Captain,  first-class 

«       Becond-clasB 

First  Lieutenant 

Second      "  

Adjutant  N.  C 

Surgeon 

Assistant  Surgeon 

Sergeant-Major  

Sergeants 

Pay-Sergeant 

Corporals 

Artificers  or  bombardiers». 

First -class  gunners 

Second  "         "      

hirst-class  drivers 

Second  "       "      

Artificers  in  wood  and  iron 

Farriers 

Collar-makers 

Trumpeters 

Fin-workers 

Wagon-masters 

Ammunition  wagons 

i;     age  wagons 

Spal  e  forge 

Carriage  smiths 

Shoeing  smiths 

Wheelers 

Horses  

Enfants  de  troupe 

Totals. 

Officers 

Men 

Horses 


11 

16 
114 

19 


222 


182 
222 


Army  of 


Austria. 


Russia. 


France. 


16 

}  - 


1MI 


4 

179 
180 


England. 


1 

6 

4 

2 

2 

}    » 

1 
1 

\    J 

1 
1 

1 

1 

1 

8 

8« 

2 

12 

16 

6 

}  '• 

28 
54 

!  « 

40 
54 

4 

3 

2 

2 

3 

8 

8 

3 

209 

968 

2 

7 

4 

158 

218 

268 

1 

2 

4 

...... 

6 
127 


14 

1 
1 
3 
2 
156 


6 
156 


98  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

CHAPTER    III. 

FORTIFICATIONS. 

How  fortifications  originated — Their  importance  and  development,  with  those  of 
means  of  attack — What  they  are  for  cities,  for  the  country — Principles — Special 
character  of  Vauban — His  system  upon  the  frontier  of  Flanders — Good  for  Hol- 
land— Why — Two  kinds  of  places — Places  of  depot — Their  first  condition — Their 
situation — Strasbourg — Metz  and  Lille — Alexandria,  Mantua,  and  Venice — Places 
of  domination — Places  of  manoeuvres — Where  to  be  established — Mountain 
gorges — River  frontiers — Importance  of  shelter  for  army  stores — Detached  works 
— Fine  application — Entrenched  camps — Two  kinds — Continuous  line — Gives  bad 
results — Why — Morale  of  an  entrenched  army — Its  duplicity  and  consequences 
— Three  examples — Lines  of  Turin,  eighty  thousand  men  against  forty  thousand 
— Lines  of  Denain,  Eugene,  and  Villars — Lines  of  Mayence — Affair  of  October  8, 
1795 — Lines  are  good — Against  which  armies — Eugene  of  Savoy  at  Belgrad — 
Guaranty  of  victory  in  courage,  and  faults  of  enemy — Permanent  entrenched 
camps — Their  true  value — Towers  of  Linz — Model  not  perfectly  followed — Their 
true  usefulness — Fundamental  principle — Strategic  point  well  chosen — Impor- 
tance of  their  construction — Sudden  march  upon  Vienna  become  impossible 
— Entrenched  camp  of  Verona — Fortifications  of  Paris — Importance  of  that 
capital — Its  fall  leads  to  that  of  the  empire — Part  of  the  detached  forts — Paris 
not  to  sustain  a  siege — Superfluity  of  enclosure. 

Notes. — 1.  Marshal  Vauban.  2.  Strasbourg.  3.  Metz.  4.  Lille.  5.  Alexandria. 
6.  Venice.  7.  Turin.  8.  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy.  9.  Denain.  10.  Marshal  Vil- 
lars. 11.  The  City  of  Paris — Entrenched  camp  in  the  Confederate  States.  12. 
Siege.  13.  Time  of  reducing  fortresses.  14.  Some  practical  matters:  Hurdles, 
gabions,  mantlets,  parallels,  screens  of  cloth  or  canvas. 

To  treat  here  in  detail  of  fortifications,  would  not  be  in  accordance 
with  the  spirit  of  this  work,  and  would  probably  surpass  my  strength. 
I  will  then,  in  this  connection,  consider  the  necessities  of  war,  the 
proposed  object  in  raising  fortifications,  and  leave  aside  that  which  be- 
longs to  the  art  of  the  engineer. 

Formerly  fortified  places  were  the  results  of  necessity,  and,  so  to 
speak,  were  formed  by  themselves.  In  the  times  of  anarchy,  disorders, 
and  civil  wars,  of  which  the  Middle  Ages  offer  example,  the  numerous, 
agglomerated,  and  rich  populations  were  desirous  of  protecting  them- 
selves. They  fortified  and  surrounded  themselves  with  a  rampart. 
They  armed  themselves.  The  means  of  attack  being  still  in  their 
infancy,  they  were  thus  protected  against  all  assault. 

But  the  discovery  of  artillerj7,  and  the  perfection  of  that  arm,  soon 
changed  such  a  state  of  affairs.  Instead  of  those  ancient  places, 
valueless  against  regular  moans  of  attack,  fortresses  built  with  care  and 
at  the  expense  of  the  state,  had  to  be  constructed.  And  since  every 
place  could  not  be  fortified,  the  government  selected  those  cities  which, 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  99 

on  account  of  their  importance,  and  especially  their  position,  demanded 
most  care  and  sacrifices.  The  question  was,  therefore,  no  longer  the 
special  interests  of  cities,  but,  beyond  all,  the  defence  of  the  country 
against  an  exterior  enemy.  Often,  however,  the  determination  was 
owing  to  accident,  without  having  any  sufficient  motives  for  preference. 

All  great  questions  should  bo  solved  by  principles.  First,  the  end 
must  be  known  and  indicated  ;  then  the  means  by  which  it  can  be 
attained  will  present  themselves  to  the  mind  ;  otherwise,  we  journey  at 
hazard. 

In  this  case,  the  resolutions  arrived  at  have  again  boen  modified  by 
private  interests  and  personal  iuflucnce,  and,  it  may  be  said,  through 
the  system  of  war  which  originated  in  the  epoch  of  Louis  XIV,  and 
which  was  based  upon  so  many  errors. 

No  one  certainly  has  greater  respect  for  Vauban1  than  myself,  but 
he  was  more  of  an  engineer  than  a  general  ;  and,  in  raising  many  for- 
tresses, he  gave  himself  complaisantly  up  to  labors  of  his  taste. 

The  number  he  constructed  was,  therefore,  prodigious.  Still,  one 
thing  astonishes  me  in  a  genius  of  his  nature:  it  is,  that  upon  an  open 
frontier  like  that  of  FLanders,  ho  had  the  idea  to  create  a  barrier  of  any 
strength,  by  means  of  a  system  of  fortified  places,  as  upon  tho  chess- 
board. 

Had  a  like  system  been  established  for  a  small  country  like  Holland, 
the  defence  of  which  is  mostly  based  upon  natural  circumstances  which 
can  be  profitably  employed,  nothing  would  have  been  better;  there, 
short  distanoes  and  fortified  places,  commanding  very  extended  inunda- 
tions, form  great  obstacles,  add  to  the  means  of  an  army,  and  facilitate 
its  manœuvres. 

But  to  imitate  this  system  upon  an  open  frontier  was  an  error  which 
ought  not  to  have  been  committed  by  a  genius  of  the  order  of  Vauban. 
If  he  has  not  been  obliged  to  conform  to  superior  orders,  he  certainly 
gave  way,  in  his  character  as  an  engineer,  to  the  attractions  and  the 
mania  for  constructions. 

The  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the  art  of  war,  and  especially 
as  to  the  strength  of  armies  in  the  field,  have  demonstrated  the  evil  of 
such  a  system  of  defence,  and  no  military  mind  would,  nowadays, 
conceive  the  idea  of  constructing  again  works  of  such  a  nature. 

Recognized  principles  have  established  two  kinds  of  places  :  placos  of 
depot,  and  places  of  manœuvres. 

The  first  should  be  very  large,  strong,  and  few  in  number;  one  upon 
a  frontier  Buffices* 

They  should  contain  sufficient  material  for  the  wants  of  a  large  army 
there  assembling,  in  artillery  equipage,  in  small-arms  for  necessary 
changes,  and  provisions  of  all  sorts.  They  should  have  numerous 
workshops,  an  arsenal  of  construction,  and,  at  all  times,  the  material 


100  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

for  a  large  hospital,  and  subsistence  stores.  The  regiment?  which  are 
directed  there,  finally,  should  leave  perfectly  organized  and  armed,  so  as 
to  be  immediately  ready  to  take  the  field  and  to  combat. 

In  the  next  place,  reinforcements  and  replacements  of  which  the  army 
stand  in  need,  are  there  organized  ;  and,  if  the  opening  of  the  war  has 
been  unfortunate,  or  if  the  army,  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  be 
reduced  from  the  beginning  to  the  defensive,  its  forces  are  doubled  by 
resting  upon  such  a  place  for  support — which,  by  preference,  should  be 
established  near  a  navigable  river,  to  facilitate  the  arrival  of  munitions 
of  war.  A  place  of  depot  thus  favoring  the  movements  of  an  army 
operating  in  its  neighborhood  gives,  at  the  same  time,  greal  consistence 
to  its  base  of  operations. 

In  France  \\e  have  three  places  of  this  kind,  wonderfully  situated: 
Strasbourg1*,  Metz3,  and  Lille4,  for  the  frontiers  of  Germany,  the  Ar- 
dennes, and  Flanders. 

In  the  times  of  our  greatness  we  possessed,  in  Italy,  viewing  their 
situation,  three  places  in  echelon,  which  secured  its  possession  :  Alex- 
andria5, Mantua,  and  Venice6.  Had  our  prosperity  lasted,  another 
place  of  great  importance  would  probably  have  been  constructed  upon 
the  Save.  In  newly-conquered  countries  such  places  are  not  only 
depots  for  the  defence  of  the  frontier  ;  they  are,  besides,  places  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  territory  which  surrounds  them. 

After  places  of  depot,  come  places  of  manœuvre.  They  serve  to 
facilitate  the  movements  of  armies,  and  to  disconcert  or  prevent  those  of 
the  enemy. 

They  should  be  exclusively  situated,  either  upon  rivers,  whose  two 
banks  they  occupy,  or  on  mountains,  whose  valleys  they  close. 

A  chain  of  mountains  presents  great  obstacles  to  the  movomonts  of  an 
army.  Only  by  the  roads  which  traverse  them  is  there  a  passage  for 
the  considerable  material  accompanying  an  army.  It  is,  therefore, 
useful  to  close  the  entrance  through  these  roads  by  a  fortress,  so  as  to 
prevent  the  attacking  enemy  from  profiting  by  them,  and  thus  reserving 
their  use  for  ourselves. 

A  river  forms  the  defensive  line  of  an  army  ;  an  enemy,  disposed  to 
clear  it,  must  create  means  of  passage,  because  the  permanent  bridges 
are  not  in  his  power.  The  army  placed  upon  the  defensive,  on  the  con- 
trary, can  with  security  manoeuvre  upon  its  two  banks,  and  bring  all 
its  forces  against  a  part  of  the  enemy's,  whenever  they  are  divided.  If 
it  happens  to  engago  troops  remaining  in  rear,  and  which  have  not  yet 
crossed  the  stream,  those  who  have  cleared  the  passage  are  at  the 
power  of  those  sad  chances  always  presented  by  an  isolated  situation, 
without  any  communication.  The  most  efficacious  method,  generally, 
besides  the  energetic  defensive  one,  consists  in  offensive  movements 
which  are  restrained,  well  calculated,  rapidly  executed,  and  begun  at  the 
rijrbt  time. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  101 

I  shall  confine  to  this  the  general  ideas  which  should  govern  the  de- 
fence of  a  frontier.  As  to  the  details  of  construction  I  will  only  say, 
in  view  of  the  progress  in  artillery  and  tho  facility  of  its  transportation, 
it  is  an  object  which  can  not  too  much  be  recommended  to  the  care  of 
the  engineers;  without  sufficient  and  perfectly  secure  shelters  for  the 
munitions  of  all  kinds,  and  a  considerable  part  of  the  personnel  of  the 
garrison,  there  can  be  no  defence  possible. 

Besides,  fortified  places  should  occupy  a  great  extent  of  ground  by 
means  of  systematically  constructed,  detached  works,  and  strong  enough 
to  enable  each  to  defend  itself.  The  general  defence  will  be  much 
easier  through  them,  the  attack  more  embarrassing,  and  the  resistance 
much  longer.  This  kind  of  fortification  has  been  beautifully  applied  at 
Alexandria,  iu  Piedmont,  and,  if  political  events  had  permitted  to  make 
it  useful,  this  place  would  have  then  rendered  the  greatest  services. 
But  since  its  considerable  extent  required  a  large  garrison,  and  the 
Piedmontese  army  being  but  of  medium  strength,  it  did  not  suit  the 
King  of  Sardinia  to  preserve  it  ;  the  fortifications  have,  therefore,  been 
destroyed,  and  are  reduced,  at  this  day,  to  the  citadel  merely. 

I  have  already,  before  this,  explained  what  is  the  aim  of  erecting 
strong  places,  and  what  are  the  conditions  which  should  determine  their 
manner  of  construction  and  the  choice  of  their  locality.  I  will  now 
speak  of  fortifications  whose  object  is  to  cover  an  inferior  army  against 
one  which  is  superior,  and  to  give  to  the  former  the  faculty  of  resist- 
ing in  spite  of  the  disproportion  of  forces;  in  short,  I  speak  of 
entrenched  camps,  which  are  destined  to  establish  some  kind  of  equili- 
brium between  forces  of  different  strength. 

Entrenched  camps  are  of  two  kinds.  The  first  kind  is  composed  of 
one  continuous  line,  which  creates  material  obstacles  upon  the  whole 
extent  of  the  position  which  the  army  occupies;  tho  other  kind  consists 
in  a  fixed  number  of  carefully  fortified  points,  made  strong  enough,  if 
possible,  to  be  secure  from  sudden  assault.  Since  they  can  resist  any 
attack,  however  spirited,  they  serve  as  a  support  to  the  troops,  protect 
their  flanks,  cover  a  portion  of  their  front,  and  make  them  invincible 
without  checking  the  liberty  of  their  movements. 

Tho  first  have  scarcely  ever  given  good  results  whenever  seriously 
attacked  ;  they  have  always  been  forced.  This  result  is  to  be  attributed 
to  two  causes  : 

In  the  first  place,  tho  troops  are  too  much  divided,  being  obliged  to 
guard  the  whole  extent  of  the  line;  often  the  capture  of  a  single  point 
brings  about  the  evacuation  of  all  others.  In  the  second  place,  the  en- 
trenched army  believes  itself  always  inferior,  and  this\)pinion  robs  it 
of  one-half  of  its  valor.  If  one  point  of  the  line  be  forced,  the  army 
no  longer  thinks  of  defending  itself;  although,  at  this  very  moment, 
it  would  have  the  greatest  chance  of  victory,  because  its  force  is  uec- 
9* 


102  THE    SPIRIT   OP 

e88arily  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  who,  while  penetrating  with 
the  head  of  his  column  through  the  breach,  prevent?  the  troops  which 
follow  from  taking  any  part  in  the  attack;  besides,  the  enemy  has  to 
pass  a  defile.  Thus,  when  it  has  the  best  part  of  the  bargain,  and 
should  most  assuredly  succeed,  this  army  thinks  of  retreating. 

Examples  of  this  kind  are  numerous.  I  could  easily  cite  very  many, 
but  I  am  content  to  recall  three,  which  are  celebrated,  and  one  of 
which  happened  under  my  own  eyes. 

The  first  is  the  capture  of  the  lines  of  Turin7,  defended  by  an  army  of 
80,000  men,  attacked  by  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy8,  with  40,000  Austrians. 

The  second  happened  at  Dcnain9,  where  Marshal  Villars10,  with  an  in- 
ferior and  discouraged  army,  beat  Prince  Eugene, 

The  third  is  the  capture  of  the  lines  of  Mayence,  defended  by  the 
French  army  of  30.000  men,  and  consisting  of  works  of  rare  perfection, 
the  most  considerable  of  this  kind  which  have  ever  been  constructed 
in  modern  times.  Built  under  the  direction  of  General  Chasseloup 
Laubat,  one  of  the  best  engineers  France  has  produced,  they  seemed 
impregnable.  Nevertheless,  on  the  8th  of  October,  1795,  two  small  de- 
tachments sufficed  to  create  a  disorder  which  nothing  could  repair;  one 
of  400  men,  which  passed  the  Pthine  in  the  rear  and  up  the  river,  and 
the  other,  which  was  engaged  in  a  small  space  left  between  the  river 
and  the  lines,  at  the  moment  when  numerous  troops  in  their  presence 
were  placed  in  position  for  a  front  attack. 

The  only  reasonable  use  to  construct  such  lines  is  to  employ  them 
against  very  numerous  but  bad  armies,  such  as  the  Orientals.  Their 
utility  in  this  case  has  always  been  demonstrated  and  recognized;  the 
success  obtained  by  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy  before  Belgrad  is  a  new 
proof.  Placed  between  lines  of  circumvallation  raised  against  the  gar- 
rison of  the  fortress,  and  lines  of  countervallation  in  face  of  the  army  of 
the  G  rand- Vizier,  he  was  enabled  to  continue  the  siege,  hold  the  army 
in  check,  take  the  place,  and  come  out  the  victor  of  the  strife;  but 
against  European  armies  different  principles  must  be  followed. 

When  a  soldier  is  permitted  to  place  his  entire  security  in  a  material 
obstacle  in  front  of  him,  and  when  this  obstacle  is  overcome,  he  thinks 
no  longer  of  defending  himself,  and  this  fatal  impression  is  often  com- 
municated to  persons  of  a  more  elevated  grade.  A  soldier  should  be  con- 
vinced, on  the  contrary,  and  he  can  not  be  too  often  reminded  of  it,  that 
the  guaranty  of  victory  is,  above  all,  to  be  found  in  his  own  courage,  and 
that  he  ought  to  scorn  the  enemy.  But  if,  instead  of  having  obstacles 
in  his  front  paralyzing  his  movements,  he  finds  merely  supports  cover- 
ing his  flanks  and  protecting  him,  he  will  believe  himself  invincible, 
and  this  impression  will  soon  be  communicated  to  the  enemy  ;  and,  if 
resisting  an  attack,  free  in  his  movements,  he  will  know  how  to  profit 
from  a  victory,  and  to  develop  its  consequences. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  103 

An  army  in  presence  of  a  stronger  army,  and  under  certain  circum- 
stances, will  then  do  well  to  entrench.  Supported  by  a  fortified  place, 
a  river,  or  mountains,  and  surrounded  by  a  greater  or  less  number  of 
defensive  points,  made  likewise  as  strong  as  possible,  it  will  thus  suc- 
ceed in  supplying  the  numbers  it  may  lack,  and  to  establish  something 
of  an  equilibrium. 

This  subject  naturally  brings  me  to  the  question  of  permanent  en- 
trenched camps — works  of  recent  invention,  composed  of  revetted  forti- 
fications, which  enclose  a  large  extent  of  ground,  and  which,  situated 
upon  strategic  points,  arc  traversed  by  a  great  river.  In  my  opinion, 
there  are  no  works  of  more  value,  and  which  could  render  greater  ser- 
vices. Several  establishments  of  this  kind,  although  upon  different 
scales  and  under  varied  circumstances,  are  being  or  have  recently  been 
erected. 

I  shall  speak  of  the  two  most  important,  and  which  have  particular- 
ly engaged  the  attention  of  military  men:  that  of  Linz,  in  Upper  Aus- 
tria, and  the  fortifications  of  Paris. 

The  entrenched  camp  of  Linz  is  composed  of  forty-two  carefully 
constructed  towers,  occupying  a  circular  space  of  moro  than  six  leagues; 
oach  one  of  these  towers  is  casemated,  covered  from  the  field  side  by 
the  relief  of  the  glacis,  and  its  fire  is  entirely  grazing.  The  model- 
tower  had  a  deep  ditch  with  a  riveted  counterscarp,  and  a  gallery  for 
fire  in  reverse;  and  I  think  these  means  of  security  in  the  system  have 
been  wrongly  suppressed.  The  armament  of  each  tower  consists  of  a 
dozen  pieces  of  heavy  calibre.  All  the  towers  are  visible  from  and 
sufficiently  near  to  each  other  to  sustain  themselves.  They  occupy,  upon 
a  portion  of  their  extent,  a  range  of  heights  which  have,  in  front  of 
them,  in  the  distance,  rugged  and  difficult  mountains,  and  rest  against 
and  are  supported  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube  below  the  city. 
Upon  the  left  bank  a  much  larger  height  (the  Pessin-Berg)  rests  against 
the  main  branch  of  the  Danube,  and  is  occupied  by  a  suitable  and  very 
strong  work,  from  which  another  line  of  towers  commences,  which,  en- 
closing a  large  space,  rests  in  like  manner  upon  the  Danube  above  the 
city. 

I  will  not  discuss  the  strength  of  the  isolated  towers,  believing  them 
capable  of  but  little  resistance,  were  they  abandoned  to  themselves. 
But  covering  an  army  which  is  enclosed  in  the  space  ihe  towers  sur- 
round, they  appear  to  me  incapable  of  being  attacked.  The  enemy  will 
never  undertake  a  siege,  sustained  as  they  are  by  an  army,  and  the 
army  under  their  protection  need  not  fear  anything. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  entrenched  camps  of  this  kind  is  the 
impossibility  of  being  besieged,  and  to  be  at  the  point  of  the  cen- 
tre of  numerous  lines  of  communication.  In  this  respect  the  camp  of 
Linz  is  conveniently    placed,    and    its  strategic  position    «fell  chosen. 


104  Tin:  SPIRIT  or 

Two  roads,  upon  the  two  shores  of  the  Danube,  descend  this  river  at  a 
greater  or  less  distance  from  its  borders.  Several  roads  conduct  into 
Bohemia,-  others  lead  toward  Salzburg,  the  Tyrol,  Styria,  and  Ca- 
rinthia.  A  camp  as  large  as  that  of  Linz,  with  such  obstacles  as  the 
country  presents,  can  not  be  surrounded  by  the  enemy  ;  and  the  army 
enclosed  therein  can  never  lose  all  its  communications,  even  if  it  be 
supposed  that  a  force  triple  as  large  as  the  besieged  army  beleaguers  it. 
It  will  then  always  be  enabled  to  receive  reinforcements  and  to  reorgan- 
ize itself,  until  the  moment  arrives  when  it  is  able  to  assume  the  offen- 
sive; the  enemy  will  then  be  forced  to  merely  observe — because  he  will 
neverdareto  risk  himself  into  the  narrow  valley  of  the  Danube,  in  order 
to  march  upon  Vienna,  as  long  as  an  Austrian  army  remains  in  this 
offensive  and  menacing  position. 

Truly,  such  a  resolution  would  be  senseless  ;  and  if,  in  1809,  the 
camp  of  Linz  had  existed,  Napoleon  would  not  have  gone  to  Vienna; 
he  would  have  entered  it  much  later.  Besides,  in  war,  and  especially 
in  the  case  of  large  empires,  the  gain  of  time  is  everything;  and  it  is 
only  necessary  to  give  to  the  natural  resources  of  the  country  the 
means  to  develop  themselves.  The  entrenched  camp  of  Linz  is,  there- 
fore, an  admirable  and  great  military  conception. 

In  every  country  there  are  localities  which  are  suited  for  establish- 
ments of  this  kind,  and  which  would  be,  when  the  circumstances  ar- 
rive, of  the  greatest  utility. 

The  entrenched  camp  of  Verona  is  conceived  in  the  same  spirit; 
and,  although  in  its  case  the  circumstances  differ,  it  will,  in  the  hands 
of  a  general  who  knows  how  to  take  advantage  of  it  and  how  to 
manœuvre,  still  serve  admirably,  and  ought  to  play  a  great  part. 

I  come  now  to  the  defensive  works  erected  around  Paris11,  which 
have  been  and  are  still  the  object  of  long  and  solemn  debates.  The 
construction  of  the  forts,  whose  system  appears  to  me  perfectly  con- 
ceived, assures  a  greater  independence  to  Franco  against  the  attack 
of  the  whole  of  Europe  than  the  acquisition  of  several  provinces, 
which  would  have  placed  the  frontier  at  so  great  a  distance. 

No  one  will  gainsay  the  immonse  influence  which  Paris  exercises 
over  the  destinies  of  the  empire.  The  disproportionate  head  of  the 
body,  but  the  active  focus,  uniting  all  faculties  of  intelligence,  where  an 
irresistible  moral  power  is  developed,  where  immense  treasures  are  accu- 
mulated, and  where  everything  most  distinguished  in  the  country 
finds  a  common  home — Paris  has  contributed  to  an  extraordinary  ex- 
tent to  the  power,  glory,  and  splendor  of  France.  But  France  has  to 
pay  dearly  for  the  advantages  which  Paris  confers,  whenever  the  city 
falls — for  with  its  weight  it  carries  France  along.  Therefore  the  inter- 
ests which  influence  the  entire  empire  and  compromise  its  existence, 
must  not  depend  upon  the  fate  of  two  or  three  battles  ;  the  frontiers 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  105 

must  either  be  extended,  or  the  dangers  be  diminished  which  the 
approach  of  the  enemy  brings  with  it  ;  there  is  no  other  means  but  to 
prepare  an  impregnable  refuge  for  the  Frcncli  armies,  when,  unlucky 
and  beaten,  they  unite  within  the  walls  of  the  capital. 

Whatever  may  be  the  consequences  of  the  most  fatal  campaign,  the 
remains  of  the  army  will  always  be  from  eighty  to  one  hundred  thou- 
sand men,  and  sustained  by  regularly  constructed  forts  these  eighty 
thousand  men  will  be  invincible.  Because,  with  the  resources  which 
Paris  encloses  in  personnel  of  all  kind,  population,  riches  of  every 
sort,  material  of  every  species,  and  the  succors  of  the  neighboring 
departments,  the  ranks  will  soon  be  filled  and  all  losses  repaired  ;  and, 
in  less  than  one  month,  an  army  of  three  hundred  thousand  men,  well 
provided  and  filled  with  renewed  spirit,  will  march  against  the  enemy. 
What  force  will  not,  then,  the  enemy  need  to  resist  them?  If  he 
divides  his  forces,  be  will  be  weak  everywhere  and  easily  destroyed;  if 
he  remains  united  to  resist  and  to  give  battle,  how  will  he  subsist? 
And  what  will  be  his  fate  after  the  slightest  check  ? 

If,  then,  the  enemy  has  advanced  as  far  as  Paris,  he  can  do  nothing 
better  than  to  withdraw,  before  the  moment  arrives  when  the  French 
army,  reorganized,  will  issue  forth  to  seek  him  ;  and  he  must  hasten 
to  carry  the  war  into  the  provinces  and  within  reach  of  his  resources. 
Then  the  theatre  of  war  is  again  upon  the  frontiers,  and  everything 
returning  to  its  natural  state,  a  catastrophe  need  no  longer  be  feared. 
I  consider,  then,  the  most  auspicious  event  for  the  security  and  de- 
fence of  France,  the  construction  of  detached  forts,  whose  efficiency  is 
such  that  the  enemy  can  not  present  himself  in  force  upon  many  points 
at  the  same  time.  But  Paris  must  not  be  fortified  by  a  continuous 
enclosure,  because,  in  my  opinion,  and  in  the  opinion  of  all  informed 
and  experienced  men,  this  city  is  not  in  condition  to  bo  able  to  sustain 
a  siege;  it  is  sufficient  to  adopt  a  system  of  defence  which  shall  pre-  ■ 
vent  its  ever  being  besieged,  and  with  this  aim— the  only  one  to  be 
considered— the  detached  forts  are  enough:  the  continuous  enclosure  is 
superfluous;  and,  whatever  may  happen,  the  latter  can  never  be  usefully 
applied. 

NOTES. 

1.  Marshal  Vauban— Sebastien  Le  Prestrerfo  Yauban  was  born  in  Burpun- 
<]y.  May  i.  1633,  .,f  a  noble  bat  Impoverished  family,  eleven  of  whose  member*  died 
00  ,l'"  Beld  '"  ,1'"  ■errice  of  their  oooatty.  At  seventeen  he  began  his  military  lift 
in  Ooodé'a  regiment,  then  in  the  sen  ice  of  Bpaln— a  circumstance  little  surprising 
in  the  bewildering  embroilments  of  thai  period,  «ten  foe  most  llrastrioaa  general*, 
of  the  nation  wore  band  Qghtlng  now  for  Fran.,.,  ami  nowfti  her  enemies.    Be 

had  already  been  employed  a-  an  eogli r  before  be  waa  twenty  yaaas  eld,  at 

which  age  he  wascaptared  by  the  royaliste,  and  Induced  byafaaavii  to  enter  the 
king*!  service.  He  speedily  race  to  his  acknowledged  poatUoo  ai  the  Brat  of  French 
engineers,  and  his  military  lift  would  embrace  a  chronicle  of  all  the  sieges  In  the 


106  THE    SPIRIT    OP 

wars  on  the  Flemish  frontier — with  Spain  first,  and  then  with  Holland — which  filled 
the  last  half  of  the  seventeenth  century.  All  the  most  notahle  of  those  sieges  he 
directed  in  person  ;  but  it  so  chanced  that  he  never  was  called  on  to  act  in  the  defence 
of  a  besieged  place.  After  fifty  years  of  unflagging  exertion  for  the  benefit  of  his 
country  he  received  the  marshal's  bâton  (1703),  not  then  for  the  first  time  offered, 
and  died  March  30,  1707,  full  of  years  and  honors,  leaving  behind  him  one  of  the 
most  6potless  names  in  military  history,  as  "  The  first  of  engineers  and  best  of 
citizens  ;  "  a  noble  example  in  the  devoted  servant  of  an  absolute  monarch — of  a 
patriot  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word.  Besides  carrying  the  arts  of  defence  and 
attack  to  a  degree  of  perfection  unknown  before,  he  was  eminently  a  humane  and 
honest  man — at  once  loyal  and  independent,  clear-souled,  and  guided  in  the  right 
course  as  by  a  natural  instinct  :  in  war  prodigal  of  no  man's  blood  but  his  own. 
He  was  often  vvounded,  and  a  shot  in  his  cheek,  which  he  received  at  Douay  in 
1667,  marked  him  to  his  dying  day,  and  is  indicated  in  his  portraits.  His  exterior 
was  that  of  a  bluff  soldier,  but  his  simple  and  kindly  manners  agreed  with  the 
modest,  truthful,  and  genial  character  of  the  man.  When  Louis  XIV,  at  Cambrai, 
1677,  threatened  a  violation  of  one  of  the  more  humane  laws  of  war,  Yauban  alone 
fearlessly  raised  his  voice  in  dissuasion  ;  and  not  once  only,  but  again  and  again  did 
this  noble  soldier,  in  writing,  remonstrate  with  tho.  king  on  his  treatment  of  the 
Protestants  and  his  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes.  In  peace  Vauban  was  as 
laborious  as  in  war,  and  left  behind  him  a  vast  mass  of  MSS.,  embracing  projects 
for  internal  navigation  ;  for  the  improvement  of  ports  ;  for  the  defence  of  the  fron- 
tiers, and  the  fortification  of  the  capital  (accomplished  in  our  days)  ;  essays  on 
tactics,  finance,  commerce,  the  relation  between  state  .and  church,  geography, 
mathematics,  and  many  other  practical  subjects  besides  those  immediately  con- 
nected with  his  own  professional  duties.  He  is  said  to  have  been  present  at  one 
hundred  and  forty  actions  ;  to  have  conducted  fifty-three  sieges  ;  to  have  repaired 
or  improved  some  three  hundred  fortresses  and  ports,  besides  constructing  thirty- 
three  new  ones.  But,  as  is  well  said  by  the  historian  of  the  corps  of  which  Vauban 
was  60  long  the  glory  and  the  patriarch,  "  Such  services  as  his  are  to  be  weighed, 
not  numbered." 

2.  Strasbourg,  on  the  left,  and  within  a  mile  from  the  Rhine,  the  capital  of 
Alsace,  seated  near  the  confluence  of  the  111,  which  traverses  it  by  many  arms,  now 
the  chief  town  of  the  Department  of  the  Lower  Rhine,  and  head-quarters  of  the 
fourth  military  division;  having  a  directory  of  artillery  and  of  fortification,  a 
school  of  artillery,  a  military  gymnasium,  a  cannon  foundry,  a  garrison  of  infantry, 
artillery,  and  pontoon  engineers,  a  park  of  artillery,  etc.,  and  sixty  thousand  inhab- 
itants. This  is  the  centre  of  defence  of  the  frontier  of  the  Rhino,  and  one  of  the 
strongest  places  in  Europe  ;  its  citadel  is  composed  of  five  bastions,  the  outworks  of 
which  extend  as  far  as  one  of  the  arms  of  the  Rhine,  and  its  system  of  defence  is 
completed  by  a  sluice,  by  means  of  which  the  surrounding  districts  can  be  easily 
inundated.  Opposite  Strasbourg,  and  separated  from  it  by  a  bridge,  stands  Kehl, 
a  fortress  constructed  by  Vauban  ;  ceded  to  Baden  by  the  Treaty  of  the  Ryswick  ; 
taken  by  the  French  in  1703,  1733, 1793,  and  1796  ;  here  the  French  sustained  a 
memorable  siege  in  1797.    The  works  are  now  destroyed. 

3.  Metz  is  a  place  of  the  first  class,  on  the  river  Moselle,  one  of  the  affluents 
of  the  Rhine  ;  chief  town  of  the  Department  of  the  Moselle,  and  head-quarters  of 
the  third  military  division;  with  a  directory  of  artillery  and  of  fortification,  schools 
for  the  practice  of  fortification  and  artillery,  and  for  the  construction  of  gun-car- 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  107 

riages  and  baggage  wagons,  a  school  for  artillery  and  engineer  artisans,  a  military 
gymnasium,  arsenal,  artillery  forges,  powder  manufactory,  etc.  There  is  a  railroad 
from  Metz,  which  joins  the  Paris  and  Strasbourg  railroad  a  little  to  the  north  of 
Nancy.  This  is  the  centre  of  defence  of  France,  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine. 
The  principal  works  in  advance  of  the  body  of  the  place,  fortified  by  Vauban,  are 
the  double  crown-works  of  the  Moselle  and  of  Belle-Croix,  the  masterpieces  of  Cor- 
montaigne. 

4.  Lille,  on  the  river  Lys,  an  affluent  of  the  Scheldt,  is  a  place  of  the  first 
class  ;  chief  town  of  the  Department  Du  Nord,  and,  head-qttarters  of  the  second 
military  division;  having  a  directory  of  artillery  and  of  fortification,  and  a  garrison 
of  infantry  and  cavalry;  anciently  the  capital  of  French  Flanders;  taken  by  Louis 
XIV  in  1667,  by  the  Allies  in  1708,  and  vainly  besieged  by  the  Austrians  in  1792; 
seventy  thousand  inhabitants.  This  city,  one  of  the  strongest  in  Europe,  forms,  with 
its  ramparts,  an  oval,  the  greater  axis  of  which  is  7,845  feet,  and  the  smaller  axis' 3,937 
feet  ;  its  ramparts  have  seven  gates,  and  form  nine  fronts  of  fortifications— two  on  the 
west,  covered  by  the  canal  of  the  Deule,  and  defended  by  three  bastions  ;  three  on  the 
north,  consisting  of  seven  bastions,  crowned  by  cavaliers,  by  hornworks,  lunettes, 
etc.  ;  two  on  the  east,  covered  by  three  bastions,  and  the  fort  St.  Sauveur;  two  on 
the  south,  protected  by  four  bastions  and  the  citadel,  which  is  Separated  from  the 
body  of  the  place  by  the  canal  of  the  Deule,  which  can  be  made  to  Inundate*  the 
approaches  to  the  place  to  a  distance  of  upwards  of  two  thousand  yards.  The 
citadel  is  the  masterpiece  of  Vauban;  it  is  a  regular  pentagon,  whose  works  are  so 
accumulated  and  disposed  that  it  may  be  regarded  as  impregnable.  Lille  is  the 
centre  of  defence  of  the  entire  northern  frontier  of  France;  situated  in  a  plain,  it 
principally  covers  the  low,  wet  lands,  intersected  by  numerous  canals  and  ditches, 
which  extend  between  the  Scheldt  and  the  Lys.  From  Lille  there  is  railroad 
communication  with  Amiens,  Courtray,  Ostend,  Ghent,  Malines,  and  Antwerp. 

5.  Alexandria.— This  city,  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tanars,  an 
affluent  of  the  Po,  has,  upon  the  left  bank,  a  vast  citadel,  which  is  covered  by  the 
two  rivers  ;  it  is  the  most  important  place  in  all  Italy,  from  its  eminently  strategic 
position,  in  the  centre  of  all  the  roads  of  the  upper  basin  of  the  Po.  Napoleon  had 
destined  it  for  a  grand  entrenched  camp,  by  which  he  would  have  connected  the 
several  fortresses  of  Turin,  Milan,  and  Mantua;  accordingly  nothing  was  spared  by 
him  to  secure  here  a  safe  retreat,  a  great  depot,  a  formidable  rampart  for  an  army, 
Which,  having  lost  a  battle,  should  he  be  unable  to  keep  the  field  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Po,  and  be  forced  back  upon  the  Appenino*;  but  its  fortifications  were 
destroyed  by  the  Austrians  in  1814,  and  there  remains  now  nothing  but  the  citadel. 

6.  Venice— The  river  Brenta,  after  passing  the  great  road  from  Verona  upon 
Austria,  rolls  its  troubled  yet  staggfafti  waters  along  an  artificial  ehannel  on  a  very 
elevated  causeway,  turns  to  the  south-east,  and  terminates,  without  embouchure, 
anion-  green  and  stagnant  pools  and  marshes,  where  the  land  ceases  imperceptibly 
and  Mends  with  the  sea. 

It  is  amid  these  lagune*  that  Venice  is  seated  on  some  sixty  or  eighty  islands, 
and  seems  to  float  upon  the  sea;  the  canal  which  separates  it  from  the  terra  firma 
is  about  four  miles  broad,  but  it  has  an  incessant  tendency  to  be  filled  up  by  the 
earth  and  sand  which  are  brought  into  it  by  the  Brent*  ;  and  we  can  foresee  a  time 
when  this  city,  the  Queen  of  the  Adriatic,  will  be  entirely  Baited  to  the  mainland 
of  Italy.    The  canals,  which  everywhere  interact   the  city  rind  supply  th-  plao*  of 


108  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

to,  arc  menaced  with  the  same  fate,  notwithstanding  all  the  care  that  is  taken 
By  the  Venetians  to  get  rid  of  the  rami  and  Bands  which  accumulate  In  them;  and 
we  may  say  with  Chateaubriand  that,  in  a  physical  M  well  as  a  moral  sedhe, 
"Venice  will  one  day  return  to  the  slime  out  <>f  which  she  has  risen."' 

Tlie  war  of  1805  and  the  Treaty  of  Presbourg  brought  about  theunioa  of  the 
Venetian  states  with  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  when  Napoleon,  with  a  view  of  making 
Venice  a  great  military  station  and  entrepôt  of  the  commerce  of  the  Levant,  order- 
ed the  construction  of  enormous  works  in  the  port,  and  covered  the  city  on  the  land 
side  with  forts  and  redoubts.  The  Treaty  of  1814  caused  her  ouce  more  to  pass  under 
the  dominion  of  Austria. 

Her  port  is  the  most  considerable  of  the  Austrian  monarchy,  and  the  seat  of  all 
her  navy;  many  new  outworks,  both  upon  the  lagune  islands  and  in  its  villages  on 
the  mainland,  have  rendered  it  a  fortress  of  the  first  class. 

7.  Turin,  on  the  left  hank  of  the  Po,  defended  by  a  citadel,  the  only  relic  of  its 
former  fortifications:  has  an  arsenal,  military  school,  etc.,  and  one  hundred  and 
fifteen  thousand  inhabitants.  Taken  by  d'Harcourt  in  1640;  besieged  in  1706  by  the 
French;  besieged  and  taken  from  the  French  by  the  Russians  in  1799;  retaken  by 
the  former  in  1800,  and  retained  by  them  until  1814. 

8.  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy,  celebrated  in  the  contests  with  Louis  XIV  of 
France;  born  in  1663,  at  Paris;  died  at  Vienna  April  27,  1736,  in  the  service  of 
Austria. 

Served  in  Hungary  in  1683;  1691  delivered  Coni,  took  Carmagnole;  1697  com- 
manded the  Imperial  army  ;  defeated  the  Turks  at  Zentha;  in  War  of  Succession 
marched  into  Italy  with  thirty  thousand  men;  surprised  Corpi,  swept  the  Adige, 
and  beats  Marshal  Villeroy  at  Chiari  ;  1702  surprises  Cremona,  but  fails  :  defeated 
by  the  Duke  of  Vendôme  at  Santa  Vittoria  and  Luzzara;  defeated  in  1704  by  the 
French  at  Ilochstedt;  defeated  in  1705,  in  Lombardy.  at  Cassano,  by  the  Puke  of 
Vendôme;  relieves  Turin  in  1706:  gained  the  Battle  of  Suae  in  1707;  wins  the  Battle 
of  Malplaquet,  September  10, 1709,  against  Marshals  De  Villars  and  De  Boufflei  : 
1712.  takes  Douai;  beaten  by  Villars  at  Denain,  in  1710;  in  1717  he  fought  and 
gained  the  Ball  le  of  Belgrade  against  the  Turks;  in  1733  lost  Philipsbourg. 

9.  Denain,  a  town  on  the  river  Scheldt. 

10.  Marshal  Villars,  born  in  1653  at  Lyons,  others  say  at  Moulins  de  Pierre; 
died  at  Turin  in  1734.  Aide-de-camp  to  Marshal  Bellefons;  1702,  beats  the  Austrians 
at  Freilingen;  takes  Kehl  in  1703,  and  gains  the  Battle  of  Ilochstedt;  conquers  the 
fanatics  of  Languedoc  in  1704;  1707,  breaks  the  lines  of  Stollhofen  ;  dangerously 
wounded  at  Malplaquet  ;  captures  Denain,  Marchieunes,  Douai,  Bouehain,  Landau, 
Fribourg,  etc.;  commands  in  Italy  in  1733;  took  1'isighitone,  Milan,  Novarra,  Tor- 
tona;  marshal-general  of  the  French  armies. 

11.  The  City  of  Paris  is  divided  by  the  river  Seine  into  two  portions,  besides 
the  islands.  The  southern  portion  is  the  less  considerable  and  the  most  elevated  ; 
it  forms  a  semicircle,  of  which  the  Seine  is  the  diameter.  It  is  protected  on  the 
east  by  the  river,  gradually  disappears  to  the  south  on  a  wide  plateau,  which,  by  its 
blending  with  the  plains  of  Beance,  leaves  the  city  on  this  side  without  defence; 
on  the  west  it  may  be  turned  by  Saint-Denis,  Argeriteuil,  Saint-Germain,  and  Ver- 
sailles.   The  northern  portion  is  the  larger  and  the  more  strategically  important  ; 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  1(J9 

liko  the  other,  it  forms  a  semicircle,  of  which  the  river  is  the  diameter.  It  is  cover- 
ed on  the  west  by  the  Seine  from  Sèvres  to  Saint-Denis;  on  the  east  by  the  Marne 
from  Saint-Mam  to  Lagny;  and,  lastly,  on  the  north  by  a  line  of  heights  separating 
the  waters  which  fall  into  the  Seine,  near  Saint-Denis,  from  those  which  How  into  it 
or  into  the  Marne  between  Saint-Clond  and  Lagny.  This  aeries  of  rising  grounds,  of 
little  elevation,  at  first  runs  along  the  Maine  in  undulating  hills;  it  then  sinks 
down  into  a  plain  between  between  Rosny  and  Montreuil;  rises  again  in  the  plateau 
of  Belleville;  is  lost  in  the  plain  of  Saint-Denis;  ascends  into  the  high,  steep,  isolat- 
ed mound  forming  tho  Montmartre;  again  sinks  into  the  plain  of  Batignolles;  and 
terminates  in  the  gentle  hills  of  Chaillot  and  of  Passy,  which  border  the  Seine,  and 
at  last  disappears  in  the  Bois  de  Boulogne. 

Such  is  the  whole  amount  of  what  nature  has  provided  for  the  defence  of  tho 
metropolis  of  modern  civilization;  and  yet, however  inconsiderable  these  series  of 
heights  may  at  first  sight  appear,  they  offer  some  military  positions— as  :  1.  To  the 
north-east,  the  plateau  de  Belleville,  about  460  feet  high,  and  in  extent  from  328  to 
1,040  yards;  it  is  broken  by  hollows,  and  covered  with  woods,  houses,  and  gardens, 
and  forms  a  steep  acclivity  close  to  the  very  walls  of  Paris,  by  the  mound  of  Chau- 
mont,  377  feet  high  ;  Bagnolet  and  Charonne  cover  the  débouches  to  the  east,  Ro- 
niainville  to  the  north,  Pantin  and  Prés  Saint-Gérvais  to  tho  west,  where  it  is  far- 
ther protected  by  the  canal  of  the  Ourcq.  2.  To  the  north-west  the  hill  of  Mont- 
martre. 427  feet  high  and  1,100  yards  in  extent,  which  looks  down  upon  the  walls  of 
Paris,  and  is  steep  on  all  sides  except  that  toward  the  city,  where  the  slope  is 
more  gentle  ;  on  tho  east  and  west  sides  the  quarries  that  have  been  hollowed  out 
of  it  render  it  inaccessible,  and  on  tho  north  the  village  makes  it  a  true  redoubt. 
It  is  so  strong  a  position  that,  protected  by  artillery,  it  could  never  be  taken  but  by 
surprise.  The  heights  of  Montmartre  and  of  Belleville  are  separated  by  the  great 
depression  of  the  plain  of  Saint-Denis,  an  extensive  and  fertile  field  without  undu- 
lations, or  trees,  or  houses,  and  which  is  covered  on  the  west  by  the  Seine,  on 
the  east  by  the  canal  of  Saint-Denis,  a  derivation  from  the  canal  of  the  Ourcq,  and 
which  enters  the  Seine  close  to  Saint-Denis,  to  tho  south  of  which  it  passes.  The 
pli i eau  of  Belleville,  the  hill  of  Montmartre,  and  the  plain  of  Saint-Denis  are 
thus  the  military  positions  which  defend  Paris  on  the  east  and  north.  Their  impor- 
tance was  understood  in  1814  by  the  Allies,  who  directed  all  their  efforts  against 
these  three  points,  and  here  that  battle  was  fought  which  delivered  up  the  capital  of 
France  to  the  confederated  armies  of  Europe.  A  similar  disaster  is  no  longer  to  be 
apprehended;  the  focus  of  the  greatest  revolution  which  has  ever  happened  in  the 
world  is  now  secured  from  the  attacks  of  feudal  Europe, 
Paris  is  fortified  : 

1.  My  a  continuous  rampart  embracing  both  banks  of  the  Seine,  bastioned,  and 
having  an  escarpment  of  masonry  of  thirty-three  feel  high;  this  enoeùlfe  encloses  th« 

Lot  suburbs  of  Paris,  and  extends,  on  the  right  bank,  beyond  Bercy,  Charonne, 
Batignolles,  Ternes,  Passy,  Autrui],  and  Point-dnJour;  OD  the  left  bank  it  is  car- 
ried beyond  7a*gjrard,  Petit4fantroage,  PetH-Gentilly,  and  Haison-Blanche. 

2.  By  outworks  that  sure  casemated,  and  of  which  the  principal  are  the  forts  of 
Charenton,  Nogent,  Etotny,  Noisy,  ELomalnrille,  tl  •  n  the  banals  of  the 
Ourcq  and  of  Beint-Denis,  and  the  fortifications  "f  Baint-Denis  Itself,  upon  the  right 
bank;  the  forta  of  Blont-Valerj  atrouge,  B  [Try, on 
the  left  bank. 

in  the  blase  of  oontinu  d  as  of 

Paris  entirely.    Nor  did  the  period  of  hie  reversée,  from  1M2— 1S14,  lead  him  to 
protect  the  capital  nf  his  empire      H»  BSTSf  dreamed  thai  FtSAM  "uld 

10 


110  ^HE    SPIRIT    OP 

ever  become,  as  long  as  he  wielded  the  power  of  his  legions,  the  scone  of  war  and  de- 
vastation. When,  finally,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1813,  his  situation  became 
imminently  critical,  he  turned  his  attention  to  the  capital,  but  it  was  too  late 
Had  Paris  of  1814  been  the  Paris  of  1864  it  would  have  never  been  taken. 

In  the  Confederate  States  we  have  no  such  central  point  as  Paris  is  to  France. 
Richmond,  it  is  true,  has  become  of  great  importance,  no  less  in  a  political  than  in 
a  military  point  of  view,  but  it  neither  contains  the  whole  military  resources  of  the 
Confederacy,  nor  would  its  loss  dispirit  our  people  as  that  of  Paris  did  the  French 
in  1S14;  but  Richmond  is  so  far  of  the  utmost  importance,  that  if  the  casualties  of 
war  would  wrench  it  from  our  grasp,  wo  hare  not  a  single  fortified  point  within 
the  Confederacy  where  we  could  fall  back  upon,  reorganize,  and  concentrate  at 
leisure,  before  an  enterprising  enemy  flushed  with  success. 

It  appears,  then,  to  be  a  matter  of  the  greatest  urgency  that  we  should  establish 
one  or  more  large  entrenched  camps  where,  beforehand,  we  should  concentrât o 
provisions  and  material  of  war  enough  to  sustain  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
men,  with  fortifications  ready,  and  a  haven  of  refuge  at  hand,  when  a  day  of  reverses 
comes. 

There  are  several  very  strong  and  strategically  important  points  both  in  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia,  which  would  make  admirable  large  entrenched  camps. 

These  entrenched  camps  could  servo  another  useful  purpose.  The  recruits  from 
several  states  might  be  concentrated  there  and  instructed  en  masse  ;  the  most 
important  military  workshops,  etc.,  could  be  there  united,  etc. 

12.  Siege. — Major-General  Twemlow  says  : 

u  When  the  siege  of  a  fortress  or  strong  position  is  determined  on,  the  first  point 
to  be  ascertained  is  the  time  in  which  it  should  be  taken;  the  second,  the  force 
requisite  to  effect  the  object  ;  the  third,  the  reserves  requisite  to  replace  casualties 
and  supplies  of  all  kinds  ;  the  fourth,  the  strength  of  the  covering  army  to  prevent 
reliefs  and  reinforcements. 

"As  regards  the  first  and  second  points,  time  and  force,  they  ought  to  admit  of 
calculation;  if  means  adequate  are  not  available,  the  siege  should  not  bo  un i>  r- 
taken  ;  the  law  of  nations  should  forbid  it,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  blockade,  with- 
out a  sufficient  force  to  exact  it,  would  not  be  legal.  On  the  third  point,  it  is  clear 
that,  without  resources  of  men,  ammunition,  stores,  food,  and  requisites  of  every 
description,  the  effective  prosecution  of  a  siege  is  impracticable.  And,  fourthly,  we 
have  the  recent  example  of  Mooltan,  that  a  strong  place  in  an  enemy's  country 
can  not  be  invested  without  a  covering  army  preponderant  in  the  field. 

13.  Time  Of  Reducing  Fortresses. — The  expense  and  duration  of  resist- 
ance of  a  front  of  fortification  of  e.vch  of  the  systems,  is  as  follows  : 

System.  Probable  expense.  Duration  of  resistance. 

Vaubaus  first  system $200,000  .  19  days. 

"        second  and  third 400,000  29      " 

Cormontaigne 300,000  30      " 

Coehorn  250,000  21      " 

Bousmard  and  Chasseloup 1,000,000  34     " 

Montalembert 1,500,000  80     " 

Carnot 500,000  18      " 

Mr.  Ferguson's  from 40,000  without  casemates, 

To 300,000  with  them. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  Ill 

14.  Some  Practical  Matters. — Bursting  open  Gates.— The  simplest  meth- 
od is  to  suspend  a  bag  of  gunpowder,  containing  fifty  to  sixty  pounds,  near  the 
middle  of  the  gate,  upon  a  nail  or  gimlet,  having  a  small  piece  of  port-fire  or  Bick- 
ford's  fuse  inserted  in  tho  bottom.  Leathern  bags  are  best  for  this  purpose,  but 
sand  bags  filled  with  powder,  propped  up  and  ignited,  will  demolish  almost  any 
gate  or  barrier. 

If,  instead  of  being  suspended,  the  powder  should  be  placed  at  the  bottom  of 
the  gate,  any  spare  time  might  be  advantageously  employed  in  heaping  rubbish, 
stones,  or  any  other  available  heavy  material,  over  it,  as  completely  as  time  and 
circumstances  may  admit. 

Hurdles  were  much  used  by  the  ancients  in  their  field-works,  and  are  still 
occasionally  found  serviceable  for  revetting,  or  for  laying  on  wet  ground  alternate- 
ly with  beds  of  fascines.  Layers  of  hurdles,  covered  with  heath  and  ballast,  were 
extensively  used  by  Stephenson  in  tho  substructure  of  the  Liverpool  and  Man- 
chester railroad  where  it  crosses  the  Chat  Moss.  In  the  trenches  at  Antwerp, 
deluged  with  incessant  rain,  the  French  laid  doublo  tiers  of  fascines,  and  over 
these  a  layer  of  strong  hurdles,  for  the  passage  of  artillery. 

Hurdles  for  portability  may  be  made  six  feet  long  by  two  feet  nine  inches  broad, 
weighing  about  fifty  pounds  when  dry. 

Revetments  may  be  made  by  hurdle-work,  by  driving  stout  sticks  along  the  face 
of  the  slope  to  be  revetted  to  a  depth  of  about  two  feet  in  the  ground  at  its  base. 
Branches  are  then  woven  in  and  out  between  these  stakes,  and  vertical  binders 
applied,  when  the  wattling  is  completed.  Similar  wattle-work  is  employed  in 
Flanders  for  revetting  the  submerged  escarps  of  wet  ditches. 

Gabions. — Up  to  the  year  1853  they  were  made  of  wicker-work,  but  in  that  year 
it  was  proposed  to  make  them  of  plain  sheet-iron,  when  they  were  only  required 
for  a  temporary  purpose,  and  of  galvanized  iron  when  required  for  permanent 
use.  They  have  since  been  made  of  various  shapes  and  in  various  ways.  At 
Sebastopol,  where  there  was  a  great  want  of  them,  the  hay-bands  were  randed.  as 
It  is  called,  round  upright  pickets,  and  they  were  used  with  good  effect. 

Moro  recently  a  gabion  was  prepared  by  Sergeant-Major  J.  Jones,  of  the  English 
Royal  Engineers,  constructed  with  wrought-iron  bands  and  twelve  upright  pick- 
ets, which  having  been  most  favorably  reported  on  by  the  Royal  Engineer  Perma- 
nent Oommittee  at  Chatham,  and  the  Ordnance  Select  Committee,  Sir  John 
Burgoyne,  I.G.F.,  in  October,  1860,  gtrve  directions  for  the  invention  to  be 
adopted  generally  in  the  service,  and  included  in  the  list  of  stores  to  accompany 
armies  in  the  field.  The  new  gabion  is  formed  of  bauds  of  common  or  galvanized 
sheet-iron,  known  as  twenty-inch  gauge,  three  and  a  half  inches  in  width,  fixed  on 
wooden  pickets.  The  advantage  it  possesses  over  the  old  kind  of  wicker  gabion, 
hitherto  in  use  by  the  royal  engineers  in  the  construction  of  their  earth-works 
and  defences,  are  of  the  most  striking  character.  The  old  description  of  gabion 
occupies  three  men  three  hours  in  Baking;  whureas,  on  a  recent  occasion,  in  the 
presence  of  his  Royal  Highness  the  Duke  of  Cambridge  and  staff,  two  sapperH 
made  one  of  the  iron  gabions  in  four  and  a  half  minutes.  From  experiments 
made,  it  has  been  ascertained  that  one  hundred  men  can  inake  five  thousand  four 
hundred  of  these  iron  band  gabions  in  nine  hours:  while  the  same  number  of 
men  in  the  same  time  would  only  make  one  hundred  wicker  ones.  The  chief 
merits  il  Major  Jones'  gabions  are  that  they  are  more  pu  table,  inas- 

much a»  one  hundred  of  his  gabions  require  less  room  for  stowage  than  six  of  the 
wicker  onos:  and  they  are  much  lighter,  eaefa  weighing  about  twenty-nine  pounds, 
or  thirty-one  pounds  less  than  the  old  kind  ;  they  are  much  cheaper,  costing  com- 


112  THE    SPIRIT    OP 

plete  5s.  Id.  each,  or  Is.  Id.  less  than  the  preseut  description  ;  more  simple  in  their 
construction,  and  more  durable.  Being  of  iron,  they  are.  of  course,  incombustible; 
and  the  bands  are  applicable  to  the  construction  of  flying  suspension-bridges, 
hospital  beds,  ambulance  litters,  stabling  and  hutting  for  cavalry  and  infantry 
troops  on  active  service . 

Mantlets. — Captain  Tyler,  English  Royal  Engineers,  in  an  admirable  lecture, 
delivered  on  the  16th  of  April,  1858,  before  the  Council  of  the  United  Service 
Institution,  recommends  the  use  of  mantlets  in  sapping  operations.  "  This 
method  would,"  he  says,  "hare  the  great  advantage  of  enabling  the  workmen  to 
place  several  gabions  at  a  time  instead  of  one  only  :  of  enabling  them  to  work  in 
larger  numbers  and  in  greater  security;  aud,  what  is  more  important  than  all,  of 
enabling  them  to  carry  the  trench  forward  with  much  greater  rapidity.  These 
mantlets  need  not  be  very  portable,  nor  need  they  be  capable  of  being  moved 
rapidly  ;  all  that  is  necessary  is  that  they  should  be  musket-proof,  about  six  feet 
high  by  two  feet  five  inches  broad  ;  should  be  placed  on  wheels,  and  should  be 
movable  slowly  in  any  desired  direction,  each  by  one  man.  They  ought  also  to 
be  furnished  each  with  a  couple  of  loop-holes  for  the  purpose  of  observation,  »s 
well  as  to  enable  its  occupant  to  fire,  when  necessary,  toward  his  front,  without 
exposing  himself." 

A  writer  in  Blackwood's  Magazine,  December,  1859,  in  giving  an  account  of  the 
bloody  and  disastrous  fight  in  the  Peiho  river,  June  25, 1859,  alludes  to  a  striking 
innovation  in  Chinese  warfare,  by  an  ingenious  aud  successful  application  of 
mantlets  in  the  defence  of  the  Takeu  forts,  and  adds  : 

"  These  mantlets  would  be  quite  worthy  of  imitation  in  our  own  fortifications, 
and  the  cleverness  with  which  they  are  worked  deserves  all  praise.  Ilad  they 
been  fitted  to  the  upper  port  or  embrasure-sill,  any  accident  to  the  lanyard  would 
have  caused  them  to  fall  down  and  block  up  the  gun-port,  so  that  they  would  have 
to  be  blown  away  to  enable  the  gun  to  work  ;  but  placed  as  they  were,  by  attach- 
ing the  lanyards  to  the  gun-carriage,  as  the  piece  recoiled  it  closed  its  own  mant- 
let, and  if  the  lines  were  shot  away  the  mantlet  merely  fell  down,  and  left  the 
gun  to  fight  in  an  ordinal  embrasure. 

"  They  were  of  stout  wood,  covered  externally  with  a  wattling  of  rattans,  so  as  to 
be  rifle-proof.  The  mantlet  worked  on  hinges,  or  rollers,  fitted  to  the  outer  and 
lower  edge  of  the  embrasures,  and  was  triced  up  and  lowered  down  by  means  of 
lines  leading  upward  through  the  parapet  on  each  side  of  the  gun.  When  closed 
up,  the  casemated  embrasures  were  not  easily  detected  in  the  smoke  of  action,  and 
the  gun  was  loaded  and  laid  point-blank  before  being  run  out.  Directly  all  was 
ready,  down  went  the  mantlet,  out  ran  the  gun.  a  shot  was  fired  into  the  mass  of 
vessels,  and  as  the  gun  recoiled  the  mantlet  went  up  again  with  such  expedition 
that  our  men  required  sharp  eyes  to  detect  which  of  the  enemy's  embrasures  was 
firing,  and  ought  next  to  be  silenced." 

Parallels. — The  distance  of  the  first  parallel  varies  according  to  the  range  of 
grape  and  musketry.  At  Sobastopol  the  first  parallel  was  constructed  at  three 
times  the  usual  distance  from  the  works,  namely,  1,800  yards. 

Screens  of  Cloth  or  CARTAS. — "Screens  might  bo  so  useful  on  many  occasions  of 
both  attack  and  defence"  of  fortresses.  "  that  it  is  surprising  they  havo  not  been 
oftener  employed."  Sir  J.  Jones  mentions  somewhere,  that  "At  Badajos  the 
British  engineers  extended  a  canvas  screen  to  cover  an  unfinished  boyeau;  and 
the  French,  mistaking  it  for  an  earthen  parapet,  suffered  tho  excavation  to  be 
completed  without  molestation.  Similar  screens  were  used  at  Gibraltar,"  during 
the  siege  in  1781,  "  to  mask  a  thorough  repair  of  the  batteries  overlooking  the 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  113 

neutral  ground.    They  are  reoammended  also  by  Albert  Durer  and  Maggi,  in  tbeir 
treatises  on  fortification." 

The  paragraph  above,  marked  with  inverted  commas,  is  an  extract  from  Lieut. 
Yule's  work  on  Fortification,  published  in  1851.  Albert  Durer,  to  whose  treatise 
it  refers,  and  who  recommends  the  use  of  screens,  published  a  book  on  fortification 
in  the  year  1527  ;  and  Maggi's  writings  on  the  same  subject  were  printed  in  the 
sixteenth  century.  So  that  the  application  of  such  a  mode  of  shelter  or  conceal- 
ment in  the  attack  or  defence  of  fortresses  is  known  to  bo  of  early  date.  Yet,  on 
one  occasion,  a  reference  to  its  utility  being  made  in  an  assemblage  chiefly  com- 
posed of  naval  and  military  officers,  seems  to  have  excited  a  little  merriment. 

Mr.  Ferguson,  in  his  "  Portsmouth  Protected,"  says  :  «  One  of  the  objections 
made  to  my  system  was,  that  it  would  be  easy  to  place  a  few  riflemen  in  pits  or  in 
the  nearest  parallel,  and  that  they  could  easily  keep  down  the  fire  of  the  place  by 
killing  any  man  who  ventured  to  approach  the  guns.  There  did  not  appear  to  me 
any  difficulty  in  avoiding  this  danger,  and,  consequently,  when  the  discussion  at 
the  Royal  United  Service  Institution  came  on,  I  took  with  me  a  few  yards  of 
baize,  with  two  or  three  iron  rods,  and  showed  how  I  would  propose  to  stick  them 
along  the  crest  of  Ihe  parapet,  and  to  hook  on  the  green  baize,  letting  it  drop 
down  across  the  embrasures  in  front  of  the  guns.  The  baize  was  full  of  slits, 
through  which  the  besieged  could  see  or  fire  without  the  possibility  of  their  being 
seen  by  the  besiegers.  This  unorthodox  expedient  was  received  with  'great 
laughter,'  aud  afforded  an  excellent  opportunity  for  criticism  during  the  following 
three  nights.  When  we  entered  Sebastopol  we  found  curtains  of  rope  hung  up, 
exactly  as  I  proposed,  across  the  embrasure,  and  rope  wound  round  the  guns  so  as  to 
stop  the  hole  in  the  curtain  through  which  the  gun  was  fired.  This  rope-cloth,  if 
I  may  so  call  it,  was  rifle-bullet  proof,  and  would  probably  stop  grape,  while  round 
shot  would  pass  through  without  doing  it  much  injury.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  maintenance  of  the  fire  till  so  late  a  period  was  mainly  owing  to  this  expe- 
dient. The  question  is,  whether  was  the  Russian  expedient  or  mine  the  best? 
Theirs  was  expensive  and  cumbersome,  difficult  to  apply  in  all  circumstances,  and 
If  once  damaged  not  easy  to  repair;  mine  was  light  and  cheap,  available  every- 
where, and  replaced  in  a  moment  if  knocked  over.  It  is  true  it  would  not  stop  a 
ball  ;  but  blind  fire  from  rifles  is  a  very  innocent  amusement,  and  as  the  parties  fired 
at  were  invi«ible  there  was  but  little  to  fear  from  this  cau&e.  Experience  only  can 
decide  which  modification  was  the  best,  but  with  all  due  deference  to  the  Russian?, 
I  am  inclined  to  think  the  lighter  mode  will  be  found  most  generally  applicable." 
On  the  occasion  of  the  English  asiault  of  the  works  on  the  Peiho,  the  embra- 
sures and  guns  of  the  Chinese  batteries  were  effectually  screened  by  mantlets  and 
matting  from  tbe  observation  of  the  attacking  gunboats,  until  the  opening  of  a 
well-directed  and  most  destructive  fire  disclosed  them. 

Captain  Tyler,  English  Royal  Engineers,  reviving  the  subject  of  screens  or  cur- 
tains,  in  a  lecture  at  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution  in  April,  1858,  a-.-; 
"  It  is  evident  that  mere  screens  of  canvas,  or  other  suitable  material,  would  be  of 
greal  ate  111  temporarily  obstructing  the  view  of  the  besieged,  and  hiding  from 
them  the  movements  and  projects  of  the  besiegers  for  a  sufficient  time  to  enabl- 
the  latter  to  throw  up  parapets  of  a  more  permanent  Datura.  <uch  temporary 
screens  might  be  made  to  cover  a  cojim.I. «able  spare,  very  much  greater  than  that 
required  for  the  operations  of  the  besiegers,  and,  like  false  attacks,  they  might  be 
erected  for  the  purpose  of  misleading  the  garrison,  in  places  where  they  would 
serve  no  other  object." 

10*" 


114  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

CHAPTER    IV. 

ADMINISTRATION. 

Its  true  base  the  legitimacy  of  consumption — Confusion  under  Directory — One 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  not  existing — Corps  should  provide  for  them- 
selves— Responsibility  of  chiefs — Messes  of  economy — Their  importance. 

Men  congregated  in  bodies  have  wants  ;  the  talent  to  satisfy  them 
with  order,  economy,  and  intelligence,  forms  the  science  of  administra- 
tion. 

The  basis  of  a  good  administration  is  the  care  bestowed  upon  the 
economy  and  lawfulness  of  the  consumption  of  ariny  stores  of  all  kinds. 
Wherever  inspections  are  thorough,  and  where  the  effective  and  the  pres- 
ent for  duty  are  stated  precisely  and  frequently,  we  find  the  elements  of 
order;  because  great  abuses  less  often  consist  in  an  increased  cost  of 
consumed  articles,  than  in  consumptions  wbich  have  not  taken  place, 
and  which  are  yet  charged  for. 

In  the  times  of  the  Directory,  the  French  military  administration 
was  in  a  great  state  of  confusion,  and  the  First  Consul  hastened,  upon 
his  accession  to  power,  to  create  a  new  corps,  charged  with  inspections, 
to  establish  order. 

He  gave  to  this  corps  an  exalted  position,  which  was  justified  by  great 
zeal  on  its  part.  At  the  expiration  of  six  months  more  than  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thousand  men  who  did  not  exist,  but  for  the  greater  num- 
ber of  whom  provisions,  pay,  and  clothing  were  issued,  were  struck  from 
the  rolls. 

The  administrative  system  varies  with  the  countries  ;  all  are  suscep- 
tible of  good  results,  when  the  effective  and  the  present  underarms  are 
precisely  stated.  I  will  only  observe  that  (in  my  opinion,  at  least) 
great  advantages  are  derived  from  giving  to  troops  the  liberty  of  sup- 
plying themselves  as  much  as  possible.  Since  the  efficiency  of  troops 
always  depends  upon  a  good  administration,  chiefs  of  corps  should  not 
only  be  responsible  to  a  great  extent,  but  should  also  be  invested  with 
great  powers  ;  their  operations  should  be  watched,  but  they  ought  to 
have  the  direction.  If  soldiers  know  that  their  commander  is  charged 
alone  with  the  responsibility,  their  zeal  will  be  better  guaranteed.  Colo- 
nels who  transgress  must  be  exemplarily  punished,  but  the  glory  of  suc- 
cess should  alone  belong  to  them. 

The  formation  of  economical  messes  in  corps  has  been  forbidden  in 
France,  and  a  profound  error  thereby  been  committed.  The  congrega- 
tion of  soldiers  in  messes  has  always  its  advantages,  and  the  skilful 
and  intelligent  chief  of  a  corps  can  and  must  always  insist  upon  econo- 
my, without  depriving  his  soldiers  of  the  enjoyment  of  any  of  their 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  115 

rights.  If  they  are  proscribed,  they  will  not  the  less  be  formed  ;  and 
not  being  openly  avowed,  the  continued  formation  of  them  bears  a  cul- 
pable and  mysterious  character.  If,  on  the  contrary,  they  are  not  only 
authorized,  but  even  ordered,  and  left  to  the  disposition  of  the  chief  of 
corps  to  institute  them  to  the  advantage  of  the  regiment,  in  accidental 
cases  and  when  special  orders  have  not  provided  for  the  troops,  they 
will  be  very  encouraging;  and  the  colonels  will  feel  proud  of  the  suc- 
cess of  an  institution  which  yields  honorable  fruits  to  them. 

Two  very  important  branches  of  administration  are  faulty  in  almost 
every  one  of  European  armies — hospitals  and  subsistence.  An  enlight- 
ened government  should  seek  to  establish  them  upon  a  new  basis.  Im- 
portant and  direct  advantages,  influencing  the  art  of  war,  the  welfare 
and  conservation  of  soldiers,  would  result  therefrom.  I  shall  first  con- 
sider the  subsistence  of  troops. 

FIRST   SECTION. 

SUBSISTENCE. 

Bread— Greatest  obstacle  of  war — Problem  solved  by  Romans — Easy  then — Wby 
more  difficult  to-day— Efficacious  method — Soldier  able  to  provide  for  himself— 
Happy  experience  of  this  method— In  what  great  difficulty  consists— Able  to 
live  with  flour— Not  with  the  wheat— Scattering  of  labor — Soldier  knows  how 
to  make  his  soup,  if  he  has  the  materials— Should  make  his  bread  also — How — 
Army  of  Portugal — Napoleon  employs  same  means — Portable  mills — Their  con- 
dition—Objection— Is  without  force — Bran  in  the  bread — Facility  of  method 
for  administration — Question  of  nourishment  solved — Extemporaneous  ovens — 
Magazines  of  wheat  in  times  of  peace. 

In  treating  of  the  food  for  troops  I  will  only  speak  of  the  supplying 
of  bread;  it  alone  presents  difficulties — the  requisite  living  stock  being 
almost  continually -within  reach  of  the  consumers. 

The  difficulty  of  distributing  bread  regularly  to  troops  is  one  of  the 
greatest  embarrassments  in  war.  It  is  inexplicable  that  so  many  dis- 
tinguished generals,  who,  from  that  cause,  have  seen  their  projects  delay- 
ed or  miscarried,  should  not  have  solved  so  important  a  problem. 

The  Romans  had  solved  it  ;  but,  generally,  their  wars  did  not  require 
as  rapid  movements  as  in  modern  warfare. 

There  is,  I  believe,  a  perfectly  satisfactory  manner  to  conquer  this 
difficulty,  and  the  change  I  propose  would  powerfully  influence  the  art 
of  war. 

To  permit  the  administration  of  subsistence  to  supply  the  distribution 
of  bread  regularly,  the  army  must  be  either  stationary  or  retreating, 
and  either  always  remaining  within  the  same  distance  of  its  magazines 
or  approaching  toward  them.  If  inarching  in  advance,  steadily  with- 
drawing from  them,  any  commissary,  however  skilful  he  be,  will  find 


116  irai  SPIRIT  OF 

the  supplying  impracticable;  and,  because  tbe  trains  can  not  go  faster 
than  the  army,  they  will  always  follow  at  the  same  distance  as  when 
departing  from  the  depots;  with  each  new  journey  the  distance  aug- 
ments and  the  difficulty  becomes  greater. 

In  wars  of  invasion  troops  can  only  subsist  upon  the  resources  of 
the  country  through  which  they  march.  But  the  time  necessary  to  make 
bread  when  arriving  in  inhabited  places,  which  are  ordinarily  not  sup- 
plied with  a  sufficient  number  of  mills  and  bake-ovens,  or  their  distance, 
render  local  resources  very  incomplete,  and  the  scarcity  resulting  from 
it  leads  to  great  suffering  and  disorders.  And  the  maintenance  of  order 
in  every  body,  and  under  all  circumstances,  is  the  safety  of  armies. 

The  only  efficient  mode  of  ensuring  the  regular  subsistence  to  tho  sol- 
dier is  to  charge  him  with  supplying  himself,  according  to  a  fixed  rule. 
I  made  this  experiment,  and  the  result,  was  completely  favorable. 

War  is  not  made  in  a  desert,  and  when  this  passing  circumstance 
happens,  dispositions  are  made  for  it.  War  is  ordinarily  waged  in  in- 
habited countries,  and  wherever  men  are,  there  is  grain  for  their  sub- 
sistence. The  manner  of  using  this  grain,  with  which  the  granaries 
are  filled,  appears,  then,  the  solution  of  the  question. 

The  great  difficulty  is  to  reduce  grain  into  flour,  as  I  will  hereafter 
explain.  Mills  are  requisite  to  grind  the  wheat;  when  necessary,  sol- 
diers can  live  on  flour  alone  without  converting  it  into  bread,  but  they 
would  die  of  hunger  on  grains  of  wheat. 

When  laboring  hands  are  scarce  and  dear,  powerful  machines  can 
with  advantage  be  used  in  manufactories,  and  labor  is  centralized; 
but  when  labor  is  superabundant  and  costs  nothing,  a  system  absolute- 
ly opposite  must  be  followed.  When  labor  is  divided  among  a  great 
many  it  is  made  easier,  and  by  confiding  it  to  those  who  profit  therefrom, 
their  zeal  and  punctuality  will  be  assured.  Thus  considered,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  hands  of  the  soldier  can  bo  employed  without  any  draw- 
back, and  they  will  gairf  by  it,  in  receiving,  as  an  indemnity,  the  amount 
which  is  expended  to  have  the  work  done  by  others. 

Why  do  soldiers  never  fail  to  have  soup  in  the  field,  if  they  are  sup- 
plied with  meat,  bread,  and  a  kettle  ?  Because  they  themselves  cook  it. 
If  a  commissary,  under  whatever  pretext,  would  take  this  task  upon 
himself  for  a  division,  or  even  a  colonel  for  his  regiment,  soldiers,  when 
marching,  would  never  have  anything  to  eat. 

I  design  to  apply  to  the  bread  the  example  of  the  soup,  and  the  sol- 
dier will  never  want  for  it.  I  propose  to  give  to  the  army  portable 
mills;  I  employed  this  measure  during  a  campaign  in  Spain,  and  it 
completely  succeeded.  The  Army  of  Portugal,  in  1812,  thus  lived  for 
six  months;  the  only  inconvenience  experienced  was  the  rapid  wearing 
out  of  the  mill-stones  ;  they  were  replaced  by  those  of  a  better  quality, 
and  lasted  very  long. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  117 

Napoleon,  being  made  aware  of  these  results,  was  struck  with  the 
advantages  obtained  in  the  midst  of  the  miseries  of  the  Russian  cam- 
paign, and  he  ordered  a  large  number  of  these  mills  for  the  Grand  Army. 
Five  hundred  were  sent  to  him,  and  they  arrived  at  Smolensk  at  the 
same  time  with  the  army  returning  from  Moscow.  But  then  he  had 
neither  hands  to  work  them,  nor  soldiers  to  use  them. 

Tho  following  qualities  should  be  united  in  these  mills  : 

1.  Light  enough  to  be  carried  by  one  soldier,  who  is  detached  from  tho 
ranks  for  that  purposo,  on  account  of  the  importance  of  the  matter,  as 
soon  as  the  regular  means  of  transport  are  wanting. 

2.  To  be  worked  by  a  single  man. 

3.  To  give  fine  flour,  and  a  sufficient  quantity,  after  a  work  of  four 
hours,  to  supply  the  wants  of  a  company. 

The  mills  of  the  Army  of  Portugal  gave  thirty  pounds  of  fine  flour 
per  hour.  This  system  has  been  objected  to,  because  the  regulations 
prescribing  the  extraction  of  the  bran,  this  operation  complicated  the 
fabrication  of  the  flour.  I  reply  that  experience  has  taught  the  inutility 
of  the  extraction  of  the  bran,  whenever  wheat  of  good  quality  was 
used. 

With  second-class  wheat,  but  pure  and  without  mixture,  the  bread  is 
still  good.  When  the  administration  issues  bad  bread,  the  soldier  must 
necessarily  accept  and  eat  it,  under  pain  of  dying  of  hunger,  because 
the  necessity  of  consuming  it  is  immediate  ;  but  when  the  wheat  which 
has  been  distributed  is  full  of  dust  and  mixed,  it  can  bo  cleaned  before 
being  used,  and  the  soldier  will  still  have  good  bread  to  eat.  Thus,  in 
this  respect,  his  condition  will  be  improved;  it  would  be  still  more  so  by 
the  payment  for  the  work  he  has  done,  bo  it  in  money,  or  in  the  aug- 
mentation of  his  ration. 

But  let  us  consider  what  effect  this  habitual  simplification  will  have, 
in  times  of  war,  upon  the  administration  of  subsistence,  and  the  facility 
of  its  service.  A  general -in-chief,  nowadays,  makes  greater  efforts 
of  mind  to  assure  the  subsistence  of  his  troops  than  he  doos  for  any- 
thing else,  and  unceasingly  his  combinations  are  interfered  with  and 
destroyed,  because  the  bread  has  not  been  distributed  at  tho  right  time. 

Thus  not  only  the  question  of  indispensable  nourishment  of  troops 
has  been  solved,  but  also  that  relating  to  bread  itself.  Means  can  al- 
ways be  found  to  make  a  simple  excavation  in  all  kinds  of  ground,  and 
in  four  hours  for  the  construction  of  ovens,  which,  two  hours  after- 
ward, can  be  used  for  baking  bread.  In  each  bivouac,  then,  sufficient 
flour  can  be  made  for  daily  consumption,  and  at  each  daily  halt  ovens 
can  be  constructed  near  any  farmer's  house  to  bake  broad  in  advance. 
From  that  moment  an  army  provides  for  its  own  subsistence,  the  ad- 
ministration is  no  longer  occupied  with  thoso  details  which  secure  to 


118  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

each  soldier  the  circulation  of  his  blood;  it  is  the  consequence  of  a 
principle  always  in  force. 

In  times  of  peace  the  government  should  have  magazines  of  wheat» 
to  be  distributed  to  the  troops.  In  a  defensive  war  it  should  be  the 
same.  In  a  war  of  invasion,  each  regiment  would  daily  receive  the  nec- 
essary wheat  from  either  the  administration  of  the  invaded  countries, 
or  would  take  it  from  the  granaries  of  the  inhabitants.  But  this  cus- 
tom should  be  followed  and  contracted  during  times  of  peace,  because, 
in  principle,  the  usages  of  peace  should  be,  as  much  as  possible,  assimi- 
lated to  those  of  war;  and  this  truth  is  especially  incontestable  when 
the  question  is  the  introduction  of  some  great  change. 

SECOND  SECTION. 

HOSPITALS. 

Inherent  spirit  of  warrior — Duty  of  conscience  and  humanity — Duty  of  interest — 
— Pecuniary  interest  not  sufficient  recompense — Morality — Recompenses  of  the 
sentiment — Hospital  nurses — Paid  individuals — Spirit  of  charity — Hierarchy  to 
establish — Service  in  hospitals  entrusted  to  three  corps — Medical  science — Mate- 
rial of  hospitals — Service  of  nurses — Knights  of  Malta — Causes  of  their  change 
— Lively  prepossession — Impracticable  idea  under  Restoration — Why — Utility 
in  Army  of  Africa — Importance  of  objections — Vanity  of  ridicule— Ameliorations 
— Present  hospitals — Hospitals  should  be  within  reach  of  troops — Inconveni- 
ence of  long  transports — Aggravation  of  maladies— Encumbrance — Proof  ac- 
complished. ■ 

Note. — Chisolm's  Surgery. 

Nothing  is  more  sad  in  armies  than  the  frequent  spectacle  which 
military  hospitals  present.  A  sufficient  degree  of  attention  is  scarcely 
ever,  in  such  places,  bestowed  upon  a  class  of  men  who,  nevertheless, 
are  entitled  to  the  right  of  universal  solicitude.  A  life  of  devotion  is 
their  existence  ;  sufferings,  fatigues,  and  dangers,  are  their  only  pros- 
pect. The  noblest  sentiments  animate  their  heart,  and  these  generous 
men  ask  their  chiefs  only  to  love  them,  and  to  be  just  in  the  exercise  of 
their  authority.  Such  is  the  inherent  spirit  of  the  warrior,  and  it  be- 
longs particularly  to  the  French  soldier,  who  is  a  stranger  to  none  of 
the  sentiments  which  honor  humanity. 

There  undoubtedly  exist  vices  and  bad  passions  in  armies,  as  in  all 
unions  of  men  ;  but  the  example  of  the  highest  virtues  is  likewise  to  be 
found.  The  conservation  of  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  is,  then,  a  duty 
of  conscience  and  of  humanity.  It  is  at  the  same  time  of  great  im- 
portance for  the  government,  as  for  the  general,  because  the  largest 
number  of  soldiers  is  an  element  of  success,  and  their  replacement  by 
recruits,  very  dear  in  itself,  is  very  far  from  making  the  loss  good. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  119 

What  confidence,  besides,  and  what  energy,  does  the  certainty  impart  to 
a  good  soldier  upon  the  battle-field  that,  in  case  of  being  wounded,  the 
most  efficient  succor  will  be  lavished  upon  him. 

With  this  object,  perhaps,  it  would  be  well  to  try  to  change  the  spirit 
of  hospital  administration  ;  to  seek  a  more  noble  recompense  than  pe- 
cuniary interest;  to  develop  thoughts,  worthier  and  more  elevated,  in 
order  to  sustain  courage  and  devotion  the  moro. 

If  the  functions  of  those  who  administer  to  the  wants  of  the  sick 
and  wounded  were  raised,  ennobled,  and  compensated  by  public  opin- 
ion, and  the  enjoyment  of  the  powers  to  enable  them  to  exercise  charity 
and  to  call  forth  the  sontiments  of  piety,  the  result  would  be  of  the 
greatest  benefit  to  those  who  suffer.  To  attain  this  end  the  care  of 
military  hospitals  should  be  left  to  a  religious  corps,  acquainted  with 
the  lower  functions  of  surgery  and  medicine  5  which,  although  not 
charged  with  the  administration  proper,  and  the  management  of  funds, 
should  have  the  sole  attendance  of  the  sick. 

A  corps  of  hospital  brothers,  engaged  for  lifetime,  or  a  fixed  period, 
having  honored  chiefs,  should  be  charged  with  the  keeping  of  the  halls, 
and  with  the  service  near  the  sick.  Paid  assistants  should  be  placed 
under  their  orders,  and  employed  in  the  lowest  and  most  disagreeable 
duties,-  but  no  chief  should  consider  any  duty,  however  unpleasant,  to 
be  beneath  him,  in  cases  of  necessity.  The  spirit  of  charity  would  sus- 
tain them  in  their  labors.  A  detachment  of  these  respectable  brothers, 
after  having  been  assigned  their  destination,  ought  never  to  quit  those 
confided  to  their  care.  Their  presence  would  be  the  hope  and  consola- 
tion of  the  sick;  and  their  holy  ministry,  exercised  over  all,  friends  or 
enemies,  would  be  their  safeguard  with  all  European  armies,  should  the 
fate  of  arms  bring  them  into  hostile  hands. 

The  rewards  of  conscience  should  be  their  principal  recompense.  A 
wisely  combined  military  government  should  require  that  blind  obedi- 
ence be  accorded  to  this  corps,  devoted,  as  it  would  bo,  to  the  practice 
of  the  most  touching  virtues.  The  general  of  an  army  should  some- 
times receive  at  his  table,  and  place  upon  a  seat  of  honor,  the  superior 
of  the  hospital  brothers  ;  he  would  thus  honor  all  his  subalterns,  and 
pay  them  with  that  precious  money,  the  value  of  which  increases  in 
proportion  to  the  liberality  with  which  it  is  bestowed. 

Hospital  service  «would,  then,  be  divided  into  three  corps  : 

1.  Medical  men,  doctors,  and  surgeons. 

2.  The  administration,  providing  the  material,  expending  the  funds, 
and  furnishing  subsistence. 

3.  Hospital  brothers,  whose  duty  is  to  administer  to  the  wants  of  the 
sick,  and  to  see  to  the  application  of  all  proper  means  to  restore  the 
suffering  soldiers  to  health. 

This  last  corps  would  eomowhat  exorcise  a  controlling  influence,  ener- 


120  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

getic  and  always  watchful,  to  guard  against  administrative  abuses.     It 
would  be  the  guaranty  of  order  and  regularity. 

The  care  bestowed  upon  the  pilgrims  to  Jerusalem  was  the  origin  of 
the  Knights  of  Malta,  and  charity  was  their  first  virtue.  The  anarchy 
and  the  disorders  which  reigned  in  the  places  where  they  had  estab- 
lished themselves  obliged  them  to  be  armed  for  their  defence,  and  thus, 
while  remaining  hospitallers,  they  became  soldiers  also. 

Courageous  conduct  and  the  profession  of  arms  have  ever,  and  will 
always,  continue  to  please  the  multitude,  and  with  reason.  The  rôle 
of  soldier  having  finally  engrossed  their  attention  entirely,  the  charac- 
ter of  their  hospitality  became  changed.  The  creation  of  their  order 
resulted  from  the  necessities  of  a  certain  class  of  society  ;  the  order 
which  I  would  wish  to  establish  could  not  fail  to  better  the  condition 
of  a  class  of  men  which  I  consider  to  be  worthy  of  the  greatest  inter- 
est, and  who  constitute,  in  Europe,  an  energetic  and  truly  patriotic  part 
of  every  nation. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  prescribe  regulations  for  hospital  service; 
but  to  do  so  here  would  be  beyond  the  limits  of  my  work. 

For  a  long  time  past,  under  the  Empire,  and  when  witnessing  disor- 
ders of  this  kind,  I  have  entertained  this  idea.  Its  execution  was  not 
practicable  under  the  Restoration  ;  an  unworthy  construction  might 
have  been  put  upon  it  ;  but  the  moment  has  come,  perhaps,  for  its  suc- 
cessful and  useful  execution.  Of  what  support  it  would  have  been  to 
the  Army  of  Africa  ! 

I  do  not  conceal  the  objections  which  could  be  made  to  an  establish- 
ment of  this  kind,  nor  the  difficulties  of  maintaining  sufficient  harmo- 
ny between  three  rival  corps  having  the  same  object  in  view  ;  but  two 
of  then;  very  often  already  may  bo  very  far  from  any  perfect  under- 
standing with  each  other,  and  a  third  corps,  without  adding  much  to 
the  complications,  could  not  but  be  useful  in  enlightening  tho  others. 

I  am  aware  that  some  will  not  hesitate  to  ridicule  this  institution; 
but  I  willingly  brave  it,  knowing  that  it  would  contribute  to  ameliorate 
the  condition  of  the  soldier — in  my  opinion,  a  matter  of  the  greatest 
importance  for  the  service  as  well  as  for  humanity. 

In  the  last  years  the  hospital  service  has,  however,  been  improved 
by  the  military  organization  of  the  employees.  An  order  of  advance- 
ment, such  as  with  troops,  gives  a  future  to  those  who  servo  well,  and  is  a 
means  to  increase  both  surveillance  and  discipline  ;  it  calls  forth  senti- 
ments of  honor  which  mako  the  exercise  of  authority  more  easy.  Its 
results  should,  then,  be  good. 

Military  organization  generally  ensures  at  all  times  the  regular  exer- 
cise of  power;  it  constitutes,  then,  essentially  a  great  means  of  or- 
der ;  it  will  always  be  employed  with  success  in  the  case  of  a  union  of 
men  laboring  to  attain  the  same  end;  and  tho  greater  the  confusion, 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  121 

the  greater  will  be  the  profit  and  advantage  resulting  from  its  employ- 
ment. 

One  more  word  upon  hospitals. 

Miserable  and  illusory  calculations  of  economy  in  regard  to  what  is 
called  the  "  daily  expenditure  of  hospitals  "  often  restrain,  in  too  great 
a  degree,  the  number  of  these  establishments  ;  and  the  desire  to  charge 
other  persons  with  our  duties  renders  ovacuations  of  hospitals  too  fre- 
quent. Nothing  is  more  sad  than  these  two  systems,  when  they  are  not 
dictated  by  imperious  circumstances — such  as  the  neighborhood  of  the 
enemy,  or  the  absolute  want  of  means.  In  ordinary  cases,  hospitals  can 
not  be  placed  too  near  the  troops,  nor  can  the  sick  be  too  much  divided. 
Generally,  simple  diseases  are  cured  in  a  few  days  when  at  once  treat- 
ed. They  are  aggravated  when  the  sick  have  to  be  transported  too  great 
a  distance;  and  long  return  voyages,  after  the  illness,  exhaust  men  still 
weak,  and  produce  relapses  which  another  voyage  renders  fatal.  Thus, 
in  multiplying  hospitals  and  by  placing  them  within  the  reach  of  troops, 
the  cure  is  facilitated,  maladies  are  secure  from  aggravation,  and  the 
sick  from  weakness  ;  and  that  great  accumulation  is  prevented  which 
leads  to  contagious  diseases,  the  terrible  sources  of  the  greatest  rav- 
ages. 

Such  a  system  appears  to  require  a  great  expenditure  of  money,  but 
in  reality  it  is  attended  with  much  economy. 

I  have  constantly  followed  it,  and  the  troops  under  my  orders  have 
always  been  in  fine  condition. 

NOTE. 

Chisolm's  Surgery.— The  officer  who  aspires  to  the  honor  of  discharging  his 
duties  to  the  fullest  extent,  and  to  watch  over  the  welfare  of  those  he  commands 
in  every  particular,  will  not  consider  it  the  least  of  his  charges  to  see  that  his  men 
are  properly  provided  for  when  well,  and  to  look  after  them  when  they  are  sick. 

To  give  to  him  a  consciousness  of  the  momentous  trust  reposed  in  him,  and  to 
bring  matters  before  his  consideration  which  thousands  of  officers  are  only  too  apt 
to  look  upon  as  trivial,  every  regimental  officer  is  earnestly  requested  to  read  and 
ponder  over  the  admirable  work  of  Major  J.  J.  Chisolm,  Surgeon  C.  S.  A.,  on 
"  Military  Surgery"  the  third  edition  of  which  has  just  been  issued  by  Evans  & 
Cogswell,  Columbia,  S.  C. 

A  more  valuable  and  popularly  written  work  on  the  important  subject  it  treats 
can  not  be  found  in  any  language. 

11 


122  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

CHAPTER   V. 

MILITARY  JUSTICE,  AND  COMPOSITION  OF  COURTS. 

Army  a  particular  society — Character  of  military  justice — Should  be  given  to 
whom — Military  judges  during  Revolution — Error  seen — Creation  of  councils  of 
war — Military  justice  not  absolute — Not  founded  upon  same  principles  aa  civil 
justice — Here  regiment  forms  the  unit — Colonel — Regimental  courts — Motive» 
of  legislator  in  regard  to  courts — By  division — Composition  of  councils  of  war — 
All  grades  represented — Why — Indulgence  rather  with  luperior  grades — Right 
of  grace — Should  be  reserved  to  colonel — Usage  in  Austria. 

Notes. — Articles  of  WW  of  the  Confederate  States  Army.  Imperfections. 
French  code  of  military  punishments.  Remarks  on  our  present  system  of  courts- 
martial. 

Social  order  can  not  exist  if  the  conditions  of  its  existence  are  not 
fulfilled.  It  is  the  same  with  an  army,  which  presents  the  example  of  a 
particular  society,  governed  by  special  regulations  and  customs.  To 
discover  the  principle  which  solves  the  question  of  military  justice,  we 
seek  the  definition  of  the  latter,  and  find  it  to  be  the  accomplishment  of 
disciplinary  measures.  To  whose  hands  should  the  execution  of  mili- 
tary justice  be  confided  ?  To  the  hands  of  those  who  are  engaged  in 
the  maintenance  of  discipline,  who  every  day  feel  its  necessity  when 
discharging  their  duties,  and  who  are  most  interested  in  it.  To  the 
officers  in  active  service  this  charge  should,  then,  be  exclusively  en- 
trusted. 

However,  it  has  not  always  been  thus.  During  the  Revolution  mili- 
tary judges,  who  were  civilians,  and  who  accompanied  the  army,  were 
appointed.  The  error  which  had  been  committed  was  soon  perceived; 
the  saddest  consequences  ensued,  and  councils  of  war,  such  as  they  now 
exist,  were  created, 

In  1829  this  matter  was  again  agitated,  and  a  new  law  of  military 
justice  was  laid  before  the  Chamber  of  Peers. 

A  commission,  composed  of  men  of  eminent  merit,  but  strangers  to 
the  knowledge  of  troops,  proposed,  to  substitute  for  temporary  councils 
of  war  permanent  tribunals  of  war,  presided  over  by  general  officers. 
This  new  mode,  in  establishing  a  military  magistracy  distinct  from  the 
army  proper,  would  have  had  all  the  drawbacks  of  the  system  tempo- 
rarily adopted  under  the  Republic,  and  would  have  furthermore  lowered, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  troops,  the  character  of  generals,  who  are  essentially 
men  of  combat — who  should,  by  their  presence,  awaken  ideas  of  glory 
and  rewards,  rather  than  thoughts  of  crime  and  chastisement. 

Military  justice  is  not  established,  in  any  absolute  manner,  upon 
moral  principles  ;  it  has  for  its  basis  necessity. 

Undoubtedly,  in  the  opinion  of  every  eeneiblo  man,  when  considering 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  123 

morality  and  personal  security,  there  is  a  wide  difference  between  the 
thief  and  the  soldier  who  disobeys  his  chief  and  insults  him  in  a  pas- 
sionate moment.  Yet  the  punishment  of  the  military  man  will  be  much 
more  grave  ;  to  vindicate  society  it  will  be  sufficient,  in  most  ciroum- 
stancos,  that  the  one  should  go  to  the  galleys,  while  the  army  would 
be  lost  if  the  other  were  not  put  to  death  ;  because,  in  that  moment,  all 
bauds  wourtl  be  broken,  and  the  military  edifice,  which  is  based  upon 
respect  and  submission  alone,  would  crumble  to  pieces  without  this  sus- 
taining pillar. 

There  is,  then,  an  immense  difference  between  civil  and  military  jus- 
tice. The  latter  appears  barbarous,  but  it  is  indispensable  ;  and  its 
execution  can  only  be  guaranteed  by  those  who  themselves  are  directly 
interested  in  its  proper  existence. 

If  the  battalion  forms  the  unit  of  combat  for  troops,  the  regiment 
forms  the  social  military  unit,  the  family,  and  the  clan.  The  colonel, 
the  chief  of  this  society,  is  invested  with  a  sort  of  magistracy,  which 
should  watch  over  its  conservation. 

He  should  punish  ;  he  should  assure  to  every  one  prompt  and  impar- 
tial justice,  and  maintain  daily  order,  and  the  observance  of  the  laws 
upon  which  this  order  reposes.  When  armies  were  regularly  formed, 
each  regiment  had  its  own  court,  under  the  high  surveillance  of  its 
colonel  ;  and  even  at  that  epoch  this  was  not  only  a  necessity,  but  a 
right — because  every  colonel,  being  the  organizing  power  of  his  regi- 
ment, was  obliged  to  have  legal  and  extensive  privileges,  which  were 
the  guarantee  of  the  obedience  of  his  subordinates. 

Regimental  courts  still  exist  in  several  of  the  great  European  armies. 
Placed  within  immediate  reach  of  those  amenable  to  law,  their  action 
can  always  be  made  to  be  felt  without  any  delay.  This  consideration 
is  of  such  capital  importance  that  it  perhaps  should  be  preferred  to  the 
French  and  Russian  systems,  where  courts  are  only  established  by  di- 
vision. 

The  motive  which  has  influenced  the  legislator  is  easily  comprehend- 
ed :  he  wished  to  place  those  accused  beyond  the  personal  passions  of 
the  chiefs,  by  trying  the  former  by  a  court  composed,  in  the  greatest 
part,  of  officers  not  belonging  to  their  corps.  On  the  other  hand,  these 
officers  being  in  active  service,  employed  with  the  troops,  one  is  assured 
that  their  verdict»  rendered  without  prejudice,  will  have  that  degree  of 
severity  most  capable  of  furthering  the  good  of  the  service — because 
the  presiding  colonel  will  act  so  in  the  interest  of  another  regiment  as 
he  would  wish  the  colonel  of  that  regiment  to  act  at  other  times  in  the 
case  of  his  own  regiment.  The  interest  of  the  army  will  always  be 
considered. 

Every  council  of  war  has  been  composod  of  members  of  different 
rank.     This  is  a  compliment  paid  to  the  sentiments  of  duty  which 


124  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

equally  pervade  all  classes  of  military  organizations,  and  a  guarantee  to 
the  accused,  who  thus  will  have  one  or  two  of  equal  rank  with  himself 
among  the  judges.  A  composition  of  this  kind  has  no  danger,  because 
indulgence,  should  any  be  feared,  is  rather  with  the  more  elevated  than 
the  inferior  grades. 

I  conclude,  then,  with  the  observation  that  all  military  courts  should 
be  exclusively  composed  of  individuals  in  active  service,  and  even  be- 
longing to  the  corps  placed  under  their  jurisdiction. 

Another  feature  would,  perhaps,  be  desirable  in  military  justice.  It 
exists  in  Austria,  and  the  effects  appear  to  mo  salutary.  The  right  of 
grace,  and  the  commutation  of  the  sentence,  is  not  reserved  to  the  sov- 
ereign ;  it  belongs  to  the  colonel-proprietor  of  the  regiment,  who,  ac- 
cording to  usage,  delegates  the  exercise  of  this  power  to  the  colonel 
commanding.  There  are  so  many  circumstances  wJiich  may  be  found 
in  favor  of  a  soldier  guilty  of  breach  of  discipline  (and  it  is  generally  al- 
ways in  such  cases  that  the  power  of  grace  is  interposed),  and  the  chiefs, 
placed  upon  the  spot,  are  so  much  more  apt  to  appreciate  and  determine 
the  propriety  of  an  act  of  clemency,  that  it  appears  to  me  very  useful 
to  give  this  prerogative,  not  to  the  chief  of  corps,  but  to  the  general 
commanding  the  division  or  the  corps  d'armée. 

In  the  actual  state  of  things  a  brave  soldier,  whom  every  one  would 
wish  to  save,  perishes,  the  victim  of  the  rigor  of  the  law;  or,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  one  who  has  justly  forfeited  his  life  in  the  interest  of  his 
conservation,  justice  is  not  dealt  out — an  equally  grievous  alternative. 

NOTES. 

Articles  of  "War  of  the  Confederate  States  Army— Imperfec- 
tions. French  code  of  military  punishments.  Remarks  on  our  present  system 
of  courts-martial. 

A  review  of  the  Articles  of  War  will  disclose  a  very  important  imperfection,  viz  : 
the  very  great  discretion  given  to  courts- martial  in  determining  the  punishments 
for  military  crimes  and  misdemeanors.  An  analysis  of  the  Articles  of  War  will 
show  that  there  are  definite  and  determined  punishments  in  hut  twenty-one  cases, 
and  but  four  different  punishments.  They  are: 
Art.  Crime  or  Misdemeanor.  Punishment. 

2.  Improper  behavior  at  places  of  public  worship Arrest  and  fine. 

3.  Use  of  oath,  etc " 

14.  Signing  false  certificate Cashiered  or  dismissed. 

15.  False  muster "  " 

16.  Accepting  bribes "  '" 

17.  Mustering  civilian  as  soldier ■. "  " 

18.  False  return "  " 

22.  Harboring  or  receiving  deserters , 

Principals  and  accessor  to  duels 

Upbraiding  for  refusing  to  fight  duel 


:} 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  125 

29.  Sutler  breaking  regulations * Cashiered  or  dismissed. 

31.  Commanding  officer  conniving  -with  or  extorting  Upon 

sutler  ..        <;  '* 

33.  Refusal  of  commanding  officer  to  deliver  soldier  ame- 
nable to  civil  justice " 

36.  Embezzlement  of  public  stores "  " 

39.  Embezzlement  of  public  money "  " 

45.  Drunk  on  duty "  " 

77.  Breacb  of  arrest "  " 

83.  Conduct  unbecoming  officer  or  gentleman "  " 

48.  Non-commissioned  officer  conniving  at  evasion  of  duty 

on  the  part  of  privates Reduction. 

55.  Forcing  a  safeguard  in  foreign  parts Death. 

In  all  other  military  misdemeanors  courts-martial  award  punishment  at  discre- 
tion. Different  expressions  are  used  indiscriminately,  such  as  dismissal,  cashier- 
ed, discharged,  and  displaced.  This  discretion  is  not  beneficial  to  an  army,  as  wo 
may  illustrate  in  one  case.  It  may  happen  that  the  penalty  of  death  is  visited 
upon  a  deserter  in  one  army  corps,  while  he,  perhaps,  would  have  received  a  mild- 
er punishment  if  placed  before  the  court  of  another.  The  punishment  for  mili- 
tary crimes  should  be  much  more  clearly  defined  than  that  for  civil  ones,  because 
in  the  former  case  they  arc  generally  much  swifter  and  more  terrible.  For  each 
crime  defined  there  should  be  a  specific  punishment,  and  no  other  ;  and  nothing 
should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  any  tribunal,  but  everything  to  the  grace  of  the 
commanding  officer  and  the  President. 

To  show  the  singular  vagueness  of  some  of  our  Articles  of  War,  I  beg  leave  to 
point  out  only  a  few  instances  : 

1.  In  article  5  an  officer  may  abuse  the  governor  or  legislature  of  any  state, 
provided  he  only  takes  care  not  to  be  quartered  in  said  state.  Consequently  it 
would  be  a  military  crime  to  abuse  the  Governor  of  Georgia  in  Georgia,  but  not 
on  the  Potomac. 

2.  In  article  6  I  am  only  prohibited  from  showing  contempt  or  disrespect  to  my 
commanding  officer,  but  nothing  is  said  of  the  many  superior  officers  I  may  have. 

3.  In  article  9  the  more  comprehensive  term  of  superior  officer  \s  used.  It  is  no 
doubt  intended  in  article  6  to  include  superior  officers,  but  as  that  article  now 
reads  I  can  not  punish  a  man  for  showing  disrespect  to  any  superior  officer  who 
is  not  his  commanding  officer  also. 

4.  Article  16  displaces  an  officer  for  bribery,  and  utterly  disables  him  to  hold  office 
under  the  Confederate  States'  government.  In  other  articles,  where  dishonesty  is 
alike  punished,  the  additional  penalty  of  loss  of  right  to  hold  office  is  not  men- 
tioned, although  the  misdemeanors  are  quite  as  serious  as  in  article  16. 

5.  In  article  21  it  is  not  certain  whether  officers  are  to  be  punished  alike  witli 
soldiers  for  absenco  without  leave.  In  other  articles  officers  alone  are  punished 
for  misdemeanors  which  can  as  well  be  committed  by  soldiers. 

6.  Article  24  arrests  any  officer  who  uses  reproachful  or  provoking  speeches,  or 
gestures,  etc.,  but  it  neither  orders  by  whom  nor  how  long  they  shall  be  punished. 

7.  Article  43.  The  same  is  the  case  when  soldiors  fail  to  retire  to  quarters  after 
retreat. 

8.  Article  49  gives  death  penalty  at  discretion  to  any  officer  who  occasions  false 
alarms,  but  soldiers,  who  are  much  more  apt  to  commit  that  offence,  are  not  men- 
tioned. 

Finally,  general  court-martial  and  court  martial  are  used  ad  libitum.    But  I 
11* 


126  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

have  cited  sufficient  instances  in  which  the  articles  could  be  twisted,  if  wo  look  at 
the  letter  of  the  law  alone. 

To  show  the  different  kinds  of  punishments  in  the  Army  of  France,  I  attach 
the  following,  extracted  from  the  French  Military  Code  : 

Death — Abandonment  of  post  by  cowardice,  obliteration  of  horse  marks,  carry- 
ing arms  against  France,  assassination,  chief  of  mob,  author  of  mob,  seditious  clam- 
ors, plot  to  desert,  false  countersign  compromising  security,  correspondence  with 
the  enemy  without  permission,  stripping  a  body  with  mutilation  or  assassination., 
desertion  to  the  enemy,  to  foreign  armies  either  off  or  on  duty,  after  grace,  while 
on  sentry,  aggravated  disobedience  in  face  of  the  enemy,  kidnapping,  poisoning, 
spiking  of  gun  without  order,  spy,  false  testimony  causing  death,  incendiarism, 
insulting  sentinel  with  assault,  ir.sult  by  subordinate  with  assault,  intelligence 
with  enemy,  cowardice  of  sentry  in  presence  of  enemy,  machinations  with  enemy, 
menaces  with  assault,  pillage  with  arms  in  hand,  concealing  spy,  reception  of  de- 
Berter  at  camp  after  retreat,  formal  refusal  to  march  against  the  enemy,  revelation 
of  parole  to  enemy,  treason,  drummer  or  bugler  without  order  passing  advancod 
posts,  rape  followed  by  death,  assault  on  commanding  officer  by  inferior. 

Iron,  12  years — Rape  of  girl  less  than  14  years  of  age. 

Iron,  10  years — Stripping  of  liviug  body,  disobedience  of  a  troop  (meaning  small 
body  of  soldiers),  violation  of  countersign,  theft  at  one's  host. 

Iron,  8  years— Abandonment  of  post  to  pillage,  fabrication  of  false  signs,  forged 
leave  of  absence,  usage  of  another's  leave,  stripping  of  dead  body  without  order, 
theft  of  clothing,  double  enrolment,  deterioration  of  flour,  falsification  of  march 
route,  signing  with  false  name,  insult  by  subordinate  by  word  or  gesture,  persist- 
ent marauding,  menaces  of  the  subordinate,  substitution  of  name  upon  leave. 

Iron,  6  years — Author  or  accomplice  permitting  escape  of  prisoners  of  war. 

Iron,  3  years — Cowardice  in  abandoning  arms  in  action,  false  certificate  of  ill- 
ness, fraud,  cheating  in  weighing  rations,  loss  of  countersign  near  enemy,  sleep- 
ing of  sentinel  near  enemy. 

Ball  and  chain,  10  years — Desertion  with  effects  of  comrade,  desertion  to  foreign 
parts,  desertion  after  amnesty,  desertion  from  public  labor. 

Ball  and  chain,  5  years— Desertion  of  substitute. 

Labor  on  public  works — Acquitted  deserter  who  does  not  return  arms,  effects,  or 
horses  he  carried  off  when  deserting  (term  according  to  offence);  desertion  into 
the  interior,  3  years;  desertion  from  the  army  or  from  a  fortress,  5  years;  deser- 
tion from  service,  or  over  the  rampart,  5  years  ;  desertion  with  effects  of  state  or 
corps,  5  years;  sale  of  arms,  clothing,  or  equipment,  2  to  5  years;  desertion  with 
side-arms,  1  year,  hard  labor. 

Forcedlabor — Murder;  theft  of  arms  and  ammunition  belonging  to  the  state, 
moneys,  or  whatever  effects  may  belong  to  the  soldiers  or  the  state  (according  to 
offence,  the  term  may  be  reduced  from  3  to  5  years). 

Prison — Absence  at  long  roll,  1  month — second  time,  6  months;  sale  of  small 
equipments,  2  months  to  1  year;  attempt  at  liberty  or  safety, 6  months;  changing 
countersign  near  enemy  without  giving  notice,  6  months  ;  formal  disobedience  to 
superior,  1  year;  abuse  of  armament,  equipment,  or  clothing,  6  months  to  2  years; 
fraud  attbfe  house  of  a  citizen  when  quartered  there,  3  months  ;  fraud  with  men- 
aces, 6  months  ;  pawning  effects  or  arms,  2  months  to  1  year  ;  insulting  sentinel, 
2,  4,  and  6  years  ;  receipt  of  pawned  effects,  2  months  to  1  year;  assault  toward 
subordinate,  1  year;  uniform  worn  without  rank;  refusal  to  employ  force;  false 
certificate. 

Civil  degradation— Abuse  of  the  power  of  the  armed  force  ;  arbitrary  deten- 
tion. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  127 

Imprisonment,  seclusion,  or  forced,  labor,  according  to  circumstances— Connivance 
at  proposals  made  by  condemned  prisoners. 

The  maximum  of  the  punishment— Desertion  with  horse  or  fire-arms. 
This  short  extract  will  give  some  idea  of  the  difference  of  the  French  code  of 
punishments  and  that  of  our  army  ;  and  the  impression  can  not  be  suppressed 
that  our  Articles  of  War  and  Regulations  need  revision,  so  as  to  adapt  them  to  the 
various  exigencies  of  the  momentous  and  singular  struggle  in  which  we  are  en- 
gaged. I  do  not  know  the  history  of  the  Articles  of  War  and  Regulations  of  the 
Confederate  Army,  but  I  believe  I  have  sufficiently  indicated  that  they  are  not  all 
they  should  bo,  and  that  the  men  who  framed  them  could  not  have  had  anything 
like  the  very  extended  knowledge  of  military  affairs  required  at  this  day,  the  army 
both  physically  and  morally  considered.  The  very  defect  which  exists  in  our  Arti- 
cles of  War— that  of  leaving  the  determination  of  punishments  to  the  discretion 
of  so  many  variously  constituted  minds,  and  thus  depriving  us  of  the  uniformity 
of  punishment  so  essential  to  the  discipline  of  an  army— has  been  carefully  guard- 
ed against  in  the  service  of  France,  and  almost  nothing,  certainly  nothing  impor- 
tant, is  there  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  tribunals.  Practical  experience,  no  doubt, 
has  shown  the  great  defects  in  our  regulations  :  and  I  sincerely  believe  that  no 
board  of  army  officers  could  be  more  usefully  employed  to  themselves  and  the  ser- 
vice than  by  revising  our  military  laws  and  regulations. 

The  remarks  of  a  general  officer  of  our  service,  who  has  had  much  experience 
in  the  field,  and  of  the  adjutant-general  of  a  division,  whose  practical  experience 
entitle  them  to  great  consideration,  when  speaking  to  them  of  our  travelling  courts 
as  instituted  last  year,  almost  entirely  agreed  with  the  opinion  of  the  Duke  of 
Ragusa.  In  the  corps  in  which  the  general  officer  above-mentioned  commanded  a 
division,  this  permanent  court  had  done  little  good,  but  much  mischief.  Composed 
of  civilians  who  know  nothing  of  military  matters  and  of  the  requirements  of 
discipline,  they  had  punished  very  serious  military  crimes  with  great  leniency- 
others  not  at  all— making  the  commanding  officer  perfectly  powerless,  because  he 
could  only  cither  approve  the  sentence  or  disapprove  it  ;  and  then,  in  the  latter 
case,  the  delinquent  received  no  punishment  whatever— thus  making  the  enforce- 
ment of  discipline  almost  a  farce.  He  objected  upon  these  grounds,  to  their  con- 
tinuance, and  hoped  for  their  speedy  dissolution. 

It  is,  therefore,  a  matter  yet  to  be  determined  by  experience,  whether  our  pres- 
ent system  of  courts-martial  will  prove  beneficial,  or  the  contrary.  Because  we 
are  just  trying  it,  there  is  undoubtedly  some  difference  of  opinion  among  military 
men  on  that  point.  But  as  the  principle  is  a  wroug  one,  I  believe  there  is  no 
doubt  that  we  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  compelled  to  abandon  it,  as  the  French 
were  before  us. 

It  seems  to  me  that  wo  are  already  tending  toward  the  accomplishment  of  the 
maxim  that  a  soldier  can  be  justly  tried  by  soldiers  alone.  Lawyers  are  very  well 
in  civil  courts,  but  upon  military  tribunals  they  are  out  of  place.  One  of  our 
great  difficulties  to  establish  a  proper  discipline  has  been  because  we  had  too  many 
lawyers  in  the  army.  Suppose  a  West  Point  man  wore  to  attempt  to  deliver  his 
opinion  from  the  bench  to  a  crowd  of  educated  lawyers.  We  soldiers  might  think 
it  very  well,  but  there  would  be  no  end  to  the  merriment  of  the  legal  gentlemen. 


PART   THIED. 


DIVERS  OPERATIONS  OF  W.AR. 


CHAPTER    I. 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  ARMS. 

Their  organization  should  he  separate — Their  instruction  uniform — Combination 
of  arms  as  regards  their  employment — Results  of  a  good  mixture — Creation  of 
esprit  de  corps — Importance  of  similarity — Roman  legion — An  expression  of 
Tegetius — Middle  ages — Frederic — First  trial — Marshal  de  Broglio — The  Re- 
public — Formation  in  brigades — Their  constitution — Drawbacks  of  this  system — 
It  is  abandoned — Division  constant  unit — Army  upon  a  small  scale — Napoleon 
separates  the  cavalry  from  the  divisions — Inconveniences — Accessory  and  prin- 
cipal arm — When  and  how — Limit  of  numbers  as  regards  cavalry  reserves — 
Excess  of  numbers  more  embarrassing  than  useful — Armies  of  mean  strength — 
Grand  armies;  an  echelon  more  needed — Why — The  requirements  to  secure 
facility  in  the  exercise  of  command — Organization  of  corps  d'armée — Its  com- 
position— Movable  reserves — General  who  has  eighty  thousand  men  and  the 
general  with  but  ten  thousand — Their  particular  rôle — Napoleon  at  Liitzen — 
Creation  of  grades  in  accordance  with  the  commands — Necessity  of  an  inter- 
mediate grade  between  lieutenant-general  and  marshal  of  France — Of  self-love. 

Note. — The  Battle  of  Grocbow. 

The  troops  of  different  arms  should  be  organized  separately,  so  as  to 
receive  a  uniform  instruction  which  may  be  proper  for  them,  and  to 
assume  the  spirit  which  is  suitable  in  their  case. 

This  principle  has  been  disregarded  at  different  times  in  the  forma- 
tion of  legions,  and  the  inconveniences  have  been  perceived.  The 
officers  who  command  these  corps,  knowing  that  arm  best  in  which 
they  first  have  served,  give  it  always  the  preference,  and  look  upon  it 
with  partiality.  In  artillery  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  provide  for 
the  wants  of  instruction,  because  the  necessary  establishments  would 
have  to  be  infinitely  multiplied,  such  as  mock  fortifications,  schools, 
and  batteries  of  different  kinds.  The  artillery  should  be  even  united 
entirely  in  a  single  garrison,  if  it  were  possible,  so  as  to  receive  the 
same  instruction.  The  government  should,  then,  devote  more  money 
for  this  object,  because  a  larger  number  of  individuals  would  partici- 
pate in  it.     I  proposed  it  when  I  was  chief  of  the  French  artillery  ; 


THE    SPIRIT    OF    MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  129 

but  considerations  of  administration  and  economy,  strengthened  by 
local  interests,  prevented  the  adoption  of  this  change. 

But  if  it  is  necessary  to  separate  the  arms  in  times  of  peace,  to 
better  develop  their  special-instruction,  they  must  be  combined  during 

war. 

It  is  by  uniting  them  with  intelligence  and  skill  that  the  best  results 
are  obtained  ;  they  sustain  themselves  reciprocally,  and  combine  their 
efforts  at  the  right  time.  By  leaving  the  same  corps  together  which 
were  united  under  the  same  general  during  several  campaigns,  an 
"esprit  de  corps"  is  created,  which  is  followed  by  a  useful  similarity. 
Troops  then  will  be  possessed  of  all  the  valor  of  which  they  are  sus- 
ceptible. The  legion  of  the  Romans  is  the  first  example  of  this 
combination,  which,  assuredly,  has  powerfully  contributed  to  their 
triumphs.  "A  god,"  says  Vegetius,  "inspired  them  with  the  thought." 
In  the  Middle  Ages,  and  the  periods  following  up  to  our  days,  the 
greatest  generals  have  had  no  idea  of  imitating  it,  and  Frederic 
never  thought  of  it.  A  trial  was  made  in  the  French  army,  at  the  end 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  under  Marshal  de  Broglio,  and  this  general 
has  had  the  glory  of  making  this  profound  thought  practical.  But  the 
custom  was  not  introduced  until  the  commencement  of  the  Republican 
wars,  and  in  it  is  to  be  found  the  greatest  of  revolutions  in  the  art  of 
war  in  our  days. 

The  infantry,  formerly  organized  in*  brigades,  was  under  the  orders, 
when  formed,  of  two  or  three  generals,  of  whom  one  commanded  the 
centre  and  the  others  the  wings.  The  cavalry  was  likewise  divided 
and  placed  under  the  wings,  and  the  subordinate  commands  were  dis- 
tributed for  the  day  of  battle.  All  generals  resided  ordinarily  at  head- 
quarters, charged,  in  their  turn,  with  the  conduct  of  detachments.  A 
general  of  an  army,  wishing  to  confide  a  temporary  command  or  some 
expedition  to  a  general  more  capable,  or  who  inspired  him  with  more 
confidence,  was  obliged  to  wait  until  the  order  of  the  list  called  him  to 
duty,  and  he  had  to  postpone  the  operation,  or  order  fictitious  detach- 
ments to  employ  those  who  preceded  him.  When  the  detachments 
returned  the  troops  separated,  and  the  brigades  were  assigned  their 
destination  according  to  the  pleasure  of  the  general  staff.  The  ques- 
tion arises  how,  with  such  a  system,  a  considerable  army  could  have 
been  moved,  formed,  and  made  to  fight.  Then  entire  days  were  for- 
merly necessary  merely  to  place  troops  in  the  order  of  battle.  The 
slightest  movement  often  led  to  confusion,  and  the  manoeuvring  artil- 
lery leaving  the  park  for  the  battle-field,  and  placed  in  battery,  some- 
times already  the  day  before,  did  not  come  up  until  after  the  action. 

This  barbarous  and  absurd  system  has  been  changed  in  our  first 
wars;  and  soon  the  armies  of  all  Europe  iAoptod,  according  to  our 
example,  the  new  organization,  which    makes   troops   movable   and 


130  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

always  ready  for  battle.  A  general  now  has  the  means  to  make  with 
facility  such  combinations  with  which  the  circumstances  and  his  own 
genius  inspire  him. 

In  an  army  the  constant  unit,  which  should  never  vary,  but  the 
strength  of  which  may  be  more  or  less,  is  the  division.  It  is  ordinarily 
composed  of  two  brigades,  each  of  two  regiments,  and  sometimes 
three  ;  further,  of  two  batteries  of  artillery  and  a  corps  of  mounted 
troops  of  some  seven  to  eight  hundred  horses.  It  has  an  administra- 
tion complete;  it  is  an  army  upon  a  small  scale.  Thus  it  can  operate 
with  its  own  means;  it  is  able  to  act,  march,  subsist,  and  fight  sepa- 
rately, or  can  easily  take  the  post  for  which  it  is  designed  upon  the  day 
of  battle. 

The  French  army  was  thus  organized  during  the  first  and  immortal 
campaigns  of  Italy,  and  some  yoars  afterward.  Later,  Napoleon  hav- 
ing formed  corps  d'armée,  he  took  the  cavalry  away  from  the  divisions, 
and  contented  himself  to  apply  to  the  army  corps  the  principles  of  the 
legion.  But  in  army  corps  the  cavalry  is  too  far  away  from  the  divis- 
ions; it  is  not  under  the  hands  of  the  iufanti-y  generals  engaged,  and 
can  not/in  many  circumstances,  profit  at  the  proper  time  from  the  dis- 
orders which  originate  with  the  enemy.  I  will,  further  on,  speak  of 
matters  connected  with  corps  d'armée,  and  of  the  circumstances  which 
have  authorized  and  even  necessitated  their  formation. 

The  division  is,  then,  the  unit  in  an  army,  the  first  element  through 
which  the  three  arms  are  united  in  an  intimate  manner;  but  with  it  the 
wants  of  an  army  are  not  satisfied. 

Each  arm,  after  having  been  accessory,  should  become  in  its  turn  tho 
principal  one,  because  there  are  circumstances  when  a  particular  effect 
must  be  produced.  Thus,  cavalry  reserves  are  indispensable,  be  it  to 
engage  masses  of  cavalry,  be  it  to  be  precipitated  upon  badly-sustained 
corps  of  infantry,  or  to  cover  infantry  in  disorder,  and  to  surround  bat- 
teries, etc. 

This  cavalry  should  rely  upon  and  be  sustained  by  a  corps  of  artil- 
lery, which  belongs  to  and  acts  with  it  in  concert,  according  to  circum- 
stances, in  the  different  results  which  are  contemplated.  Cavalry  is 
here  the  principal  and  artillery  the  accessory  arm.  But  when,  during 
battle,  the  turn  of  the  latter  comes,  and  the  reserve  artillery  is  emplo3r- 
ed  to  produce  some  great  effect  in  a  given  moment  and  upon  a  fixed 
point,  it  suddenly  becomes  the  principal  arm;  it  crushes  the  enemy  with 
its  fire;  then  comes  the  infantry,  which  completes  the  disorder;  the  cav- 
alry intervening,  achieves  the  destruction  and  assures  the  victory. 

I  do  not.  enter  upon  those  details  whicli  would  point  out  the  circum- 
stances under  which  artillery  is  charged  to  play  an  exclusive  part;  but 
I  have  said  already  enough  to  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  each  arm 
should  be,  in  its  turn,  accessory  and  principal;  and  if  the  artillery  is 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  131 

ordered  to  act  upon  an  isolated  point,  that  the  infantry  and  cavalry 
forces,  destined  to  protect  and  secure  it,  should  be  subordinate  to  it  in 
all  their  movements. 

But  cavalry  reserves,  however  important  they  may  be,  should  not  ex- 
ceed a  certain  strength  upon  any  given  point;  above  certain  limits  the 
most  skilful  general  will  not  be  able  to  handle  them  ;  and  then  too 
many  horses  united  can  not  be  subsisted.  I  put  the  strength  with  which 
a  good  management  is  possible  at  six  thousand  horses  ;  with  this  number 
anything  which  can  reasonably  be  undertaken  with  cavalry  upon  the 
battle-field  can  succeed. 

Napoleon  organized,  in  his  last  campaigns,  corps  of  cavalry  composed 
of  three  divisions,  numbering  at  least  twelve  thousand  horses.  This 
idea  was  monstrous,  and  without  any  useful  application  upon  a  field  of 
battle  ;  it  became  the  cause  of  immenso  losses,  without  any  fighting — 
these  large  corps  having  never  served  for  anything  else  but  to  present 
an  extraordinary  spectacle,  fit  to  astonish  the  sight. 

The  organization  of  armies  should,  then,  establish  as  a  principle  the 
formation  of  divisions  and  reserves  of  each  arm.  I  speak  of  an  army 
of  medium  strength,  because  in  large  armies  another  echelon  is  neces- 
sary to  serve  as  an  element  of  order  and  action.  We  come,  then,  to  the 
formation  of  troops  into  army  corps — that  is,  fixed  and  intermediate 
commands  should  be  established  between  the  supreme  chief  and  the 
generals  commanding  divisions. 

An  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men,  composed  of  from  ten  to 
twelve  divisions,  would  be  difficult  to  handle  if  it  was  not  organized  into 
corps  d'armée,  because  confusion  would  soon  arise  from  the  too  large 
number  of  independent  units,  manoeuvring  at  liberty,  according  to  the 
general  direction  of  the  supreme  chief.  The  want  of  some  formation 
of  aggregations  of  divisions  has,  then,  been  promptly  felt,  to  simplify 
the  dispositions  of  the  chief  command,  and  two,  three,  or  four  have  been 
united.  Thus  an  army,  composed  as  I  have  just  indicated,  is  divided 
into  four  fractions;  the  general-in-chief  can  move  them  with  facility; 
he  has  under  hand  four  corps,  of  which  threo  form  his  line  of  battle, 
and  the  fourth  his  reserve. 

In  all  the  different  degrees  of  military  rank,  a  chief  is  placed  in  re- 
lation with  a  small  number  of  immediate  subordinates,  who  facilitate 
the  exercise  of  his  command. 

The  corps  d'armée  being  small  armies,  should  have  an  organization 
in  conformity  to  the  principles  which  I  have  established,  and  be  com- 
posed : 

1.  Of  three  divisions,  combined  of  the  three  arms. 

2.  Of  a  cavalry  reserve,  sustained  by  horse-artillery. 

3.  Of  an  artillery  receive. 

The  reterres,  designed  to  act  anywhere,  should  be  of  great  mobility, 


132  THE   SPIRIT    OF 

and  for  artillery,  which  must  often  take  post  at  great  distances,  horse- 
artillery  will  he  employed. 

Thus  ordinary  artillery,  which,  hy  its  new  organization,  is  very  mo- 
bile, would  do  the  service  with  infantry  divisions,  and  the  horse-artillery 
would  be  exclusively  attached  to  cavalry  and  the  reserves. 

The  organization  of  which  I  have  just  given  a  picture  is  in  accord- 
ance with  existing  armies;  it  results  from  the  nature  of  arms  and  the 
present  manner  of  making  war,  and  the  object  of  the  fractions  of  the 
army  is  to  facilitate  the  exercise  of  the  command.  Commands,  again, 
are  of  different  kinds,  and  change  character  according  to  the  number  of 
soldiers.  . 

A  general  who  combats  with  ten  thousand  men  should  be  in  the  midst 
of  his  troops,  and  often  exposed  to  the  fire  of  small-arms. 

A  general  commands  thirty  thousand  men  ;  he  orders  the  movement 
of  his  troops  and  reserves,  and  if  he  is  habitually,  with  the  exception 
of  extreme  cases,  out  of  the  range  of  musketry,  he  should  be  constantly 
within  that  of  cannon,  and  remain  within  the  limit  of  the  space  where 
the  balls  yet  fall. 

A  general  directs  eighty  or  one  hundred  thousand  men  ;  he  determines 
the  plan,  gives  the  orders  before  the  battle,  opens  the  movement,  and 
awaits  the  events  in  a  central  position.  During  the  action  he  becomes 
a  kind  of  personified  providence;  he  makes  dispositions  for  unforeseen 
cases,  and  provides  remedies  in  case  of  great  accidents.  He  should  ex- 
pose himself  before  the  battle,  so  as  to  see  for  himself,  and  judge  with 
precision  the  actual  state  of  things  ;  theso  duties  fulfilled,  he  gives  his 
orders,  and  lets  every  one  perform  the  part  assigned  to  him.  If  matters 
progress  favorably,  he  has  nothing  further  to  do  ;  if  accidents  happen, 
he  should  guard  against  them  by  those  combinations  in  his  power  j  if 
ma'tters  progress  very  badly,  and  some  great  catastrophe  is  to  be  feared, 
he  must  place  himself  at  the  head  of  the  last  troops  and  throw  them 
upon  the  enemy,  and  his  presence,  in  this  critical  moment,  gives  an  im- 
pulse to  them,  and  the  moral  effect  produced  doubles  their  valor. 

It  was  thus  Napoleon  commanded.  His  operations  having  been  near- 
ly always  crowned  with  success,  and  the  armies  he  commanded  being 
very  numerous,  he  has  but  seldom  been  exposed  to  any  imminent  dan- 
ger. But  at  Liitzen,  when  matters  were  culminating  in  a  crisis,  and  the 
nature  of  the  army,  composed  of  young  soldiers,  was  augmenting  the 
danger,  he  rallied  the  troops  himself  before  Kay  a,  and  led  them  to  the 
charge  under  a  murderous  fire. 

From  what  I  have  said  heretofore  it  will  be  apparent  which  principles 
were  the  basis  for  the  creation  of  the  different  grades.  They  have  been 
made  in  proportion  with  the  actual  commands,  so  that  a  chief,  having  a 
social  position  separate  from  those  of  his  subordinates,  that  position  is 
always  superior  even  when  he  is  off  duty. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  133 

France  is  the  only  country  where,  greatly  to  the  prejudice  of  the  ser- 
vice, there  has  not  been  created  an  intermediate  grade  between  those  of 
lieutenant-general  and  marshal  for  the  command  of  corps  d'armée. 
The  dignity  of  marshal  requires  a  command-in-chief,  and  the  sad  ex- 
perience has  been  made  that,  when  several  marshals  were  united  in  the 
same  army  and  under  the  command  of  one  of  them,  great  misfortunes 
were  nearly. always  the  result,  through  the  little  harmony  and  subordi- 
nation which  reigned  between  them.  An  emperor  or  captain-general* 
was  needed  to  command  an  army,  the  greater  portions  of  which  were 
under  the  orders  of  marshals..  Corps,  it  is  true,  were  sometimes  under 
the  orders  of  lieutenant-generals,  who  received  the  temporary  title  of 
general -in-chief,  and  a  commission  for  tho  command.  I  have  even  to 
add,  that  those  who  had  once  commanded  them  were  never  again  call- 
ed upon  to  take  a  simple  division.  But  the  grade  being  always  the 
same,  it  is  grievous  to  establish  such  distinctions  freely  and  volun- 
tarily. 

Since  authority,  necessary  everywhere,  is  still  more  so  among  troops, 
from  the  command  of  an  army  to  that  of  a  company — the  chief  who  die- 
appears  must  be  immediately  replaced — it  has  been  necessary  to  estab- 
lish, as  a  fundamental  principle,  the  right  of  seniority  in  command. 
But  the  accidental  exercise  of  this  right,  brought  about  by  fortuitous 
events  of  war,  i3  quite  different  (every  one  feels  the  necessity  of  this 
disposition)  from  the  delegation  of  authority  with  the  same  grade,  ac- 
cording to  tho  will  of  a  sovereign,  when  he  is  the  master  of  the  choice. 

Self-esteem  suffers  by  being  obliged  to  obey  au  equal,  especially  if  he 
is,  besides,  a  junior;  and  self-esteem,  the  cause  of  so  much  good  and 
evil,  exercises,  in  the  profession  of  arms,  an  immense  influence,  because 
it  is  tho  very  life  of  it. 

An  army  composed  of  men  without  self-esteem  is  worth  nothing; 
the  French  arc  such  good  soldiers  because  they  aro  impressed  with  it; 
and  through  it  we  find  soldiers  coming  from  largo  cities,  where  self-es- 
teem is  more  active,  but  who  are  less  strong  and  robust,  so  much  more 
valorous  than  those  who  come  from  the  country. 

NOTE. 

The  Battle  of  Grochow.— The  Etonian  tunny,  under  the  command  of  Mai- 
8hal  Diebil  Bcfa,  the  famed  hero  of  the  Balkan,  had,  on  the  5th  of  February,  1831,  upon 
four  different  points,  passed  the  frontiers  <>f  the  contracted  portion  of  old  Bannatis, 
now  called  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  for  the  subjugation  of  a  people  who,  like  us, 
were  fighting  fur  the  light  of  self-government. 

His  plan  of  operation  was  ably  conceived.  Pushing  forward  the  main  portion  of 
his  immense  host  upon  the  military  road  which  runs  due  west  from  the  ancient  Po- 
lish province  of  Grodno  to  Warsaw,  and  touches  the  town  of  Siedlioe,  where  rested 
the  Polish  right,  ho  was,  while  entertaining  tLe  contre  and  left  of  the  Polish  lino,  to 
make  a  vigorous  eff:rt  agninet  ond  outflank  tho  right  of  tho  Pole;,  and  thus  bsth 

12 


134  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

cut  their  communications  with  their  capital  and  interpose  his  forcos  between  them 
and  their  powerful  fortress  of  Zamosk,  on  the  River  Wieprz — thus  hoping  to  deal  out, 
in  considerably  less  than  ninety  days,  to  the  Folish  rebellion  the  death-blow,  as  our 
enemies  no  less  confidently  expected,  at  the  beginning  of  this  struggle,  to  do  the 
same  with  us. 

However,  there  were  in  his  front  soldiers  commanded  by  generals  who,  in  the 
school  of  Napoleon,  had  mastered  grand  operations.  Against  him  he  found  pitted 
men  such  asChlopicki  and  Skrzynecki.  Their  plan  of  operations  was  speedily  form- 
ed. Orders  were  despatched  to  the  different  Polish  corps  who  confronted  the  vast 
masses  of  Diebitsch  to  fall  back  in  the  direction  of  Warsaw,  to  cover  the  capital — a 
movement  which,  in  its  general  features,  strongly  resembled  that  of  our  forces  in 
thjippring  of  1862,  for  the  protection  of  Richmond. 

The  Russians,  deeming  the  Poles  discomfited  by  their  show  of  superior  strength, 
now  began  a  general  forward  movement  from  all  points,  in  pursuance  of  their  pro- 
gramme of  turning  the  Polish  right.  While  their  centre  marched  upon  the  high- 
road and  seized  Siedlice,  some  fifty-five  miles  east  of  Warsaw,  their  columns  of  the 
right  wing  debouched  upon  Warsaw  from  the  north-east.  Upon  the  Polish  right,  at 
the  village  of  Stoczek,  Vas  posted  a  corps  of  observation,  commanded  by  General 
Dwernicki.  This  small  corps,  consisting  of  barely  five  thousand  men,  was,  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  14th  of  February,  assaulted  by  the  Russian  General  Kreutz  with 
fifteen  thousand  men  and  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery.  After  a  sanguinary  strug- 
gle the  night  saw  the  Russian  column  in  utter  disorder,  driven  back  upon  their 
main  body.  The  first  action  of  the  war  had  resulted  gloriously  for  the  Poles  ;  and  the 
Russians — what,  with  superstitions  beli^l  they  thought  more  disastrous  even  than 
the  loss  of  the  battle — had  left  in  thefljfrms  of  the  Poles  an  image  of  the  Holy 
Mother,  which  had  cheered  them  undH^Kiè  fire  of  cannon,  and  was  borne  in  the 
very  centre  of  their  columns  while  marching  to  the  combat. 

The  Polish  right  wing  was  now,  in.  conformity  with  the  general  plan,  more  con- 
tracted toward  the  centre.  But,  before  this  was  executed,  another  heavy  action  at 
Boimie  resulted,  on  the  following  day  (15th),  in  the  defeat  of  the  Russians  by  the 
small  corps  under  command  of  General  Zymirski. 

Two  days  later,  on  the  17th,  the  Polish  right  and  centre  were  simultaneously  at- 
tacked. At  Minsk,  the  Polish  right,  the  Russians  were  again  discomfited.  The 
centre  column,  far  in  advance  of  the  Polish  right  and  left,  was  under  command  of 
General  Skrzynecki.  On  the  same  day,  at  Dobre,  while  slowlj'  retreating,  it  was 
closely  followed  by  thirty  thousand  Russians  and  sixty  pieces  of  cannon,  under 
Diebitsch  and  the  Grand-Duke  Constantino.  With  a  masterly  coup  oVœil  Skrzynecki 
arrested  his  march  near  the  Village  of  Dobre,  and  calmly  awaited  the  debouching  of 
the  Russian  masses  behind  a  strong  position,  lined  in  front  with  ponds  and  marshes, 
with  but  a  single  passage  across,  which  could  be  completely  reached  by  the  fire  of 
his  twelve  pieces  of  heavy  calibre.  Urged  to  deeds  of  heroism  by  their  illustrious 
leaders,  the  Russians,  for  an  entire  day,  vainly  attempted  to  force  the  passage,  and 
six  thousand  in  killed  and  prisoners  were  by  them  left  upon  the  field.  Night  set  in 
upon  another  day  glorious  for  the  Poles. 

On  the  18th  the  entire  Polish  line  was  retrograding  with  exemplary  order,  and  on 
the  19th  the  army  was  from  Warsaw  but  forty  miles  ;  and  on  the  same  day  the  spirit- 
ed combat  of  Swierza  took  place,  where  General  Dwernicki  beat  Prince  Wurtem- 
berg, who  had  passed  the  Vistula  at  Pulawa,  and  was  approaching  Warsaw. 

On  the  same  day  was  fought  the  battle  of  Wavre,  by  Sir  A.  Alison  styled  the  Bat- 
tle of  Grochow;  and  on  the  24th  and  25th  were  fought  the  Battles  of  Bialolenka 
(24th),  and  of  Grochow  (25th),  both  likewise  mitfoalled,  by  the  same  writer,  the  Bat- 


dff 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  135 

tie  of  Praga.     His  account  of  all  those  actions  is  so  mixed  up  that  it  is  barely  possi- 
ble to  discern  the  true  occurrences. 

The  Battles  of  Wavre  and  of  Bialolenka  were  nearly  fought  upon  the  same  ground 
as  the  Battle  of  Groehow.  From  the  14th  to  the  evening  preceding  the  great  bat- 
tle ten  days  had  passed,  during  which  some  ten  sanguinary  battles  had  been  fought, 
in  which  the  Poles,  though  retreating,  had  been  uniformly  successful.  The  heroism 
and  endurance  of  their  small  army  during  these  memorable  ten  days  is  above  all 
praise.  In  that  short  space  of  time  the  whole  Russian  army  had  been  engaged  by  a 
force  not  above  one-sixth  its  strength,  and  thirty  thousand  of  the  invaders  had  been 
either  killed,  wounded,  or  taken  prisoners. 

For  a  like  series  of  sanguinary  actions,  against  such  an  overmatched  force,  we 
look  in  vain  in  history.  By  it  is  demonstrated  what  a  brave  people  may  do  in  the 
defence  of  its  homes  and  the  liberty  of  its  country.  Only  a  cause  just  and  grand 
could  be  contested  for  with  like  devotion.  In  the  middle  of  winter,  in  a  climate  in- 
finitely more  rigorous  than  ours,  in  addition  to  forced  and  harassing  marches,  the 
days  were  spent  alternately  in  .ghting  and  marching,  with  but  little  rest  for  all; 
for  such  were  the  requiremen  s  of  the  hour  that,  continually,  while  one-third  were 
resting  upon  the  snow-covered  ground,  two-thirds  had  to  be  kept  under  arms  to 
guard  their  comrades'  slumber.  For  the  straggler  in  the  rear,  had  there  been  any, 
there  would  have  been  no  quarter.  Numberless  hordes  of  Cossacks  were  hovering 
around,  day  and  night,  ready  to  pounce  upon  the  isolated  victim  as  the  hawk  does 
upon  its  prey.  A  continuous  retreat,  necessities  of  war,  so  disastrous  in  nearly  all 
its  annals,  appeared  to  have  for  this  brave  race  nothing  dispiriting.  Their  morale 
was  not  shaken  an  iota;  on  the  contrary,  they  seemed  to  draw  inspiration  from  the 
hourly  increasing  proximity  to  their  capital,  where,  they  well  knew,  tender  hearts 
were  awaiting  them,  to  cheer  them  on  with  noble  devotion  in  the  great  battle  which 
was  destined  to  be  fought  under  the  very  walls  of  the  ancient  city. 

The  army  of  the  Poles  was  now  concentrated,  with  remarkable  success,  for  not  a 
Bingle  column  of  theirs  had  been  cut  off  or  defeated,  on  the  west  side  of  the  Village 
of  Groehow,  one  Polish  mile,  or  some  seven  English  miles,  from  the  City  of  Warsaw, 
and  it  occupied  a  line  which  had  been  choseu  with  admirable  genius.  The  right  of 
the  Polish  line  rested  upon  the  impenetrable  marshes  of  the  Vistula,  called  the 
Marshes  of  Goclaw.  The  left  was  posted  upon  the  slight  elevation  which  commands 
the  Village  of  Kawenzyn,  near  the  Vistula.  From  right  to  left  there  stretched,  for 
about  three  miles,  an  unbroken  plain,  composed  mostly  of  cultivated  fields,  without 
any  other  obstacles  save  those  presented  by  the  furrows  which  divide  the  fields  of 
the  different  proprietors— thus  forming  a  magnificent  field  for  all  the  manœuvres  of 
the  three  arms.  Between  the  centre  and  the  left  the  Polish  line  was  perpendicularly 
traversed  by  the  high-road  already  mentioned,  which  leads  from  the  province  of 
Grodno,  through  SiecUjce,  upon  Warsaw,  and  for  the  possession  of  which  road,  open- 
ing the  way  to  the  city,  the  battle  was  being  fought. 

There  was,  however,  upon  this  line,  and  between  the  Polish  centre  and  left,  a  po- 
sition which,  in  Polish  history,  was  destined  to  become  as  famed  as  is  the  little 
"  wood  of  birches  "  in  the  Battle  of  llochkirch  in  Prussian  annals— namely,  a  forest 
of  elder  trees,  situated  in  front  of  the  Polish  army,  and  for  the  possession  of  which 
incredible  efforts  were  made,  during  the  Btruggle,  by  vast  Russian  hosts. 

The  Russian  position  was  upon  a  front  parallel  to  that  of  the  Polish  forces,  con- 
cealed by  the  dense  woodlands  which  surround  the  Village  of  Groehow.  and  which 
the  Russians  occupied  in  force.  The  road  from  Siedliec  to  Warsaw,  having  passed 
over  a  country  thickly  wooded,  after  leaving  the  Village  of  Groehow  debouches 
upon  the  vast  plain,  stretching  for  seven  uiile^  away  toward  the  capital;  and  from 


136  THE    SPIRTT    OF 

the  belt  of  woodlands,  which  concealed  the  Russian  line  of  battle,  the  invaders  be- 
held, on  the  cold,  frosty  morning  of  the  25th  of  February,  1831,  the  magnificent  pros- 
pect, of  the  towers  and  domes  of  the  rich  and  populous  capital  of  the  country,  in 
front  the  Vistula  winding  through  the  expanse,  and  which  they  had  come  to  destroy — 
confidently  trusting  that  it  would,  by  the  mere  force  of  overpowering  numbers,  be 
their  conquered  prize  before  the  evening  sun  had  set  in. 

The  Russian  army  consisted  of  eight  corps  of  combatants,  and  three  in  reserve. 
Their  left  wing  was  between  the  Village  of  Wavre  and  the  marshes  of  Goclaw,  and 
composed  of  four  divisions  of  infantry,  forty -seven  thousand  strong,  four  divisions  of 
cavalry,  fifteen  thousand  seven  hundred,  with  one  hundred  and  twenty  pieces  of 
cannon.  The  centre,  which  rested  opposite  the  forest  of  elder3,  consisted  also  of 
four  divisions  of  infantry,  fifty-seven  thousand  men.  three  of  cavalry,  ten  thousand 
five  hundred  strong,  and  had  one  hundred  and  eight  pieces  of  cannon.  The  right 
wing,  opposite  the  Village  ofKawenzyn,  was  composed  of  three  and  a  half  divisions 
of  infantry  of  thirty-one  thousand  men,  four  of  cavalry,  fifteen  thousand  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  men.  with  fifty-two  pieces  of  cannon.  Upon  the  borders  of  the 
great  forest,  opposite  the  forest  of  elders,  was  placed  the  reserve,  commanded  by 
Grand-Duke  Constantine,  in  infantry  and  cavalry  twenty  thousand  strong,  with 
thirty-two  cannon — making  a  grand  total  of  one  hundred  and  ninety-six  thousand 
infantry  and  cavalry,  with  three  hundred  and  twelve  pieces  of  artillery. 

Against  this  enormous  host  the  Poles  could  muster,  after  great  exertions,  but  a 
vastly  inferior  force,  numbering  not  more  than  forty-three  thousand  four  hundred 
infantry  and  cavalry,  with  ninety-six  guns.  General  Szembek,  commanding  the 
right  wing,  had  seven  thousand  infantry,  with  twenty-four  guns,  and  occupied  the 
space  between  the  high-road  and  the  marshes  of  the  Vistula.  The  centre,  composed 
of  Skrzynecki's  and  Zimirski's  divisions,  fifteen  thousand  strong,  with  sixty  guns, 
occupied  the  space  between  the  forest  of  elders  to  the  high-road  ;  the  left  wing  oc- 
cupied the  Village  of  Kawenzyn  with  a  force'of  six  thousand  five  hundred  men  and 
twelve  guns,  under  the  command  of  General  Krakowiecki.  The  entire  cavalry,  nine 
thousand  five  hundred  strong,  commanded  by  Generals  Uminski,  Lubinski,  Skar- 
zynski,  and  Jankowski,  were  deployed  in  rear  of  the  infantry  and  artillery,  readj'  to 
precipitate  themselves  upon  the  Russian  columns  whenever  an  opportunity  should 
offer.  Besides  these,  a  small  reserve  of  four  battalions  and  eight  squadrons,  in 
all  about  five  thousand  four  hundred  men,  under  the  command  of  General  Pac, 
were  posted  upon  both  sides  of  the  Warsaw  high-road,  a  little  to,  the  rear  of  General 
Szembek. 

Thus,  in  sullen  silence,  the  opposing  hosts  remained  during  the  night  of  the  24th, 
awaiting  the  day  which  was  to  decide  upon  the  fortunes  of  a  country,  and  which  to 
thousands  was  to  be  the  last  one  which  should  dawn  upon  them.  The  night  was  un- 
usually serene  and  clear..  Thousands  of  watch-fires,  around  which  the  weary  Poles 
were  reposing,  illumined  the  horizon,  while  along  the  dark  line  of  the  forest  which 
enclosed  the  Russian  hosts  everything  would  have  seemed  quiet  as  the  night  but 
for  the  dense  volumes  of  smoke  ascending  from  behind  the  curtain.  Far  in  the  dis- 
tance myriads  of  lights  were  to  be  seen,  showing  the  extent  of  the  Polish  capital, 
which,  like  beacons,  shone  all  night — for  but  few  were  there  in  the  ancient  city  who, 
wrapt  in  slumber,  were  forgetful  of  the  threatening  dangers. 

With  the  break  of  day  the  armies  were  awaiting,  in  serried  columns,  the  begin- 
ning of  the  struggle.  The  first  rays  of  light  had  scarce  dispelled  the  darkness  when, 
upon  the  Polish  left,  in  the  direction  of  Kawenzyn,  debotiched  from  the  forest  the 
Russian  right,  with  a  force  as  large  as  the  entire  army  of  the  Poles.  Fifty  pieces  of 
artillery  preceded  the  columns,  on  the  winga  of  which  hung  clouds  of  cavalry  in 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  137 

threatening  masses.  A  tremendous  cannonade  was  directed  upon  the  village,  which, 
soon  in  flames,  was  wrapt  in  clouds  of  smoke.  To  this  overpowering  force  there 
were  opposed  seven  battalions  and  twelve  guns.  With  unflinching  resolution  Gen- 
erals Krakowiecki  and  Malachowski  made  the  most  gallant  efforts  to  keep  their 
ground.  At  the  head  of  their  columns,  on  foot,  they  repeatedly  charged  the  advan- 
cing battalions  of  the  enemy,  while  the  twelve  pieces  of  artillery,  skilfully  served, 
tore  whole  streets  through  the  enemy's  masses — unmindful  of  the  concentrated  fire 
of  the  Russian  artillery — directing  every  discharge  into  the  dense  advancing  hosts. 
For  five  long  hours  this  gallant  band  withstood  the  successive  shocks,  till  at  last, 
weary  of  unsuccessful  efforts,  the  enemy's  fire  slackened  and  soon  died  away.  Thus 
the  great  attack  upon  the  Polish  left  had  been  repulsed. 

Mai>hal  Diebitsch,  during  the  whole  of  this  attack,  had  firmly  expected  that  tho 
Polish  left  would  bfl  forced.  He  had,  therefore,  directed  the  whole  masses  of  tho 
Russian  right  upon  the  Village  of  Kawenzyn.  expecting  to  force  the  Poles  to  weaken 
their  centre  in  order  to  sustain  their  left.  But  they  well  knew  that  no  succor  could 
be  expected  from  any  quarter  in  the  defence  of  the  positions  assigned  to  them  re- 
spectively, and  thus  they  had  formed  the  resolution  to  conquer  or  to  die  upon  the 
ground. 

Up  to  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  centre  and  right  of  the  Polish  line  had  re- 
mained unattached.  But  when  the  efforts  against  their  left  became  apparently  use- 
less, Diebitsch  resolved  upon  a  great  demonstration  against  the  Polish  right.  Two 
hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  as  if  by  magic,  began  to  vomit  their  missiles  of  death 
against  the  Polish  line.  The  earth  seemed  to  tremble  under  foot.  Covered  by  this 
tremendous  fire,  the  Russians  now  began  to  debouch  from  the  forest,  and  in  one  mo- 
ment the  plain  of  Wavre  was  covered  with  their  columns.  Looking  over  that  plain, 
between  the  forest  of  elders  and  the  Vistula,  the  eye  saw  nothing  but  one  undivided 
mass  of  troops  in  motion;  not  even  the  different  divisions  could  be  distinguished* 
from  each  other.  Still  under  cover  of  the  guns,  the  Russians  steadily  advanced. 
But  a  great  catastrophe  awaited  them.  In  an  incredibly  short  space  of  time  the  en- 
tire cavalry  of  the  Poles  had  been  collected;  issuing  through  the  openings  left  be- 
tween the  columns  of  the  infantry,  they  threw  themselves  upon  the  Russians,  and, 
with  one  grand  charge,  swept  them  from  the  field. 

This  brilliant  success  inspired  the  Poles  with  tho  greatest  ardor.  When  the  brave 
horsemen  returned  from  the  charge  cries  of  defiance  rent  the  air  from  the  entire 
Polish  line,  striking  terror  into  the  enemy's  ranks. 

A  lull  now  succeeded  in  the  unequal  contest.  Rapidly  the  Russians  concentrated 
one  hundred  and  twenty  guns  against  the  forest  of  elders,  held  by  Generals  Skrzy- 
necki's  and  Zimirski's  divisions,  composed  of  the  very  flower  of  the  Polish  army. 
Among  the  devoted  soldiers  holding  this  now  for  ever  memorable  forest  was  the  cele- 
brated Fourth  regiment  of  infantry,  which,  on  the  day  inaugurating  the  revolution, 
had.  to  a  man,  taken  the  solemn  oath  administered  by  their  brave  colonel,  Bogus- 
lawski,  never  to  fire  a  single  shot,  but  always  to  attack  with  the  bayonet,  until  their 
country  should  be  free— a  pledge  carried  out  under  their  succeeding  colonel,  Bor- 
cenzki,  and  especially  in  the  fierce  struggle  i  >f  (! mcliow,  and  so  faithfully  that,  at  the 
end  of  the  revolution,  but  ten  nun  remained. 

One  hundred  thousand  men  now  assaulted  the  forest  of  elders,  ami  after  a  fierce 
Struggle  the  Poles,  were  driven  from  their  position.  But  the  artillery,  with  a  bravery 
never  BUrpawed,  dashed  within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  Russian  columns,  and  a 
tremendous  discharge  Of  grape,  double-Shotted,  Shattered  the  advance  columns  of  the 
confidently  marching  host.  The  Polish  infantry,  but  fourteen  battalions  strong, 
with  a  fierce  charge  of  the  bayonet,  repulsed  the  Russians,  and  the  forest  was  re- 

12« 


138  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

taken.  But  in  an  Instant  fresh  regiments  of  infantry  were  hurried  against  the 
biasing  forest,  while  the  Russian  cuirassiers  attacked  both  Hanks.  While  they  were 
endeavoring  to  break  through  the  line  the  Polish  cavalry,  ever  on  the  start, defeat- 
ed the  iron-dad  regiments,  and  drove  tlieni  back  in  utter  confusion.  The  Polish  in- 
fantry a  second  time  was  driven  from  the  forest.  Again  the  artillery  shattered  the 
Etassians,  and  again,  with  one  charge,  they  were  repulsed  by  the  infantry,  and  the 
forest  retaken  a  second  time.  The  other  portions  of  the  line,  during  these  fierce  at- 
tacks, were  not  unmolested.  On  the  right  and  left  the  combat  raged  furiously,  with- 
out, b^owever.  making  any  visible  impression  upon  the  stout  Polish  infantry. 

Toward  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  while  the  combat  was  extending  along  nil 
points  of  the  lino,  the  enemy  made  one  grand  last  effort  against  the  forest  of  elders, 
when  the  second  division,  terribly  reduced,  began  to  give  way,  and  the  Russian  col- 
umns at  once  poured  into  the  interval  which  had  thus  been  made.  Destruction 
appeared  inevitable;  the  crisis  of  the  battle  seemed  to  have  come;  and  already  the 
wavering  preceding  a  great  catastrophe  was  to  be  seen  in  the  Polish  centre,  when 
the  battle  was  restored  by  one  of  the  most  daring  artillery  charges  on  record.  The 
five  Polish  batteries  of  Adamski,  Maslowski.  Hildebrand,  Bielak,  and  Picntka  ad- 
vanced, like  cavalry,  to  the  charge,  throwing  themselves  into  the  interval  with  un- 
daunted resolution,  and.  approaching  close  to  the  rapidly  advancing  Russian  columns, 
opened  a  fire  of  grape  which  spread  destruction  and  disorder  in  their  ranks.  The 
Russians  halted  in  astonishment  at  so  daring  a  charge  ;  and  while  they  were  yet  at 
bay,  the  batteries,  with  the  celerity  of  thought,  had  taken  shelter  in  rear  of  the  now 
confidently  advancing  second  division,  which,  for  the  ninth  and  last  time,  had  now 
retaken  the  blood-stained  ground  of  the  forest. 

For  four  hours  this  terrible  massacre  had  lasted.  Under  their  heroic  leaders, 
Skrzynecki,  Zimirski,  Boguslawski,  Czyzewski,  and  Rohland,  the  Polish  centre  exe- 
cuted deeds  of  daring  such  as  have  never  been  surpassed.  Opposed,  a  living  mass, 
to  the  concentrated  tire  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns,  they  never  wavered  for  a 
moment  under  a  storm  of  missiles  more  terrible  than  had  been  hurled  by  four  hun- 
dred French  guns,  nineteen  3rears  before,  against  the  great  redoubt,  of  the  Moskowa, 
Changes  of  front,  the  attack  in  columns,  and  in  echelon,  the  concentration  of  forces 
upon  the  Russian  points  which  were  wavering,  reserving  their  fire  until  close  to  the 
enemy  and  not  wasting  a  single  shot,  were  executed  with  an  activity,  order,  and 
coolness  unparalleled.  Only  by  such  conduct  could  the  tremendous  attack  of  the 
Russians  have  been  withstood  for  four  hours  by  fifteen  thousand  men,  who,  at  the 
ninth  attack,  had  been  reduced  to  less  than  ten  thousand. 

Like  the  infantry  and  artillery,  the  Polish  cavalry  had  performed  prodigies.  Be- 
sides protecting  the  advancing  artillery,  the  different  charges  which  they  executed 
with  such  bravery,  they  were  manoeuvred  with  the  utmost  skill  by  their  generals, 
and  continually  called  upon  to  shift  from  point  to  point  in  order  to  fill  tlie  voids  oc- 
casioned by  the  inferiority  of  the  Polish  forces,  so  as  always  to  present  to  the  enemy 
an  unbroken  line. 

By  such  manœuvres  of  the  three  arms  combined,  and  executed  with  the  greatest 
celerity  and  determination,  in  which  every  commander  performed  his  duty  with  the 
greatest  devotion,  the  plans  of  the  enemy  were  never  permitted  to  be  fully  develop- 
ed and  executed;  and  his  dazzling  force,  which  at  first  sight  would  have  been  «up- 
posed  capable  of  absolutely  crushing  the  small  Polish  army,  was,  in  effect,  but  one 
great  unwieldly  mass,  which  only  confidently  marched  to  the  combat  under  the  pro- 
tection of  an  enormous  number  of  guns,  the  fire  of  which,  during  the  whole  day, 
upon  every  portion  of  the  Polish  line,  had  been  steadily  maintained,  whether  neces- 
sary or  not,  with  the  utmost  regularity. 


*  MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  139 

The  battle  had  now  raged  for  nearly  twelve  hours,  and  the  loss  of  life  on  both 
«idea  had  been  immense.  The  three  grand  attacks  of  the  Russians,  it  is  true,  had 
been  unsuccessful,  but  at  the  cost  of  weakening  the  extended  Polish  line  to  such  a 
degree  as  to  make  it  exceedingly  dangerous  to  await  a  new  attack  upon  the  same 
front.  The  Polish  generals  therefore  determined  to  withdraw  their  forces  to  the  rear 
upon  the  same  line,  the  centre  of  which  had  beon  occupied  during  the  struggle  by 
the  small  reserve  corps  of  General  Pac,  near  an  obelisk  of  iron,  immediately  upon 
the  high-road,  or  some  half  a  mile  from  the  former  line  of  battle.  The  object  was 
to  gain  a  more  commanding  position;  to  draw  the  enemy  upon  the  open  plain;  to 
concentrate  the  forces  still  more,  and  to  place  them  upon  two  lines — the  second  to  bo 
composed  of  the  whole  of  the  Recond  and  a  part  of  the  third  division,  which,  having 
withstood  the  main  attack  in  the  centre,  were  nearly  exhausted.  Furthermore,  it 
was  expected  that  the  enemy  would  be  led  into  the  error  to  suppose  the  manoeuvre 
a  retrograde  movement,  forced  upon  the  Poles  by  their  losses,  and  that  they  felt 
themselves  too  weak  to  continue  the  defence  of  the  forest. 

To  execute  this  manoeuvre,  and  to  enable  the  second  division  to  retire  from  the 
forest  of  elders  without  being  molested,  the  artillery  was  left  with  some  twenty 
squadrons  to  protect  the  retrograde  march.  The  artillery  and  cavalry  were,  ordered 
to  evacuate  their  positions  gradually,  and  the  former  to  take  post  in  the  centre  under 
the  protection  of  the  whole  of  the  cavalry,  which,  formed  in  echelon,  were  prepared 
for  a  general  attack.  The  change  was  as  admirably  executed  as  it  was  conceived. 
The  enemy  had  no  suspicion  of  its  object,  but,  presuming  it  to  be  a  flight,  at  once 
undertook  to  profit  by  it.  It  was  then  that  Marshal  Diebitsch,  sure  of  victory,  saw 
himself  already  at  Warsaw,  and,  in  the  exultation  of  the  moment,  exclaimed  :  "Clio- 
rozo!  tiepier  ja  dumaiu  po  skonczanii  etoy  krwawoy  sraeenia,  ja  wsostianii  hudu 
wziat  u)  Bclwerderskom  dwarce."  "Well,  then,  it  appears  that,  after  this  bloody 
day.  I  shall  take  tea  in  the  Belvidere  palace." 

It  was  about  three  o'clock  when  the  second  division  began  to  retire  by  echelons- 
To  hasten  the  execution  of  this  movement  General  Chlopicki  ordered  that  the  col- 
umns, retiring  in  succession,  on  reaching  a  considerable  distance  from  the  enomy 
should  quicken  their  pace  as  they  proceeded,  in  order  to  form  the  second  line  as  soon 
as  possible,  and  to  give  space  for  the  operations  of  the  artillery  and  cavalry.  It  was 
at  this  moment  that  General  Zimirski,  who  had  lost  several  horses  under  him  and 
had  just  mounted  a  fresh  one  to  superintend  this  movement,  was  struck  by  a  twelve- 
pound  ball,  which  carried  off  his  arm.  making  a  terrible  wound  in  his  shoulder,  of 
which  he  died  in  a  few  hours.  The  melancholy  loss  of  this  general  was  most  deeply 
felt  by  the  whole  army,  and  particularly  by  his  own  division,  but  it  did  not  interfere 
with  the  success  of  the  movement.  The  brave  General  Czyzewski  immediately  took 
command  of  the  division,  greatly  supported  by  Generals  Hohland  and  Zaluski. 

As  soon  as  the  last  columns  of  the  Poles  quitted  the  forest  of  elders  the  Russian 
troops  began  to  debouch  from  it,  and  the  Polish  artillery  commenced  a  terrible  fire. 
The  bravo  Colonel  Picntka,  who  was  still  in  front,  checked  the  advance  of  the  col- 
umns. Boated,  with  the  most  perfect  suiiij-frnvl.  Upon  a  disabled  piece  of  artillery, 
he  directed  an  unremitting  fire  from  his  battery.  The  artillery  and  cavalry,  after 
bavin;.'  protected  the  retrograde  movement  of  the  centre,  still  held  their  ground  to 
enable  the  wings  also  to  retire  undisturbed. 

The  whole  Poliah  army  VM  HOW  in  full  march  for  the  new  line  of  battle,  and  the 
second  division  had  already  begun  to  form  the  SOOOnd  line,  and  had  commenced 
firing  by  battalions.  At  this  moment  Marshal  Diebiteeh,  with  admirable  celerity, 
had  massed  a  heavy  force  of  cavalry  between  the  Village  of  Kawensyn  and  the  forest 
of  elders  to  penetrate  and  annihilate  the  retiring  Polish  columns.     Forty  squadrons, 


140  TIIK    M'IRIT    OF 

at  their  head  five  regiments  of  cuirassiers,  issued  from  the  borders  of  the  forest  upon 
the  plain,  in  one  solid  body — ten  thousand  admirable  horsemen  coming  to  the 
charge. 

In  their  way  was  nothing  but  the  battery  of  Colonel  Picntka.  supported  by  a  sin- 
gle regiment  of  lancers.  Pientka,  with  gnat  coolness,  greeted  them  with  one  tre- 
mendous discharge  of  grape:  then  limbering  up,  he  quitted  a  poet,  at  full  gallop, 
which  he  had  held  for  five  hours,  to  save  himself  from  being  cut  off. 

Animated  by  this  rapid  retreat,  the  Russian  squadrons  now  came  onward  upon 
a  trot,  and  in  line  perpendicular  to  a  battery  of  rockets  which  had  been  stationed 
in  the  second  Polish  line,  between  the  second  and  third  divisions.  But  Skrzynccki's 
division  had  already  formed  in  squares  to  receive  the  onset.  Nearer  and  nearer 
they  fame  toward  the  wall  of  fire  of  rhc  brave,  second  division,  when  suddenly  the 
battery  of  rockets  opened  fire.  The  horses  of  the  cuirassiers,  maddened  by  tho 
shower  of  flakes  of  fire  and  the  hissing  noise  of  the  rockets,  stopped,  reared,  turn- 
ed, partly  fled  and  partly  dashed  through  the  Polish  lines.  Throwing  the  rear  col- 
umns of  the  heavy  mass  into  inextricable  confusion,  the  squares  now  opened  fire,  and 
from  the  plain  were  seen  dashing  onward  the  renowned  Polish  lancers,  completing 
the  utter  rout  of  the,  five  minutes  before,  apparently  invincible  host.  So  nearly 
complete,  in  fact,  was  their  destruction,  that  of  a  regiment  of  cuirassiers  which 
was  at  the  head  of  the  attacking  force,  called  the  regiment  of  Albert,  bearing  the 
designation  of  "Invincible*'  upon  their  gorgeous  helmets,  not  a  man  escaped.  A 
portion  of  this  cavalry  had.  however,  penetrated,  and  was  dashing  onward  toward 
Praga,  where,  from  the  wills  of  the  fortress,  they  were  received  by  a  murderous 
fire  of  artillery  and  utterly  annihilated,  upon  their  retreat,  by  the  Polish  cavalry. 

The  whole  Polish  line  had  now,  as  if  by  magic,  formed  into  squares.  But  as  soon 
as  the  cavalry  column  was  seen  to  retreat,  overthrowing  in  their  course  the  Russian 
artillery  and  infantry  which  had  been  ordered  up  to  support  the  grand  attack,  and 
carrying  utter  consternation  into  the  Russian  ranks,  the  squares  deployed.  Gen- 
eral Chlopicki,  the  Polish  commander,  while  the  change  of  lino  was  being  executed, 
had  been  severely  wounded  in  the  leg  by  a  grenade.  It  was  necessary  to  appoint, 
upon  the  field  of  battle,  a  new  commander-in-chief,  and  the  Polish  generals,  with 
singular  unanimity,  called  Skrzynecki  to  that  responsible  position,  although  lie 
was  junior  to  many  of  them. 

Under  his  orders  the  whole  Polish  line  pressed  onward  upon  the  now  retreating 
and  utterly  discomfited  Russians.  A  cavalry  force  of  ten  thousand  fresh  men 
would  probably  have  completed  their  destruction.  But  we  have  seen  the  immense 
task  which  the  Polish  cavalry  had  already  so  ably  discharged.  Worn-out,  they 
could  not  attempt  a  prolonged  pursuit. 

Tho  Russians  left  upon  the  fiold  of  battle  thirty  thousand  men.  Tho  Poles  had 
sustained  a  los6  of  tweivo  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded,  or  oue-thifd  of  their 
army — a  loss  equal  to  that  sustained  by  the  Confederate  arms  upon  the  bloody  field 
of  Shiloh,  with  only  this  difference  :  that  the  majority  of  the  wounds  received  by 
the  Russians  at  Grochow  was  from  the  bayonet  of  the  Poles,  and  that  of  the  hitter 
mainly  from  the  artillery  and  musketry-fire  of  the  Russians. 

Such  was,  in  its  main  features,  the  hard-coutested  Battle  of  Grochow.  Warsaw 
had  been  temporarily  saved.  Diebitsch  was  disgraced;  and  months  elapsed  before 
the  Russians  again  assumed  the  offensive. 

This  battle  has  been  sketched  as  an  illustration  of  what  the  three  arms  of  the 
service  may  accomplish  when  skilfully  combined.  There  is,  besides,  no  instance  in 
modern  history  where  such  an  inferiority  of  forces  defeated  a  like  immense  host. 
This  achievement  will  never  fuil  to  fill  us  with  admiration  for  a  people  who  can  thus 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  141 

fight  for  liberty,  and  who,  after  a  despotism  of  over  thirty  years  has  kept  them  in 
chains,  have  again  risen,  and  are  now  sustaining  themselves  for  over  three  years, 
against  the  enormous  powers  of  the  Russian  Czar.  The  germ  of  liberty  never 
dies;  and  if  we,  with  advantages  much  greater  than  those  of  the  Poles,  can  not 
achieve  our  independence,  we  do  not  deserve  to  have  it.  But  wo  most  assuredly 
will  achieve  it,  if,  mindful  of  the  great  lessons  which  history  teaches,  we  can  rise 
above  the  slimy  level  of  extortion  and  the  greed  of  gain,  shake  off  the  apathy 
which  now  disgraces  those  at'  home,  and  come  back  to  the  glorious  days  of  1861, 
when  all  was  fervor  and  patriotic  devotion.  If  we  do  so,  success  is  not  doubtful 
for  a  minute  ;  if  not,  what  mortal  man  can  tell  how  long  our  brave  soldiers  in  the 
field  will  retain  that  spirit  which  hitherto  has  made  them  the  barrier  between  us 
and  utter  degradation  ? 


CHAPTER    II. 

OFFENSIVE  AND  DEFENSIVE  WARS. 

The  applications  of  the  principle  easier  in  the  latter  than  in  the  former— Particu- 
lar characteristics  of  each — Necessity  of  studying  contemporaneous  wars — 
Why— They  instruct  better — Wars  of  Frederic— Resources  of  his  genius— The 
campaigns  of  the  Revolution — Memoirs  of  Gouvion  Saint-Cyr— Operations  of  the 
Archduke  Charles  in  1796— Campaigns  of  Italy  in  1796  and  1797— First  example 
of  strategic  operations  upon  a  vast  scale — Immense  results  with  mediocre 
means — In  one  year,  an  audacious  and  skilful  offensive  and  a  model  in  defen- 
sive operations — Unexampled  victories — Immortal  epoch— Summary  of  achieve- 
ments— Should  be  written  with  commentaries — Campaigns  of  1805,  1806,  and 
1809— Spanish  wars— Neglect  of  principles — Awakening  in  1814— One  against 
ten — Thirty-five  thousand  men  of  remnants — Champ-Aubert,  Vauchamps,  Gué- 
à-Trême,  Paris — Song  of  the  Swan. 

Notes.— 1.  The  Battle  of  Liitzen.    2.  Marshal  Mortier. 

I  have  already  stated,  and  I  repeat,  that  the  movements  of  war,  be 
they  offensive  or  defensive,  should  always  be  founded  upon  a  calcula- 
tion as  to  both  time  and  distance.  But  the  applications  of  this  prin- 
ciple are  easier  in  defensive  than  in  offensive  wars. 

In  the  latter  the  combinations  are  vaster,  the  conditions  more 
variable,  and  the  elements  of  calculation  more  uncertain.  At  every 
moment  a  general  may  be  forced  to  change  his  programme,  to  abandon 
an  attack  in  order  to  defond  himself,  and  to  escape  from  great  dangers. 
A  more  extended  genius  is  then  necessary,  to  bo  always  ready  to  vary 
one's  projects,  and  to  execute  new  combinations. 

In  defensive  warfare  the  theatre  is  more  contracted;  the  operations 
are  conducted  upon  sections  of  country  well  known,  and  the  nature  of 


142  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

which  can  be  exactly  appreciated.  The  number  of  combinations  being 
less,  they  are  more  easily  carried  out  and  provided  against.  In  offen- 
sive war  the  genius  must  supply  experience  and  divine  the  nature  of 
the  country  destined  for  operations  ;  the  points  of  support  which  are 
counted  upon  vary,  and  sometimes  disappear  altogether.  In  defensive 
war  the  field  of  operations  has  been  well  prepared  and  studied;  the 
pivots  of  operation  are  fixed,  and  everything  can  be  calculated  with 
precision.  A  superior  genius  is  then  more  necessary  for  an  offensive 
war,  while  an  extensive  knowledge  of  the  profession  of  war,  the  talent 
to  choose  well  the  points  of  support,  great  foresight,  and  indefatigable 
activity,  may  be  sufficient  for  the  requirements  of  the  defensive  war. 

This  mode  of  warfare  is,  however,  far  from  being  easy — since,  prop- 
erly speaking,  a  general  is  only  reduced  to  assume  the  defensive  when 
it  becomes  apparent  that  his  disposable  means  are  inferior  to  those  of 
the  enemy.  Besides,  in  modern  wars,  with  such  an  equality  in  arms, 
instruction,  and  experience,  numbers  are  of  great  importance.  The 
difference  which  exist  between  such  and  such  an  army,  and  such  and 
such  a  campaign,  depends  more  particularly  upon  the  morale  of  the 
troops,  and  its  appreciation  is  not  prescribed  by  the  rules  of  the  profes- 
sion, but  must  be  sought  in  that  sublime  part  of  the  art  which  treats 
of  the  knowledge  of  the  human  heart,  the  movements  of  which  are  so 
rapid  and  mysterious. 

After  having  laid  down  the  principle  upon  which  the  movements  of 
armies  depend,  it  can  only  be  developed  by  examples.  Instruction 
lies  in  the  study  of  the  most  memorable  campaigns.  Dogmatical 
teachings  are  founded  upon  facts.  They  can  be  chosen  from  successes 
as  well  as  reverses — by  dividing  the  recital  of  each  event  into  that  part 
which  treats  of  the  combinations,  and  the  other  which  depended  upon 
hazard. 

The  study  of  the  events  of  our  epoch  should  be  preferred;  the  exam- 
ples will  be  better  comprehended,  because  the  events  are  better  known. 
Besides,  on  account  of  the  progress  which  the  art  of  war  has  expe- 
rienced, and  the  actual  and  ever-increasing  mobility  of  our  armies, 
those  achievements  have  become  easy  which  formerly  were  impracti- 
cable. 

The  former  wars  which  are  still  full  of  useful  instruction  are  those 
of  Frederic  II.  It  is  true  that  the  examples  of  those  times  are  no 
longer  applicable  to  our  days,  because  everything  is  changed  ;  but  that 
great  captain's  campaigns  should  especially  be  studied  in  regard  to 
their  moral  aspect.  When,  after  having  been  beaten  at  Hochkirch, 
with  the  loss  of  some  two  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  Frederic  is  seen 
to  retire  upon  two  single  points  only,  upon  the  Spree,  and  there  takes 
a  menacing  position  toward  the  enemy,  the  explanation  of  such  a 
mystery  is  vainly  asked  for  in  our  days. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  143 

In  reflecting  upon  the  weakness  of  Frederic's  resources,  we  further- 
more inquire  how,  in  the  presence  of  such  numerous  enemies  and 
during  so  many  years,  he  could  have  maintained  and  recruited  his 
armies.  Truly,  we  hardly  know  which  to  admire  most,  whether  the 
glory  of  his  victories,  or  his  talents  for  discovering  new  resources  and 
preserving  his  forces. 

The  long  wars  of  our  epoch,  the  great  events  presented  to  our  con- 
templation, and  the  careful  examination  of  all  attending  circumstances, 
the  military  student  must  equally  observe  in  our  armies  and  those  of 
the  enemy. 

The  first  campaigns  of  the  Revolution  present  nothing,  both  with  us 
and  with  our  adversaries,  which  is  not  susceptible  to  severe  criticism  ; 
the  proof  of  this  may  be  found  in  reading  the  first  volume  of  tho 
Memoirs  of  Marshal  Grouvion  St.  Cyr,  which,  in  this  respect,  are  of  the 
greatest  interest. 

The  operations  of  Archduke  Charles  in  1796,  when  opposing  the 
French  Armies  of  the  Sambre  and  Meuse,  and  of  the  Rhine,  are  tho 
first  example  of  operations  systematically  combined  upon  a  vast  scale. 
The  work  of  this  prince  can  not  be  studied  too  much;  his  principles  are 
there  established  by  an  exposition  of  his  operations  and  the  motives 
which  dictated  them.  While  all  grand  principles  of  war  may  be  de- 
duced from  them,  their  application  is,  at  the  same  time,  found  in  the 
facts  narrated. 

But  the  campaigns  requiring  most  reflection  are  those  of  the  French 
army  in  Italy  in  1796  and  1797.  They  all  unite  exactness  of  calcu- 
lations, correctness  of  movements,  and  a  profound  knowledge  of  men 
and  things. 

Never  was  war  more  admirably  and  perfectly  conducted.  The  most 
sublime  part  of  the  art  of  war  has  been  illustrated  through  it.  With 
mediocre  means  immense  results  have  been  obtained. 

This  war,  which  lasted  hardly  one  year,  presents  models  of  all  kinds  : 
an  offensive  skilfully  and  audaciously  conducted;  a  defensive  where 
inferior  forces  have  constantly  repulsed  superior  forces,  but  often  man- 
aging upon  the  field  of  battle  to  have  a  superiority  of  numbers;  a  war 
which,  by  the  skill  of  direction  and  the  vigor  of  execution,  has  led  to 
a  series  of  unoxamplod  victories.  It  was  an  immortal  epoch,  the  pro- 
digious achievements  of  which  have  surpassed  everything  either  before 
or  after:  because,  in  a  series  of  combats  so  long  continued,  and  exe- 
cuted in  the  midst  of  so  many  divers  movements,  it  is  impossible  to 
discover  a  single  fault,  or  a  single  neglect  of  the  true  principles  of  the 

art. 

At  the  moment  of  the  opening  of  the  campaign  the  French  army, 
scarcely  thirty  thousand  men  strong,  and  in  want  of  everything,  had 
not  even  completed  its  preparations  when  it  was  forced  to  commence 


144  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

aotive  operations — the  enemy  approaching  from  Genoa  to  cover  that 
place.  The  hostile  army  was  attacked,  composed,  it  is  true,  of  troops 
of  two  different  nations,  but  more  than  fifty  thousand  men  strong. 
The  Austrians  were  beaten,  pursued,  and  soon  consisted  of  but  a  single 
division.  The  French  army  then  threw  itself  upon  the  Piedmontese 
army;  complete  and  rapid  successes  augmented  the  confusion  and  the 
discouragement  of  the  Allies,  and  the  King  of  Sardinia  made  peace. 

By  a  precipitate  march  the  passage  of  the  Po  was  seized,  which 
river  the  French  army  could  not  cross  in  strong  force  on  account  of 
the  want  of  material.  An  energetic  action  cleared  the  line  of  the  River 
Adda  of  the  enemy.  Milan  opened  its  gates.  Soon  after,  an  insurrec- 
tion convulsed  a  whole  province  ;  the  insurrection  was  quelled.  The 
army,  which  had  scarcely  slackened  its  march  for  a  moment,  passed 
the  Mincio  in  strong  force,  arrived  upon  the  Adige,  and  took  a  defen- 
sive position  which  covered  the  conquests  made  in  loss  than  fifty  days. 
Hostile  armies  were  successively  formed,  and  expended  upon  us  their 
useless  efforts.  Mantua  fell  ;  we  marched  upon  Vienna,  and  the  peace 
was  concluded. 

Nothing  would  be  more  useful  for  the  instruction  of  officers  who  de- 
vote themselvas  to  the  study  of  grand  warfare  and  to  military  concep- 
tions of  a  higher  order,  than  to  write  this  memorable  campaign,  with 
the  details  and  documents  belonging  to  it.  Commentaries  should  be 
joined  to  it,  which,  explaining  the  reasons  of  the  movements,  would 
show  the  character  of  the  campaign  and  its  results.  The  fine  cam- 
paign of  1805,  so  well  conducted  and  so  remarkable  in  its  conclusion, 
but,  it  is  also  true,  favored  by  immense  and  almost  incredible  faults  of 
our  adversaries;  that  of  1S06,  which  completed  it;  finally,  that  of 
1809 — may  well  be  objects  of  special  study  and  instructive  commen- 
taries, because  this  great  epoch  of  Napoleon's  life  can  not  be  too  muoh 
admired. 

But  with  silence  wo  are  compelled  to  pass  over  tho  Spanish  wars 
and  those  following  that  time,  or  at  least  we  can  only  speak  of  their 
faults,  and  show  that  fortune  abandoned  Napoleon  on  the  day  when  he 
became  unfaithful  to  the  true  principles  of  the  art.which  hitherto  he 
had  always  respected.  Then  the  accumulation  of  men  and  means  was 
useless.  From  the  date  of  this  epoch  of  sad  memory,  if  tho  Battles  of 
Liitzen1  and  Bautzen  are  excepted,  Napoleon  is  not  recognized  in  any 
oue  of  his  campaigns. 

A  kind  of  awakening,  however,  came  later.  The  great  captain  wa3 
himself  again  in  1814;  but  the  spirit  of  the  people  and  his  soldiers 
only  fought  for  him;  he  had  no  longer  an  army;  we  could  hardly 
place  one  man  against  ten.  The  forcos  of  which  Napoloon  could  dis- 
pose, in  his  movements  between  the  Seine  and  the  Marne,  never  exceed- 
ed thirty-five  thousand  men  of  shattered  remains.     My  corps,  which 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  145 

alone  had  the  honor  of  combating  at  Champ-Aubert,  Vauchamps, 
Montmirail,  and  the  second  affair  of  Gué-à-Trêrne,  had  never  as  many 
as  four  thousand  men,  the  remains  of  fifty-two  different  battalions. 
At  Paris,  sustained  by  the  Duke  of  Treviso2,  our  united  forces  only 
amounted  to  fourteen  thousand  men,  and  the  enemy  had  fifty-three 
thousand  men  engaged,  and  thirteen  thousand  were  disabled.  It  was 
the  song  of  th'e  swan. 

NOTES. 

1.  The  Battle  of  Lutzen.— The  opening  of  the  campaign  of  Napoleon  in  1813, 
after  the  great  emperor's  misfortunes  in  Russia,  was  characterized  by  his  want  of 
cavalry,  and  by  the  many  conscripts,  young  and  inexperienced  soldiers,  of  which  his 
army  consisted.  The  veterans  Of  Jena,  Austerlitz,  and  Wagram  lay  buried  beneath 
the  snows  of  the  vast  Eastern  plains.  Opposed  to  him  he  found  the  coalition  of 
Prussia,  a  state  whose  politics  have  at  all  times  been  signalized  by  wavering  and 
treachery — and  Russia,  eager  to  avenge  the  invasion  of  her  territories.  They  both 
controlled  vastly  superior  means  to  those  of  Napoleon,  and  an  extraordinarily  pow- 
erful body  of  cavalry  was  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  of  the  defeats  which  the 
French  should  meet. 

It  was  at  this  period  that  Napoleon  proclaimed  to  his  legions  the  maxim,  forced 
upon  him  by  circumstances,  and  wrung  from  him  against  his  conviction,  to  assure 
his  young  conscripts  :  "  Q  'une  bonne  infanterie  soutenue  par  de  Vartillerie  doit 
savoir  se  suffire."  ("  Let  it  be  demonstrated  that  a  good  infantry,  sustained  by 
artillery,  is  amply  sufficient.") 

The  great  military  road  leading  from  "France  into  Germany,  upon  which  Napoleon 
advanced,  crosses  into  Germany  at  the  confluence  of  the  River  Main  with  the 
Rhine,  protected  by  the  strong  fortress,  Mayence.  From  thence  it  leads  in  a  north- 
eastern direction  through  the  very  centre  of  Germany  to  Weissenfels,  Lutzen, 
and  to  the  City  of  Leipzig,  a  strategic  position  of  great  importance  ;  from  there  it 
leads  to  Dresden,  capital  of  the  Kingdom  of  Saxony,  where  it  crosses  the  Elbe,  and 
from  which  city  three  important  roads  go  to  Berlin,  North-eastern  Prussia,  and  the 
heart  of  Bohemia.  Napoleon's  purpose  was  first  to  humiliate  the  Prussians  as  at 
Jena  in  1806,  and  then  to  debouch  upon  the  Russians.  This  was,  however,  in  meas- 
ure prevented  by  the  exceedingly  vigorous  movements  of  the  Allies,  who,  crossing 
the  Elbe  at  several  points,  occupied  Leipzig  and  threatened  Napoleon's  communica- 
tion with  France,  before  the  latter  had  scarcely  half  concentrated  his  forces.  The 
central  point  upon  which  the  French  forces  moved  was  Leipzig.  Viceroy  Eugene, 
whose  gallant  attitude  in  keeping  the  Allies  in  check  had  permitted  Napoleon  to 
make  his  proper  dispositions,  was  at  Merseburg,  a  town  some  eleven  miles  north- 
west from  Leipzig.  As  soon  as  Napoleon  had  en  ssed  the  Soale  the  Allies  m 
forward  with  greal  promptness  to  prevent  his  man!)  upon  Leipzig,  and  h  solved  to 
give  battle  in  the  plains  of  Liitzen.  a  small  town  already  Immortalized  by  tlm 
heroic  death  ofOustavxu  2dolpb.ua  of  Sweden  in  it'.:.;-.',  it  is  a  very  remarkable 
position.  The  road,  after  having  ascended  the  defile  of  Poaerna,  runs  along  a  pla- 
teau exceedingly  favorable  for  combat,  and  densely  dotted  with  little  villages.  The 
strategical  combination  of  the  Allies  was  to  refuse  tlieir  right,  to  make  a  feint  attack 
upon  the  centre,  but  to  throw  their  whole  weight  upon  the  French  rigid,  thus  to  en- 
tirely change  Vie  position  of  the  French,  and  to  cut  them  off  from  the  great  road  to 
Fran-x.  vpon.  wln^.h  thvjjvàt  were  advancing.  Napoleon  waa  expecting  no  6ercuu 
resistaûos  until  ho  eliould  bavo  <-c?upi<.d  L-iipzig  ^nd  wa*  advancing  upon  Dresden, 

13 


14(5  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

when  both  armies  came  suddenly,  on  the  2d  of  May.  into  collision,  both  in  open 
columns  and  under  march. 

South  of  Liitzcn.  and  to  the  westward,  there  runs  a  little  streamlet,  with  steep 
banks  on  both  sides,  called  the  Flossgraben.  This  the  Allies  had  crossed  in  farce  In 
four  heavy  columns.  In  front  of  this  streamlet  lie  four  small  villages — Gross-Goer- 
Mhen,  Klein-Goemchen,  Rahno,  and  Kaya — which  was  the  French  right,  forming  an 
irregular  quadrangle,  and  of  which  Kaya  is  Dearest  to  LUtzen  and  to  the  high-road 
to  Leipzig,  and  of  which  the  first,  Gross-Goerschen,  was  only  occupied  by  one  divis- 
ion of  the  French  under  General  Souham.  The  Allies  overwhelmed  Souham,  took 
the  village,  and  with  shouts  of  triumph  carried  Klein-Goerschen  and  Rahno  like- 
wise. The  situation  became  critical  ;  but  Napoleon  had  already  mastered  the  ene- 
my's combinations,  and  directed  all  of  his  forces  to  his  right.  The  troops  halted 
upon  the  high-road  and  wheeled  into  line.  Mannont  hastened  across  the  fields. 
Eugene  heard  the  firing  from  afar,  and  retraced  his  steps. 

The  brave  Ney  now  supported  Souham  with  three  divisions,  and  by  a  splendid 
charge  regained  the  lost  villages. 

The  Prussians,  returning  to  the  attack  under  Wittgenstein,  threw  the  French 
into  confusion.  They  not  only  earned  the  villages  again,  but  drove  the  French  be- 
yond Kaya,  the  key  of  the  French  position. 

The  French  now  abandoned  their  whole  line  of  battle,  taking  a  new  position  some 
six  hundred  yards  in  rear.  It  was  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  ;  the  battle  had  already 
lasted  eight  hours.  The  most  alarming  despatches  reached  the  emperor,  who,  upon 
his  left,  awaited  the  issue  of  the  struggle  on  the  right.  He  at  once  set  out  in  person, 
and  reached  the  position  where  his  troops  appeared  to  be  in  the  greatest  disorder. 
But,  as  at  Marengo  his  presence  reanimated  the  heroes  of  Italy,  so  here  the  young 
conscripts  cried  "  Vive  Vempereur  /"  when  they  Baw  him,  and  formed  for  a  renewed 
struggle.  Kaya  having  now  become  the  decisive  point  of  the  battle,  Napoleon  led 
his  troops  to  the  attack  himself  to  retake  it.  A  most  desperate  conflict  ensued. 
The  reinforcements  had  come  up,  and  with  Beventy  thousand  men  the  Allies  were 
pressed,  and  the  brave  Ney  again  drove  them  beyond  Kaya. 

But  in  the  meantime  the  Russian  artillery,  sustained  by  the  infantry  of  the  re- 
Horve,  had  taken  an  advantageous  position  upon  the  French  left,  and  were  making  a 
great  impression.  The  Village  of  Kaya  was  retaken  a  third  time,  and  the  French 
army  repulsed  from  all  the  villages  again. 

The  decisive  moment  now  came.  Sixty  guns  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  under  the 
immortal  Drouot,  sustained  by  sixteen  battalions  of  the  Young  Guard,  advanced  to 
the  final  issue,  as  the  Old  Guard  often  had  done  before  the  disastrous  Russian  cam- 
paign, followed  by  the  entire  cavalry  of  the  reserve.  Kaya  was  regained,  and  the 
successful  advance  of  Eugene  upon  the  rear  of  the  forces  which  assaulted  the  French 
upon  the  left  decided  the  struggle  in  favor  of  the  arms  of  France. 

Here  Napoleon  once  more  showed  his  genius  in  all  its  splendor.  Surprised  at 
Gross-Goerschen  in  the  morning  at  ten  o'clock,  with  but  Ney's  corps  at  hand,  and 
his  troops  scattered  upon  the  high-road  at  a  distance  of  thirty  miles,  he  was  in  im- 
minent danger  of  having  his  army  pierced.  He  saw  that  the  struggle  was  to  be  for 
the  possession  of  Kaya,  in  spite  of  the  feint  attacks  of  the  enemy  upon  his  left,  and 
that  he  contrived  to  restore  the  battle  after  the  heavy  repulse  from  Kaya  at  six  in 
the  evening,  entitles  him  to  the  highest  glory. 

His  inferiority  in  cavalry,  six  thousand  against  thirty  thousand  of  the  Allies,  pre- 
vented him  from  pursuing  them,  and  to  reap  any  fruits  from  this  and  his  subse- 
quent great  victory  at  Bautzeu. 

It  was  a  campaign  in  which  his  talents  were  taxed  to  the  utmost;  but  nothing 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  147 

could  replace  his  want  of  cavalry,  and  tbc  fatal  issue  of  Leipzig  may  be  traced  to 
this  cause.  Without  its  vigorous  and  decisive  concurrence,  after  an  impression  has 
%once  been  made  upon  the  enemy,  nothing  but  barren  victories  may  be  expected. 

But  then  the  cavalry  must  bo  highly  disciplined,  well  drilled  In  firing,  and  es- 
pecially in  the  handling  of  the  sword. 

We  have  the  most  splendid  material  for  cavalry  in  the  world.  Neither  the  Cos- 
sack nor  the  Hungarian  Honved  are  superior  to  the  Southern  horseman.  The 
Banger  of  the  Confederate  States  surpasses  them  all. 

The  foreign  levies  of  the  United  States  do  not  know  how  to  ride,  and  will  never 
learn  it.  How  many  Confederate  colonels  of  cavalry  are  there  who  are  swordsmen  ? 
These  remarks  may  offer  to  them  some  food  for  meditation  and  imitation. 

2.  Marshal  Mortier,  Duc  de  Treviso.— The  career  of  this  officer  was  of 
the  most  brilliant  nature.  He  was  a  captain  in  1791,  and  rose,  during  the  wars  of 
revolutionary  France,  to  the  rank  of  general  of  division.  He  was  employed  with 
the  Armies  of  the  North,  the  Sambre  and  Meuse,  and  the  Rhine.  In  1801  he  was 
in  sole  command  of  the  seventeenth  division  of  the  Army  of  Hanover.  Created  a 
marshal  of  the  empire  in  May,  1804,  he  served  with  great  distinction  with  tho 
Grand  Army,  then  in  Spain,  and  again  with  the  Grand  Army  of  France.  After  the 
departure  of  Napoleon  for  the  Island  of  Elba  he  joined  the  Bourbons,  and  held 
many  appointments  of  importance  under  the  Restoration.  In  1831  he  was  Grand 
Chancellor  of  the  Legion  of  Honor.  In  1834-5  Minister  of  War  and  President  of 
Council.  Napoleon  created  him  Duc  de  Treviso.  He  was  Chevalier  of  the  Order  of  St. 
Esprit,  and  bore  several  foreign  (Austrian  and  Portuguese)  orders.  He  died  in  July, 
1835. 


CHAPTER    III. 

MARCHES  AND  ENCAMPMENTS!. 

Marches  within  reach  of  the  enemy— Precautions— Composition  of  advance  guards 
—Out  of  the  enemy's  reach— Utility  of  light  troops— Wooded  and  broken  coun- 
tries—Scouts on  the  flanks— Thrown  out  in  fan-shape— Camps— Suitable  spots- 
Natural  obstacles— To  camp  this  side— Why— Surprises— Two  modes  of  camping 
—Deployed  and  massed  troops— Which  preferable— Way  of  execution— Conse- 
quences of  disregard  of  rules— Uaynau,  1813— The  division  Maison  surprised— 
Fine  revenge  upon  the  Prussiaus  at  Vauchamps,  Hohenlinden,  Falkenheim— 
Marches  in  tho  enemy's  presence— This  is  tactics— Vigilance  and  foresight  of  the 
chief— Discipline  and  quick  manoeuvres  on  the  part  of  tho  army— Parallel  march 
of  the  French  and  English  armies  in  1812— Historicarfletails— Flank  movements 
—French  army  Marches  like  a  regiment— The  two  generals  hesifate  to  give  bat- 
tle—They keep  within  a  space  of  five  leagues— The  only  instance  of  a  march  of 
this  kind. 

Notes— 1.  March  Regulations  of  Doctor  Jackson.    2.  The  Battle  of  Hohenlinden. 
Marches  within  reach  of  the  enemy  can  not  be  executed  with  too  much 


148  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

precaution,  nor  the  encampments  be  selected  with  too  much  prudence. 
Every  one  knows  how  the  former  are  executed.  Still,  marches  are  modi- 
fied by  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  composition  of  the  advanced 
guards,  and  by  the  respective  position  of  the  arms  of  which  they  are 
composed. 

The  object  being  to  obtain  news  from  the  enemy,  and  to  have  knowl- 
edge of  nis  arrival  upon  his  approach,  it  is  useful  to  gain  this  informa- 
tion at  the  greatest  possible  distance  from  the  enemy,  without,  however, 
compromising  the  security  of  one's  detachments.  The  vanguard  of  an 
army,  if  it  be  not  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  should  at  least  march 
at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  mass  of  the  troops,  and  that  of  a 
division  should  be  at  a  march  of  several  hours'  duration  ahead. 

Light  troops  must  be  employed  with  intelligence,  and  neither  should 
they  be  spared — for  in  this  service  particularly  consists  their  useful- 
ness ;  if  they  permit  the  army  to  be  surprised,  the  officer  who  commands 
them  fails  in  his  duty,  and  he  can  allege  no  sufficient  excuse.  In  bro- 
ken and  wooded  countries,  especially,  the  precautions  must  be  doubled. 
Scouts  thrown  out  upon  the  flanks  should  bo  sustained  by  detachments 
upon  which  they  can  fall  for  support;  the  detachments  should,  besides, 
be  strong  enough  to  defend,  when  necessary,  those  defiles  for  some  time, 
which  would  enable  the  enemy  to  turn  the  army. 

By  combining  the  march  of  troops  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy, 
so  as  to  be  always  formed  in  the  shape  of  a  fan,  every  surprise  is  guard- 
ed against;  and  they  are  never  exposed,  because  their  point  of  retreat 
is  always  upon  the  line  of  operation  of  the  army. 

Upon  marches,  encampments  are  established  to  repose  troops  and  to 
satisfy  their  wants,  but  never  to  engage  the  enemy.  An  encampment  is 
placed,  by  preference,  upon  the  banks  of  a  small  stream,  near  to  a  vil- 
lage, to  supply  the  soldiers  with  water,  and  to  bring  within  their  reach 
the  resources  usually  found  among  an  agglomerated  population.  But 
whatever  be  the  importance  of  these  considerations,  security  should 
likewise  be  considered,  and  the  means  must  not  be  neglected  to  provide 
against  unforeseen  attacks  and  surprises.  I  do  not  allude  here  to  the 
guards  ;  they  must  always  cover  and  surround  a  camp;  they  are  of  the 
greatest  necessity,  be  it  only  for  the  police. 

If  there  be  any  obstacle,  the  encampment  should  be  placed  upon  this 
side  and  never  beyond  it — at  least,  for  the  greater  portion  of  the  troops. 
It  would,  undoubtedly^ be  advantageous  to  have  passed  the  defile  upon 
commencing  the  day's  march,  and  to  debouch  more  easily  ;  but  this  ad- 
vantage is  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  security  of  repose.  If 
there  be  no  obstacle,  or  if  the  obstacle  may  be  easily  turned,  a  surprise 
is  to  be  feared  ;  a  numerous  cavalry  may  suddenly  appear,  as  if  rising 
from  the  ground;  then  security  must  be  even  sought  in  the  selection  of 
the  encampment. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  149 

There  are  two  ways  of  camping:  the  troops  are  deployed  upon  the 
color-line,  or   formed  en  masse  by  battalion.     This  last  disposition  is 
much  to  be  preferred,  and  offers  many  advantages. 
It  is  executed  in  the  following  manner: 

A  division  is  placed  upon  two  lines,  and  each  battalion  is  formed  in 
columns  by  division  ;  it  is,  furthermore,  separated  in  two  demi-battal- 
ions  in  columns  by  platoons.  The  interval  separating  the  two  fractions 
is  equal  to  the  front  of  a  division,  and  forms  a  perpendicular  street  to 
the  line  of  battle  of  the  encampment. 

The  tents  or  barracks  are  established  upon  the  right  and  left,  and 
their  front  is  placed  so  as  to  open  upon  the  street,  either  directly  or  by 
a  tranversal  lane.  Whenever  the  battalion  takes  arms,  each  soldier  falls 
into  his  platoon,  which  is  formed  in  the  camp  street,  almost  at  the  same 
time  with  the  battalion,  ready  to  march.  If  impetuosity  leads  a  body 
of  cavalry  to  precipitate  itself  upon  the  camp,  it  will  find  all  the  troops 
massed,  and,  so  to  speak,  entrenched  in  the  midst  of  their  tents  and 
barracks. 

The  violation  of  the  above  rules  led,  on  the  29th  of  May,  1813,  near 
Haynau,  in  Silesia,  to  a  deplorable  event.  The  division  Maison,  which, 
having  marched  during  tho  entire  day,  and  taken  position  without 
sufficiently  reconnoitring  the  same,  was  surprised  ;  twenty-two  Prus- 
sian squadrons,  ambuscaded  in  the  neighboring  wood,  debouched  sud- 
denly at  the  moment  when  the  division  was  about  establishing  itself  in 
camp  ;  the  consequence  was,  its  being  almost  entirely  destroyed,  with- 
out having  been  able  to  offer  any  resistance. 

Upon  another  occasion  the  same  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  Prus- 
sians gave  to  us  a  fine  revenge,  and  obtained  for  us  an  easy  victory. 

After  the  roinbat  of  Champ- Aubert  (10th  of  February,  1814),  where 
my  corps  d'armeë  alone  destroyed  and  took  prisoners  almost  the  whole 
Russian  corps  of  Olsufieff,  the  emperor  ordered  me  to  repair  to  Etoges 
to  cover  the  army  in  that  quarter,  while  he  was  to  march  upon  Montmi- 
rail,  occupied  by  the  corps  of  Sacken.  Sacken,  beaten,  retired  upon 
Château-Thierry,  where  he  passed  the  Marne  to  arrest  Napoleon's  pur- 
suit, who  had  followed  him.  During  this  time  Blucher  in  person  had 
advanced  with  Klcist's  corps,  and  had  marched  upon  Etoges  ;  on  the 
13th  he  took  his  measures  to  force  me  to  evacuate  this  advantageous 
post.  After  having  feigned  that  I  wished  to  defend  it,  in  order  to  retard 
Bliicher's  march,  I  commenced  to  retreat;  the  enemy  kept  near  to  me, 
but  followed  with  great  circumspection,  and  until  the  evening  we  en- 
gaged, only  feebly,  our  light  troops.  I  took  position  upon  the  borders 
of  the  woods  of  Fromentière,  and  the  enemy  encamped  within  two 
cannon-shots  of  myself.  I  had  communicated  the  arrival  of  Blucher  to 
Napoleon,  and,  having  made  him  acquainted  with  the  movements  I  had 
just  executed,  I  was  assured  of  his  prompt  return.  Ou  tho  14th,  at  four 
13* 


150  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

o'clock  in  the  morning,  I  began  to  march  upon  Montrairail,  and 
despatched  an  officer  to  obtain  information  from  the  emperor.  Ho  was 
approaching,  and  sent  me  word  that  I  might  attack  the  enemy  whenever 
I  would  find  it  convenient,  and  that  he  was  within  supporting  distance. 

There  is,  in  front  of  the  Village  of  Vauchamps,  toward  Paris,  an  ad- 
vantageous and  easily  to  be  defended  position  ;  it  is  upon  the  declivity  o* 
the  plateau  which  borders  the  valley  in  which  Vauchamps  is  built.  Upon 
the  right  of  this  position,  a  wood  in  front  gives  the  means  to  take  in 
reverse  any  body  which,  inconsiderately  advancing,  would  fail  to  secure 
it  at  first.  I  occupied  this  wood  in  a  cautious  manner  ;  I  deployed  upon 
the  hill-side,  placed  my  cannon  in  battery,  and  awaited  the  enemy. 

The  corps  of  Kleist,  whose  strength  was  four  times  greater  than  my 
own,  believed  they  had  nothing  to  apprehend,  and  marched  with  exceed- 
ing confidence,  his  troops  disposed  in  columns  and  touching  each  other, 
without  any  distance  between  them,  and  even  without  having  any  flank- 
ers ;  finding  the  village  unoccupied  he  traverses  it,  but,  assailed  by  a 
murderous  artillery  and  musketry  Are,  attacked  at  the  same  time  in  the 
front  and  upon  the  flanks,  he  was  put  in  confusion,  retired  through  the 
village  in  the  greatest  disorder,  and  our  cavalry  falling  upon  him,  four 
thousand  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands.  From  this  moment  the  enemy 
retreated  from  morning  till  night,  without  any  regular  formation,  and 
this  favorable  action  for  us  was  followed  for  him  by  a  new  catastrophe. 

The  victory  of  Hohenlinden2,  the  glory  and  results  of  which  were  so 
great,  is  an  event  of  like  nature.  The  centre  column  of  the  Austrian 
army  which  followed  the  high-road,  and  with  which  a  large  portion  of 
the  artillery  was  joined,  marching  in  lateral  columns  to  facilitate  tho 
transportation,  outstripped  the  other  columns,  and  it  moved  without 
having  sufficiently  reconnoitred  its  line  of  march,  on  account  of  the 
confidence  which  the  combat  of  the  preceding  day  had  given  the  troops, 
and  from  the  belief  that  the  French  army  was  beaten  and  retreat- 
ing. It  suddenly  encountered  the  latter  in  the  depth  of  the  forest. 
Attacked  with  vigor  before  having  been  ablo  to  mako  the  necessary  dis- 
positions for.  resistance,  soon  taken  in  flank,  this  immense  column*  of 
material  was  surrounded,  and  the  battle  gained. 

Nothing  is  more  delicate  and  merits  more  attention  than  traversing, 
with  a  numerous  artillery,  a  very  wooded  country  in  presence  of  the 
enemy.  Whatever  be  the  urgency  of  quickly  uniting  under  like  cir- 
cumstances, too  many  precautions  to  guard  against  a  surprise  can  not 
be  taken,  because  the  consequences  of  the  least  negligence  are  nearly 
always  deplorable. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  August,  1813,  after  the  Battle  of  Dresden,  I 
was  charged  with  the  pursuit  of  the  hostile  army,  the  greater  part  of 
which  was  retreating  upon  the  road  to  Attenberg.  After  having  beaten 
the  corps  which  covered  the  movement  of  concentration  at  Poasendorf 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  151 

and  Dippoldiswaldc,  I  was  to  continue  iny  march  the  following  morning 
upon  Falkenheim.  Arrived  at  the  Village  of  Frauendorf,  I  learned 
that  the  enemy  occupied,  with  a  Strong  vanguard,  a  good  position  at 
Falkenheim.  Before  bringing  on  the  engagement  in  the  forest  which 
I  was  compelled  to  traverse,  and  which  was  occupied  by  some  light 
troops,  I  had  it  thoroughly  ransacked  and  cleared  by  some  three  or  four 
thousand  infantry,  extended  upon  a  very  large  front.  After  having 
freed  it  from  the  enemy,  I  occupied  the  borders  of  the  forest  with  my 
vanguard,  and  awaited  the  entire  junction  of  my  corps.  I  then  de- 
bouched with  all  my  means  ;  the  enemy  was  overthrown  and  driven 
from  his  position  in  a  moment,  and  left  behind  almost  his  entire  artil- 
lery. ,  , 

There  are  also  marches  executed  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  with  an 
army  entirely  united,  thoroughly  formed,  and  ready  to  combat,  the  ob- 
ject of  which  is  to  force  an  enemy  to  quit  a  position  he  occupies. 
These  marches  belong  to  tactical  movements,  but  nothing  merits  great- 
er attention  and  requires  more  precautions. 

To  execute  a  movement  of  this  kind  very  disciplined  and  well  drill- 
ed troops  are  necessary,  commanded  by  activo  and  intelligent  generals, 
and  by  a  chief  endowed  with  great  foresight. 

The  Army  of  Portugal,  in  1812,  under  my  command,  executed  such  a 
inarch  with  success. 

The  French  and  English  armies  were  encamped  upon  both  banks  of 
the  Duero  ;  the  first  was  inferior  to  the  other  by  six  thousand  infantry 
and  four  thousand  cavalry.  Despite  the  inferiority  of  forces,  I  had 
been  obliged  to  assume  the  offensive.  I  had  been  instructed,  through 
my  official  correspondence,  that  any  important  succor  would  not  be 
given  to  me;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  English  army,  already  so  su- 
perior, was  enabled  within  a  few  days  to  receive  powerful  reinforcements 
from  Estramadura  by  the  bridge  of  Alcantara,  while  the  Army  of  Ga- 
licia,  which  blockaded  Astorga,  had  just  become  disposable  and  oper- 
ated upon  my  rear  in  consequence  of  the  reduction  of  that  city,  which, 
on  account  of  the  scarcity  of  provisions,  was  upon  the  point  of  opening 
its  gates.  I  concluded  that,  to  change  the  state  of  things,  it  was  neces- 
sary for  me  to  assume  the  offensive,  but  with  prudence  :  so  to  manœuvre 
as  to  force  the  enemy  to  retreat,  and  not  to  engage  him  until  it  became 
necessary.  The  passage  of  the  Duero  was  then  resolved  upon  and  exe- 
cuted. 

The  French  army,  fully  united,  encountered  the  next  day  two  English 
divisions  at  Tordesillas  de  la  Orden,  who  retired  in  haste;  they  were 
hotly  pursued  and  would  probably  been  destroyed,  being  quite  isolated, 
had  the  French  cavalry  been  less  inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy. 

The  two  armies  found  themselves,  upon  the  evening  of  this  pursuit, 
facing  each  other,  and  separated    by  the  Guarena,  a  marshy  streamlet. 


152 


THE    SPIRIT    OF 


On  the  twentieth  of  July  the  French  army,  formed  throughout  in 
order  of  battle  broken  into  platoons,  made  a  manœuvre  by  the  flank  to 
the  right,  to  ascend  the  streamlet  ;  arrived  at  a  ford,  known  in  advance 
and  promptly  taken  advantage  of,  the  head  was  thrown  upon  the  left 
bank,  seized  at  once  a  plateau  which  extended  indefinitely  in  a  direction 
menacing  the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  and  debouched  upon  it  under  the 
protection  of  a  very  heavy  battery  which  covered  its  movements. 

The  Duke  of  Wellington  at  first  believed  to  be  able  to  oppose  this 
offensive  march,  but  it  was  executed  with  so  much  spirit  and  unison 
that  he  soon  renounced  the  idea  of  attacking  us.*  He  contented  him- 
Belf  in  following  the  French  army  in  the  direction  of  a  plateau  parallel 
to  that  which  we  held. 

The  two  armies  continued  their  march,  separated  by  a  narrow 
valley,  always  in  readiness  to  receive  battle  ;  several  hundred  cannon- 
shots  were  exchanged,  by  taking  advantage  of  the  more  or  less  favor- 
able positions  arising  from  the  sinuosities  of  the  plateau,  and  both  gen- 
erals were  willing  to  receive  battle,  but  neither  to  offer  it.  They  arriv- 
ed thus,  after  a  march  of  five  leagues,  in  the  respective  positions  which 
they  wished  to  occupy — the  French  army  upon  the  heights  of  Aldea- 
Rubia,  the  English  army  upon  those  of  Saint-Cristoval. 

This  remarkable  march  is,  to  my  knowledge,  the  only  one  of  this 
kind  which  has  been  executed  in  our  times.  But  it  may  occur  again, 
in  a  war  where  the  forces  are  balanced,  and  when  the  generals  are  only 
willing  to  engage  with  advantages  already  assured,  or  when  certain  and 
very  favorable  circumstances  take  place. 

NOTES. 

1.  March  Regulations  of  Dr.  Jackson. — A  knapsack  crammed  with  nec- 
essaries, so  as  to  load  a  foot-soldier  like  a  pack-horse,  oppresses  by  its  weight,  con- 
sequently consumes  a  part  of  the  power  which  is  intended  for,  and  which  ought 
to  be  reserved  for,  military  exertion.  Superfluity  of  baggage  is  a  common  error 
in  the  British  service  ;  and  the  usual  manner  of  disposing  of  it  for  carriage  is  not, 
moreover,  well  contrived.  A  full  knapsack  rolls  upon  the  back  like  a  billet  of 
wood,  and  shoulder-straps  gall  the  skin,  if  the  whole  weight  of  the  pack  bear 
upon  the  shoulder.  To  remedy  the  rolling  of  the  back  and  the  galling  of  the 
shoulders,  the  shoulder-straps  are  joined  by  a  belt  across  the  breast.  The  remedy  is 
worse  than  the  evil  it  is  intended  to  remedy;  and  it  is  worse  for  this  reason,  that 
few  persons  are  aware  of  the  mischief  which  it  occasions.  The  pressure  of  a  cross-belt 
confines  the  free  motion  of  the  chost,  and  impedes  respiration.  Whatever  impedes 
free  respiration  increases  the  heat  of  the  body  beyond  the  just  temperature.  It  Is 
thus  that  a  person  who  joins  the  shoulder-straps  of  his  pack  by  a  belt  across  the 
breast  is  oppressed  with  heat,  and  pants  for  breath,  frequently  without  adverting  to 
the  cause  which  occasions  the  increase  of  heat  and  oppression.    On  the  contrary, 

*  The  Duke  of  Wellington  told  me  afterward  that  the  French  army  marched  at 
that  moment  like  one  regiment.    This  was  his  own  expression. — Note  of  Author. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  153 

where  the  pack  is  supported  wholly  by  the  shoulder-straps,  though  the  shoulders 
may  be  galled  the  respiration  is  free,  and  the  body  is  less  liable  to  be  overheated. 
As  soldiers  are  supposed  to  be  arrangée!  in  companies  according  to  powers  of 
exertion,  and  as  there  must  necessarily  be  some  variety  in  the  effective  power  of 
companies,  it  is  obvious  to  common  sense  that  the  least  effective  companies  ought 
to  be  placed  in  front,  the  movement  being  there  least  embarrassed.  The  rate  of 
the  slow  pace  is  three  miles  per  hour— the  rate  of  the  exerted  pace,  four.  These 
paces  are  to  be  changed  at  stated  intervals  only,  time  and  distance  being  measured 
exactly  by  an  officer,  who  leads  at  a  justly-regulated  step.  If  this  be  not  don© 
with  care,  a  precise  effect  cau  not  be  expected  in  combined  movement;  and  hence 
it  happens  that  by  the  neglect  or  by  the  transgression  of  this  fundamental  rule  of 
order,  the  military  purpose  is  defeated,  or  less  completely  executed  than  it 
might,  be. 

Various  contingencies  arise,  in  the  course  of  a  march,  which  oblige  individuals 
to  leave  the  ranks.    The  act  of  leaving  the  ranks  is  unmilitary  in  appearance,  and 
reprehensible  irregularities  not  unfrequently  follow  the  practice  of  it.    In  order, 
therefore,  to  remove  all  shadow  of  pretext  for  the  occurrence  of  such  necessity,  it 
will  be  proper  that  a  general  halt  be  made  for  five  minutes  at  the  end  of  the  first 
hour,  so  that  every  one  may,  during  the  interval,  adjust  those  personal  concerns 
which  require  adjustment.    The  march  of  the  first  hour  is  supposed  to  be  per- 
formed  at  the  slow  pace  ;  that  of  the  second,  at  the  accelerated.    The  column  halts 
for  fifteen  minutes  or  more  at  the  end  of  the  second  hour;  and,  during  the  halt, 
the  individuals  are  supposed  to  recline,  or  assume  a  horizontal  position-for  it  is 
only  in  the  recumbent  position  that  the  limbs  experience  the  full  benefit  of  rest. 
When  fifteen  minutes  have  expired,  the  march  is  resumed  at  the  slow  pace    When 
the  hour  is  completed,  the  column  halts  five  minutes  for  purposes  of  personal 
adjustment,  and,  at  a  given  signal,  resumes  its  course  at  the  accelerated  pace.    In 
this  manner  a  journeyof  fourteen  miles  is  performed  in  the  space  of  four  hours 
and  twenty-five  minutes,  including  the  time  allowed  for  halting;  and  if  the  march 
be  Conducted  in  the  manner  proposed,  no  person,  it  is  presumed,  who  is  fit  to  be 
admitted  into  the  military  ranks,  will  fail  in  performing  it.    A  distance  of  four- 
teen miles  is  a  common  day's  march  for  troops  on  ordinary  service.  Circumstances 
sometimes  occur  which  require  that  the  distance  be  lengthened,  even  that  it  be 
doubled.    The  exertion  will  not,  it  is  believed,  bear  hard  upon  well  formed  troops, 
if  due  care  be  taken  in  adjusting  the  primary  arrangement,  and  due  consideration 
employed  in  directing  the  subsequent  steps  of  the  march.    For  example    it  is 
understood  that  a  halt  for  the  space  of  one  hour  takes  place  after  the  performance 
of  the  first  part  of  the  allotted  march,  and  that  the  shoes,  socks,  and  trowsers  or 
breeches,  and  levins,  be  then  taken  off;  the  feet,  legs,  and  thighs  washed',  or 
bathed  in  cold  water,  if  the  nature  of  the  halting  ground  supply  water  in  suffi- 
cient quantity  for  that  purpose.    If  water  be  deficient,  the  lower  extremities  may 
be  rubbed  with  a  wet  towel,  and  exposed  to  the  cool  air.    Such  is  a  simple  expe- 
dient only,  but  it  restores  vigor  and  capability  of  exertion  equal  to  some  hours  of 
rest.    If  hunger  or  faintness  be  felt  by  any  one,  a  crust  of  bread,  with  a  morsel  of 
cheese,  washed  down  by  tea,  or  vinegar  and  water-with  which  every  soldier  is 
understood  to  be  provided-is  sufficient  to  remove  it.    The  march  is  to  be  resumed 
at  the  expiation  of  an  hour;  and,  with  the  observance  of  the  rules  prescribed  the 
distance,  it  is  presumed,  will  be  performed  with  ease  in  the  calculated  time  if 
care  has  been  taken  in  the  primary  arrangement  to  separate  the  weak  and  ineffi- 
cient parts  from  the  sound  and  effective. 


154  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

2.  The  Battle  of  Hohenlinden.—  From  Munich,  the  capital  of  Bavaria,  a 
high-road  leads  in  an  easterly  direction  into  Austria,  through  the  following  places  : 
Hohenlinden,  eighteen  miles;  Matenpot.  twenty-four  miles;  Haag,  twenty-eight 
miles  ;  turning  north-east,  it  strikes  the  Tillage  of  Ampfing,  forty  miles  ;  and  five 
miles  further  the  Town  of  Muehldorf,  forty-five  miles  from  Munich  ;  beyond  it 
the  road  crosses  the  River  Inn. 

Another  road  leaves  Munich,  south  and  parallel  to  the  former,  to  Salzburg  in 
the  Tyrol,  passing  through  Ebersdorf,  eighteen  miles  east-south-east,  and  Wasser- 
burg,  thirty-one  miles  east-south-east  from  Munich,  crossing  the  Inn  likewise 
beyond  the  latter  place. 

The  forest  of  Hohenlinden  spreads  out  in  contiguous  masses,  forming  a  natural 
stockade  at  from  fourteen  to  seventeen  miles  in  length  and  four  miles  in  depth, 
and  its  depth  is  traversed  by  these  two  roads.  Hohenlinden  and  Ebersburg  lie 
upon  the  entrance  to  and  on  the  Munich  side  of  the  forest;  in  other  words,  the 
forest  is  the  defile  and  those  two  villages  the  points  upon  which  an  army,  coming 
from  Austria,  debouches  after  having  traversed  the  defile.  Between  these  two 
roads  are  some  impracticable  by-roads.  From  Muehldorf,  as  far  as  Hohenlinden, 
the  country  is  hilly,  intersected  by  woods  and  rivulets;  from  Hohenlinden,  as  far 
as  Munich,  it  is  but  one  fine  and  continuous  plain. 

Moreau's  forces  were,  on  the  1st  of  December,  1300,  in  straggling  and  detached 
columns,  moving  from  Hohenlinden  upon  these  two  roads  toward  Austria;  Lecourbe 
and  Sainte-Suzanne's  divisions  were  detached  far  in  the  rear.  Moving  thus  from 
west  to  east,  Grenier,  who  commanded  the  left,  while  leisurely  approaching  Ampfing 
was  suddenly  attacked  by  the  Austrians,  under  Archduke  John,  who  were  being 
moved  from  north  to  south,  and  thus  thrown  perpendicularly  upon  the  French, 
perfectly  united  and  sixty  thousand  strong.  Grenier  was  routed  at  once.  In  vain 
Ney,  Grandjean,  Hardy,  and  Legrand  strove  to  make  a  stand;  and  the  decline  of 
the  day  saw  the  French  army,  thoroughly  beaten  and  panic-stricken,  returning 
through  the  forest  toward  Hohenlinden. 

Archduke  John  was  content,  and  failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  victory.  He 
gave  to  the  enemy  one  day,  the  2d  of  December,  to  reorganize.  Moreau,  whose 
genius  was  up  to  the  emergency,  knew  that  the  Austrians  would  have  to 
traverse  the  forest  to  follow  up  their  victory.  He  took  a  position  in  front  of 
Hohenlinden,  where  the  forest  begins,  and  awaited  his  adversary. 

Before  daylight  on  the  3d  the  Austrians  marched  in  three  heavy  columns 
through  the  foiest.  The  roads  were  terrible,  and  it  snowed  incessantly.  The 
centre,  forty  thousand  strong,  with  one  hundred  cannon  and  five  hundred  cais- 
sons, marched  upon  the  Muehldorf  high-road  ;  the  right  upon  the  lower  road, 
under  Latour,  twenty-five  thousand  strong;  the  left  and  the  light  troops  upon 
cross-roads. 

The  centre,  outstripping  the  other  columns  because  it  marched  upon  the  best 
road,  debouched  upon  Hohenlinden  at  nine  in  the  morning,  when  Grouchy  drove 
it  back.  The  Austrians,  however,  steadily  gained  ground;  but  Grouchy  and 
Grandjean,  at  the  head  of  fresh  battalions,  repulsed  them  once  more.  Meantimo 
the  Austrian  right  began  to  debouch,  but  Ney  opposed  it  most  effectually. 

The  French  general,  Richepanse,  meantime  had  advanced,  early  in  the  morning, 
between  (he  space  occupied  by  the  two  high-roads,  to  take  the  Austrian  centre  in 
the  rear — whether  by  Moreau's  orders,  or  independently,  is  a  disputed  point,  but,  it 
is  most  probable,  by  the  orders  of  Moreau.  He  arrived  within  sight  of  the  Village 
of  Matenpot,  where  the  rear  of  the  Austrian  centre  rested,  composed  of  artillery  and 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  155 

the  cavalry-both  reposing,  the  latter  dismounted-and  was  about  toattack,  when 
he  himself  was  pureed  by  the  Austrian  left,  under  Riesch.    Thus  brought  between 

nILTt?r8\  ;eS,agla°ral0f  medi°Cre  taleDt  and  courage  would  have  per- 
mitted he  centre  to  march  unmolested,  and  either  turned  against  the  lesser  body 
o  sought  safety  in  retreat.  But  Richepanse  engaged  both  by  himself,  assailing 
th  cavalry  and  artillery,  «id  charging  the  commander  of  his  severed  forces  to 
hold  the  position  they  then  occupied  against  Riesch.  This  he  did  nobly,  and  no 
efforts  of  the  latter  dislodged  him.  The  success  of  Richepanse's  efforts  was 
iZZLeT  Utm°8t  C°U3ternati0n  °™*  th°  ~  of  the  centre  ;  it  fledtwlrd 
At  the  moment  when  Richepanse  arrived  near  Matenpot,  Moreau  nearly  found 
himself  overwhelmed  by  the  Austrians.     But  when  he  heard  the  cannon  in  the 

rr  1bMRtenPOt  he  direCtC<1  NCy  aml  *-*  to  make  •  ^  ÏS  "h h 
ov  rth     w  the  now  consternated  enemy.    The  fugitives  meeting  the  onward  près 

u re  of  the  rear  columns  pursued  by  Richepanse,  a  perfect  rout  ensued,  and  the 

day  was  gained.    Grenier,  who  commanded  the  French  left,  and  already  o^pow 

ered  by  the  Austrians,  upon  the  intelligence  of  the  rout  of  the  centre  resûm  d 

the  offensive  and  drove  Latour  back  into  the  woods.     Moreau's  beTd  ouaTra 

-re  that  night  at  Haag.    The  Au.trians  lost  over  one  hundre     cllTTrll 

hundred  caissons,  and  eighteen  thousand  men  ;  the  French  nine  thousand 

The  most  .mportant  lesson  which  this  battle  teaches  is  the  importance  of  follow 

WW  a  vector».    Wo  see  here  that  the  Austrians  were  as  JJsZontoXt 

of  December  as  a  general  could  wish  to  be.    Moreau  and  all  of  his  general,  not 

alone,  but  the  men,  were  in  consternation.    It  is  most  likely  that  S f  Awhduke 

John   had  secured  the  defile  of  llohenlinden   and  pressed  on  toward       u^ch 

M  reau  would  have  been  obliged  to  cross  the  frontiers  of  France.    But  one  daVe 

delay  brought  upon  the  Austrian  arms  the  heaviest  defeat  they  had  as  yet  eipe. 

The  second  observation  is,  the  very  confident  manner  with  which  the  Austrian* 

The  third  observation  to  be  made  is,  that  had  the  French  trusted  alone  tn  « 
strength  of  their  position  and  contented  themselves  to  KE££££ 
hey  would  have  been  conquered  a  second  time.     Moreau  wis  already  exhau  td 
m  the  centre,  and  the  left,  under  Grenier,  beaten;  the  Austrians  were  ah"  dv 
concentrating  in  the  plain  of  Hohonlinden  in  front  of  the   woods      But  Riche 
pause's  turning  manœuvre  decided  the  day.     It  was  the  most  bri  .iant  manœuv," 

e°LcuteCdaT,Sn'    *  WaS  a  defen8he  attUude  8kilful*  COmb-d  wi  h  a  WgZ    ! 
Zer      at'6  m°VCmeut'  which  decided  the  whole  campaign.    Thlfact tl  at 
General  Moreau  was   awaiting  with  impatience   the   movement  of  RichTl 
appears  to  establish,  beyond  controversy,  that  he  ha^ordcred  it    «^ sô  *' 

In  ou;  war  wW  TT"' lf  DOt  the  or^rs,  of  the  general  commanding. 
In  our  WW,  where  direct  attacks  are  so  prevalent,  Lieutenant-General  Jackson 
thae8  ^t^r  —    »*  wiU  always  stamp  upo^a ~ 


156  THE    8PJRIT    OF 

CHAPTER   IV. 

GRAND  RECONNOISSANCES,  AND  PRECAUTIONS  THEY  REQUIRE. 

Great  difficulty  in  the  conduct  of  an  army — We  must  seek  the  enemy — Necessity 
of  permanent  contact — Rôle  of  cavalry — The  curtain  must  be  lifted — Precept — 
Consequences  of  its  disregard — The  Army  of  Portugal  in  the  Valley  of  the  Tagus 
— Twofold  reconnoissance  upon  Almeida  and  Elbodon — English  cavalry  flies — 
Brigade  of  infantry  isolated — Fuente-Guinaldo — The  reconnoissance  not  properly 
carried  out — The  English  army  escapes — Smiles  of  fortune.  , 

To  know  the  position  of  the  enemy,  to  be  informed  in  time  of  the 
movements  which  he  is  executing,  to  gather  sufficient  facts  from  which 
his  projects  may  be  divined,  is  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties  which  the 
command  of  an  army  presents  continually.  Nothing  should  be  neg- 
lected to  arrive  at  exact  information,  and  the  surest  means  is  to  be 
constantly  in  contact  with  the  enemy  by  means  of  light  troops,  to  have 
frequently  small  engagements,  and  to  take  prisoners,  whose  answers 
are  generally  always  naive  and  sincere.  More  can  be  ascertained  from 
them  than  from  the  most  faithful  spies;  the  latter  often  confound  the 
names  of  corps  and  generals,  and  estimate  the  strength  of  the  troops 
upon  which  they  report  very  inaccurately. 

When  two  armies,  through  the  combinations  of  war,  find  themselves 
suddenly  in  the  presence  of,  or  have  remained  for  a  long  time  at  a  cer- 
tain distance  from,  each  other,  it  is  well  to  be  assured  more  positively 
of  the  situation  of  affairs  ;  and  then  are  made  what  we  call  grand  re- 
connaissances. These  operations  demand  great  prudence,  and  even 
particular  foresight,  especially  if  it  be  undecided  whether  to  engage  or 
not,  at  least  in  extraordinary  and  very  advantageous  circumstances. 

It  is  necessary  to  employ  a  large  force  of  cavalry,  and,  if  possible, 
only  light  cavalry  and  horse-artillery,  so  as  to  remain  more  surely 
master  of  one's  own  movements.  The  question  is,  how  to  withdraw 
the  curtain  which  covers  an  army,  and  when  a  general  has  sufficiently 
penetrated  to  the  front  to  see  with  his  own  eyes  the  situation  of  the 
enemy,  he  has  attained  his  object. 

But  he  should  also  be  in  a  proper  state  of  sustaining  the  troops 
which  are  engaged,  and  to  gather  them,  should  they  have  become 
scattered  in  a  lively  attack.  He  will  have  within  reach  a  corps  of  in- 
fantry of  respectable  size,  and  in  the  rear  of  this  corps  the  whole  army 
will  be  disposed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  enabled  to  march  at  once, 
should  circumstances  require  their  taking  any  part  in  the  action.  One 
moment  of  hesitation  may  lead  to  the  neglect  of  the  employment  of 
those  sudden  circumstances  which,  seized  in  the  proper  manner,  would 
have  brought  about  unforeseen  advantages. 

I  may  cite  one  instance  where  the  disregard  of  this  precept  prevent» 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  157 

ed  me  from  achieving  an  easy  victory  over  the  English  army  in  Spain. 
The  recital  of  faults  is,  perhaps,  more  instructive  than  the  account  of 

successes. 

In  1811  I  occupied  the  Valley  of  the  Tagus  with  the  Army  of  Port- 
ugal. My  mission  was  to  watch  over  the  safety  of  two  strong  places 
which  covered  the  north  and  the  south—  Ciudad-Rodrigo  and  Badajoz— 
which  belonged  to  the  Armies  of  the  South  and  the  North,  and  made 
part  of  their  department.  Ciudad-Rodrigo  being  in  want  of  provi- 
sions, General  Dorsenne,  commanding  the  Army  of  the  North,  organized 
a  large  train  and  made  preparations  to  conduct  it.  He  furnished,  as 
an  escort,  a  force  of  ten  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  horse. 
Rut  the  co-operation  of  the  Army  of  Portugal  was  necessary  to  assure 
his  march,  the  English  army  being  encamped  in  his  proximity.  I  car- 
ried the  greater  portion  of  the  army  beyond  the  Col  de  Banos,  and  I 
marched  in  echelon  from  Tamames  until  I  reached  the  River  Aguéda.  I 
marched  upon  Rodrigo  with  fifteen  hundred  cavalry.  General  Dor- 
senne arrived  there  likewise,  and  securing  his  large  train  of  munitions  of 
war  in  that  place,  left  there  a  small  division  of  three  thousand  infantry, 
commanded  by  General  Thiébauld.  The  rumor  had  been  circulated 
that  the  English  were  disposed  to  invest  Rodrigo,  and  that  all  army 
stores  within  reach  had  been  concentrated  in  the  place.  To  secure 
them  would  have  been  opportune  for  them,  and  it  became  necessary  to 
make  a  double  reconnaissance  upon  the  road  to  Almeida  and  toward 
the  heights  of  Elbodon,  upon  which  the  outposts  of  the  English  army 
had  been  established.  This  reconnaissance  was  to  be  executed  by  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Portugal,  commanded  by  General  Montbrun. 

General  Thiébauld  received  orders  to  sustain  the  latter  when  neces- 
sary. The  position  of  Elbodon  having  been  carried  in  a  moment,  the 
English  cavalry  was  put  to  flight,  and  a  brigade  of  English  infantry 
found  itself  isolated.  After  having  bravely  sustained  several  charges, 
it  retreated  upon  Fuente-Guinaldo.  Favored  by  the  difficult  nature  of 
the  ground,  and  thanks  to  the  rapidity  of  its  march  and  its  bravery, 
we  were  unable  to  take  it.  It  became  important  to  occupy  without 
delay  the  Village  of  Fuente-Guinaldo,  it  being  the  point  of  convergence 
of  many  roads,  and  of  strategical  importance  for  the  concentration 
of  the  army.  The  division  of  Thiébauld  was  therefore  called  upon  ; 
but  placed  too  far  away,  because  the  object  of  its  march  had  only  been 
the  defence  and  security  of  a  convoy,  and  the  field  of  battle  having 
become  singularly  distant,  owing  to  the  enemy's  retreat,  it  arrived  too 
late,  and  its  extreme  weakness  forbade  its  being  thrown,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  night,  upon  the  entrenchments  of  Fuente-Guinaldo,  toward 
which  place  the  columns,  coming  from  différent  sides,  were  directed. 
Had  eight  thousand  men  been  at  my  disposal  I  would  have  been  able 
to  act  with  confidence.  Fuente-Guinaldo  would  have  fallen  into  mv 
14  y 


158  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

power  ;  the  light  division,  placed  at  Martiago,  upon  the  right  bank  of 
the  Aguéda,  would  probably  have  been  taken  or  destroyed,  the  English 
army  dispersed,  and  its  corps,  being  without  communication,  would 
have  been  in  the  most  critical  position.  Having  had  time  to  unite,  it 
hastened  to  make  good  its  retreat,  and  the  opportunity  of  an  easy  and 
complete  success  was  passed. 

I  repeat  that,  when  making  a  reconnaiatance  in  force,  the  troops 
should  always  be  disposed  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  forcing 
them  to  a  serious  engagement;  but,  at  the  same  time,  they  should  be 
able  either  to  rally  troops  should  they  have  been  beaten,  or  to  profit 
from  fortuitous  and  favorable  circumstances.  Whatever  consideration 
we  accord  to  our  adversary,  we  should  never  believe  him  to  be  infalli- 
ble ;  fortune  often  smiles  when  least  expected,  and  we  should  always 
be  prepared  to  prove  that  we  are  not  unworthy  of  its  favors. 


CHAPTER   V. 

DETACHMENTS  IN  PRESENCE  OF  THE  ENEMY— THEIR  CHANCES,  AND 
THE  DANGERS  WHICH  ACCOMPANY  THEM. 

Hare  for  object  to  profit  from  an  expected  victory — Examples  of  failures  not  count- 
ed upon — Wurmser  in  1796,  near  the  Lake  of  Garda — Alvinzi  at  Montebaldo  and 
Corona — Detachment  upon  the  Adige — Detachments  upon  the  Po,  Tosino,  and 
Adda — Supposition  of  a  retreat  upon  Genoa — Forty-five  thousand  men  against 
twenty-two  thousand — The  Austrian  army  attacks — Battle  of  Marengo  lost  at  five, 
p.  m. — Return  of  Desaix's  division,  detachod  upon  the  Genoa  road — Fine  victory 
— But  a  dangerous  example  to  follow — Rout  at  the  Katzbach  in  1813 — Conclu- 
sions, and  precepts. 

Notk — The  Battle  of  Marengo. 

Sometimes  a  general,  too  much  preoccupied  with  the  hopes  of  a  suo- 
cess,  makes  beforehand,  without  having  as  yet  beaten  the  enemy,  such 
dispositions  as  will  give  great  results  to  his  victory.  To  attain  this  ob- 
ject he  divides  his  forces  and  sends  them  in  different  directions  ;  instead 
of  conquering,  he  is  beaten.  His  detachments  are  either  surrounded  or 
destroyed,  and  a  campaign  opened  under  good  auspices,  ends  by  a  se- 
ries of  reverses. 

In  support  of  this  I  can  cite  several  examples  : 

In  1796  Wurmser  opens  the  campaign  in  Italy  with  an  army  supe- 
rior to  the  French;  a  column  turns  the  latter,  and  throws  itself  upon  its 
communications  toward  Brescia.  This  column,  too  feeble  to  resist  tho 
united  French  army,  retiree  at  ite  approach.     Separated  from  the  great 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  ]59 

er  portion  of  the  .army  by  mountains  and  the  Lake  of  Garda,  it  remains 
a  stranger  to  succeeding  events,  and  the  French  army,  posted  in  tho 
centre  of  tho  enemy's  position,  beats,  one  after  the  other,  every  corps 
which  successively  appears  in  its  front. 

In  the  same  year,  1796,  General  Alviuzi  debouches  from  the  Tyrol 
and  attacks  the  French  army,  occupying  the  chain  of  the  mountains  of 
Baldo  and  La  Corona.  Believing  a  victory  to  be  certain,  he  detaches 
a  corps  of  five  thousand  men,  commanded  by  Colonel  Lusignan,  who, 
after  having  followed  the  borders  of  the  Lake  of  Garda,  changes  direc- 
tion, approaches  the  Adige,  and  takes  a  position  in  rear  of  the  French 
army  and  upon  its  direct  line  of  communication.  This  corps  is  held  in 
check  by  the  feeble  division  of  Rey,  which  rejoined  the  army  and  estab- 
lished itself  in  front  of  the  Austrians.  The  battle  is  gained  by  the 
French  army,  and  the  corps  of  Lusignan  attacked,  is  routed  and  almost 
entirly  captured. 

In  1800  Napoleon  debouches  into  Italy  with  an  army  of  sixty  thou- 
sand men.  Having  passed  the  Po  and  completely  turned  the  Austrian 
army,  he  finds  himself  upon  its  communications,  and  is  about  to  seize 
all  the  roads  by  which  it  could  seek  to  retire*.  To  attain  this  ob- 
ject he  places  part  of  his  forces  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Po,  upon  the 
Tesino,  while  he  was  compelled  to  despatch  a  division  upon  the  Adda 
and  the  Oglio  to  cover  himself  in  that  quarter.  Then,  supposing  that 
the  Austrian  army,  assembled  at  Alexandria,  would  most  likely  retreat 
upon  Genoa,  he  detaches  a  division  in  the  direction  of  Novi,  to  close 
that  road  likewise.  But  twenty-two  thousand  men  were  at  his  disposal, 
while  the  enemy  had  a  force  of  forty-five  thousand  men  assembled 
upon  the  Bormida.  The  enemy  attacks,  and  the  Battle  of  Marengo 
takes  place;  disputed  with  obstinacy,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  evening 
it  seems  as  lost,  when  the  division  despatched  toward  Novi  arrives. 
General  Desaix,  who  oommanded  it,  had  wisely  stopped  its  march  when 
hearing  the  cannonade,  to  await  further  orders.  He  retraces  his  steps, 
and  arrives  yet  in  time  to  be  useful  as  a  reserve  force,  and  the  battle  is 
gained,  although  but  twenty-seven  thousand  men  had  in  all  been  en- 
gaged, and  of  these  twenty-two  thousand  alone  had  been  obliged  to  sus- 
tain the  shock  of  tho  battle.  Thus  our  forces,  in  this  instance,  amount- 
ed to  but  two-thirds  of  those  of  the  enemy,  and  but  for  one  fortunate 
circumstance  they  would  have  numbered  but  one-half.  It  was  un- 
doubtedly a  fine  victory,  the  results  of  which  were  immense  ;  but  it 
would  be  dangerous  to  take  its  strategical  combinations  as  a  model, 

*  The  army  which  fought  at  Marenço  only  consisted  of  Victor's  corps,  which  wan 
composed  of  the  two  small  divisions  of  Gardaune  and  Chamberlhac,  and  of  Lannes' 
corps,  composed  of  the  divisions  of  Votrin  and  Monier,  the  division  of  Boudet,  five 
thousand  strong,  a  very  small  force  of  cavalry,  and  thirty-two  pieces  of  cannon.- 
Nott  vf  Author. 


160  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

since  the  battle  ought  to  have  been  lost,  on  account  of  the  superiority 
of  forces  and  the  means  which  were  brought  against  us. 

If  victories  under  such  circumstances  are  likely,  their  possibility 
must  not  be  too  much  relied  upon.  An  energy,  correspondingly  in- 
creasing with  less  favorable  circumstances,  may  undoubtedly  be  shown, 
but  the  latter  must  not  be  wantonly  provoked. 

In  1813  the  French  Army  of  Silesia,  more  than  eighty  thousand  strong, 
concentrated  at  Goldsberg,  commanded  by  the  Marshal-Duke  of  Taren- 
tum,  confronted  an  army  nearly  equal,  commanded  by  Blucher.  The 
Duke  of  Tarentum  advances  upon  the  enemy,  supposing  him  to  be 
massed  at  Jauer  :  he  detaches,  at  the  moment  of  his  making  a  motion, 
the  division  of  Puthod,  to  march  by  way  of  Schoenau  upon  Jauer,  so  as 
to  engage  the  enemy  in  flank. 

But  Blûcher  at  the  same  moment  himself  takes  the  offensive;  the 
French  army  having  reconnoitred  badly,  suddenly  encounters  the  ene- 
my near  the  Katzbach,  and  is  obliged  to  accept  battle  without  having 
united  its  forces.  Bad  combinations  and  a  series  of  unfortunate  cir- 
cumstances lead  to  confusion.  The  French  army  being  beaten,  is  forced 
to  fall  back  ;  the  division  of  Puthod  loses  its  communications  ;  thrown 
back  upon  the  flooded  Bober,  overwhelmed  by  numbers,  and  after  hav- 
ing valiantly  striven  to  resist,  it  is  captured  entirely. 

From  the  examples  above  cited,  and  many  others  which  could  be 
added,  the  following  conclusions  are  drawn  : 

1.  Nothing  is  more  dangerous  than  to  make  a  detachment  of  any  im- 
portance before  the  battle  has  been  fought,  a  victory  been  achieved, 
and  a  decided  advantage  over  the  enemy  been  obtained. 

2.  The  execution  of  this  hazardous  combination  requires  that  the 
army  have  a  sufficient  superiority  to  assure  great  probabilities  of  vic- 
tory, and  that  concentrated  forces  be  never  weakened  beyond  the 
strength  of  those  of  the  enemy. 

3.  When  distant  from  an  enemy  who  is  strong  enough  to  give  battle, 
and  when  marching  toward  him,  the  space  of  at  least  one  day's  march 
from  the  enemy's  forces  must  be  occupied  by  the  vanguards  and  light 
troops,  so  as  to  be  informed  of  his  movements,  and  to  modify  ours  cor- 
respondingly. 

4.  Lastly,  when  it  is  believed  that  an  isolated  detachment  can  be 
made  with  advantage,  its  direction  must  be  determined  and  troops  be 
stationed  to  support  it,  in  such  a  manner  as  always  to  assure  its  retreat 
upon  the  army,  and  that  it  in  no  case  be  in  danger  of  losing  its  commu- 
nications. 

NOTE. 

The  Battle  of  Marengo.— Early  on  the  14th  of  June,  1800,  Napoleon  was  here 
surprised,  while  one-half  of  his  forces  were  detached,  and  the  remainder,  about 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  161 

twenty-two  thousand  men,  under  Lannes  and  Victor,  were  disposed  in  obliqueorder 
by  echelon,  left  in  front,  and  the  right  at  half  a  day's  march  in  the  rear,  in  march- 
ing order.  Marengo  is  near  the  fortress  of  Alexandria,  upon  the  marshy  borders  of 
the  Fontanone,  in  a  perfectly  level  plain.  The  Austrian  general,  Melas,  with  over 
thirty  thousand  men  and  two  hundred  cannon,  fell  suddenly  upon  the  French 
Orders  were  immediately  sent  to  Desaix  to  come  up. 

The  Austrian  infantry  overthrew  Gardanne,  the  advance  guard,  in  front  of  Ma- 
rengo. Victor  stemmed  the  tide  for  over  two  hours  unsupported,  and  was  at  length 
rc.nforced  by  Lannes'  vanguard.  The  Austrians  steadily  progressed,  and  Melas, 
hearing  that  the  French  general,  Suchet,  had  arrived  at  Aqui,  a  village  some  twelve 
miles  south  of  the  battle-field,  detached  a  body  of  twenty-five  hundred  horsemen  to 
hold  him  in  check.  Meantime  Victor  was  obliged  to  retreat  through  Marengo  upon 
a  pos,t,on  some  five  miles  west  and  a  little  to  the  south,  to  the  Village  of  San  Guili- 
ano.  Lannes  retreated  across  the  plain,  amid  a  terrible  fire,  with  admirable  preci- 
sion and  coolness,  in  echelons  by  squares.  Although  the  French  horse,  under  Kel- 
lermann  and  Lampeaux,  made  most  gallant  efforts  to  disconcert  the  Austrian 
infantry,  the  latter  progressed  steadily  onward,  and  a  total  rout  of  the  French  was 
already  impending. 

At  eleven  o'clock,  a.  m..  Napoleon  with  hie  staff,  and  two  hundred  grenadiers  of  the 
Guard,  arrived  upon  the  battle-field,  and  the  sight  of  him  reanimated  his  soldiers 
He  brought  with  him  the  vanguard  of  Desaix's  division,  and  at  the  same  time 
when  Napoleon  rallied  his  centre,  and  at  the  head  of  a  demi-brigade  of  Lannes'  divis- 
ion, advanced  toward  the  Austrians,  Monier,  with  five  battalions  of  Desaix's  van- 
guard and  eight  hundred  grenadiers  of  the  Guard,  fell  upon  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Austnaus  at  Castel  Ceriolo,  and  carried  that  village.  Retaken  by  the  Austrians  in 
the  ensuing  struggle,  Cara  St.  Cyr  again  stormed  it,  and  held  it  the  remainder  of  the 
day. 

While  the  French  right  was  thus  victorious,  the  left  was  thrown  into  irreparable 
disorder,  and  giving  way  on  all  points.  Napoleon  had  already  resolved  to  withdraw 
northward  across  the  fields  toward  Pavia,  and  abandon  the  battle-field.  Melas,  as- 
sured of  victory,  had  given  up  the  command  to  Zach,  to  rest  at  Alexandria. 

In  this  emergency,  at  four,  p.  m.,  Desaix  made  his  appearance  at  St.  Giuliano. 
.  The  battle,"  counselled  this  brave  soldier,  *  is  undoubtedly  lost,  but  we  have  time  to 
gam  another  one."  Victor  and  Lannes  were  reformed  and  massed  in  front  of  San 
Giuhano  ;  Marmont  prepared  a  masked  battery  of  twelve  guns,  and  Desaix  advanced 
at  the  head  of  four  thousand  men  to  the  charge.  Zach,  unsuspectingly  advancing, 
was  received  by  the  discharge  of  this  masked  battery,  and  Desaix  debouched  from 
the  villages  ;  while  advancing  toward  the  staggered  enemy,  he  fell,  pierced  by  a  ball 
in  the  breast.  The  enemy,  recovering  from  the  surprise,  advanced  with  six  thou- 
sand Hungarian  grenadiers,  and  the  French,  in  their  turn,  hesitated  and  broke. 

In  this  moment  Kellermann  charged.  He  describes  it  thus  :  «  The  combat  was  en- 
gaged; Desaix  soon  drove  back  the  enemy's  tirailleurs  on  their  main  body;  but  the 
■ight  of  that  formidable  column  of  six  thousand  Hungarian  grenadiers  made  our 
troops  halt.  I  was  advancing  in  line  on  their  flanks,  concealed  by  festoons  of  vines- 
a  frightful  discharge  took  place;  our  line  wavered,  broke,  and  fled.  The  Austrians 
rapully  advanced  to  follow  up  their  success,  in  all  the  disorder  and  security  of  vic- 
tory. I  see  it  ;  I  am  in  the  midst  of  them  ;  they  lay  down  their  arms.  The  whole 
did  not  occupy  so  much  time  as  it  took  me  to  write  these  six  lines,-  and  the  French 
ach.eved  a  complete  victory.  Loss:  Imperialists,  7,000  killed  and  wounded,  3  000 
prisoners,  8  standards,  20  pieces  of  cannon.  French,  6,000  killed  and  wounded 
1,000  prisoners. 

11  ' 


lt>2  THE    SPltUT   Off 

This  battle  illustrates:  1.  The  importance  of  concentration  of  forces.  2.  The 
danger  of  receiving  an  enemy  when  disposed  by  columns  in  echelon,  because  any 
disorder  in  front  speedily  spreads  to  the  rear,  and  the  successive  columns,  instead  of 
coming  up  to  the  aid,  will  mostly  find  themselves  overwhelmed  by  retreating  forces. 
3.  The  folly  of  the  Austrian  general  to  detach  twenty-five  hundred  of  his  cavalry  to 
check  a  movement  in  his  rear,  when  General  Suchet  was  fully  twelve  miles  distant, 
and  could  not  have  come  up  for  several  hours — time  enough  to  beat  the  French.  4. 
That  a  victory  was  won,  through  Desaix's  counsel,  from  four,  p.  M.,  to  sunset.  Thus, 
one  single  hour,  late  in  the  day,  decided  the  fate  of  Italy. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

BATTLES. 

Rules  and  principles — Variations — Nature  of  terrain — Strength  of  position  aug- 
ments the  number  of  troops — Defiles  in  advance — Formation  upon  two  lines — Not 
absolute  ;  commands  should  embrace  both  lines — Why — Reserve — General  dispo- 
sition— Defensive  battles— Choice  of  position — Rear  free  and  protected— Offensive 
battles — Strategy  and  tactics — Dash,  intelligence,  and  skill  in  manœuvres — Ge- 
nius of  the  French  for  the  offensive — Immense  difficulties  in  that  warfare  as  re- 
gards administration  and  maintenance  of  troops — The  defensive  the  genius  of  the 
English — Wellington  in  Spain — Masséna  menaces  Portugal — The  Duke  shelters 
himself  behind  the  Coa  and  two  fortresses — Retires  upon  Lisbon,  awaiting  the 
disorganization  of  the  French— System  decided  upon  and  perseveringly  followed 
—Renewed  at  Waterloo — The  English  give  a  defensive  battle — Precepts — Transi- 
tion from  the  offensive  to  the  defensive — Example — Offensive  war  the  genius  of 
Napoleon — His  campaign  in  Italy  offensive,  then  defensive,  then  again  offensive 
—1805— Austerlitz— Jena— 1809— Ratisbon— Wagram  ;  a  front  attack— 1812,  Bat- 
tle of  the  Moskowa — Importance  of  a  flank  movement — Direct  attacks — Likes  to 
employ  great  strength— 1813,  Llitzen,  defensive— Bautzen— Leipzig— Bad  battle- 
field— The  18th  of  October,  defensive — Battles  of  Brienne,  Craon,  Laon,  Arcis, 
Champ-Aubert,  31ontmirail,  Vauchamps,  Montereau — What  to  do  at  Paris — 
14,000  men  against  54,000—13,000  of  the  enemy  hors  de  combat— The  time  of  bat- 
tles— Regulated  according  to  circumstances — With  superior  forces  attack  soon  in 
the  morning — Why — Napoleon  at  Waterloo — With  equal  forces  attack  in  the 
middle  of  the  day— Why— 1796,  reverse  of  Cerea  and  Due  Castelli— Wurmser  out 
of  Mantua, — Victory  of  Saint-George — Defensive  battles  a  part  of  the  profession — 
Frederic  II  in  the  Seven  Years'  War — His  campaigns  resemble  Napoleon's — Every 
general  has  his  own  manner  of  conducting  war — Turenne  and  Condé — Alexander 
and  Ca?.sar — Fabius,  Hannibal,  and  Scipio. 

Notes. — 1.  Confederate  corps  of  reserves.  2.  The  lines  of  Torres-Vedras,  in  Portu- 
gal.   3.  Wellington's  strategy.    4.  The  Battle  of  Waterloo. 

To  treat  in  detail  of  all  the  dispositions  which  the  conduct  of  a  battle 
demands,  is  a  thing  impossible.  A  thousand  unforeseen  circumstances 
may  force  us  to  modify  them — fortuitous  accidents  may  suddenly  change 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  163 

the  entire  disposition.  I  will,  then,  limit  myself  to  the  consideration 
and  the  statement  of  those  rules  which  it  is  necessary  to  follow,  and  of 
the  principles  which  must  be  respected  to  make  preparations  for  the 
battle,  and  to  distinguish  the  particular  character  which  belongs  to  it. 
As  to  the  manner  of  giving  battle,  there  is  nothing  m<>ro  variable.  It 
differs  with  the  nature  of  the  operations  to  be  executed,  and  the  charac- 
ter of  the  mission  the  army  has  been  charged  with.  It  varies  with  the 
composition  of  armies,  and  the  degree  of  genius  belonging  to  the  sol- 
diers; still  more,  it  differs  by  reason  of  the  order  of  talent  and  the  de- 
gree of  capacity  of  the  commanding  generals. 

I  shall  enter  but  little  into  technical  details  respecting  the  formation 
ami  preliminary  position  of  troops,  since  these  dispositions  depend, 
above  all,  upon  the  nature  of  the  ground  upon  which  a  general  is  called 
to  engage  the  enemy.  Thus,  for  instance,  it  is  evident  that  a  position 
near  the  battle-field,  which  may  serve  as  a  support  and  increaso  the 
means  of  sustaining  ourselves,  must  be  occupied  in  force,  and  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  bo  fruitful  of  some  salutary  action,  either  when  attacked, 
or  when  we  ourselves  assume  tho  offensive.  The  strength  of  a  position 
renders  less  disadvantageous  tho  inferiority  in  the  number  of  troops  ; 
defiles,  placed  in  advance,  render  a  part  of  our  means  of  defence  superflu- 
ous, and  increase  the  difficulties  of  attack.  As  for  the  rest,  the  simplest 
reasoning,  and  oftentimes  instinct  alone,  suffices  to  indicate  the  modifica- 
tions necessary  to  be  made  in  the  manner  of  formation  sanctioned  by 
usage. 

I  will  only  recall,  in  a  few  words,  that,  aside  from  the  influenco  of 
localities,  as  a  fundamental  principle  the  formation  of  troops  upon  sev- 
eral lines  has  been  adopted.  The  first  line  is  deployed,  and  the  second 
is  in  column  of  battalions  at  a  distance  equal  to  that  of  the  deploy- 
ment, ready,  if  needful,  to  march  or  to  move  into  line  of  battle;  and  a 
third  line,  composing  the  reserve,  in  column  of  brigades,  ready  to  be 
moved  wherever  it  may  become  most  useful. 

I  shall  make,  however,  one  observation  upon  general  dispositions.  It 
is,  that  the  command  of  troops  should  be  divided  in  such  a  mannor  an 
to  embrace  both  lines — that  is  to  say,  the  corresponding  parts  of  each 
should  be  under  the  authority  of  the  same  chief.  The  reason  for  this  is 
easily  understood.  Since  the  second  line  is  destined  to  sustain  the  first, 
tho  movements  of  the  same  fractions  in  both  lines  should  accord  per- 
fectly. It  is  not  the  same  with  the  reserve;  it  forms  a  complete  and  in- 
dependent corps,  whose  means  should  be  perfectly  concentrated  to  act 
according  to  circumstances.  Thus,  a  corps  d'année  of  four  divisions,  dis- 
posed to  "give  battle,  would  have,  in  my  opinion,  the  following  forma- 
tion : 

Tn  the  first  line,  three  brigades  of  three  different  divisions,  and  in  the 
second  tho  three  other  brigades  of  tho  same  divisions,  and  the  fourth 


164  THE    SriRIT    OF 

division  in  rear,  united,  and  formed  in  two  massos,  each  constituting  a 
brigade. 

The  cavalry  would  thus  be  placed  :  That  of  divisions,  upon  the  flank 
or  in  rear  of  their  respective  divisions,  and  the  great  bodies  of  cavalry 
upon  several  lines  and  upon  the  flanks  of  the  army,  off  the  second  line, 
and,  in  preference,  upon  that  side  where  the  country  is  most  open  and 
favorable  to  its  movements  and  action. 

As  for  the  artillery,  that  of  the  reserve  will  keep  in  rear  of  the  reserve 
infantry,  ready  to  move  wherever  required. 

Finally,  I  will  add  that  the  art  of  directing  well  a  battle  consists, 
particularly,  in  the  judicious  employment,  and  at  the  right  time  and  in 
the  right  manner,  of  or^e's  reserves  ;  and  that  the  general  who,  in  a  well- 
contested  battle,  has  fresh  and  disposable  troops  at  the  end  of  the  day, 
when  his  adversary  has  given  his  all,  is  almost  certain  of  victory1. 

I  will  now  establish  the  character  of  battles,  by  dividing  them  into 
two  classes  :  Defensive  battles  and  offensive  battles. 

For  the  first,  the  conditions  of  success  are  :  The  choice  of  a  good 
position,  whose  flanks  are  well  supported  and  the  rear  of  which  is  per- 
fectly secure  and  open  to  movements,  with  obstacles  in  front  which 
render  the  approach  of  the  enemy  more  difficult;  lastly,  brave  and  dis- 
ciplined troops,  commanded  by  an  energetic  and  stubborn  soldier. 

Offensive  battles,  above  all,  require  an  excellent  strategical  combina- 
tion and  tactical  skill,  and,  particularly,  troops  accustomed  to  manoeuvre 
and  to  march  well,  and  who  are  adroit  and  intelligent,  and  of  a  spirit 
not  to  be  mistaken.  It  is  necessary  that  the  soldier  should  look  upon 
success  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  that  he  associate  himself  with  it  be- 
forehand. 

In  applying  these  observations,  which  I  believe  to  be  of  rigorous  ex- 
actness, to  the  spirit  of  different  armies,  and  by  taking,  for  example, 
troops  which  resemble  each  other  the  least,  we  recognize  the  French  as 
those  troops  which  most  nearly  satisfy  the  requirements  of  offensive  bat- 
tles, and  we  accord  to  the  English  the  first  place  in  defensive  battles. 
If  it  is,  besides,  remarked  that  the  difficulties  of  administration  and  the 
maintenance  of  troops  are  immense  in  offensive  warfare,  while  for  the 
defence  only  money  and  the  will  are  required  ;  and  when  we  further  re- 
flect that  the  English  army,  by  its  composition,  manners,  and  wants, 
ought  to  be  more  abundantly  supplied  than  any  other — we  are  more  and 
more  strengthened  in  the  conclusion  that  defensive  warfare,  with  all  its 
consequences,  is  more  in  accordance  with  the  talents  of  the  English 
army,  and  that  it  would  be  less  easily  conducted  with  a  French  army. 

The  events  of  the  Peninsular  war,  yet  fresh  in  our  remembrance,  de- 
monstrate this  truth.  The  English  general,  either  by  his  nature  and 
his  peculiar  character,  or  owing  to  his  ability  in  comprehending  the 
circumstances  in  which  he  had  been  placed,  understood,  from  the  be- 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  165 

ginning,  the  systom  which  ho  ought  to  follow,  and  never  deviated 
from  it. 

^  For  a  long  time  he  perseveringly  took  advantage  of  a  powerful  aux- 
iliary  which  the  force  of  circumstances  had  given  into  his  hands— our 
misery;  he  never  ceased  to  turn  it  to  account.  His  army,  abundantly 
provided  with  everything,  able  to  concentrate  at  any  day,  was  constantly 
in  a  condition  for  movements,  and  always  menacing.  Military  and  po- 
litical -calculations  alone  were  considered  in  its  operations;  while  the 
French  army,  suffering  from  all  kinds  of  wants,  and  discharging  duties  of 
every  nature,  daily  lost  in  strength  and  means.  If  a  position  could  not 
be  attacked,  the  English  general  occupied  it  and  waited  until  it  was  in 
danger  of  being  turned,  or  until  the  French  army  had  thrown  itself 
against  insurmountable  natural  obstacles,  in  pure  loss  consuming  its 
valor. 

Thus,  when  Marshal  Masséna,  at  the  head  of  a  superior  army,  threat- 
ened to  invade  Portugal,  Wellington  took  position  in  rear  of  two  strong 
places,  being,  besides,  covered  by  the  Coa,  and  waited  until  the  French 
army  had  wasted  a  part  of  its  resources  by  two  sieges— abandoning  to 
the  fate  of  war  the  garrison  of  these  two  places,  which  did  not  belong 
to  his  army— he  retired  when  they  capitulated,  and  fearful  of  being 
attacked,  took  a  position  at  Busaco.  After  having  repulsed  the  French 
army,  which  inconsiderately  had  attacked  him,  he  retired  and  disap- 
peared while  the  latter  was  manoeuvring  to  turn  him,  and  the  English 
army  withdrew  within  the  lines  of  Lisbon,  where  art  had  added  to 
powerful  natural  means  of  resistance2. 

The  English  general  waited  patiently  until  want  and  misery  had  dis- 
organized and  destroyed  the  French  army  ;  he  followed  his  system  in 
so  rigorous  a  manner  that  he  left  it  at  peace,  although  it  was  within 
his  sight  and  the  range  of  his  artillery,  and  unable  to  give  battle  or  to 
oppose  any  serious  resistance,  weakened  as  it  was  by  the  absence  of 
from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand  men  who,  leaving  their  arms  stacked, 
dispersed  over  a  space  of  some  fifteen  to  twenty  leagues  into  the  inte- 
rior of  Portugal  to  seek  for  provisions.  Nearly  reduced  to  one-half, 
the  French  army  returned  to  Spain,  after  having  abandoned  all  of  its 
cannon,  its  entire  material,  on  account  of  the  want  of  draught-horses, 
and  with  three-fourths  of  its  cavalry  dismounted.  It  had  sustained 
immense  losses,  although  it  had  but  once  fought— at  Busaco— and  had 
been  engaged  in  only  two  combats  of  little  importance  during  the  re- 
treat. 

Wellington  always  followed  a  like  system;  and  when  later  he  was 
face  to  face  with  Napoleon  at  Waterloo,  he  again  fought  a  defensive 
battle3. 

It  is  then  seen  that,  in  a  defensive  war,  which  is  always  a  question 
of  time,  battles  should  not  be  given  except  very  rarely— since  marches 


160  i  THE   SPIRIT    OP 

and  divers  circumstances  sometimes  disorganize  and  destroy  the  means 
of  an  adversary  more  surely  than  tho  most  signal  victory. 

Regarding  the  particular  requirements  of  offensive  battles,  they 
should  always  be  given  by  the  front;  and  the  talent  consists  in  forcing 
the  enemy,  by  means  of  wisely-conceived  dispositions,  to  attack  where 
we  have  been  able  to  render  resistance  most  easy.  But  there  are  like- 
wise battles  which,  commencing  with  an  offensive  movement,  are 
afterward  reduced  to  a  defensive  action  :  this  happens  when  prudent 
and  circumspect  commanders  are  at  the  head  of  nearly  equal  forces, 
ready  to  give  battle. 

The  campaign  in  Spain  in  1812  offers  an  example  of  this  kind  :  the 
English  army  being  superior  by  eight  thousand  infantry  and  four 
thousand  cavalrjT  to  that  of  the  French.  Tho  French  general,  after 
having  for  a  long  time  remained  on  the  defensive,  awaiting  promised 
reinforcements,  and  officially  informed  that  they  would  not  be  sent,  was 
obliged  to  assume  the  offensive  to  prevent  the  continually  increasing 
dangers  of  his  situation. 

But  in  assuming  the  offensive,  and  in  forcing  the  enemy  to  recoil  by 
means  of  strategical  movements,  he  did  not  wish,  however  willing  to 
fight,  to  renew,  by  an  inconsiderate  attack,  those  events  which  had  be- 
fore taken  place.  He  desired,  on  the  contrary,  should  there  be  any 
battle,  that  it  be  fought  upon  ground  of  his  own  choice,  and  to  accept, 
not  to  initiate  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  English  general,  true  to  his 
system,  was  equally  desirous  of  reducing  any  action  to  the  defence  of 
his  position.  From  it  arose  the  remarkable  movements  which  took 
place  from  the  Duero  to  the  Tormes  toward  the  middle  of  the  month 
of  July,  1812. 

This  system  being  followed  by  both  parties,  the  English  army  was 
obliged  to  make  a  retrograde  march.  Its  return  upon  the  Aguéda  and 
reoccupation  of  Portugal  would,  incontestably,  have  been  the  imme- 
diate result  of  this  part  of  the  campaign,  if  a  movement  had  not  been 
executed  without  orders  in  the  French  army,  and  if  tho  marshal  who 
commanded  it  had  not  received  a  serious  wound  three-quarters  of  an 
hour  before  the  battle,  which  unsettled  the  command  and  prevented  the 
timely  reparation  of  committed  errors,  and  led  to  an  action  which 
should  only  have  been  brought  about  at  a  later  day  and  under  better 
auspices.  Despite  these  drawbacks,  the  losses  were  equal  in  both 
armies. 

Although  I  believe  firmly  that  the  French  troops,  when  well  com- 
manded and  properly  provided  for,  are  equal  to  all  modes  of  warfare, 
I  yet  believe  that  offensive  war  is  more  within  the  spirit,  nature,  and 
the  character  of  our  soldiers.  The  same  was,  above  all  others,  the  par- 
ticular genius  of  Napoleon. 

I  have  already  remarked  that  no  man  has  ever  possessed,  in  a  higher 


iMILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  167 

degree  than  he,  the  talent  of  strategy  ;  all  his  offensive  marches,  until 
the  period  of  the  Russian  war,  were  skilfully  conceived.  The  powerful 
resources  of  which  he  disposed,  the  energy  with  which  they  were  em- 
ployed, and  the  morale  by  which  they  were  animatod — his  activity,  the 
absolute  liberty  of  his  projects  and  combinations— all  were  calculated 
to  precipitate  events,  and,  by  exalting  the  spirit  of  his  soldiers,  to  over- 
whelm the  enemy  in  advance  with  discouragement;  and  he  was  not 
very  far  from  the  fear  of  being  conquered  in  one  defeat.  What  series 
of  splendid  operations  were  executed  by  this  almost  supernatural 
genius  !  In  the  bogiuning  of  his  career,  in  Italy,  he  turns  all  the 
positions  of  the  enemy  and  beats  him  in  detail,  before  the  latter  had 
been  able  to  concentrate.  He  passes  the  Po  without  having  an  enemy 
in  his  front,  because  he  had  foreseen  his  movements.  The  war  becomes 
defensive;  but  soon  he  changes  its  character,  and,  in  attacking,  he 
again  applies  the  genius  particular  to  him. 

In  1800  he  enters  Italy  and  forces  the  Austrian  army  to  receive 
battle  in  the  most  discouraging  situation,  and  under  most  grievous 
disadvantages,  after  having  lost  both  its  communications  and  point  of 
retreat. 

In  1805  the  simple  direction  of  his  armies  which  he  threw  upon  the 
Danube  in  masses,  after  having  occupied  the  Black  Forest  with  the 
heads  of  his  columns  to  engage  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  decides 
tho  question  of  the  campaign — because  Mack,  instead  of  bringing 
about  the  catastrophe  of  the  Austrian  army  by  an  unreasonable  confi- 
dence, ought  to  have  retired.  As  it  was,  one  simple  movement  placed  us 
in  possession  of  the  whole  of  Bavaria. 

At  Austerlitz  we  see  a  tactical  movement  decide  the  fate  of  the  battle 
in  a  few  hours.  At  Jena  the  same  astonishing  results  were  brought 
about  by  like  means.  As  long  as  this  system  was  followed,  we  see  every 
enterprise  of  Napoleon  crowned  by  equal  success. 

In  1809,  at  the  outset  of  the  campaign  before  Ratisbon,  the  same 
spirit  regulates  his  operations.  But  soon  his  system  changes.  Tho 
passage  of  tho  Danube,  after  having  been  baffled  the  first  time,  is  exe- 
cuted with  success,  and  followed  by  the  victorious  battle  in  the  plain  of 
Wagram.  Here  an  attack  in  front,  a  direct  manœuvre,  constituted  the 
combat.  Attending  circumstances  left  no  choice.  The  passage  of  a 
river  like  the  Danube  is  not  an  easy  matter,  and  can  not  be  executed 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy  ;  and  if  an  army  placed  upon  the 
opposite  bank  seeks  to  prevent  it,  we  must  at  once  prepare  for  a  heavy 
engagement  while  debouching;  then  the  rapid  accumulation  of  means, 
and  the  energy  with  which  they  are  directed,  are  the  only  assurances  of 
victory. 

In  1812  it  depended  upon  his  own  will  to  give  to  the  great  battle 
which  wae  fought  upon  the  Mof  kowa  the  character  of  hie  preoeding  vie- 


168  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

tories  ;  by  a  simple  flank  movement  he  could  have  engaged  the  Russian 
army  with  much  greater  advantage,  and  a  chance  for  still  greater  results 
in  the  future  would  have  been  opened.  But  already  a  marked  taste  for 
direct  attacks,  and  the  enjoyment  of  employing  force,  appeared  to  man- 
ifest itself,  with  him,  and  a  sort  of  disdain  for  the  concours  of  art  and 
the  combinations  of  the  mind.  He  vanquished,  but  with  immense 
losses  and  inadequate  advantages. 

In  1813  he  varies  in  his  application  of  strategy. 

At  Liitzen,  being  surprised,  the  battle  commences  by  being  defensive, 
but  soon  becomes  offensive. 

At  Bautzen  his  strategical  movements  are  well  and  skilfully  con- 
ceived. 

But  at  Leipzig  we  ask  how  Napoleon,  who  had  it  in  his  power  to 
change  the  theatre  of  operations,  could  himself  select  a  battle-ground 
so  disadvantageous,  and  which  the  simplest  calculations  should  have 
shown  as  being  fraught  with  disaster.  The  battle  of  the  18th  of  Octo- 
ber was  defensive,  and  presented  no  chance  of  success,  since  the  battle 
of  the  16th  had  not  been  gained;  and  as  the  enemy,  on  the  17th,  had 
received  a  reinforcement  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  he 
should  have  then  avoided  it,  and  should  have  retreated  without  delay. 

The  Battles  of  Brienne  and  of  Craon,  those  of  Laou  and  Arcis,  fought 
in  France,  could  effect  no  real  advantage,  owing  either  to  the  manner  of 
concentrating  the  forces  or  to  the  direction  which  the  attacks  assumed. 
All  operations  of  this  epoch  were  limited  to  partial  movements  directed 
upon  separate  corps.  On  these  occasions  only  the  remaining  energy  of 
the  French  army  was  properly  exercised,  and  these  combinations  were, 
besides,  within  the  range  of  Napoleon's  genius — who,  sundry  times 
thereafter,  made  several  happy  applications,  as  at  Champ-Aubert, 
Montmirail,  Vauchamps,  and  Montereau — where,  in  giving  to  an  obsti- 
nately-maintained defensive  tho  character  of  the  offensive,  he  made  use 
of  the  greatest  feature  of  his  genius. 

But  at  last,  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  giving  battle,  through  the 
union  of  the  enemy's  entire  forces,  when  obliged  to  deliver  it  he  should 
have  given  it  a  defensive  character,  selected  a  position  under  the  walls 
of  Paris,  and  fortified  that  city;  he  should  have  concentrated  all  of  his 
resources  and  those  of  the  capital,  which  he  alone  was  able  to  turn  to 
account,  and  there,  for  a  last  time,  tried  his  fortune. 

If  fourteen  thousand  men,  consisting  of  remains  of  a  former  army, 
abandoned  to  themselves,  could,  in  an  open  country — without  a  single 
work  of  art  to  sustain  them,  and  deprived  of  all  succor  which  the  city 
would  have  been  able  to  furnish,  owing  to  the  disappearance  and  the 
flight  of  the  superior  authorities — resist,  for  ten  hours,  the  colossal  forces 
united  in  their  front,  of  which  fifty-four  thousand  men  had  been  engaged 
and  thirteen  thousand  disabled,  it  is  easy  to  foresee  what  would  and 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  169 

should  have  happened  if  thirty  thousand  men  could  have  fought  under 
the  protection  of  good  works,  tripling  their  force,  and,  aided  hy  the  re- 
sources of  Pari3,  concerted  action  would  have  been  the  result  of  Napo- 
leon's presence  and  authority. 

But  this  sort  of  resolution  was  not  within  the  range  of  his  genius  ;  he 
neither  could  bring  himself  to  contemplate  it  nor  to  prepare  for  its  exe- 
cution ;  in  this  last  resort  he  placed  his  reliance  solely  upon  the  pow- 
erful lever  with  which  public  opinion  appeared  to  favor  him,  and,  how- 
ever mighty  this  power  of  opinion  may  be,  it  can  only  be  durable  as 
long  as  the  condition  of  the  country  is  base  A  upon  something  positive 
and  real. 

One  moro  remark  upon  offensive  battles.  At  what  hour  should  they 
be  given?  and  this  is  a  question  of  great  importance,  worthy  of  exam- 
ination. 

The  hours,  if  the  choice  can  be  had,  should  be  changed  according  to 
circumstances.  If  there  is  any  decided  superiority  authorizing  a  firm 
reliance  upon  victory,  the  attack  must  take  place  early  in  the  morning, 
so  as  to  enable  us  to  draw  profit  from  obtained  successes.  There  is  not 
one  military  man  who  does  not  keenly  remember  the  grief  he  experienced 
when  the  night  closed  upon  success,  or  the  impatience  with  which  he  ex- 
pected thé  morning  after  a  reverse. 

Again.  The  attack  should  be  made  as  soon  as  possible,  when  the  troops 
are  all  held  well  in  hand,  and  when  the  enemy  has  not  as  yet  concen- 
trated his.  It  is  vainly  asked  why  Napoleon,  at  Waterloo4,  during  the 
longest  days  of  the  year,  attacked  the  English  only  at  eleven  in  the 
morning,  though  well  knowing,  through  an  intercepted  letter  of  Bliicher 
to  Wellington,  that  the  former  would  not  be  able  to  debouch  until  four 
o'clock  in  the  evening;  since,  if  Napoleon  was  victorious,  he  would  have 
confronted  the  Prussian  army  after  having  beaten  the  English;  and  had 
the  battle  been  against  him,  he  at  least  would  not  have  had  a  second 
army  upon  his  hands  in  the  very  midst  of  the  engagement. 

Great  military  questions  are  nearly  always  reduced  to  simple  ideas; 
and  here  the  formula  is,  whether  one  has  a  better  chance  in  fighting 
one  against  one,  or  one  against  two. 

But  if  the  forcos  are  pretty  nearly  equal  and  render  victory  uncertain, 
it  is  better  to  attack  toward  the  middle  of  tho  day  ;  the  consequences 
of  a  reverse  are  then  less  to  be  feared,  and  a  general  should,  above  all, 
think  of  preserving  his  army.  The  destruction  of  the  enemy  is  only 
effected  with  the  second  line  of  the  order  which  our  duties  and  interests 
prescribe  to  us.  And,  furthermore,  if  the  question  rests  unsolved,  the 
whole  night  remains  to  prepare  for  a  now  attack  and  other  combinations. 
Then  the  troops  have  had  some  repose,  they  have  been  able  to  take  a 
meal  before  the  engagement]  and  they  are  in  a  condition  to  display 
strength  and  energy.  On  tho  contrary,  the  army  which  defends  itself 
15 


170  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

is  full  of  reflection  and  agitation  ;  it  can  not  give  itself  up  to  the  same 
degree  of  reposo,  and,  oftentimes,  its  morale  decreases  as  the  moment  of 
action  approaches. 

In  the  midst  of  our  triumphs  in  Italy  we  experienced  two  slight  re- 
verses in  two  succeeding  days — at  Cereaand  Aile  due  Castelli — owing  to 
the  extrenje  fatigue  and  a  little  disorder  which  existed  in  Masséna's  di- 
vision. As  it  was  important  to  keep  Wurinser  shut  up  in  Mantua,  and 
to  guard  against  a  new  check,  the  troops  were  permitted  to  repose  until 
noon;  they  took  arms  only  after  having  had  a  meal,  and  the  victory  of 
Saint-George's  was  not  doubtful  for  one  moment. 

To  sum  up.  Defensive  battles  are  more  a  part  of  the  profession,  while 
offensive  battles,  well-prepared  and  well-conducted,  are  the  portion  of 
genius.  Such  was,  likewise,  the  peculiar  character  of  the  wars  of  Fred- 
eric II,  because  the  great  defensivo  Seven  Years'  War  had  almost  en- 
tirely the  character  of  the  offensive;  and,  in  this  respect,  his  campaigns 
resemble  several  of  Napoleon's  very  much,  with  the  difference,  resulting 
from  the  times  and  the  state  of  the  art. 

In  attentively  perusing  the  recital  of  the  actions  of  great  generals, 
the  character  of  their  troops  are  recognized  by  the  manner  of  their  em- 
ployment. Their  particular  excellencies  are  always  detected,  since  it 
must  be  admitted  that  those  who  excelled  in  a  particular  kind  of  war 
had  a  special  genius  for  it;  the  instinct  which  nature  has  imparted,  if 
it  be  not  our  foremost  guide,  at  least  powerfully  contributes  to  the. de- 
velopment of  our  faculties. 

In  all  centuries  the  operations  of  great  generals  have  worn  a  peculiar 
physiognomy;  even  those  conducted  by  men  most  frequently  compared 
present  essential  differences  to  our  reflection.  The  campaigns  of  Tu- 
renno  and  of  the  great  Condé  bear  no  resemblance  whatever;  it  is  the 
same  with  the  generals  of  antiquity,  if  wo  compare  Alexander  with 
Caesar  and  Fabius,  or  Haunibal  with  Scipio. 

A  skilful  general  should,  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign,  be  fully 
impressed  with  the  importance  of  his  situation,  the  more  or  less  favora- 
ble chances  of  which  depend  upon  the  character  of  his  troops,  their 
number,  the  task  assigned  to  him,  and  the  resources  which  have  been 
placed  at  his  disposal.  The  powers  thus  given  him  he  ought  to  bring 
into  action  in  the  manner  most  likely  to  attain  the  object  with  which 
he  has  been  charged,  even  if  the  particular  mode  of  execution  required 
of  him  does  not  agree  with  his  tastes  or  wishes. 

NOTES. 

1.  Confederate  Corps  of  Reserves.— Before  we  may  expect  any  extraor- 
dinary achievements  from  reserve  bodies  of  troops,  another  principle  must  be 
adopted  in  their  choice.  Now  we  have  no  body  of  reserve  corps  in  any  of  our  ar- 
mies.   Certain  regiments  or  brigados  are  simply  detailed  as  a  reserve  corps  for  thftt 


MTLITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  171 

temporary  duty.  In  doing  so,  we  neglect  one  of  the  greatost  stimulants  to  excel 
upon  the  field  of  battle:  the  creation  anrl  education  of  bodies  upon  whom  the  whole 
army  looks  with  pride,  and  to  whom  superior  excellence  is  willingly  accorded  ; 
bodies,  who,  when  they  once  march,  are  sure  to  carry  everything  before  them,  and 
whose  organization,  instead  of  being  temporary,  should  be  permanent. 

Such  bodies  can  only  be  created  in  times  of  war,  because  upon  the  field  of  battle 
their  glories  ought,  first  to  be  incontestably  established.  Now  the  proper  time  ap- 
pears to  have  come  to  create  them.  The  bravest,  best  drilled,  and  the  most  steady 
troops  should  compose  the  corps  of  reserves  of  every  army;  We  have  all  the  ele- 
ments in  our  armies;  and  we  have  an  example  in  Napoleon's  Guards,  and  in  the 
present  Imperial  Guard  of  France. 

Has  a  regiment  particularly  distinguished  itself  upon  the  field  of  battle,  let  the 
vote  of  the  whole  army  assign  it  to  the  corps  of  reserves.  The  next  battle-field 
would,  no  doubt,  show  great  emulation,  and  every  army  would  soon  have  a  splendid 
corps  of  reserves.  Has  an  officer  particularly  distingiiished  himself,  let  him  be  pro- 
moted into  the  reserves;  and  only  the  bravest  general  among  the  brave  should 
command  a  brigade  of  reserves. 

In  «he  Italian  war  of  1859,  one  of  the  principal  reasons  which  contributed  to  the 
speedj'  overthrow  of  the  Austrian  army  was  the  want  of  an  Imperial  Guard  such  as 
the  French  army  had.  This  guard  is  its  reserve  corps.  In  it  all  old  veterans  serve, 
and  a  young  soldier  has  no  chance  to  be  admitted  to  its  ranks  before  ho  has  given 
proof  of  his  prowess  upon  the  field  of  battle. 

With  the  Austrians  the  whole  army  consisted  of  comparatively  young  soldiers, 
but  few  having  served  more  than  two  years;1  and  none  over  three.  It  is,  therefore, 
easily  understood  why  they  could  not  stand  before  the  French  Imperial  Guard. 

There  seems  to  be  no  special  legislation  of  Congress,"or  even  any  particular  ordors 
from  the  Department  of  War,  necessary  to  effect  the  object  (except  such  an  order 
from  the  latter  would  at  once  effect  it).  Every  general  commanding  an  army  can 
himself,  and  ought  himself,  to  do  it.  Many  of  our  indecisive  fields  of  battle  might 
have  worn  a  different  aspect  but  for  a  fresh  corps  of  reserves.  We  are  forcibly  re- 
minded of  Sharp8burg,  and,  alas!  too  many  other  fields  of  that  kind. 

"  Had  we  but  had  five  thousand  more  men,"  may  be  heard  after  almost  every 
battle.    This  has  its  significance,  and  expresses  some  general  want. 

2.  The  lines  of  Torre3-Vedras,  in  Portugal.— The  famous  lines  con-' 
Btructed  here  during  the   Peninsular  war  by  Lord  Wellington  were  not  only,  in 
their  kind,  the  proudest  monument  of  British  military  science,  but  present  the  most 
stupendous  example  of  a  mountain-chain  of  entrenchments  which  any  age  of  the 
world  has  yet  seen. 

The  recoil  of  Mass6na's  army  from  these  lines  formed  the  point  of  reaction  in  the 
career  of  French  conquest,  from  which  all  the  subsequent  reverses  of  Napoleon  may 
bo  dated.  It  was  at  the  close  of  1809  that  these  stupendous  lines  were  commenced. 
The  offensive  movements  which  led  to  the  Battle  of  Talavera  having  put  to  the  test 
the  value  of  Spanish  co-operation,  and  having  fully  demonstrated  the  utter  ineffici- 
ency of  their  armies  from  want  of  organization,  want  of  discipline,  and  skilful  offi- 
cers, it  became  apparent  t .  >  WelUngtOB  that  the  contest  would,  in  the  next  campaign, 
devolve  on  the  small  body  of  veteran  British  and  the  newly-raised  Portuguese  troops 
Under  his  command,  and  a  defensive  system  Of  warfare  ensue.  To  prepare  for  a  final 
struggle  was  thenceforward  the  great  object  of  consideration;  and  as  the  hope  of 
successfully  defending  an  extended  and  open  frontier,  like  that  of  Portugal,  against 
a  very  superior  and  highly  skilful  enemy  could  scarcely  be  entertained,  it  was  decid- 


172  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

ed  to  seek  out  some  positions  in  the  lower  part  of  Estremadura.  not  liable  to  be 
turned  or  passed,  and  having  an  assurod  communication  with  the  sea.  which  should 
command  all  the  approaches  to  Lisbon,  and  which  positions,  being  entrenched  in  the 
strongest  manner,  would  offer  a  point' of  concentration  for  the  whole  of  the  defi-n- 
eive  forces  of  Portugal,  army,  militia,  irregular,  etc.,  where  they  might,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  British,  be  victualled  and  supplied  with  ammunition  for  any  period  of 
time,  while  occupying  a  most  favorable  field  for  deciding  the  fate  of  the  capital  and 
the  kingdom  in  a  general  action.  With  these  views,  while  the  army  was  centred 
on  the  Guadiana,  Lord  Wellington,  after  a  minute  personal  reconnoissance  of  the 
country,  commenced  a  chain  of  fortified  posts  across  the  Peninsula.  Wben  complet- 
ed they  formed  a  double  and  nearly  parallel  chain  of  redoubts  and  other  entrench- 
ments. The  outer,  or  advanced  line,  extended  from  the  mouth  of  the  small  River 
Zezandra,  on  the  ocean,  through  the  mountain  point  of  Torres-Vedras  and  Monté 
Agraça,  the  keys  of  the  position,  to  Alhandra,  on  the  Tagus  ;  and  following  the 
trace  of  its  defensive  features,  this  outer  line  measured  twenty-nine  miles.  In  rear 
of  this,  the  second  or  principal  line  of  defence  across  the  Peninsula,  had  its  left  on 
the  sea,  at  the  mouth  of  the  little  River  St.  Lorenzo  (in  front  of  Ericena),  and  its 
right  on  the  Tagus  at  Via  Longa — occupying,  on  its  trace,  the  strong  mountain- 
passes  of  Mafra,  Montachigne,  and  Buccelas,  through  which  run  three  of  the  four 
great  roads  to  Lisbon,  while  the  fourth  skirts  the  river.  The  principal  line,  in  its 
sinuosities,  measured  twenty-four  miles;  the  direct  breadth  of  the  nook  of  the  Pen- 
insula, between  the  flanks  of  the  two  lines,  being,  however,  twenty-five  and  twenty- 
two  miles  respectively. 

3.  "Wellington's  Strategy. — As  a  matter  of  interest,  wo  subjoin  here  the 
remarks  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Graham,  of  the  English  army,  on  the  strategical 
talents  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  mostly  condensed  from  General  Jomini  : 

"In  respect  to  the  influence  produced  by  Wellington  on  the  progress  of  the  art 
of  war,  although  his  campaigns  tend  to  confirm  the  great  truths  of  the  science,  it 
can  not  be  said  that  he  created  or  brought  into  practice  any  important  principles 
In  the  higher  branches  of  the  science  which  had  not  been  previously  illustrated  in 
the  operations  of  Napoleon,  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  other  celebrated  gen- 
erals. 

"At  the  same  time  it  may  be  claimed  for  Wellington  that  he  had  a  system  of 
his  own,  which  forms  an  important  and  interesting  subject  for  reflection  and  dis- 
cussion. 

"  The  combination  of  the  defensive  with  the  offensive,  generally  used  by  Wel- 
lington, has  been  thus  described  by  various  military  writers: 

"  In  the  Peninsula,  and  more  particularly  in  Portugal,  he  had  under  his  com- 
mand a  mass  of  native  troops,  better  adapted  to  act  as  light  troops  and  harass  the 
enemy  in  his  operations,  than  for  a  pitched  or  regular  battle. 

'•Having  experienced  the  fiery  ardor  of  the  French  attack,  the  impetuosity  of 
columns  led  by  Masséna  and  Ney,  ho  devised  very  skilfully  the  means  of  first 
blunting  the  force  of  that  impetuosity,  and  then  overcoming  it. 

"His  plan  was  to  choose  positions  very  difficult  of  access  ;  the  approaches  he 
covered  with  clouds  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  tirailleurs,  thoroughly  conversant 
with  the  art  of  taking  advantage  of  inequalities  of  ground;  his  artillery  he  placed 
partly  on  the  tactical  crest  of  the  position,  partly  a  little  in  rear  of  it. 

"  By  these  means  he  shattered  the  columns  on  the  march  by  a  murderous  fire 
of  artillery  and  musketry,  while  his  excellent  British  infantry,  one  hundred 
paces  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill,  was  kept  in  reserve  without  being  exposed. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  173 

"When  tlio  columns  reached  the  sum  mit,  fatigued,  out  of  breath,  and  already 
[d'-cimated,  a  general  discharge  from  the  infantry  and  artillery  of  the  second  line 
hurst  upon  them,  followed  up  immediately  by  a  charge  upon  their  half-disordered 
masses. 

•'This  description  has  only  reference  to  the  campaigns  of  Wellington  in  Spain 
and  Portugal — rugged  countries  to  which,  as  well  as  to  the  peculiar  characteristics 
of  the  troops  composing  his  army,  such  a  system  was  perfectly  suited.  In  the 
campaign  in  Belgium  a  modification  of  this  system  was  necessarily  adopted. 

"  The  position  at  Waterloo  was  on  a  plateau,  with  a  gentle  slope  in  front  of  it, 
forming  a  glacis,  over  which  the  infantry  had  a  magnificent  range  of  fire,  and  its 
effects  were  terrific.  The  flanks  of  the  British  were  well  protected,  and  Welling- 
ton could  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy  from  the  summit  of  the  plateau, 
while  his  own  were,  in  a  great  measure,  concealed.  With  all  these  advantages  it 
still  remains  a  question  whether  his  system  would  have  been  successful  on  that 
day,  if  a  multitude  of  other  circumstances  had  not  lent  their  aid. 

"  We  admire  the  sagacity  with  which  the  various  materials,  or  nationalities, 
placed  in  Wellington's  hands,  wore  used  to  the  best  advantage;  but  one  of  the  most 
striking  characteristics  of  his  operations,  as  far  as  respects  the  art  of  war,  is  his 
almost  constant  use  of  deployed  lines  two  deep. 

"His  successes  in  the  Peninsula  and  at  Waterloo,  gained  with  the  troops  so 
formed,  and  generally  attributed  to  the  deadly  fire  of  his  lines  of  infantry,  have 
given  rise  to  controversial  discussions  on  the  relative  advantages  of  the  formation 
of  troops  in  columns  and  in  lines. 

u  In  these  discussions,  highly  useful  in  some  respects,  the  tendency  in  too  many 
instances  has,  unfortunately,  been  to  reduce  the  system  of  war  to  absolute  rules  ;  as 
if  it  were  possible  to  decide  absolutely  that  troops  should  on  all  occasions  be 
formed  either  in  column  or  in  line. 

"  The  locality  in  which  they  are  to  act,  national  character,  and  other  circum- 
stances, must  be  considered  by  the  general  ;  and  it  is  for  his  genius  to  decide  when 
and  where  the  one  formation*or  the  other  may  be  the  most  advantageous." 

It  is  curious  to  perceive  how  the  paragraph  commencing  with  "  The  position  at 
Waterloo,"  etc.,  differs  from  the  same  in  Note  No.  4. 

They  are  both  translations  from  Jomini.  Of  course  Mr.  Pardigon's  is  the  cor- 
rect version,  and  Colonel  Graham  cither  did  not  know  French  sufficiently  to  trans- 
late correctly,  or  he  purposely  perverted  the  meaning  of  Jomini. 

4.  The  Battle  of  "Waterloo.— Of  the  Battle  of  Mont- Saint- Jean,  as  it  is  call- 
ed by  the  French,  La  Belle  Alliance  by  the  Prussians,  and  Waterloo,  very  singular- 
ly, by  the  English — the  Village  of  Waterloo  having  been  fully  two  miles  to  the  rear 
of  the  English  front  of  battle — so  much  has  been  written,  and  so  many  diverging 
opi§ions  by  many  celebrated  military  writers  are  on  record,  that  it  appears  ex- 
ceedingly difficult  to  form  a  just  and  correct  estimate  of  it  as  regards  the  merits 
of  the  great  leaders  therein  engaged.  And  while  we  know,  in  almost  every  bat- 
tle fought  by  Napoleon,  to  whom  to  ascribe  the  honors  of  tho  victory,  to  this  very 
day  English  and  Prussian  writers  violently  dispute  who  really  gained  the  Battle  of 
Waterloo  ;  and  the  latter  proclaim  Marshal  Blucher  as  the  victor  as  firmly  as 
the  English  maintain  that  tu  Wellington  alone  the  honors  are  due.  They  both, 
however,  agree  that  the  French  were  beaten  by  the  skill  of  their  own  generals. 

But  to  throw  some  light,  even  at  this  late  day,  upon  the  subject,  I  beg  to  refer 
to  the  incontestable  fact  of  numbers,  as  established  in  the  otlicial  data  of  "Cap- 
tain Siborne's  Waterloo  Campaign."  We  find  there  evidence,  which  perhaps  has 
15* 


174  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

as  yet  but  little  been  considered,  tbat  out  of  C7.661  men  under  Wellington  pres- 
ent upon  the  field  of  battle,  but  23,991  were  Englishmen  (and  it  maybe  well  sup- 
posed that  the  greater  part  of  those  were  gallant  Irishmen),  and  the  remaining 
troops — that  is,  43.670  men — were  mostly  Germans,  in  which  number  are  included 
nearly  18,000  of  Dutch  and  Belgians.  Of  artillery,  these  foreign  troops  actually 
had  one-half — that  is,  seventy-eight  out  of  one  hundred  and  fifty-six  guns. 

Furthermore  we  see.  from  the  same  source,  that  the  loss  of  the  English  troops, 
not  including  that  of  the  large  body  of  foreign  troops,  was  5  672  in  killed  and 
wounded  during  the  entire  action — that  is,  from  morning,  eleven  o'clock,  when 
the  village  clock  of  Nivelles  gave  the  signal  to  the  bloody  conflict,  until  night 
covered  the  ghastly  scene — and  that  the  Prussians,  who  appeared  upon  the  field 
of  battle  late  in  the  afternoon,  still  lost  as  many  as  4,810  in  killed  and  wounded; 
so  that  wo  must  infer,  if  the  English  troops  fought  very  splendidly,  the  Prussians 
did  not  the  less  so.  We  see,  therefore,  no  substantial  grounds  to  award  the  greater 
glory  to  either. 

But,  despite  the  convincing  figures  of  Siborne,  it  must  be  a  matter  of  astonish. 
ment  if  the  English,  far  from  according  any  credit  to  these  large  bodieB  of  foroign 
troops,  both  military  men  and  historians  have  not  only  depreciated  their  services, 
but  also  not  hesitated  to  cast  injurious  reflections  upon  their  character — a  course 
which  can  not  be  defended,  since  there  is  no  record  that  those  troops  failed  in 
their  duty;  on  the  contrary,  we  know  that  a  body  of  these  very  auxiliaries  defended 
and  maintained  the  important  position  of  the  Orchard  of  Hougoumont  against  the 
severest  efforts  of  the  French.  It  illustrates  strongly  a  feature  of  their  national 
character — great  selfishness  and  unblushing  unfairness  whenever  their  national 
pride,  interest,  or  prejudices  dictate  a  course  different  from  that  which  justice, 
honor,  and  magnanimity  would  appear  to  indicate. 

In  regard  to  the  respective  merit  to  be  attributed  to  the  great  commanders 
engaged  in  the  Battle  of  Mont-Saint-Jeau,  so  much  is  established,  that  Napoleon's 
combinations,  which  culminated  in  this  battle,  admit  of  no  adverse  criticism  ; 
they  are  acknowledged,  even  by  English  historians,  as  having  been  signalized  by 
the  genius  so  singularly  revived  after  the  groat  reverse  of  Leipzig,  In  October,  1813» 
and  which  was  demonstrated  by  his  subsequent  magnificent  campaign  of  1814, 
when,  in  the  plains  of  La  Champagne,  he,  with  barely  GiiOOO  men,  kept  in  check, 
for  a  long  period,  the  combined  hosts  of  the  Kussians,  Prussians,  awd  Auetrians, 
amounting  to  over  200,000  men. 

Not  very  long  ago  two  officers,  who  speak  the  French  language — one,  Colonel 
( 'barras,  a  French  exile — the  other,  a  Captain  Brialmont,  of  the  Belgian  army — have 
written  voluminous  works  to  prove  that  Napoleon  showed  very  little  if  any  gener- 
alship, extolling  that  of  Wellington  to  the  skies.  But  their  motives  are  easily  per- 
ceived, and  their  reward  has  been  the  contempt  of  all  unprejudiced  men  and  the 
high  praises  of  the  British  press. 

The  emperor's  plan  of  operations,  upon  setting  out  from  Paris,  was  to  antici. 
pate  the  junction  of  Wellington  with  Blucher  :  to  turn  to  the  right  and  beat  the 
Prussians,  and  then  seek  Wellington  and  defeat  him.  The  first  part  of  his  in- 
tended operations  succeeded  as  well  as  could  have  been  expected,  and  Blucher 
was  beaten  at  Ligny  on  the  sixteenth  of  June — bu-t  two  days  anterior  to  the  final 
struggle — and  it  would  have  ended  in  the  total  destruction  of  the  Prussians  but  for 
the  unpardonable  want  of  vigor  and  resolution  on  the  part  of  Ney,  who,  having 
been  directed  to  march  by  way  of  Quatre-Bras  aud  Bly,  upon  Blucher's  rear,  per- 
mitted himself,  despite  the  emperor's  urgent  despatch — "  The,  fate,  of  France  is  in 
your  hands" — to  be  kept  at  bay  by  a  few  thousand  men  in  front  of  Quatre-Bras — 
giving  Wellington  time  there  to  concentrate  and  defeat  him. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  175 

Both  Wellington  and  Bllicher  now  retreated  ;  the  former  from  Quatre-Bras  to 
Gtmappe  and  Waterloo-the  latter  from  Ligny  to  Wavre.  Wellington  halted  in 
front  of  the  straggling  little  Village  of  Waterloo  to  make  a  stand,  BlUcher  having 
promised  him  to  unite-on  the  18th. 

To  prevent  the  junction  of  their  forces  Napoleon  had  detached  Marshal  Grouchy, 
With  a  force  of  thirty-five  thousand  men,  toward  Wavro  and  Somhref.  with  strict 
directions  to  watch  and  keep  within  sight  of  Bllicher.  Either  a  traitor  or  an  im- 
becile, hut.  most  likely  the  former-since  his  previous  glorious  career  gives  him 
greater  cla.ms  to  intelligence-the  marshal  failed  to  do  this;  and,  although  within 
sound  of  the  firing  of  Waterloo,  knowing  that  the  fate  of  his  country  was  about 
to  be  deeded,  and  against  the  urgent  entreaties  of  Count  Gerard,  one  of  hig 
1  .eutenants.  he  refused  to  march  to  the  emperor's  assistance.  In  this  circumstance 
we  must  seek  the  main  reason  of  Napoleon's  loss  of  the  battle-for  the  issue  could 
not  have  been  doubtful  had  he  been  able  to  dispose  of  Grouchy»,  corps.  When, 
finally,  after  having  worsted  the  English  upon  every  point,  a  corps  of  seventy-two 
thousand  Prussians,  with  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  cannon,  made  its  appear- 
ance npon  the  field  of  battle,  it  was  beyond  human  power  to  preserve  the  victory. 
mil,  ha  well-contested  action  is  shown  by  the  great  loss  of  the  Prussians,  whoso 
main  body  was  not  engaged  before  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening 

From  the  battle-field  of  Waterloo,  or  rather  from  the  Chateau  of  Hougoumoot, 
it  is  about  ten  miles  north  to  Brussels,  six  miles  south  to  Genappe,  eight  and  a 
half  miles  south  to  Quatre-Bras,  fifteen  and  a  half  miles  south-east  bv  east  to 
Ligny-ali  on  the  same  road-and  but  eight  and  a  half  miles  east  to  Wavre- 
which  dntanco  could  have  been  made  by  Grouchy  in  a  forced  march  of  three 
hours,  by  his  infantry  and  foot-artillery,  and  in  one  and  a  half  hours  by  his  cavalry 
and  light-artillery. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  an  equally  well  established  fact  that  Wellington  was 
already  beaten,  and,  but  for  Grouchy',  failure,  would  not  now  be  called  the  great 
victor  of  W  aterloo  and  conqueror  of  Napoleon.    General  Jomini  gives  the  follow 

on?  ",  ™6  TfieS  °f  the  l0B8  °f  the  battle  in  a  chaPter  written  ^  1856  (wide  p 
206  of  Mr.  C.  P.  Pardigon's  translation  of  «The  Practice  of  War,"  Richmond,' 

«At  Waterloo,  the  English  general  took  position  on  a  plateau  sloping  gently 
down  and  forming  a  glacis,  where  the  artillery  formed  a  magnificent  line  of  fire 
and  ranged  with  its  most  terrible  effect;  moreover,  both  flanks  were  well  pro! 
tected.  Wellington  could  descry  from  the  crest  of  the  plateau  the  least  move- 
ments of  the  French  army,  while  the  latter  could  not  .ee  anything  of  his  But 
notwithstanding  all  those  advantages,  his  system  could  not  have  prevented  him 
from  losing  the  battle,  had  not  several  other  circumstances  turned  in  his  favor 

«  1st.  The-rain  soaking  the  ground,  rendered  very  slow  and  toilsome  the  offon- 
eive  march  of  the  French,  deprived  of  all  the  impulse  of  the  first  attacks,  and  did 
not  permit  them  to  be  properly  supported  by  artillery. 

-2d.  The  formation,  from  the  beginning,  in  too  deep  columns,  especially  at  the 
right  wing. 

"3d.  The  incoherent  use  of  the  three  arms,  since-the  cavalrv  and  the  infantry 
made  several  alternate  attacks,  without  ever  being  simultaneously  engaged. 

«4th.  Caetly,  and  above  all,  the  unexpected  arrival  of  the  whole  of  the  Prussian 
army,  falling  at  the  decisive  moment  on  the  right  flank  and  NitftLT  ox  tue  rkar  of 

the  French.  J 

*  All  military  men  of  experience  will  agree  that,  in  spite  of  mud  and  the  good 
bearing  of  the  English  infantry,  if  the  main  body  of  the  French  infantry  had 


176  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

pushed  forward  in  columns  by  battalions,  just  after  the  great  charge  of  cavalry,  the 
combined  army  would  have  been  broken  and  thrown  back  upon  Antwerp.  Even 
independently  of  those  circumstances,  the  English  army,  but  for  Vie  arrival  of 
Blucfur.  would  have  been  compelled  to  fall  back!" 

Alison  and  other  English  historians  admit  that  Wellington  was  outgeneralled  in 
the  beginning  of  the  struggle.  Wellington,  whose  claims  as  a  master  of  defensive 
warfare  can  not  be  denied,  can,  however,  not  be  ranked  as  a  first-class  general  ;  to— t 
of  all  could  he  be  placed  in  a  line  with  the  incomparable  genius  which  controlled 
the  operations  of  a  Napoleon,  as  theEnglish  would  make  us  believe.  General  Jomlui 
tells  us,  in  Nos.  2  and  3,  of  Napoleon's  failures — and  they  were  serious;  still  Welling- 
ton did  not  take  advantage  of  them,  merely  maintaining  his  defensive  position.  It 
may  be  safely  asserted  that,  in  like  circumstances,  had  Napoleon  seen  that  Welling- 
ton committed  such  mistakes,  he  would  have  acted  widely  different.  Furthermore, 
in  this  battle,  which  alone  would  give  to  Wellington  not  even  the  reputation  of 
a  second-rate  general,  he  violated  one  of  the  most  important  maxims  of  war.  by 
taking  a  position  in  front  of  the  woods  of  Soignes,  with  but  one  military  road  in 
his  rear  to  retreat  upon,  thus  leaving  behind  him  a  defile.  This  road  was  at  that 
time  the  only  one  practicable  for  artillery,  cavalry,  and  baggage-trains.  There 
are  certainly,  as  all  English  writers  maintain,  in  order  to  shield  Wellington  from 
any  censure,  many  roads  which  traverse  the  forest  of  Soignes;  but  they  were,  at 
the  time,  mere  foot  and  bridle  paths,  upon  which  a  retreat  could  not  be  conducted 
without  destruction.  Had  the  Prussians  not  come  up  in  the  nick  of  time,  Welling- 
ton would  have  been  totally  routed  upon  his  retreat;  and  the  consequences  of 
his  violation  of  one  of  the  principles  of  war  would  have  become  more  disastrous 
to  him  thau  the  passage  of  the  defile  of  Hohenlinden  was  to  the  Austriaus  fifteen 
years  before.  If,  however,  his  partisans  still  contend  that  Wellington  acted  right 
in  thus  placing  himself — a  defence  which  could  not  possibly  be  supported  by  any 
rules  of  the  art — the  inference  is  not  improper  that  he  was  driven  to  bay  by 
Napoleon's  capable  operations,  which  resulted  in  the  Battle  of  Ligny. 

Wellington  is  the  only  remarkable  Englishman  the  wars  with  Napoleon  pro- 
duced. The  immense  consequences  which  followed  in  the  train  of  the  Battle  of 
Waterloo  could  not  but  heighten  the  lustre  of  that  victory — and  to  these  two  rea. 
sons  the  great  admiration  the  English  possess  for  their  Wellington  can  easily  be 
traced. 

As  to  Marshal  Bliicher,  history  has  pronounced  its  judgment  upon  him  likewise. 
Ho  was  a  general  personally  very  brave,  and  always  ready  to  engage  in  combat 
himself,  rather  than  to  employ  his  head — leaving  that  disagreeable  work  to  his 
generally  able  chiefs  of  staff.  The  obstinacy  with  which  he  maintained  a  combat, 
and  his  great  loyalty,  so  little  found  among  French  generals,  were  not  the  least  of 
his  good  traits,  and  under  a  proper  leader  he  would  most»  likely  have  made  a  gen- 
eral of  the  character  of  Murat,  but  not  a  Ney.  »  His  often  injudicious  dispositions 
and  inconsiderate  impulses  led  to  more  defeats  than  victories.  His  coarseness, 
however,  was  astonishing,  and  almost  amounted  to  brutality,  though  he  could 
have  never  become  a  Butler. 

Under  his  explicit  orders  the  Prussian  squadrons  pursued  and  slaughtered  the 
French  with  a  degree  of  barbarity  that  has  but  seldom  been  equalled  in  history,  and 
which,  long  since,  has  been  stamped  with  the  seal  of  unqualified  condemnation  ; 
and  the  remembrance  of  their  cruel  deeds  will  be  fresh  in  the  breasts  of  French- 
men as  long  as  one  of  their  national  standards  is  raised. 

Blucher'8  motto  was:  " Forward ;"  but  uot  the  "forward"  which  aims  to 
achieve  some  great  and  humane  end  through  the  medium  of  military  operations, 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  177 

but  that  which  is  characterized  by  rapino,  murder,  and  annihilation — which,  at 
last,  would  bring  us  back  to  the  horrors  of  the  most  uncivilized  timos,  and  which 
to  check  is  the  duty  of  every  Christian  nation.  • 

To  apply  somewhat  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo  to  our 
own  struggle,  instances  could  be  cited  where  generals,  charged  by  the  general- 
in-chief  of  the  army  with  which  they  served  with  certain  operations  upon  which 
the  fate  of  the  battle,  or  the  campaign,  or,  who  knows,  the  cause,  might  have  de- 
pended, appear  to  have  signally  failed  to  carry  these  operations  into  effect.  They 
permitted  the  struggle  to  proceed,  and  did  nothing,  when  their'appearance  upon 
either  the  flank  or  the  rear  of  the  enemy  might  have  socured  the  moat  decisive 
victory;  or,  when  the  commander  of  a  large  detachment,  though  within  hearing 
of  the  conflict,  and  knowing  that  the  great  struggle  was  going  on,  remained  inde- 
cisive, did  not  move  to  where  the  fire  was  heaviest,  and  had  either  not  the  courage 
or  the  good  sense  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  hastening  to  the  support  of  the 
main  body. 

There  are  omissions  in  military  life  which  may  not  be  within  reach  of  the  Arti- 
cles of  War,  but  which,  sooner  or  later,  will  bring  upon  the  officer  thus  failing  the 
condemnation  of  the  entire  nation,  and  which  will  consign  his  name  to  those  who 
ignominiously  deceived  the  high  trust  reposed  in  them.  Such  failures  can  bo  ex- 
cused as  little  in  a  simple  colonel  as  in  the  exalted  rank  of  a  general  of  whatever 
grade,  because  the  pate  op  the  country,  and.  in  our  case,  the  immense,  stake  ofhu~ 
man  liberty,  may  depend  upon  it.  Grouchy,  whether  he  was  in  reality  a  traitor, 
or  whether  he  failed  simply  to  seize  the  decisive  moment,  i6  helçj  in  execration. 
No  Frenchman  mentions  his  name  but  with  a  curse  upon  his  lip  or  in  his  heart. 
Such  will  be  the  fate  of  those  of  whom  hereafter  it  shall  be  established  that  they 
betrayed  their  trust  ;  that  they  permitted  their  bravo  comrades  to  be  slaughtered, 
and  a  cause  to  be  ruined,  despite  the  wisest  and  most  effective  measures  of  both 
the  general-in-chief  and  the  government,  when  they  had  it  in  their  power  to  turn 
the  scales  of  victory,  and  bring  about  the  glorious  consummation  of  our  struggle. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

CONDUCT  OF  THE  GENERAL  THE  DAY  FOLLOWING  THE  VICTORY. 

Many  know  how  to  gain  battles,  but  few  how  to  profit  from  them — LosseB  in  a  bat- 
tle iucrease  indecision  and  timidity — Schœrer  at  Loano — Clairfait  at  Mayence — 
Moreau  in  1800 — Brune  on  the  Mincio — Napoleon's  conduct — He  never  needed  to 
fight  a  second  battle — Great  fatigues  momentary — Abundance  and  repose  gained 
for  a  long  time — Limits — Russian  campaign — An  offensivo  movement  of  three 
months — Requirements  of  a  serious  pursuit — Necessity  of  suiting  the  means  to 
the  end — After  Wagram — March  upou  Zna'im — Passage  of  the  Taya — Offered  suc- 
cor must  never  bo  refused. 

Note. — Marshal  Davoust. 

Generals  who  gain  battles  are  less  rare  than  those  who  know  how  to 
profit  from  victory.  They  would  make  the  engagement  the  object, 
while  it  is  but  the  means.  This  may  especially  bo  remarked  of  former 
wars  ;  still,  even  in  our  own  times,  examples  are  not  wanting. 


178  THE    SPTRTT    OF 

An  ordinary  general  thinks  only  of  the  losses  he  has  sustained,  and 
hardly  suspects  those  of  the  enemy;  from  it  arise  indecision  and  fatnl 
timidity,  instead  of  a  feeling  of  confidence,  most  probably  authorized  by 
all  attending  circumstances. 

In  1795,  after  the  Battle  of  Loauo,  Schœrer  could  have  invaded  Italy 
without  any  serious  engagement.  In  the  same  year  Clairfait,  after  his 
signal  victory  before  Mayence,  could  have  easily  advanced  under  the 
very  walls  of  Strasbourg,  had  he  marched  without  delay.  In  1800  Mo- 
reau  would  have  been  able,  by  means  of  rapid  movements,  to  complete 
his  successes  at  the  very  outset  of  the  campaign.  In  the  same  year,  in 
Italy,  Brune,  after  the  passage  of  the  Mincio  and  the  Adige,  could  have 
entirely  destroyed  the  Austrian  army  which  was  retiring  before  him; 
the  least  display  of  energy  would  have  been  sufficient,  to  such  a  degree 
did  circumstances  favor  him. 

Napoleon  is  the  first  general,  in  our  epoch,  who  knew  how  to  draw 
from  victories  all  the  results  of  which  they  were  susceptible.  After  a 
battle  had  been  gained  he  marched  with  rapidity  to  pursue  the  enemy, 
in  order  to  gain  easy  successes,  and  to  deprive  him  of  his  remaining  little 
confidence.  With  such  a  system,  a  new  battle  became  rarely  necessary 
for  the  attainment  of  an  important  object. 

While  thus  marching  it  was,  of  course,  impossible  to  provide  in  any 
great  degree  for  the  wants  of  the  army,  and  inconveniences  resulted 
therefrom,  but  they  were  of  much  less  weight  than  the  advantages  which 
were  assured.  As  a  fertile  country  was,  besides,  traversed,  in  the  midst 
of  a  compact  population,  the  sufferings  of  the  soldiers  were  much  mod- 
erated, the  rapidity  of  the  march  was  soon  slackened,  and  important 
spoils,  with  immense  resources,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  conqueror. 
Abundance  and  repose  thereafter  furnished  the  means  of  not  only  re- 
pairing the  losses,  but  also  of  augmenting  the  effective.  While  Napo- 
leon made  war  in  Germany  he  acted  in  this  manner,  and  found  himself 
well  off.  Vienna,  twice  occupied,  supplied  him  with  incalculable  re- 
sources, and  was  itself  a  pledge  in  the  negotiations,  whose  value  could 
not  be  too  highly  estimated. 

But  there  is  a  limit  in  these  operations  which  can  not  be  exceeded 
without  impunity.  When  this  system  of  war  was  applied  to  Russia,  the 
question  was  not  to  make  ten  or  twelve  rapid  marches,  in  the  midst  of  a 
country  full  of  resources  and  inhabited  by  a  mild  people,  accustomed  to 
order  and  obedience;  it  was,  on  the  contrary,  an  offensive  movement  of 
nearly  three  months'  duration*,  almost  without  halting,  in  a  poor  coun- 
try, offering  but  the  most  indifferent  resources,  and  inhabited  by  an 
oftentimes  hostile  people.     This  movement  had  not  for  its  object  the 

*  Passage  of  the  Niémen,  23d  of  June  ;  entrance  Into  Moscow,  14th  of  September 
— tho  movement  occupying  eighty-three  days. — Note  of  Author. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  179 

pursuit  of  a  vanquished  army,  but  to  overtake  an  army  which  was  con- 
tinually falling  back  upon  now  resources,  while  wo  were  expending  ours 
upon  the  march  alone,  and  to  alleviate  the  sufferings,  of  every  descrip- 
tion, which  our  soldiers  underwent* — sufferings  which  soon  engendered 
a  state  of  things  bordering  on  disorganization.  Napoleon  was  then 
marching  into  certain  misfortune. 

If  we  are  right  in  saying  that,  to  satisfy  one  of  the  great  principles  of 
war,  a  general  should  seek  to  profit  from  his  successes,  and  to  neglect 
nothing  to  complete  them  by  rapid  movements  in  the  pursuit  of  the  beaten 
enemy,  we  likewise  perceive  that  this  rule  is  by  no  means  without  its 
limits,  and  that  its  application  should  always  be  subordinate  to  the  exi- 
gencies of  particular  circumstances. 

But  if  a  serious  pursuit  must  be  undertaken,  the  most  powerful  and 
compact  resources  must  be  lavished  upon  it,  suitable  to  surmount  all  ob- 
staeles.  If,  on  the  contrary,  a  general  is  forced  to  keep  back,  he 
strengthens  the  morale  of  tho  enemy,  and  advantages  escape  him  upon 
which  we  could  have  rightfully  counted. 

After  the^  Battle  of  Wagram,  on  the  8th  of  July,  Napoleon  ordered  me 
to  the  command  of  one  of  the  vanguards  of  the  Grand  Arm}'.  Masséna 
was  following  the  main  body  of  the  enemy's  army,  which  was  retreating 
upon  the  road  of  Hollabrun.  I  was  thrown  upon  the  road  to  Nicolsburg, 
to  pursue  Prince  Rosemberg,  who  was  marching  in  that  direction,  and 
Marshal  Davoust  received  orders  to  sustain  me  with  his  corps.  I  over- 
threw the  troops  in  my  front;  and  as  they  changed  direction  and  aban- 
doned the  road  to  Moravia  to  march  upon  Laa,  to  effect  there  a  pas- 
sage over  the  Taya,  so  as  to  unite  with  their  main  body  at  Znai'm,  I  took 
the  same  direction.  On  the  evening  of  the  9th,  when  I  had  arrived  upon 
that  river,  I  received  a  message  from  Marshal  Davoust,  written  from 
Wilfersdorf,  to  the  effect  that  if  I  wished  succor  he  was  ready  to  join  me. 
I  had  experienced  but  little  resistance  from  the  enemy,  and  no  circum- 
stance authorized  me  in  deeming  any  succor  necessary  ;  I,  therefore, 
extended  no  invitation  to  that  effect  to  Marshal  Davoust. 

I  thought,  besides,  that  since  nobody  had  moved  upon  Nicolsburg, 
Davoust  ought  to  cease  marching  upon  that  town.  Still  everything 
happened  differently  from  what  circumstances  had  authorized  me  to  be- 
lieve. Davoust  marched  upon  Nicolsburg  in  order  to  subsist  more 
easily  ;  and  I  marched  upon  Znai'm,  where  I  expected  to  meet  nothing 
but  a  rear-guard,  and  to  be  able  to  join  Masséna.  But  the  retreat  of 
the  enemy  had  been  slower  than  I  thought,  and  two-thirds  of -his  army 


*The  first  corps,  when  entering  upon  the  campaign,  was  eighty-five  thousand 
men  strong;  at  the  review  of  Moscow  it  had  only  fifteen  thousand. 

The  French  cavalry  of  the  line,  when  commencing  the  campaign,  counted  fifty 
thousand  men  ;  at  the  levitw  of  Moscow,  six  thousand. — Aote  of  Author. 


180  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

were  still  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  with  nearly  the  whole  train,  and 
one-third  was  in  my  front.  I  took  a  defensive  position  to  resist  his  as- 
saults ;  and  this  position  being  sufficiently  near  to  Znai'm,  influenced 
the  retreat  of  the  enemy's  army,  by  commanding  the  passage  of  the 
bridge  over  the  Taya.  Despite  his  reiterated  efforts,  he  could  not  dis- 
lodge me  ;  still  I  did  not  feel  the  fault  I  had  committed  the  less,  in  not 
calling  for  Davoust's  support,  and  that  which  he  himself  had  committed 
in  not  at  once  marching  to  sustain  me.  The  retreat  of  the  hostile  army 
having  been  broken,  and  the  greater  portion  of  his  forces  obliged  to  re- 
treat upon  very  difficult  cross-roads  and  to  again  ascend  the  Taya,  the 
sequel  would  probably  have  been  the  loss  of  the  greater  portion  of  his 
material  and  his  disorganization.  This  success  would  have  had  incal- 
culable consequences. 

Succor  which  is  believed  superfluous  should  never  be  called  for;  but 
if  any  is  offered  it  ought  never  to  bo  refused.  Often  a  fortuitous  occa- 
sion arrives  when,  unexpectedly,  such  succor  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. 

NOTE. 

Marshal  Davoust,  Prince  d'Eckmuhl.— This  distinguished  soldier  of 
the  French  Republic  and  the  Empire  was  educated  for  the  army  at  the  Ecole 
Militaire.  At  fifteen  years  of  age  he  received  his  commission  as  a  sub-lieutenant, 
and'in  1788  was  appointed  to  the  cavalry  in  the  Royal  Champagne  regiment. 
Soon  after  the  breaking  out  of  the  revolutionary  war  he  was  raised  to  the  rank 
of  provisional  chef  de  brigade,  and  in  1796  was  general  of  brigade.  In  these 
capacities  he  fought  in  Belgium,  on  the  Rhone,  and  Moselle,  and  in  Egypt.  Ho 
particularly  distinguished  himself  at  the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  in  tho  attack  and 
capture  of  the  entrenchments  of  the  enemy  at  Diersheim  and  Honnau  ;  in  tLe 
expedition  to  Upper  Egypt  with  General  Desaix,  and  at  the  Battle  of  Aboukir,  on 
July  25, 1799.  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  discovering  his  military  talents,  appointed 
him  a  general  of  division,  and  gave  him  the  command  of  cavalry  with  the  Army 
of  Italy  in  1800,  and  in  the  following  year  appointed  him  inspector-general  of 
the  French  cavalry.  When  the  camp  was  formed  at  Bruges  in  1803,  tho  command- 
in-chief  was  conferred  on  Davoust.  He  subsequently  received  the  bâton  of  a 
marshal  of  the  empire,  and  in  that  exalted  capacity  commanded  the  corps  d'armée 
ort  the  Rhine  and  in  Germany,  contributing,  by  his  skill  and  bravery,  to  the  subju- 
gation of  Prussia  and  Austria.  In  1808  he  was  created  Due  d'Auerstadt,  and  in 
1809  was  raised  to  the  dignity  of  Prince  d'Eckmuhl.  After  the  campaign  in 
Germany  he  held  command  in  the  Grand  Army  which  struggled  for  Frencli 
dominion  in  Spain  and  Portugal.  Upon  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  he  was 
'deprived  of  all  the  appointments  he  'enjoyed  ;  but  in  August,  1817,  the  privileges 
and  emoluments  of  a  French  marshal  were  restored  to  him.  He  lived  to  enjoy 
them  until  1823.  when  he  died  in  Paris,  on  the  1st  of  June. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  181 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

RETREATS. 

In  presence  of  a  stronger  force — Delicate  operation — Difficulty  consists  in  the  morale 
of  troops — Different  effect  upon  the  soldier  when  he  marches  from  the  enemy — To 
scorn  the  enemy  is  to  excite  his  respect — First  dispositions — Necessity  of  retard- 
ing the  enemy's  march — Echelons — Partial  combat»— Rear-guard — Importance 
of  artillery — The  enemy  kept  at  bay— 1814,  Bltlcher  before  Vindé — Six  thousand 
men  retire  in  peace  before  forty-five  thousand — Retreat  upon  the  Voire  after  the 
Bnttlo  of  Brienne— The  enemy  attracted  at  Pertho — The  defile  of  Rosnai  passed 
without  disorder,  and  as  if  on  drill— Retreats  with  troops  equal  in  number  to  the 
enemy's — Position  chosen  in  advance — Calculation  as  to  time,  distance,  and 
celerity — Retreat  upou  the  Duero — Moroau  retreating  upon  the  Rhine — Masséna 
in  Portugal.  % 

Note. — Marshal  Blasséna. 

That  retreats  executed  in  the  presence  of  a  superior  enemy  have  al- 
ways called  forth  great  eulogiums  is  very  reasonable,  since  they  are 
among  the  most  delicate  and  momentous  operations  of  war. 

The  principal  difficulty  is  to  be  found  in  the  morale  of  troops,  which, 
under  such  circumstances,  is  greatly  shaken.  It  is  a  singular  fact 
what  a  different  impression  is  made  upon  the  soldier  when  he  stands 
face  to  face  with  the  enemy,  and  when  his  back  is  turned  toward  him. 

In  the  first  case,  he  only  €ees  what  really  exists,*  in  the  second,  his 
imagination  never  fails  to  magnify  the  danger.  It  is,  therefore,  the 
duty  of  a  general  to  inspire  his  troops  with  sentiments  of  pride  and  with 
confidence,  justified  in  view  of  their  situation,  and  to  make  the  power 
and  necessity  of  these  impressions  felt  as  one  of  the  means  of  their 
safety. 

He  must  teach  the  soldier  that,  by  scorning  the,  enemy,  the  latter  will 
respect  him.  In  ordinary  cases,  when  a  general  is  obliged  to  retire  at 
the  approach  of  the  hostile  army,  and  when  no  additional  circumstances 
may  require  his  prolonged  stay  in  the  position  he  is  about  to  evacuate, 
both  reason  and  prudence  require  of  him  to  begin  his  movements  before 
the  arrival  of  the  enemy.  In  keeping  an  interval  of  from  six  to  seven 
miles  at  least,  his  march  will  be  pursued  with  increased  ease  and 
facility.  But  circumstances  may  occur  when  it  becomes  necessary, 
above  every  other  consideration,  to  retard  the  enemy's  march,  and  to 
oblige  him  to  lose  time  in  making  dispositions  for  attacking  us,  which 
will  suddenly  become  superfluous,  because  we  withdraw  as  soon  as  the 
prospects  of  the  opening  of  the  engagement  becomes  serious.  In  such 
an  event  both  excellent  troops,  and  great  precautions  on  the  part  of 
him  who  commands  thctn,  arc  required.  Security  then  must  be  found 
in  the  dispositions  of  the  echelons  and  the  precision  of  movements. 
1G 


182  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

If  the  retiring  corps  is  of  such  disproportion  with  the  pursuing  as  to 
forbid  the  commander  of  the  former  to  offer  battle,  partial  combats,  if 
prudently  sustained  and  initiated,  are  still  in  his  power  and  without 
danger.  To  this  end,  all  necessary  movements  and  dispositions  should 
be  made  beforehand,  so  as  to  prevent  his  troops  from  being  seized  by 
any  kind  of  embarrassment,  and  to  maintain  their  march  in  as  easy  and 
light  a  manner  as  possible.  He  will  strengthen  his  rear-guard  with  a 
sufficient  body  of  artillery,  without  encumbering  the  same.  The  artil- 
lery should  be  well  servod,  perfect  in  its  material,  and  ought  to  contain 
several  pieces  of  heavy  calibre.  This  artillery,  if  divided  into  two  or 
three  sections,  in  echelon,  will  march  with  facility,  and  be  well  prepared 
for  any  successive  and  instantaneous  stands  for  resistance  that  may  be 
requisite.  The  enemy  will  thus  be  forced  to  stop  and  make  his  dis- 
positions before  the  attack  takes  place,  and  at  the  moment  his  disposi- 
tions aro  finished  the  movement  is  once  more  begun,  and  we  disappear. 
Then  the  enemy  advances  again,  but  is  held  at  bay  by  the  fire  of  the 
artillery,  which  soon  will  show  its  superiority  over  his — beoauso  the  one, 
in  pursuing,  extends  his  columns,  while  the  other  party,  by  retiring,  is 
constantly  withdrawing  from  the  battle-field  and  approaching  the  re- 
serves. 

And,  from  this  time,  a  like  constant  change  will  take  place  in  the 
respective  forces  thus  coming  into  contact. 

On  the  25th  of  February,  1814,  I  executed  a  movement  of  this  kind 
very  successfully.  I  operated  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Aube,  and  my 
corps  was  composed  of  about  six  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  The  Prus- 
sian army,  commanded  by  Marshal  Blucher,  and  forty-five  thousand 
strong,  passed  that  river  at  Plancy,  and  marched  against  me.  I  took 
position  upon  the  heights  of  Vindé,  in  rear  of  Sezanne.  The  appear- 
ances were  such  that  I  imparted  to  the  hostile  general  the  belief  of 
being  resolved  to  engage  him.  He  made  complete  dispositions  to  attack 
and  surround  me,  and  massed  a  battery  of  thirty  guns.  The  moment 
came  ;  all  my  troops  gave  way  with  order,  unity,  and  celerity,  and  the 
enemy  began  to  pursue  ;  but  during  the  march,  which  continued  all  day, 
circumstances  conspired  in  keeping  him  always  at  a  distance,  and  he 
was  obliged-  to  stop  his  march  frequently,  in  order  to  reassemble  his 
forces  whenever  they  became  too  pressing.  I  arrived  at  Ferté-Gaucher, 
while  continually  exchanging  cannon-balls,  and  took  position  in  rear  of 
Morin.  I  had  only  lost  those  struck  by  the  enemy's  balls,  and  neither 
a  single  living  man  nor  one  piece  of  cannon  had  been  left  behind. 

On  the  day  succeeding  the  Battle  of  Brienne  I  was  charged  by  Na- 
poleon to  retire  upon  Voire,  and  to  take,  at  first,  a  position  at  Perthe, 
to  attract  the  attention  of  the  enemy  the  longest  time  possible,  thus 
making  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  main  body  of  the  troops,  who  were 
retiring  upon  the  Aube  by  the  bridge  of  Lesmont.     After  parading  my 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  183 

forces  during  the  day,  and  proparing  my  retreat  to  make  it  with  surety, 
I  executed  it,  without  any  loss,  under  the  cannon  of  the  enemy.  I 
passed  the  defile  of  Rosnai,  without  disorder  and  as  if  upon  drill,  before 
me  the  army  of  the  enemy,  which  almost  entirely  had  been  directed  upon 
me  ;  it  was  unable  to  clear  the  Voire,  the  passage  of  which  it  had 
several  times  attempted  in  vain. 

If  the  retiring  army  is  of  sufficient  force  to  measure  itself  with  the 
enemy,  the  dispositions  will  be  analogous.  Its  security  rests  then  in 
the  manner  of  disposing  the  echelons;  the  end,  however,  is  always  the 
application  of  the  fundamental  principle  already  established — that  is, 
to  be  always  more  numerous  than  the  enemy  at  the  moment  of  the  en- 
gagement upon  the  battle-field. 

The  best  disposition  to  be  made  in  a  similar  combination,  is  as  fol- 
lows :  To  set  out  with  the  army  at  an  early  hour,  leaving  a  strong  rear- 
guard, which  marches  as  late  as  possible,  without,  however,  compro- 
mising itself,  and  to  take  a  position  upon  a  defensive  ground  at  such  a 
distance  that  the  enemy  could  not  arrive  there  before  three  hours  of 
sunset.  Whatever  his  ardor  to  engage,  there  is  no  time  to  make  the 
requisite  preparatory  dispositions  ;  and  if  he  ventures  upon  an  attack 
without  having  completed  them  he  ought  to  be  crushed,  because  the 
encamped  army  has  all  of  its  forces  assembled,  while  he  necessarily 
can  only  dispose  of  a  part  of  his  own. 

It  was  thus  when  the  Army  of  Portugal  retired,  in  1812,  very  inferior 
to  the  English,  within  sight  of  the  latter,  from  the  banks  of  the  Tonnes, 
to  take  a  position  upon  the  Duero,  the  enemy  making  no  effort  at  any 
time  to  pursue  it. 

In  1796,  when  General  Moreau  evacuated  Bavaria  to  retire  upon  the 
Rhine,  and  was  followed  by  the  Austrian  army,  he  reduced  the  above 
theory  to  practice;  and  when,  finally,  too  heavily  pressed,  and  march- 
ing perfectly  concentrated,  he  made  a  halt,  gave  battle,  and  came  off 
victorious. 

But  if  an  army  upon  retreat,  and  even  a  simple  rear-guard,  finds 
upon  its  route  an  impregnable  position,  which  the  enemy  can  only 
seize  by  turning  at  a  distance,  it  should  always  remain  in  occupation  of 
the  same  as  long  as  it  can  be  done  without  danger.  If  the  enemy 
manœuvres  to  cause  its  evacuation,  the  operations  of  the  campaign  will 
thereby  be  delayed,  and  time  is  everything  to  him  who  defends  himself. 
If  the  enemy,  In  his  impatience,  attacks  with  some  degree  of  ardor, 
and  rushes  upon  obstacles  of  some  extent,  an  easy  victory  will  be 
achieved,  sometimes  exceedingly  murderous  for  the  enemy,  and  sus- 
ceptible of  changing  the  respective  mor^il  state  of  both  armies  in  favor 
of  the  defenders. 

This  happened  in  Portugal  on  the  27th  of  September,  1810.  The 
English  army,  inferior  to  the  French,  occupied  a  post  on  the  26th, 


184  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

upon  the  mountain  of  Busaco,  a  counterfort  of  the  Sierra  d'Accoba. 
The  right  of  the  position  being  impregnable,  barred  the  road,  while 
the  left,  supported  by  higher  mountains,  was  of  easy  access.  Masséna, 
to  whom  the  emperor  had  recommended  to  profit  by  his  superiority, 
and  to  force  the  enemy  to  receive  battle,  resolved  to  attack  him  at 
once,  and,  unhappily,  without  having  before  sufficiently  reconnoitred 
the  entire  front  of  his  position.  After  unheard-of  efforts  the  corps  of 
General  Reignier  succeeded  in  scaling  the  mountain  under  the  enemy's 
fire  ;  but  having  arrived  upon  the  plateau,  and  finding  the  entire  Eng- 
lish army  in  lino  of  battle,  it  was  easily  overthrown,  and  in  a  few 
minutes  lost  the  ground  which  it  had  cost  a  painful  and  brave  struggle 
of  one  hour  to  gain.  Six  thousand  men  were  disabled.  The  next  day, 
at  the  sight  of  the  French  army  operating  against  its  right,  the  English 
army  disappeared.  The  result  of  this  unfortunate  combat  changed  the 
morale  of  the  two  armies  ;  it  diminished,  on  our  part,  that  blind  confi- 
dence which  is  so  necessary  to  success,  and  enhanced  that  of  the 
enemy.  Had  this  event  not  taken  place,  an  attack  upon  the  lines  of 
Lisbon  would,  most  probably,  have  been  attempted,  and  had  it  suc- 
ceeded, the  Peninsular  war  would  have  been  terminated. 

NOTE. 

Marshal  Massena,  Prince  of  Essling.— Originally  a  private  soldier,  he 
advanced  gradually,  between  August,  1775,  to  September,  1784,  through  the  vari- 
ous ranks  of  corporal,  sergeant,  fourrier,  and  adjutant  sous-officer.  In  1789  he  re- 
ceived leave  of  absence;  but  we  find  him  rejoining  the  army  in  1791,  and  obtain- 
ing the  command  of  a  battalion  in  1792.  In  the  autumn  of  the  following  year  he 
was  made  a  general  of  brigade,  and  in  the  winter  a  general  of  division.  Ho  made 
all  the  campaigns  of  the  Revolution  with  the  Armies  of  the  Alps,  Italy,  the  Rhine, 
and  Helvetia.  In  1799  he  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Danube. 
Everywhere  so  much  success  attended  his  operations,  that  he  acquired  the  appel- 
lation of  *  L'Enfant  gâté  de  la  Victoire."  On  the  assumption  by  Napoleon  of  the 
imperial  crown,  Masséna  was  made  a  marshal.  The  years  1805  and  1806  saw  him 
commanding  armies  in  Italy,  and  in  1809  he  was  at  the  head  of  the  corps  of  ob- 
servation on  the  Rhine.  The  failure  of  Soult,  Victor,  Ney,  etc.,  induced  Napoleon 
to  send  Masséna  into  Portugal,  but  it  was  only  to  sustain  defeat  at  Busaco  and  Fu- 
entes  d'Onore,  and  to  be  compelled  to  retire  from  before  the  formidable  lines  of 
Torres-Vedras.  Upon  his  retroat  he  lost  some  forty  thousand  men.  Returning  to 
France,  he  was  made  Governor  of  Toulon  in  1813,  chief-commandant  of  the  eighth 
military  division,  and  governor.  In  July,  1815,  he  was  Governor  of  Paris,  and  died 
April  4, 1817. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  185 

CHAPTER   IX. 

NIGHT  ATTACKS  AND  SURPRISES. 

A  surprise  a  good  fortune — Good  troops  never  meet  with  surprises,  and  only  under- 
take them — Night  attacks — Opportunities — Few  troops  to  be  employed — Disorder- 
in  tho  enemy's  ranks — Certain  success  against  indifferently  disciplined  troops—' 
Necessity  of  very  precise  instructions — Examples  :  Austrian  army  at  Hochkirch 
— Affair  at  Etoges  in  1814;  surprise  of  Ouroussow's  corps — Chevert  at  Prague — 
Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy  at  Cremona — Details — Presence  of  mind  of  French  sol- 
dier— Attempt  of  the  English  against  Berg-op-Zoom ;  fine  defence  of  General 
Bizanet — General  Laudon  at  Glatz — Enterprise  against  the  T  of  Mantua — Colo- 
nel Dufour  at  the  Fort  of  Bard — M.  de  Sénarmont. 

Notes. — 1.  The  Battle  of  Hochkirch.  2.  Celebrated  turning  manoeuvre  of  Fred- 
eric after  the  battle. 

A  theory  treating  of  surprises  can  not  be  established.  It  should  bo 
an  impossibility  to  execute  surprises  in  the  daytime,  and  it  would  al- 
ways be  so  if  every  chief  and  every  soldier  did  unceasingly  perform 
the  duties  of  his  profession  with  exactness  and  intelligence  ;  but  some- 
times things  happen  differently.  Still,  whenever  we  succeed,  and  tho 
enemy  can  be  surprised,  we  must  look  upon  it  as  a  fortunate  occurrence, 
from  which  too  much  profit  can  not  be  derived,  since  there  is  no  oper- 
ation in  war  promising  a  more  prompt  and  easy  consummation. 

Troops  which  are  in  the  required  order  of  formation  for  such  an  en- 
terprise, and  who  know  that  they  are  about  to  be  engaged — who  are,  fur- 
thermore, imbued  with  a  consciousness  of  their  strength  and  a  feeling 
of  confidence — such  troops,  attacking  a  surprised  enemy,  can  not  be  re- 
sisted by  anything;  they  have  all  the  advantages  on  their  side,  and 
have  a  right  to  consider  the  victory  as  already  secured. 

Only  very  good  troops,  animated  with  an  excellent  spirit,  and  com- 
manded by  a  skilful  general  who  takes  his  resolutions  promptly,  may 
sometimes  escape  a  catastrophe,  when  placed  in  like  circumstances. 
But  it  is  also  true  that  similar  troops  and  a  general  of  that  kind  will 
never  conduct  themselves  so  as  to  be  placed  in  such  a  condition. 

It  is  entirely  different  with  night  attacks,-  there  can  be  no  surprise, 
in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  term;  in  that  case  it  is  a  mere  unfore- 
seen, impetuous  attack,  and  ignorance  of  the  true  dispositions  of  the 
enemy,  owing  to  the  fact  of  our  inability  to  reconnoitre  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  during  the  night-time,  except  at  a  very  short  distance, 
whenever  armies  are  very  near  each  other. 

Only  in  case  of  very  great  proximity  I  believe  such  an  enterprise  to 
be  possible;  because,  otherwise' it  would  be  necessary  to  march  a  long 
distance  before  the  attack  can  take  place,  and  then  the  different  col- 
umns, at  the  moment  of  action,  would  most  likely  be  unable  to  act  with 
any  degree  of  harmony  between  them. 
16* 


9 


186  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

I  repeat,  then,  that  such  actions  can  only  happen  when  two  armies 
have  approached  very  close  to  each  other;  then,  bodies  of  medium 
strength  alone  should  at  first  be  employed;  they  should  attack  simulta- 
neously upon  several  points,  and  seek,  above  all,  to  create  disorder  in 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy.  If  they  succeed  in  this,  the  effects  of  a  victory 
are  obtained  without  any  great  sacrifices,  and  we  are  enabled  to  profit 
from  it  in  proportion  as  the  condition  of  affairs  would  thereafter  per- 
mit us  to  do. 

Against  mediocre  and  indifferently  disciplined  troops  such  actions 
will  especially  be  advantageous.  If  such  troops,  in  the  midst  of  the 
uncertainty  of  a  real  attack,  arc  moved  forward,  confusion  soon  spreads 
among  them,  and  sometimes  it  will  even  happen  that  the  different  col- 
umns mistake  and  combat  each  other,  entirely  to  the  profit  of  the  as- 
sailants, who  will  be  merespectators  of  the  scene  ;  while  he  who  attacks, 
on  the  contrary,  employing  but  part  of  his  troops,  after  having  given 
to  them  precise  instructions  as  to  the  sphere  in  which  they  will  be  re- 
quired to  operate,  and  having  made  them  acquainted  with  the  position 
and  direction  of  the  other  columns,  will  be  much  less  apt  to  fall  into 
like  fatal  errors.  More  than  once  the  columns  of  the  same  army,  oper- 
ating during  the  night,  have  each  mistaken  the  other  for  the  enemy,  and 
much  damage  has  been  done*.  If  a  simple  accident  can  lead  to  such 
actions,  it  is  easily  understood  how  possible  it  is  to  originate  them  ; 
they  will  then  be  much  more  serious,  since  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
is  a  reality,  and  he  can  make  himself  felt  in  a  direct  manner.  It  is, 
therefore,  well,  should  circumstances  be  very  favorable,  sometimes  to 
attempt  night  attacks  ;  at  first  to  employ  but  a  limited  number  of  troops, 
who,  by  seeking  to  become  masters  of  several  important  points,  and  to 
keep  near  enough  to  overwhelm  the  en/smy  in  force  at  break  of  day,  can 
derive  the  greatest  advantage  from  such  operations. 

The  most  striking  example  of  a  night  attack  of  this  kind  may  be 
found  in  the  enterprise  of  the  Austrian  army  against  the  Prussians  at 
Hochkirch,  during  the  night  of  the  thirteenth  of  October,  1758.  Both 
armies  were  in  close  proximity.  Marshal  Daun  planned  the  attack  with 
skill,  and  General  Laudon  executed  it  with  great  vigor.  It  was  favor- 
ed by  the  blind  confidence  of  Frederic  the  Great,  who  failed  to  perceive 
the  dangers  which  menaced  him.  A  spirited  attack,  executed  with  sev- 
eral columns,  made  the  Austrians  masters  of  the  great  battery  in  the 
Prussian  camp.  The  battle  lasted  with  great  energy  until  ten  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  when  the  Prussian  army  was  forced  to  a  retreat,  which 

*  As  a  testimony,  see  the  rash  action  of  the  Austrian  army  at  Karausebes,  in 
1789.  under  Joseph  I.  The  different  columns  mistaking  each  other  for  the  enemy, 
at  night  fired  upon  each  other,  and  more  than  six  thousand  men  were  disabled. — 
Note  of  Author. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  187 

it  executed  with  order  and  without  being  pursued,  after  having  lost 
nearly  its  whole  artillery.  The  excellent  character  of  the  Prussian  troops 
and  the  prestige  of  the  name  of  the  great  captain  who  had  been 'con- 
quered, alone  saved  the  army1,  2. 

But  if  circumstances  permitting  an  undertaking  of  this  nature  do  but 
rarely  occur,  and  if  the  execution  of  the  attack  requires  great  delicacy 
and  much  meditation,  yet  there  are  other  circumstances  in  which  a  com- 
mander should  manifest  no  hesitation,  and  where,  without  running  any 
risk  in  case  of  failure,  success  will  be  attended  with  the  greatest  results. 

If  troops  who  are  beaten,  and  upon  the  retreat,  inconsiderately  take 
a  position  in  the  evening  too  near  the  pursuing  enemy,  and  are  unpro- 
tected by  any  material  obstacles,  the  circumstances  are  exceedingly  fa- 
vorable; then  a  night  attack,  executed  with  but  few  troops,  but  led 
with  vigor  and  intelligence,  will  always  be  eminently  proper. 

In  the  evening  of  the  Battle  of  Vauchamps  I  had  the  fortune  to  ap- 
ply this  principle  with  much  success. 

On  the  lith  of  February,  1814,  after  the  rash  morning's  action  of 
Vauchamps,  which  cost  four  thousand  prisoners  to  the  Prussian  army, 
the  enemy  commenced  his  retreat;  my  corps  pursued  him  with  much 
ardor,  and  I  succeeded  in  surrounding  his  rear-guard,  composed  of  a 
Russian  division,  with  my  cavalry,  augmented  by  a  reserve  of  the 
same  arm  which  Napoleon  had  placed  under  my  disposition.  This 
Russian  infantry  bravely  resisted  the  charges  directed  upon  it,  and 
continued  to  march. 

When  arrived  at  Etoges,  upon  the  approach  of  night,  and  under 
shelter  of  the  woods  which  it  had  crossed,  the  Russian  infantry 
arrested  its  march  and  made  preparations  for  encamping  for  the 
night.  I  had  received  an  order  from  Napoleon  to  halt  at  Champ-Au- 
bert  and  take  position  there  ;  but  being  perfectly  acquainted  with 
the  place,  having  left  there  only  the  preceding  day,  and  knowing  that 
the  position  of  Etoges  was  as  bad  for  the  enemy  as  it  was  favorable  to 
us,  and  foreseeing  that,  on  the  day  following,  I  would  most  likely  be 
charged  with  covering  the  emperor's  movement  to  gain  the  vicinity 
of  the  corps  manoeuvring  in  the  basin  of  the  Seine,  I  considered  it 
of  urgency  to  attempt  a  sudden  assault  upon  the  Russian  infantry,  and 
not  to  wait  until  they  had  evacuated  the  Village  of  Etoges.  I  concen- 
trated eight  hundred  infantry  and  formed  in  columns  upon  the 
main-road,  placing  only  fifty  men  upon  the  right  and  loft  into  the 
woods,  at  a  distance  of  one  hundred  paces,  to  guard  the  flanks,  and 
myself  marching  with  them.  I  moved  forward  with  the  strictest  silence, 
prohibiting  the  men  from  firing  a  single  shot,  but  charging  them  to  fall 
upon  the  enemy  as  soon  as  they  should  come  sufficiently  within  his 
presence.     The  distance  from  Champ-Aubert  to  Etoges  is  about  two 


188  THE   SPIRiT   OF 

miles.  In  half  an  hour  we  had  reached  the  enemy's  outposts.  The 
Russian  troops,  occupied  with  their  camping  operations,  were  scattered 
about,  and  only  the  grand-guards  and  posts  of  observation  were  under 
arms.  With  a  bayonet-charge  we  drove  everything  before  us,  and 
threw  ourselves  upon  the  village;  and  in  one  moment,  after  having  re- 
ceived scarcely  five  hundred  shots,  the  entire  infantry  and  artillery, 
consisting  of  about  four  thousand  men,  were  in  our  power,  with  Prince 
Ouroussow,  the  commanding  officer. 

After  a  decided  reverse  and  a  precipitate  retreat,  no  matter  how  or- 
derly the  latter  is  executed,  we  must  then  be  sufficiently  distant  from 
the  enemy  on  the  evening  of  the  engagement  to  be  beyond  his  reach  ; 
and  after  an  undoubted  success  we  must  never  hesitate  to  make  a  sud- 
den attack  during  the  night  upon  a  beaten  enemy,  who  imprudently  has 
placed  himself  within  reach  of  the  blows  of  his  victor. 

I  come  now  to  surprises,  whose  object  is  to  seize  a  fortified  place. 
Enterprises  of  this  kind  have  been  undertaken  several  times;  some  have 
succeeded,  others  have  failed  ;  and  although  it  is  a  difficult  matter  to 
recognize  in  any  precise  manner  the  circumstances  influencing  the  issue 
of  such  undertakings,  they  may  still  somewhat  be  indicated  by  seeking 
to  discover  the  conditions  upon  which  success  depends. 

When  such  operations  can  be  executed,  hesitation  should  never  influ- 
ence their  trial,  since  their  success  will  oftentimes  suddenly  change 
both  the  system  and  the  character  of  a  war,  and  secure  advantages 
much  greater  than  those  resulting  from  a  gained  battle. 

Commonly,  operations  are  carried  on  by  means  of  intelligence  estab- 
lished with  the  inhabitants.  Sometimes  money  is  a  sufficiently  strong 
inducement  to  seduce  them;  but  when  religious  or  political  passions 
are  exercising  their  influence,  the  chance  of  encountering  individuals 
whose  character  passes  for  honorable,  and  who  are  disposed  to  serve  us, 
is  pretty  often  presented.  There  are  likewise  enterprises  solely  exe- 
cuted by  the  application  of  ruse,  audacity,  and  courage,  which  are  suc- 
cessful, and  whose  project  is  based  upon  the  known  weakness  of  a 
garrison,  or  some  negligence  which  has  crept  into  the  service.  Among 
the  number  of  the  last-mentioned  I  recall  the  surprise  of  Prague  by  the 
French  army  in  1741,  which  rendered  the  name  of  Chevert  celebrated, 
and  the  taking  of  Tort  Mahon  in  1756. 

The  fundamental  principle  for  success  in  a  surprise,  be  it  favored  or 
not  by  any  one  within  the  place,  is  to  become  promptly  master  of  one 
of  the  issues  leading  to  the  open  country.  The  number  of  troops, 
introduced  either  by  stealth  or  escalade,  must  always  be  very  limited; 
and  it  can  never  increase  as  rapidly  as  the  troops  uniting  for  the  de- 
fence within,  nor  promptly  enough  to  become  formidable  to  the  garrison 
placed  on  the  defensive  ;  the  principal  object  must  then  be  to  send 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  189 

powerful  succor  with  the  least  possible  delay.  If  this  is  not  done,  and 
the  garrison,  together  with  their  commander,  do  not  lose  their  heads,  the 
most  hardy  enterprises  of  this  kind  will  always  fail. 

But  it  is  an  important  matter  to  consider  that,  with  even  the  most 
favorable  elements,  failure  is  yet  possible,  should  the  garrison  thus  sur- 
prised be  animated  by  an  excellent  spirit,  and  if  the  soldiers  are  en- 
dowed with  great  energy,  which  prevents  them  from  thinking,  at  the 
first  moment,  of  the  disproportion  of  their  forces  and  their  immediate 
danger,  and  which  would  lead  them  to  think  of  defending  themselves 
rather  than  to  seek  safety  in  retreat.  In  that  case  every  soldier  fights 
where  he  happens  to  be  ;  the  smallest  squads,  however  feeble,  band  to- 
gether and  defend  themselves  from  behind  the  door  of  a  house,  at  the 
corner  of  a  street,  or  under  the  shelter  of  a  wagon,  etc.  The  enemy's 
combinations  are  suddenly  deranged,  and  the  march  of  the  first  troops 
is  checked;  it  is  the  first  step  toward  securing  the  safety  of  the  place. 
New  chances  thereafter  are  presented  with  every  minute  ;  other  troops 
form  in  the  same  manner  as  the  preceding,  and  the  garrison  is  soon  ral- 
lied and  placed  beyond  any  danger,  through  the  power  of  that  moral 
action  which  foresees,  unites,  and,  acting  by  combined  movements, 
comes  off  victoriously  from  a  strife  which  at  first  appeared  to  be  fraught 
with  its  destruction. 

In  like  circumstances,  the  first  soldiers  who  find  themselves  thus  con- 
fronted by  the  enemy  should  have  but  one  thought — that  of  the  safety 
of  all,  and  of  the  glory  which  always  accompanies  some  great  act  of 
devotion. 

This  sentiment  has  never  been  more  forcibly  illustrated,  or  has  been 
executed  with  greater  success,  than  during  the  surprise  of  Cremona,  on 
the  1st  of  February,  1702.  The  character  of  the  French  soldier  has 
never  been  shown  in  a  more  glorious  manner  ;  it  stands  alone  in  history, 
and  is  the  greatest  exhibition  of  what  courage  and  valor  are  able  to 
achieve.  Cremona  was  occupied  by  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  and 
a  garrison  of  eight  thousand  men.  The  great  extent  of  the  place,  the 
negligent  manner  with  which  the  interior  service  was  performed,  and 
the  security  reigning  everywhere  within  its  enclosure,  as  well  as  the 
habitual  neglect  of  military  duties,  wore  remarked  by  Prince  Eugene  of 
Savoy,  and  gave  origin  to  the  plan  of  seizing  tho  place  by  surprise  and 
of  making  the  garrison  prisoners.  The  discovery  of  an  ancient  aque- 
duct, long  since  abandoned,  furthermore  favored  the  enterprise.  A 
priest  was  gained  over,  who,  with  soveral  other  inhabitants,  made  prep- 
arations to  favor  the  undertaking.  Four  hundred  grenadiers  were  In- 
troduced in  disguise  and  remained  concealed  in  a  church,  and  some 
other  troops  penetrated  through  tho  aqueduct.  A  walled  door  was  de- 
molished during  tho  night;  six  thousand  picked  troops,  at  the  head 
of  whom  was  Princo  Eugene  himself,  the  first  general  of  that  epoch,  ap- 


190  THF.   SPIRIT   OF 

parently  took  possession  of  the  city  ;  finally,  the  enemy  arrived  upon 
the  place  d'armes,  the  principal  square  of  the  town,  and  occupied  the 
principal  communications  before  any  alarm  had  startled  the  garrison. 
But  at  the  cry  "  The  enemy  is  in  the  town  !"  every  one  woke  up  and  rushed 
to  arms,  and  small  engagements  were  at  once  commenced  at  all  points. 
Marshal  Villeroi  was  taken  a  prisoner  ;  all  the  generals  except  two  were 
either  killed,  wounded,  or  captured,  and  the  management  of  the  defence 
was  entirely  left  to  the  instinct  of  the  soldiers.  Voices,  appearing  almost 
providential,  made  themselves  heard,  indicating  the  movements  and 
combinations  through  which  the  garrison  could  alone  be  saved  ;  and 
these  troops,  surprised  in  their  beds,  undressed,  and  without  any  officers 
to  lead  them,  who  were  vainly  endeavoring  to  join  their  men,  fought 
with  the  greatest  fury  in  the  midst  of  this  chaos  for  twelve  hours,  with- 
out either  taking  food  or  drink,  and  in  the  very  middle  of  winter,  devoid 
of  any  clothing.  They  finally  drove  the  enemy  who  had  at  first  attack- 
ed them  from  the  town,  after  having  placed  them  in  imminent  danger 
of  being  captured.  And  thus  this  enemy,  commanded  by  an  illustrious 
captain,  was  entirely  mistaken  in  its  calculations,  which  was  that  they 
would  encounter  only  a  battalion  going  to  its  daily  drill,  and  in  the  ex- 
pectation of  a  reinforcement  of  four  thousand  men  whose  sole  duty  it 
was  to  prevent  the  flight  and  escape  of  the  garrison. 

Nothing  more  sublime  can  be  conceived.  If,  under  such  grievous  and 
extraordinary  circumstances,  a  garrison  knew  how  to  find  safety  iu  its 
own  energy,  we  may  easily  judge  of  what  must  happen  if  a  garrison 
does  not  abandon  its  trust  at  the  first  sight  of  danger,  and  endeavors  to 
resist  a  feeble  detachment  which  has  penetrated  by  means  of  a  surprise; 
and  when  the  disproportion  of  numbers  is  so  great  between  the  attack- 
ing and  defending  forces,  the  mere  resistance  for  one  hour  will  decide 
the  event,  since  it  dispels  the  eflects  of  being  taken  unawares,  always  so 
powerful  ;  then  we  arrive  within  the  precincts  of  reality,  a  thousand 
times  less  formidable,  whatever  degree  of  danger  it  may  be  fraught 
with,  than  those  which  imagination  suggests. 

In  our  days  an  event  like  the  one  I  have  just  related  has  made  our 
arms  illustrious.  It  is  not  generally  known,  but  it  is  well  to  recall  it  to 
memory,  and  to  transmit  the  circumstancos  to  posterity. 

When,  in  1814,  the  scenes  of  war  were  removed  from  the  banks  of  the 
Rhine,  and  Holland  evacuated,  it  became  at  once  hostile  to  France. 
English  troops,  under  command  of  General  Graham,  were  soon  disem- 
barked there,  in  order  to  sustain  the  public  spirit,  and  to  give  some  de- 
gree of  consistency  to  the  approaching  revolution. 

General  Molitor)  when  evacuating  Hollaud,  left  garrisons  in  the  most 
important  fortresses;  but  the  state  of  our  armies  then  did  not  pormit 
the  assignment  of  many  troops  to  this,  object,  and  most  likely  but  de- 
pot-battalions were  employed  for  it.     The  garrison  of  Bcrg-op-Zoom, 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  191 

in  view  of  the  importance  and  the  extent  of  that  place,  was  brought  up 
to  four  thousand  men.  The  conscripts,  not  coming  from  ancient  France, 
having  deserted,  it  was  reduced  to  at  least  three  thousand  men,  and 
with  this  weak  body  alone  the  brilliant  deed  of  arms  which  I  am 
about  to  relate  was  accomplished — an  action  as  glorious  to  that  hand- 
ful of  brave  men  as  to  General  Bizanet,  their  commanding  officer,  at- 
tended as  it  was  with  the  wisest  and  most  far-seeing  measures  of  the 
latter,  succeeded  b}'  still  more  energetic  ones  when  the  moment  of  ac- 
tion had  come.  This  case  differed  from  the  surprise  of  Cremona,  where 
the  successful  issue  had  solely  been  brought  about  by  the  obstinate 
courage  of  the  soldiers.  At  Berg-op-Zoom  the  soldiers  showed  them- 
selves eminently  brave  as  well  as  resolute  and  energetic;  still  it  was 
especially  through  their  submission  to  the  laws  of  discipline,  and  their 
ready  obedience  to  the  voico  of  their  chief,  that  they  triumphed  over 
the  enemy. 

The  iusufficienc}'  of  the  garrison  had  determined  General  Bizanet  to 
concentrate  all  of  his  troops  in  tho  city,  and  to  evacuate  the  interior 
works,  among  which  his  small  force  almost  disappeared.  He  remedied 
the  difficulties  resulting  from  this  measure  by  increased  surveillance 
and  a  large  number  of  patroles,  in  doubling  his  interior  posts,  and  es- 
tablishing numerous  night-piquets,  ready  at  any  time  to  spring  to 
arms. 

General  Graham,  who  commanded  the  English  in  Holland,  and  who 
was  at  a  short  distance  from  Berg-op-Zoom,  informed  of  the  small  num- 
ber of  defenders  within  the  fortress,  believed  he  would  be  able  to  seize 
it!by  a  coup-de-main.  He  counted,  likewise,  upon  the  concours  of  the 
inhabitants,  having  means  of  receiving  intelligence  from  within  the 
place.  He  devoted  to  this  enterprise  four  thousand  eight  hundred 
men,  and  choso  for  its  execution  the  night  of  the  8th  of  March,  tho 
anniversary  of  the  birth  of  the  Prince  of  Orange. 

Tho  assailant  divided  his  troops  into  four  columns,  destined  to  make 
four  simultaneous  attacks;  the  two  first  were  to  escalade  the  rampart, 
one  to  effect  an  entrance  between  the  gate  of  Anvers  and  the  seaport, 
and  the  other  between  the  gates  of  Anvers  and  Breda;  the  third  column 
was  to  show  itself  in  front  of  the  gate  of  Strenbcrg,  in  order  to  make  a 
false  attack;  lastly,  the  fourth  column  was  to  effect  an  entrance  be- 
tween the  city  and  tho  port  by  profiting  from  the  low  water. 

At  ten  o'clock  at  night  the  third  column  surprised  the  outpost  noar 
the  Strenberg  gate,  but  was  arrested  in  a  complete  manner  by  the  fire 
of  the  troops  stationed  within  a  stockade  of  circular  palisades  which 
had  been  erected  tor  the  defence  of  tho  fixed  bridge. 

The  garrison  at  once  rushed  to  arms. 

At  the  .same  time  the  fourth  column  entered  between  tho  port  without 
being  perceived  by  the  guard-boat,  and  penetrated  into  the  city.     But 


192  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

some  troops  being  sent  against  it,  tho  column  wa6  divided — one  portion 
being  held  in  check  and  arrested,  and  the  other  penetrating  through 
the  rampart,  where  it  was  pursued. 

The  second  column  had  been  successful  in  its  escalade,  and  was 
marching  upon  the  Anvers  gate  to  open  it  to  General  Graham,  who  was 
waiting  upon  the  glacis  with  the  remainder  of  his  troops  and  his  caval- 
ry. But  a  strong  support  of  piquets  being  sent  in  great  haste  by  Gen- 
eral Bizanet  to  the  Anvers  gate,  it  succeeded  in  preventing  the  English 
from  seizing  it,  and  tho  first  column  having  been  repulsed  in  its  esca- 
lade, was  driven  away  with  great  loss. 

These  different  engagements,  in  all  directions,  occupied  nearly  the 
whole  night. 

At  the  first  dawn  of  day  General  Bizanet  made  an  attack  with  the 
remainder  of  his  troops,  and  drove  the  enemy  through  the  sea-gate  and 
overthrew  him.  Unable  to  make  a  retreat,  and  torn  by  the  canister-shot 
of  the  exterior  works,  the  English  columns  were  thus  obliged  to  lay 
down  their  arms,  with  a  loss  of  twelve  hundred  dead  and  six  hundred 
wounded,  among  whom  were  two  general  officers,  and  two  thousand 
one  hundred  and  seventy-five  prisoners,  including  one  general  and  four 
colonels,  four  thousand  small-arms,  four  flags,  and  a  large  amount  of 
ammunition,  etc. 

General  Graham  solicited  an  armistice  of  three  days  to  inter  his  dead, 
remove  the  wounded,  and  receive  the  paroled  prisoners. 

Any  comment,  after  the  mere  recital  of  such  an  action,  is  unnec- 
essary. 

We  see  from  this  that  French  blood  has  been  glorious  during  all 
epochs  ;  our  customs  bestowing  extraordinary  importance  upon  the  ac- 
quirement of  military  glory,  and  a  proper  acknowledgment  of  the 
value  of  the  sacrifice  of  life  (a  sacrifice  which  is  only  adequately  com- 
pensated when  a  nation  knows  how  to  appreciate  the  same),  has  greatly 
contributed  in  France  to  develop  the  virtue  of  devotion  to  the  coun- 
try, the  only  safeguard  for  the  preservation  and  the  power  of  nations. 
The  spirit  of  the  army  will  not  change,  if  only  our  appreciation  of  its 
virtues  remain  as  it  is  ;  and  may  Providence,  for  the  destiny  of  the 
country,  decree  that  it  be  thus  ;  and  that  those  unfeeling  minds,  who 
see  social  happiness  in  nothing  but  material  prosperity,  and  whose  fa- 
tal aberrations  show  a  total  unacquaintance  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
human  heart,  may  never  exercise  a  power  and  influence  in  the  councils 
of  the  country  which,  if  followed,  could  not  but  prove  disastrous.    ■ 

I  endeavor  in  vain  to  seek  for  an  instance,  in  my  memory,  where 
French  troops  have  been  successfully  surprised  ;  but  there  are  many  to 
be  cited  among  foreign  troops.  Two  of  them  happened  with  the  Prus- 
sians in  the  Seven  Years'  War:  at  Glatz  in  1760,  and  at  Schwoidnitz  in 
1761. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  193 

Genoral  Laudon  had  for  some  time  been   in  correspondence  with 
several  officers,  garrisoned  within   the  fortress  of  Glatz,  by  means  of 
monks  who  were  within  the  city.     The  Austrians  had  scarcely  arrived 
before  the  place  when  they  opened  trenches,  and,  informed  of  the  time 
when  the  officers  in  their  favor  would  be  on  guard  in  the  advanced  fort, 
named  De»la  Grue— a  fort  hewn  in  rock,  and  apparently  impregnable— 
they  directed  a  lively  attack  upon  that  point;  the  besieged  fled,  and  the 
Austrians  pursuing  with  vigor,  both  parties  entered  the  fortress  pell- 
mell.     The  troops  within  reach  following  the  example  of  those  that  had 
preceded  them,  the  Austrians  made  themselves  masters  of  the  place 
without  having  experienced  the  least  resistance.     In  the  case  of  the 
fortress  of  Schweidnitz,  the  surprise  happened  in  the  following  man- 
ner :    Five  hundred  prisoners  of  war  were  held  in  its  precincts,  and 
among  them  an  Italian  major  named  Iloca,  a  partisan  officer.    'This 
officer  acquired  the  good-will  of  the  commandant,  and  obtained  permis- 
sion  to  walk  at  liberty  within  the  fortress.     He  soon  obtained  a  knowl-  ' 
edge  of  the  position  of  the  different  posts  and  the  details  of  the  service. 
Intriguing  in  the  city,  he  managed  to  corrupt  those  who  might  be  of 
service  to  him.     Upon  his  reports  General  Laudon  conceived0 the  pro- 
joct  of  surprising  the  place,  which  was  executed  on  the  night  of  the  30th 
of  September.     He  distributed  twenty  battalions  for  four  attacks.     The 
commandant  of  Schweidnitz,  was  at  a  ball;  but  on  account  of  several 
alarming  indications  he  had  ordered  the  garrison  under  arms,  without, 
however,  taking  the  precaution  of  sending  some  person  outside  of  the 
fortress"  to  ascertain  whether  the  enemy  was  approaching— so  that  the 
Austrians  advanced  as  far  as  the  palisades  without  having  been  per- 
ceived, and  surprised  the  Stricgauet  gate;  in  the  confusion,  the  prison- 
ers of  war,  having  laid  aside  their  masks,  seized  the  interior  gate,  and 
in  less  than  an  hour  the  city  was  taken  and  the  garrison  made  prisoners 
of  war. 

I  will  mention,  in  addition,  two  surprises  which  were  attempted  in 
our  own  times,  but  which  failed  solely  on  account  of  their  faulty  exe- 
cution. 

In  1796,  when  the  French  were  placed  in  position  to  besiege  Mantua, 
it  was  considered  as  possible  and  very  opportune  to  carry,  in  the  very 
first  night,  the  T  work  by  surprise.  This  unlined  work  protects  a  long 
curtain  separated  from  the  body  of  the  place,  which  is  only  flanked  by 
two  heavy  towers;  it  made,  therefore,  at  that  time,  and  did  so  until  the 
construction  of  the  Fort  of  Pictoli,  which  was  built  by  us,  the  best  part 
x)f  the  defence  of  Mantua  from  that  side.  The  garrison  was  considered 
to  be  weak  and  exhausted  by  illness  ;  three  hundred  soldiers  had  been 
clad  in  the  uniform  of  one  of  the  regiments  in  garrison  at  the  place,  and 
placed  under  the  orders  of  an  Italian  officer,  a  deserter  from  the  Aus- 
trian army,  serving  in  our  rank?  ;  he  was  to  feign  a  defence  of  the  island 


194  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

upon  which  the  fort  is  situated,  and  to  appear  as  being  heavily  pressed 
by  French  troops  ;  to  throw  himself  upon  the  barrier  of  the  covered 
way,  as  if  soeking  shelter,-  to  have  it  opened  to  hira,  and  thus  to  secure 
fend  seize  the  entrance  to  the  fort.  But  the  officer  of  whom  I  have  just 
spoken,  not  caring  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Austrians  and  be  hanged, 
was  too  timorous  in  the  execution  of  his  rôle,  while  Marat,  who  com- 
manded the  troops  who  were  to  support  him,  was  too  slow  and  circum- 
spect. The  troops  of  the  garrison,  whose  vigilance  was  excited  by  rea- 
son of  so  much  slowness,  were  not  to  be  duped  by  any  such  farce,  which 
£ould  only  have  succeeded  by  means  of  great  activity  and  extraordinary 
swiftness. 

The  second  is  the  enterprise  against  the  Fort  of  Bard  in  1800.  Its 
garrison  consisted  of  barely  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  ;  the  assault 
would  infallibly  have  succeeded  had  it  been  conducted  with  the  least 
dogree  of  discernment.  Colonel  Dufour,  a  brave  soldier,  but  wholly 
•  devoid  of  intelligence  and  incapable  of  reflection,  was  charged  with  the 
command  of  the  column  which  was  to  carry  the  gate.  Instead  of  ap- 
proaching in  silence,  and  placing  his  ladders  against  the  wall  noiseless- 
ly, which  he  would  have  been  able  to  scale  in  an  instant,  he  ordered, 
like  an  insane  man,  the  beating  of  the  charge  when  debouching  from 
the  village.  The  garrison,  thus  advised  of  its  danger,  placed  itself  in 
a  position  for  defence.  Dufour  received  a  ball  in  the  breast,  and  the  at- 
tack was  repulsed  with  a  considerable  loss  of  men.  This  check  made 
that  hardy  and  unexampled  enterprise  necessary — to  conduct  the  artil- 
lery by  hand,  under  the  walls  of  that  same  fort,  in  the  night  time,  de- 
spite the  enemy's  fire,  and  thus  to  clear  the  defile.* 

NOTES. 

.1.  Battle  of  Hochkirch,  fought  on  the  14th  of  October,  1758,  between  the 
Prussians  under  Frederic  II  and  the  AustrianB  under  Fiold-Mar6hal  Daun. 
Strength  of  armies  :  Prussians — 51  battalion b,  29,000  men;  108  squadrons,  13,000 
—total,  42,000  men.  Austrians— 116  battalions,  69,000  men;  128  squadrons, 
15,000  men  ;  light-horse,  6,000— total,  90,000  men.  Loss  of  Prussians  :  246  officers, 
3,851  men,  101  cannon,  30  colors.  Losb  of  Austrians:  325  officers,  5,614  men, 
according  to  their  own  statements. 

King  Frederic,  misled  through  inaccurate  reports,  was  under  the  impression 

*  I  am  entitled  to  claim  for  myself  the  merit,  conception,  and  execution  of  this 
audacious  enterprise,  of  which  I  directed  all  details  personally. 

The  First  Consul  was  only  concerned  in  it  as  far  as  he  authorized  its  execution; 
but  justice  requires  of  mo  to  aasociate  with  it  the  name  of  my  chief  of  staff,  then 
Lieutenant-Colonel  De  Sénarmont,  an  officer  of  great  merit  and  bravery,  who  after- 
ward rose  to  be  lieutenant-general,  and  was  killed  in  front  of  Cadiz.  His  assist- 
ance contributed  powerfully  to  its  success.  This  officer  was  one  of  the  beat  known 
in  the  artillery  service,  in  which  his  fethor  before  him  h«d  ilroady  bfon  distin- 
guished— ATotc  of  Author 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  I9n 

that  Field-Marshal  Daun  was  under  full  retreat  into  Bohemia.  He  immediately 
resolved  to  follow  him  with  the  hulk  of  his  forces,  and  left  Bautzen  on  the  10th  of 
October  for  Hochkirch,  a  little  village  some  seven  miles  to  the  east  of  the  former 
town,  and  some  throe  miles  to  the  south  of  the  main  branch  of  the  great  military 
high-road  from  Saxony  into  Silesia.  But  his  army  had  no  sooner  reached  the  defile 
of  Jenkwitz  when  it  was  met  hy  the  advanced  light  troops  of  Laudon's  corps.  Soon 
there  was  no  doubt  that  the  Austrians  were  assembled  in  force  in  his  front;  and 
Frederic,  repulsing  the  enemy  toward  Hochkirch,  secured  that  strong  position, 
leaning  his  right  upon  it,  and  resolving  to  attack  the  enemy  without  delay,  despite 
thn  objections  of  several  of  his  generals. 

At  the  same  time  orders  were  despatched  to  General  Rctzow,  who  held  the  left 
Of  the  Prussian  position,  to  occupy  an  elevation  called  the  Stromberg,  a  point  of 
the  utmost  importance,  controlling,  as  it  did,  the  entire  field  of  battle.  This 
General  Retzow  neglected  to  do  before  the  Austrians  ;  and  to  this  failure  the  disas- 
trous issue  of  the  battle  must  mainly  be  ascribed. 

The  attack  was  to  have  taken  place  on  the  part  of  the  Prussians  ;  but  when 
Retzow  had  failed  to  secure  the  key  of  the  field,  and  it  had  been  promptly  seized 
by  the  Austrians,  Frederic  was  eminently  conscious  of  the  danger  of  his  position, 
and  he  replied  to  Marshal  Keith's  remark  :  "  If  Dauu  leaves  us  in  this  camp,  he 
ought  to  be  hanged,"  laughingly  :  "  It  is  then  to  be  hoped  that  he  is  more  afraid  oi 
us  than  of  the  rope  ;  "  but  he  resolved,  as  soon  as  the  provisions  should  arrive  from 
8axony,  to  take  a  different  position,  and  to  turn  the  right  flank  of  the  Austrians 
by  anight  movement,  in  order  to  menace  their  line  of  advance  into  Silesia.  For 
this  enterprise  the  night  of  the  14th  of  October  had  been  fixed.  The  result  of  a 
whole  campaign,  and  the  lives  of  ten  thousand  brave  men,  hung  thus,  as  the 
sequel  demonstrated,  upon  the  difference  of  one  day. 

While  Frederic  was  thus  lying  in  fancied  security,  almost  within  cannon-shot  oi 
the  rapids-accumulating  an  i  threatening  masses  of  his  adversary,  Marshal  Daun 
had  meditated  and  was  resolved  upon  a  brilliant  manœuvre,  destined  to  crush  the 
Prussian  hero.  For  the  first  time  in  the  Austrian  general's  career  against  tho 
great  king,  he  had  resolved  to  attack  him. 

The  movement  was  to  be  executed  by  the  Austrian  left,  against  the  strongest 
position  of  the  Prussians,  the  wood-encircled  and  fortified  Tillage  of  Hochkirch. 
during  the  night  of  the  loth  of  October.  At  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  14th 
the  dispositions  for  the  complete  turning  of  the  Prussian  right  wero  to  have  been 
completed,  and  a  strong  attack  with  overwhelming  forces  was  there  to  be  made. 
A  feint  attack  was  to  be  executed  upon  tho  centre,  while  tho  Austrian  right  was  to 
retain  its  strong  position,  and  onlj'  advance  to  the  attack  when  the  complete  suc- 
cess upon  the  Prussian  right  at  Hochkirch  was  secured. 

Unfortunately  for  the  Prussians,  the  great  turning  manœuvre  of  tho  Austrians 
was  a  complote  success.  Despite  the  rigor  of  tho  climate  in  those  latitudes  at 
that  season,  the  deuse  fog  which  had  settled  over  tho  whole  country,  and  the 
immense  difficulties  of  marching  through  pathless  woods  under  such  circum- 
stances, this  march  was  splendidly  executed,  and  reflects  the  highest  credit  upon 
the  Austrian  arms.  To  completely  deceive  the  Prussians,  during  the  13th  of  Octo- 
ber, and  continuing  during  the  night,  largo  bodies  of  troops  were  assiduously 
felling  trees  and  constructing  abattra  iu  front  of  the  Prussian  position,  persistently 
challenging  each  other,  and  keeping  up  a  great  noise,  as  if  from  that  quarter 
the  main  danger  to  the  Austrians  threatened. 

In  front  of  Hochkirch  WU  then  a  little  birch  wood,  before  which  the  dark 
masses  of  tho  Austrians  had  assembled  within    musket-range  of  the  Prussiau 


19G  THE    SPTRIT    OP 

advanced  posts,  at  four  o'clock  on  the  cold,  foggy  morning  of  the  14th  of  October. 
So  great  was  the  security  of  the  Prussians  that  the  infantry  lay,  undressed,  in 
slumber  within  their  tents,  and  even  the  cavalry,  save  a  few  regiments,  among 
which  that  of  Ziethen,  had  unsaddled  their  horses. 

"When  the  village-clock  ol  Hochkirch  struck  five  o'clock,  the  Prussian  free-battal- 
ions, which  held  the  birch  wood,  were  attacked  by  the  infantry  of  one  of  Daun'a 
divisions  and  the  Pandours  of  Laudon's  corps,  and,  after  a  6hort  struggle,  thrown 
back  upon  the  three  battalions  of  the  extreme  Prussian  right,  which  hastened  to 
the  succor  of  the  retreating  advanced  guard.  Formed  with  the  alacrity  of  veter- 
ans, they  opposed  to  the  Austrians  an  impenetrable  front,  and  had  already  driven 
them  beyond  the  birch  wood,  when  they  were  suddenly  assailed  in  rear  by  Croats 
and  infantry  who  had  penetrated  to  their  abandoned  camps.  Still  they  continued 
the  struggle,  but  were  at  last  compelled  to  cut  their  way  through  the  rapidly- 
augmenting  masses  in  their  rear,  and  to  retreat  to  the  village,  behind  the  shelter 
of  a  battery  of  eighteen  heavy  12-pounders. 

Simultaneously  with  this  attack,  Laudon  had  *epulsed  the  Prussian  videttes  of 
the  right  flank,  and  General  Ziethen  was  compelled  to  withdraw  behind  Hochkirch 
likewise.  Quickly  taking  advantage  of  his  easy  success,  Laudon  established  a 
battery  of  eight  guns  upon  the  heights  of  Meschwitz,  from  which  tho  whole 
camps  of  the  right  wing  were  at  his  mercy. 

Now  thoroughly  alive  to  the  dangers  of  the  situation,  the  entire  Prussian  lines 
were  under  arms,  and  three  fresh  battalions  of  the  second  line  advanced  to  the  succor 
of  the  troops  who  had  been  driven  from  the  wood  of  birches,  where,  after  having  re- 
taken it,  they  were  a  second  time  forced  to  give  way  to  overwhelming  numbers. 
Upon  this  success  Daun  advanced  his  whole  line  and  took  the  heavy  Prussian  bat- 
tery in  front  of  Hochkirch,  throwing  the  Prussians  entirely  into  the  village,  and 
occupying  the  whole  ground  in  front  and  flank,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  gardens 
and  the  church-yard — the  latter  defended  valiantly  by  the  battalion  of  Major  Lange. 
It  was  now  half-past  five  o'clock. 

Marshal  Keith  and  General  Ziethen  made  several  fruitless  attempts  to  retake  the 
heavy  battery,  with  invincible  resolution.  The  former,  who  so  long  had  illustrated 
the  Prussian  arms,  here  fell,  and  Ziethen  was  disastrously  driven  back  to  Hoch- 
kirch. 

The  village  itself  now  became  the  theatre  of  one  of  the  most  bloody  episodes  of 
modern  times.  Up  to  this  time  Frederic  had  never  doubted  that  the  demonstration 
of  the  Austrians  was  but  a  feint.  But  now  he  ordered  heavy  reinforcements  for  the 
possession  of  Hochkirch.  Prince  Francis  of  Brunswick  and  Prince  Maurice  of 
Dessau  led  their  troops  against  the  hosts  of  the  enemy.  The  former,  while  endeav- 
oring to  retake  the  great  battery,  was  violently  assailed  in  both  flanks;  his  troops, 
after  a  stout  resistance,  were  overpowered,  and,  after  the  fall  of  their  heroic  com- 
mander, retreated  in  utter  disorder  behind  the  village.  Hochkirch  was  in  flames, 
and  the  Prussians  were  rapidly  giving  way.  But  another  band  of  heroes,  under 
Prince  Maurice,  issued  from  the  disorder,  and,  driving  the  Austrians  beyond  the  vil- 
lage, retook  the  birch  wood  ;  and,  had  he  received  reinforcements,  he  would  have  held 
himself  thero.  He  was  at  last  obliged  to  give  way,  ami  with  the  utmost  difficulty 
he  effected  his  retreat.  Amid  all  the  storm  raging  around  him,  Major  Lange,  with 
his  weak  battalion,  had  maintained  his  important  position  within  the  enclosures  of 
the  church-yard  of  Hochkirch.  The  successive  attacks  of  seven  regiments  he  had 
withstood;  but  when  Prince  Maurice  gave  way  the  flood  overpowered  him  also. 
His  fate  was  a  sad  one.  After  prodigies  of  valor  his  bravo  command  was  entirely  de- 
stroyed, and  this  intrepid  officer  himself  fell  with  the  band  of  heroes  ho  had  led 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  197 

Zicthen,  with  his  renowned  horsemen,  had  meantime  charged  the  Austrian  cavalry 
repeatedly,  but  without  effect,  and  was  at  last  driven  beyond  HocVikirch  with 
great  loss. 

From  the  wreck  of  the  Prussian  right  wing  Prince  Maurice  of  Dessau  made  a 
last  attempt  with  four  battalions  to  retake  the  ill-fated  village,  now  burning  furi- 
ously. After  a  severe  contest  the  forlorn-hôpe  gave  way;  the  heroic  prince  fell 
dead,  pierced  by  two  nuïsket-balls. 

At  this  crisis  the  king  placed  himself  in  person  before  three  regiments  and  one 
battalion  of  the  guards.  Incredible  efforts  they  made  to  wrench  the  victory  from 
the  hands  of  the  Austrians  ;  they  even  penetrated  to  the  right  of  the  village  to  the 
very  spot  where  their  right  flank  had  sustained  at  first  the  conflict.  Their  attack 
might  have  succeeded  had  not,  at  the  moment  they  charged,  a  repeated  rear-attack 
thrown  them  into  disorder.  With  this  last  attempt  ended  the  efforts  of  the  Prussians 
to  regain  the  village,  which  henceforth  remained  in  the  enemy's  possession. 

It  was  now  after  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  the  heavy  fog  at  last  cleared 
away  and  revealed  to  the  king  the  extent  of  the  disaster.  The  plain  to  the  right 
and  rear  of  Hochkirch,  toward  the  defile  of  Dresa,  was  dotted  with  the  retreating 
and  advancing  columns,  and  shattered  remains  of  both  contending  hosts  in  confu- 
sion. Both  generals  appear,  at  this  moment,  to  have  understood  the  situation  alike. 
Frederic,  now  conscious  of  the  great  disaster  which  had  befallen  him,  rapidly  sent 
orders  to  establish  a  new  line  of  battle  to  the  rear  of  the  former,  and  by  an  entire 
change  of  front,  which  brought  the  Prussian  right  wing  nearer  toward  the  high- 
mad  to  Bautzen.  Marshal  Daun,  on  his  part,  rapidly  concentrating  his  scattered 
columns,  endeavored  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Prussians  upon  Saxony,  and  had 
nigh  succeeded  when  Major  Moellendorf  repulsed  his  columns  with  a  hastily-col- 
lected body  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and  thus  achieved  the  great  glory  of  keeping 
open  to  the  beaten  but  not  discouraged  Prussians  their  last  and  only  line  of  retreat. 
Simultaneously  with  this  attempt,  General  Colloredo  was  repulsed  on  the  other 
flank  while  trying  to  turn  the  left  of  the  new  Prussian  position,  and  under  both 
trials  the  Prussian  army  finally  and  heroically  formed  their  new  line  of  battle,  con- 
fidently awaiting  the  further  attacks  of  the  enemy. 

Marshal  Daun  contented  himself,  seeing  the  sang-froid  and  resolution  of  the 
Prussian  right,  to  await  the  issue  of  the  Duke  of  Ahremberg's  attack  upon  the  Prus- 
sian left,  from  which  he  expected  to  give  the  finishing  stroke  to  the  fortunes  of  his 
adversary.  During  the  sanguinary  struggle  on  the  right,  the  Prussian  general  on 
the  left  had  been  permitted  to  remain  unattacked,  conformable  to  the  orders  of 
Daun.  But  when  the  successive  reinforcements,  drawn  from  the  centre  toward 
Hochkirch,  threatened  to  weaken  the  line  so  as  to  endanger  his  safety,  ho  slowly 
retired,  closely  followed  by  the  Austrian  overwhelming  forces,  to  the  shelter  of  a 
heavy  battery  of  thirty  guns,  yet  intact.  Finally,  at  the  moment  when  Frederic 
was  endeavoring  to  safely  withdraw  his  right,  the  left  was  fiercely  assailed  by 
Ahrcmberg,  who,  with  surprising  rapidity,  overthrew  all  the  forces  in  his  front, 
•charged,  and  took  the  great  Prussian  battery  of  the  left,  and  made  many  prisoners. 
But  this  preciouH  advantage  was  neither  followed  up  by  the  duke  nor  by  the  mar- 
shal. The  latter  was  satisfied  with  the  honors  of  Hochkirch,  and  remained  a  peace- 
able spectator  of  the  wise  retreat  of  the  king,  which  now  took  place  from  every 
portion  of  the  field. 

General  Retzow,  who  had  neglected  to  seize  the  Stromberg.  without  the  posses- 
sion of  which  Daun  would  never  have  thought  himself  strong  enough  to  attack  Fred- 
eric, was  confronted  by  the  Prince  of  Durlach,  entirely  cut  off  from  the  main  body  of 

17* 


iy&  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

the  king's  army,  and  in  an  extremely  perilous  position.  If  the  Duke  of  Ah  rem  berg 
had  failed  t<*  reap  any  fruits  from  a  decisive  repulse  of  the  enemy,  Prince  Durlach 
failed  still  more  deplorably  against  General  Retzow.  The  latter  eluded  him  perfect- 
ly, and,  although  making  a  detour  to  avoid  the  enemy's  main  body,  a  portion  of  his 
command  arrived  in  time  upon  the  field  of  battle  to  repulse  a  charge  of  the  enemy'.* 
cavalry  upon  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  main  body.  Retzow  himself,  with  the  re- 
mainder of  his  forces,  joined  later.  With  this  skilful  extrication  from  a  dangerous 
position,  if  he  did  not  atone  for,  he  at  least  considerably  softened,  his  previous 
failure. 

To  cover  his  retrograde  movement  Frederic  placed  his  cavalry  in  large  intervals 
upon  the  plain;  the  baggage  passed  through  the  defile  of  Dresa;  the  infantry  fol- 
lowed, and  he  took  a  new  position  upon  the  mamelons,  called  Spitzbergen,  to  the 
north  of  the  battle-field,  and  half-way  between  Hochkirchand  Bautzen — in  fact,  the 
same  position  which  the  Allie>  .subsequently  occupied  after  the  Battle  of  Liitzen 
in  181:3. 

2.  Celebrated  turning  manœuvre  of  Frederic  after  the  battle  — 
Daun,  after  the  decisive  repulse  of  the  king,  took  a  new  position  in  advance  of 
Hochkirch,  upon  the  line  of  the  Spree,  facing  Saxony,  hardly  three  miles  from  the 
king's  new  camp,  and  covering  effectually  the  grand  route  into  Silesia — contenting 
himself  to  watch  the  Prussians,  and  thus  forgetting  the  important  maxim  in  war, 
that  the  fruit  of  a  victory  depends  upon  the  profit  we  draw  therefrom — the  most  de- 
sirable talent  of  a  general. 

The  condition  of  Frederic  after  the  battle  would  have  been  a  disheartening  one 
to  any  second-rate  general,  and  would  most  probably  have  led  to  tho  conclusion  of 
the  struggle  ;  but  to  the  king  it  presented  but  new  chances  to  improve  his  situation  ; 
and,  sustained  by  the  fine  spirit  of  his  brave  veterans,  he  resolved,  by  a  grand  de- 
tour, after  having  received  reinforcements,  to  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  Austrians. 
As  soon  aB  he  had  gained  his  new  camp  the  resolution  was  instantly  taken  and  an- 
nounced in  these  words  :  "Daun  lias  permitted  us  to  escape;  the  game  is  not  lost; 
%vc  loill  repose  a  feio  days,  and  then  march  upon  Silesia  to  deliver  JVeiss. 

The  great  route  from  Saxony  to  Silesia,  shortly  after  issuing  fiom  Bautzen,  divides 
into  two  branches,  both  running  nearly  due  east.  The  northern  branch,  after  ten 
miles,  passes  the  Town  of  "Weisscnberg,  and  unites  again  with  the  southern  branch 
at  the  Town  of  Reichenbach,  distant  from  Bautzen  fifteen  miles;  whence  the  road 
continues  past  Markersdorf,  where  Duroc  fell  in  1813  at  the  side  of  Napoleon,  to  the 
fortress  of  Gcerlitz,  on  the  Neiss,  at  a  distance  of  six  miles. 

The  Austrian  camp  covered  both  of  these  roads  in  advance  of  Weisscnberg,  and 
was  some  fivo  miles  from  Bautzen— Frederic's  camp  being  an  equal  distance  to  the 
north  of  that  town.  From  the  Austrian  camp  the  distance  to  Gcerlitz  was  about 
eighteen  miles,  or  one  good  day's  march. 

To  the  north  of  these  roads  the  country  is  exceedingly  hilly,  and  dotted  with 
woods  and  small  villages,  traversed  by  little  streams,  effectually  covering  any  move- 
ments, but,  nevertheless,  dangerous  on  account  of  the  enemy's  numerous  light  troops 
scouring  the  country,  and  which  could  only  be  executed  upon  miserable  cross-roads, 
almost  impassable  in  the  rigorous  season  which  had  set  in.  The  king'6  project  was 
to  transport  the  bulk  of  his  stores  and  artillery,  and  to  execute  a  rapid  march 
through  this  difficult  country,  so  as  to  gain  Gcerlitz  before  the  enemy.  This  point 
once  reached,  there  appeared  no  further  obstacle  to  his  rapid  advance  for  the  deliver- 
ance of  the  Silesian  fortress  of  Neiss,  which,  being  besieged  by  the  Austrian  general, 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  199 

Harsch,  with  thirty  thousand  men,  was'  already  believed  to  be  near  reduction. 
Neiss  once  delivered,  lie  was  to  return  to  Saxony  upon  rapid  marches,  for  the  succor 
of  Dresden,  only  held  by  a  small  force. 

To  deceive  the  Austrians  the  sick  and  wounded  were  transported  north  to  Glogau. 
The  munitions  of  war  were  sent,  at  first,  directly  north,  but  suddenly  turning  at 
Kumcrau  to  the  right,  disappeared  in  the  intricacies  of  that  difficult  country.  Both 
movements  were  well  known  to  the  Austrians,  who  now  felt  perfectly  sure  of  the 
intention  of  the  king  to  evacuate  Saxony,  and  to  retreat  within  his  hereditary  do- 
minions. 

On  the  24th  of  October,  at  six  in  the  evening,  the  trains  and  baggage,  under 
Braun,  were  sent  ofT,  and  after  a  march  of  six  miles,  directly  north,  parked  at  Neu- 
dorf.  The  infantry  occupying  the  villages  in«rfront  and  on  the  flanks,  retired  to 
camp  at  ten  o'clock  at  night  in  the  greatest  silence,  leaving  the  advanced  guards  of 
cavalry  there  stationed  until  next  morning.  At  ten  o'clock  at  night  the  tents  were 
struck  and  the  army  began  the  march  by  lines  and  by  the  left.  The  vanguard 
marched  to  the  north-east  upon  Dresa,  passed  the  Little  Spree,  changed  direction  to 
the  right,  and  marched  all  night  upon  Ullersdorf,  fourteen  miles  from  camp,  a  little 
Tillage  whose  left  flank  and  front  being  protected  by  small  watercourses  and  three 
lakes,  formed  an  eligible  position  for  defence.  The  first  column,  composed  of  the 
entire  infantry,  followed  the  same  route;  the  second  column  passed  Neudorf,  upon 
a  line  to  the  rear  of  the  infantry,  and  was  there  followed  by  Braun's  convoy,  arriving 
at  the  position  of  Jenkendorf,  near  Ullersdorf,  on  the  25th,  at  noon.  Finally,  the 
rear-guard,  under  Prince  Henry,  occupied  the  abandoned  position  all  night,  and  fol- 
lowed the  main  body  early  in  the  morning.  Nearly  the  entire  Prussian  army  was 
concentrated,  at  break  of  day  of  the  25th  of  October,  at  Ullersdorf,  some  ten  miles  to 
the  north  of  G  œil  it  z. 

The  Austrians  were  only  aware  of  the  kind's  departure  late  at  night  on  the  24th. 
when  the  king  was  yet  some  fifteen  miles  from  Gœrlitz.  The  distance  of  their  camp 
from  that  fortress,  upon  a  splendid  military  high-road,  was  but  eighteen  miles, 
while  Frederic  had  to  execute  a  march  nearly  double  that  distance.  Had  Daun 
at  once  marched,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  have  gained  possession  of  it  before 
Frederic;  but  he  contented  himself  to  send  General  Caramelly  to  pursue  the  rear- 
guard, and  only  in  the  afternoon  of  the  25th  he  detached  the  grenadiers,  the  reserve, 
and  two  regiments  of  hussars  from  lieichenbach  to  observe  the  march  of  the  Prus- 
sians. Lascy,  who  commanded  this  detachment,  seeing  Frederic  encamped  at  Ullers- 
dorf, no  longer  was  in  doubt,  and  resolved  in  consequence  to  set  out  at  night  and 
occupy  Gœrlitz  and  the  heights  of  Landskrone,  in  advance  of  that  town. 

Frederic,  however,  here  again  foiled  the  Austrians.  Setting  out  at  night,  two 
o'clock,  with  the  advance  guard  and  the  entire  cavalry,  he  marched  across  the  coun- 
try upon  Ober-llengersdor'f,  five  miles  from  Gœrlitz,  followed  at  three  by  the  infan- 
try. At  break  of  day  he  met  the  Austrians  in  his  way,  but  overthrowing  them, 
after  a  sharp  combat,  he  gained  the  town. 

The  consequences  of  this  brilliant  manœuvre  were  of  the  greatest  importance. 
Although  closely  followed  by  the  Austrians,  he  rapidly  inarched  into  Silesia.  The 
siege  of  Neiss  was  abandoned  on  the  5th  of  November,  and  on  the  8th  already  we 
eee  Frederic  marching  upon  Saxony  to  deliver  Dresden.  Thus,  in  the  middle  of 
winter.  Frederic  had,  in  six  Weeks,  twice  changed  the  direction  of  the  war,  delivered 
two  places  of  the  first  rank,  torn  from  a  victorious  army  all  the  fruits  of  victory, 
and  thrown  it  back  upon  its  own  frontiers. 


200  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

CHAPTER    X. 

DEFENCE  OF  FORTRESSES. 

Esesential  conditions — Importance  of  the  office  of  commander — Glories  compared 
— Of  true  courage  and  the  truly  brave — Defence  of  Grave  by  Chamilly — Of 
Lille  by  Bouffi ers — Of  Saint-Sébastien  by  Rey — Of  Burgos  by  Dubreton — Of 
Wittenberg  by  Lapoype — Necessity  of  a  legal  inquiry  in  all  cases  of  surrender 
— Sorties — Their  opportuneness  and  aim — Surprises  easy — Prague  in  1741 — 
Rodrigo  in  1812 — Badajoz,  Saragossa,  Genoa. 

Notes. — 1.  A  singular  Polish  Couucil  of  War.    2.  Siege  of  Grave  in  1674. 

The  first  element  requisite  for  the  successful  resistance  of  a  fortified 
place  is  a  good  commandant.  If  to  this  first  and  indispensable  require- 
ment a  sufficiently  strong  garrison  and  a  large  amount  of  stores  of  all 
kinds,  such  as  provisions,  munitions,  etc.,  be  added,  the  most  extraor- 
dinary results  may  be  obtained. 

The  fortifications  themselves  may  bo  more  or  less  perfect,  but  this 
always  desirable  perfection  is  a  matter  of  little  importance  when  com- 
pared with  those  results  owing  to  the  courage  and  the  resolution  of  him 
who  directs  the  defence. 

The  commandant  of  a  place  is  its  very  soul;  it  lives  in  him  and 
through  him.  If,  at  the  beginning  of  a  siege,  the  garrison  be  a  bad 
one,  it  will  soon  become  a  good  one  under  a  good  commandant,  who 
knows  how  to  awaken  its  sentiments  of  honor,  patriotism,  and  glory, 
which  sometimes  grow  dull  in  the  soldier's  heart. 

It  is  an  excellent  thing  to  gain  battles;  the  glory  which  falls  upon 
the  chief  is  dazzling;  success  calls  forth  every  sentiment  of  enthu- 
siasm and  admiration;  but  it  is  a  still  more  excellent  thing,  more 
meritorious  at  least,  to  defend  a  place  for  a  period  exceeding  certain 
supposed  limits. 

The  glory  of  a  victorious  battle,  however  brilliant  it  may  be  for  the 
general,  is  necessarily  always  divided;  that  which  the  commandant  of 
a  fortress  acquires  belongs  to  him  almost  entirely.  That  glory  is  his 
OAvn  work;  it  is  the  fruit,  not  of  combined  action  accomplished  under 
certain  circumstances,  but  of  a  long  series  of  uninterrupted,  persever- 
ing efforts,  renewed  without  cessation,  with  the  same  consciousness  of 
their  inutility,  if  succor  does  not  arrive  in  good  time;  and  the  efforts 
of  each  succeeding  day  are  not  rewarded  by  the  prospect  of  the  pleas, 
ures  of  victory;  they  are,  on  the  contrary,  associated  with  the  ever- 
present  feeling  of  our  relative  weakness,  and  their  only  aim  is  to  retard 
the  success  of,  and  not  to  triumph  over,  the  enemy,  without  the  least 
hope  of  changing  the  ultimate  issue  in  any  way. 

Every  man  of  nerve  has  always  sufficient  courage  and  energy  for  the 
requirements  of  a  period  of  twenty-four  hours  ;  and  if  success  attends 
the  efforts  every  man  appears  to  be  a  hero  !     But  how  rare  is  it  to  find 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  201 

tbe  same  courage,  tenacity,  and  ardor  in  reverses  ;  the  truly  brave  alone 
will  then  show  these  qualities,  and  their  number  can  be  easily  counted. 

But  the  commandant  of  a  besieged  fortress  is  placed  in  a  still  more 
difficult  position  ;  he  must  not  alone,  from  the  very  beginning,  pre- 
serve his  moral  courage — a  virtue  so  seldom  accorded  to  man  by  Prov- 
idence— but  that  same  courage  must  grow  within  him  in  measure  as 
circumstances  become  more  difficult,  and  when  it  would  be  natural  to 
suppose  that  it  should  sink — because  his  deportment  must  counter- 
balance the  effect  of  the  miseries  and  sufferings  which  he,  with  the  gar- 
rison, will  be  obliged  to  endure.  The  commander  alone  appears  to  be 
interested  in  the  defence,  because  he  reaps  the  glory  almost  entirely, 
while  those  under  his  orders  only  endure  the  sufferings.  Moreover, 
whenover  a  commandant  is  inclined  to  surrender,  he  will  always  find 
those  who  will  come  forward  to  applaud  such  an  action,  and  officers 
ready  to  make  him  easy  should  his  mind  still  entertain  any  scru- 
ples or  doubts  as  to  the  propriety  of  his  resolution;  and  whenever  a 
commander  is  inclined  to  submit  to  the  decision  of  a  council  "of  war 
the  question  whether  it  be  time  or  not  to  capitulate,  the  result  will 
always  be  in  the  affirmative;  and  it  even  sometimes  happens  that  there 
are  persons  who  would  not  protest  against  the  surrender,  did  they 
know  that  their  opinion  would  be  of  any  power  in  changing  the  deci- 
sion of  the  majority  of  the  council.1 

Nothing  appears  more  worthy  of  admiration  than  the  defence  of  a 
place  prolonged  to  the  utmost  limits,  but  there  is,  likewise,  nothing 
which  happens  less  frequently. 

Justice  demands,  then,  that  we  should  render  the  names  of  those 
immortal  who  have  acquired  glory  of  this  kind. 

The  most  celebrated  defence  known  to  history,  in  modern  wars,  is 
that  of  Grave,2  on  theJMeuse,  by  Chamilly,  in  1675;  nothing  can  be 
compared  to  it.  This  city  had  received  the  depots  of  the  army  froua 
the  time  of  the  invasion  of  Holland  by  Louis  XIV,  and  enclosed  a 
large  amount  of  stores.  Its  extent  is  of  mean  dimensions,  and  it  was 
garrisoned  by  five  thousand  men,  who  defended  themselves  during  five 
months  of  opened  trenches  against  all  the  efforts  of  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  whose  loss  amounted  to  thirty  thousand  men  ;  and  Chamilly 
only  surrendered  upon  the  king's  express  order,  carrying  with  him  to 
France  all  of  his  ordnance.* 

*  I  have  always  had  the  ambition  of  being  charged  with  the  defence  of  a  large 
fortress,  having  the  innate  consciousness  that  such  a  task  would  not  have  been 
beyond  my  capacity.  Had  there  even  been  any  occasion  in  my  experience,  I 
would  have  ordered  the  reprint  of  the  journal  of  the  Siege  of  Grave,  bo  that  every 
officer,  non-commiasioned  officer,  and  soldier  would  have  had  an  example  before 
him,  worthy  to  bo  followed.  Should  the  day  ever  coma  when  regiments  are  pro- 
vided with  libraries,  this  work,  of  the  greatest  interest  for  the  military  man, 
should  not  fail  to  find  a  plarfl  in  it. — Note  of  Author. 


202  THE    SPIRJT    OF 

After  the  last  mentioned  admirable  defence,  that  of  Lille  and  ita 
citadel  must  bo  ranked  next.  Marshal  Boufflers,  who  commanded 
there,  acquired  immortal  glory  by  it. 

In  our  own  days  sieges  have  not  been  of  frequent  occurrence;  still 
we  can  not  pass  that  of  Saint-Sébastien  in  silence,  which  was  command- 
ed by  General  Rey — resulting  in  a  long  and  obstinate  defence,  which 
caused  to  the  English  army  very  considerable  losses. 

The  defence  of  Burgos,  under  the  orders  of  General  Dubreton,  who, 
though  attacked  by  a  less  powerful  force  than  he  himself  disposed  of, 
•«till  acquired  some  glory;  and  that  of  Wittenberg  upon  the  Elbe,  under 
General  Lapoype,  may  likewise  be  mentioned. 

But  in  comparison  with  a  few  extraordinary  instances  of  resistance, 
which  we  can  not  but  admire,  how  many  mediocre  defences  and  culpa- 
ble, unpunished  surrenders  are  there,  which  are  looked  upon  by  public 
opinion  with  a  degree  of  indulgence  entirely  unmerited. 

The  preservation  of  a  fortified  place  is  a  matter  of  such  capital 
importance,  influencing,  as  it  does,  sometimes  in  the  most  powerful 
manner,  the  fate  of  an  army  or  even  of  an  entire  country,  that  ita 
surrender  should  always  be  the  occasion  for  a  legal  inquiry,  in  order  to 
bring  out,  in  all  their  clearness,  the  whole  train  of  circumstances,  of  the 
defence  which  led  to  the  capitulation.  The  commanding  officer  should 
then  be  either  severely  punished,  or  be  rewarded  and  overwhelmed 
with  praises;  a  different  course  of  proceedings  ought  not  to  be  admitted. 

The  navy  regulations  prescribe  the  trial  of  every  captain  of  a  vessel 
who  has  lost  his  ship,  no  matter  how  the  occurrence  took  placf.  If  he 
performed  his  duty,  he  is  acquitted  and  honorably  dismissed. 

Any  indulgence  in  legislation  in  matters  concerning  the  sea  will  be 
easily  understood,  because,  upon  an  element  a.s  changing  as  the  water, 
circumstances  much  more  powerfully  influencing' and  conquering  science, 
vigilance,  and  courage,  may  happen.  But  upon  terra  firma  nothing 
varies  ;  unless  the  reduction  be  caused  by  the  want  of  army  stores  of 
any  kind,  there  can  bo  no  legitimate  excuse  :  we  can  but  choose  between 
either  censure  or  praise.  The  military  regulations  upon  this  point  mu3t 
be  vigorously  enforced,  and  if  a  commander  surrenders  before  the  en- 
ceinte has  a  practicable  breach,  and  before  he  has  sustained  at  least  one 
assault,  he  has  committed  a  crime,  and  should  receive  due  punishment. 

I  shall  not  enter  into  technical  details  as  to  the  attack  and  defence  of 
places;  special  works  have  treated  of  these  matters  sufficiently  satis- 
factorily. I  will  be  content  with  making  some  reflections  upon  the 
general  direction  to  be  followed  in  the  defence. 

In  the  case  of  large  fortresses,  the  custom  is  too  prevalent  of  making 
sorties  long  before  the  commencement  of  the  siege,  and  a  portion  of 
one's  means,  forces,  and  confidence  is  thereby  expended,  which  to  re- 
tain for  the  moment  when  courage  and  vigor  are  of  the  greatest  neces- 
?ity,  W'uld  bemufh  more  u^ofnl  and  important.     By  frying  any  distance 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  203 

from  the  fortifications  we  lose  thoir  support,  and  voluntarily  deprive 
ourselves  of  a  succor  which  establishes  some  sort  of  equilibrium  between 
tho  troops  of  the  garrison  and  the  attacking  force.  I  would,  therefore, 
at  any  rate,  at  least  have  some  hopes  of  raising  tho  siege  by  making  a 
sortie  with  the  larger  portion  of  the  garrison,  and  to  remain  sufficiently 
near  to  have  the  efficacious  support  of  the  cannon  of  the  fortress. 

But  if  these  sorties  should  be  prohibited,  those  whose  object  it  is  to 
destroy  works  begun  by  the  enemy  can  not  be  made  too  often  :  the  prin- 
cipal aim  being  to  arrest  the  enemy  and  to  gain  time,  which  can  be  at- 
tained by  giving  him  frequent  causes  for  alarm  and  in  bringing  about 
short  and  lively  engagements,  which  will  force  him  to  recommence  the 
same  works  several  times.  In  measure  as  the  enemy  approaches  the 
place  and  the  siege  is  progressing,  sorties,  with  but  few  troops  and  upon 
a  restrained  field  of  battle,  should  become  more  frequent.  Finally,  at 
the  very  time  when  the  great  proximity  of  the  enemy  puts  so  often  the 
idea  into  the  heads  of  commanders  to  surrender,  the  true  defence  should 
commonce  :  and  it  even  appears  to  me  that  it  ought  never  to  be  finished, 
if  with  every  day  new  obstacles  are  prepared,  if  interior  entrenchments 
were  beforehand  constructed,  and  such  dispositions  made  that  the  be- 
sieged would  never  be  completely  deprived  of  the  fire  of  his  artillery, 
but  would  always  retain  some  well-covered  pieces  of  cannon  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  breach.  This  precaution  alone,  which  should  be  particu- 
larly considered  and  taken,  may  decide  the  safety  of  the  place  during 
several  days,  and  add  much  to  the  glory  of  the  defence. 

I  will  close  this  chapter  with  a  remark  by  which  commandants  of 
besieged  fortresses  can  not  too  much  profit.  They  should  particularly 
guard  against  surprises,  because  the  more  a  thing  appears  improbable, 
the  greater  will  be  the  effect  when  it  happens.  A  brave  garrison  do- 
fends  a  breach,  and  the  enemy  will  uot'be  able  to  contend  long  against 
it;  but  if  at  the  moment  when  all  attention  is  directed  upon  the  defence 
of  an  open  point,  the  defenders  hear  that  the  enemy  has  effected  an  en- 
trance into  the  fortress  by  escalade  at  another  point,  then  men's  minds 
will  be  upset,  tho  defence  of  the  breach  will  be  abandoned,  and  the  place 
is  taken. 

The  strictest  surveillance  of  all  points  should,  therefore,  never  be  re- 
laxed, and  those  appearing  in  least  danger  of  being  attacked,  because 
they  arc  considered  impregnable,  should  be  guarded  most — since  they 
are  the  very  points  which  tho  enemy  will  choose  in  preference,  becauso 
it  is  evident  that  if  these  points  appear  to  sustain  themselves,  it  is  not 
likely  that  any  one  will  be  charged  with  their  defence. 

In  1741  the  fortress  of  Prague  was  the  object  of  very  noisy  night  at- 
tacks upon  two  points  on  the  part  of  the  French  army  ;  and  while 
these  demonstrations  attracted  the  attention  of  the  entire  garrison < 
other  troop»  ,per*  ?iknt!y  ftkectad  upon  a  point  of  the   c  the 


204  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

new  city,  some  considerable  distance  from  them;  they  scaled  the  wall 
with  a  single  ladder,  mounted  the  rampart,  and,  finding  nobody  defend- 
ing the  place,  the  gate  near  was  at  once  opened  and  the  city,  with  its 
garrison,  taken  almost  without  any  engagement. 

In  our  days,  in  1S12,  the  garrison  of  Rodrigo  bravely  defended  a 
practicable  breach  in  the  body  of  the  place  and  repulsed  the  enemy;  but 
fifty  English  soldiers  scaled  the  castle  with  ladders,  which  commanded 
all  other  points,  having  a  revetted  scarp,  and  being  very  high;  they 
created  alarm  within,  disorder  ensued,  and  they  thus  becamo  masters 
of  the  town. 

The  Town  of  Badajoz  was  besieged  in  the  same  year,  and  well  garri- 
soned, commanded  by  a  distinguished  soldier,  General  Philippon,  who 
already,  the  year  preceding,  had  sustained  a  glorious  siege.  Entrench- 
ed around  the  breach,  he  repulsed  the  assaults  of  the  enemy  ;  but  the 
castle,  the  walls  of  which  were  eighty  feet  high,  were  scaled  by  fifty 
men,  alarm  and  disorder  spread  through  the  town,  and  it  was  taken. 

Under  no  pretext  should  watchfulness  ever  bo  relaxed.  Means  of  re- 
sistance must  be  everywhere  created;  and  even  in  those  parts  of  the 
fortress  which  appear  least  exposed  to  an  attack,  especially  at  the  com- 
mencement of  a  siege,  and  when  the  enemy  may  and  should  suppose 
that  all  means  of  defence  have  been  concentrated  upon  the  points  upon 
which  he  is  about  to  direct  his  attacks.* 

NOTES. 

1.  A  singular  Polish  Council  of  "War.— In  1674,  when,  the  Grand- 
"Vizier.  in  his  retreat  after  the  defeat  near  Leopol,  in  Gallicia,  invested  Trembowl  x, 
a  small  town,  strongly  fortified,  in  the  province  of  Podolia,  and  summoned  the 
commandant  of  the  Polish  garrison,  Samuel  Chrasanowski,  a  Jew,  to  surrender, 
he  received  the  following  reply  :  "Thou  art  mistaken  if  thou  expectest  to  find 
any  gold  within  theso  walls  ;  wo  have  nothing  here  but  steel  and  soldiers.  Our 
number,  indeed,  is  small,  but  our  courage  is  great." 

The  Turks  at  once  attacked  the  town  upon  all  points,  with  an  overwhelming 
force  and  great  vigor.  A  council  of  war,  convoked  by  the  commandant,  advised 
to  open  negotiations  for  the  surrender  of  the  town,  in  order  to  save  it  from  the 
fury  of  the  Moslem  hoi  des;  when  suddenly  the  wife  of  the  commandant,  a  Jew- 

*  I  have  not  included  among  the  number  of  remarkable  defences  that  of  Saragos- 
sa  by  the  Spaniards,  because  it  belougs  to  another  class  of  events.  An  immense 
population,  refugees  from  the  country,  with  a  large  amount  of  provisions — a  popu- 
lation excited  to  fanaticism  by  religion  and  patriotism,  whose  numbers  being  con- 
stantly double  that  of  the  besiegers,  and  whose  daily  losses  were  hardly  felt,  occu- 
pying thosa  immense  and  indestructible  convents  as  strong  as  real  fortresses — could 
and  ought  to  have  for  a  long  time  frustrated  our  efforts.  But  circumstances  of 
this  kind  can  not  recur,  and  this  defence  can  offer  no  precepts  which  might  be  of 
nse  in  a  regular  war.  As  to  the  Siege  of  Genoa,  it  was  a  remarkable  and  great 
operation,  but  rather  tho  defence  of  an  entrenched  camp,  and  not  that  of  a  fortress. 
—tfcte  of  Author. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  205 

ess,  appeared  in  their  midst,  and,  with  two  daggers  in  her  hands,  thus  confronted 
her  husband,  saying:  "One  of  these  daggers  is  destined  for  thee,  if  thou  surren- 
derest  this  town;  the  other  I  will  plunge  in  my  own  breast." 

After  this  impassioned  appeal  the  council,  of  course,  had  nothing  more  to  do 
but  to  submit,  and  dispersed  ;  and,  fired  by  the  resolution  of  this  Jewish  heroine,  a 
vigorous  resistance  was  continued,  in  which  the  bravo  wife  of  the  commandant, 
togother  with  others  of  her  sex,  participated  by  supplying  ammunition  to  the 
soldiers  and  by  stimulating  their  courage. 

By  a  singular  providential  coincidence  this  noble  devotion  was  not  destined  to 
romain  unrewarded.  King  Sobiewski,  at  the  head  of  a  Polish  army,  a  few  hours 
afterward  appeared  to  relieve  the  garrison,  completely  routed  the  Turks,  and 
upon  their  retreat  took  eight  thousand  prisoners. 

(Mentioned  in  the  Polish  histories  of  Naraszewicz,  Bantkie,  and  Lelewel.) 

2.  Siege  of  Grave  in  1674.— The  celebrated  journal  of  this  siege,  alluded 
to  by  Marshal  Marmont,  would  bo  too  voluminous  for  this  work.  The  following 
account  is  therefore  given  in  its  place  : 

Rabenhaupt,  the  Dutch  general,  was  still  in  front  of  Grave,  which  had  been  in- 
vested for  a  long  time,  and  was  beiug  besioged  regularly.  This  place,  built  upon 
the  banks  of  the  Meuse,  was  strong  by  its  position.  The  French,  anxious  to  keep 
it  while  abandoning  other  forts,  had  augmented  its  fortifications,  and  mounted 
more  than  three  hundred  pieces  of  cannon.  A  garrison  of  four  thousand  men, 
under  command  of  Count  do  Chamilly,  defended  it.  De  Betonce,  Saint-Ju*t,  and 
Saint-Louis,  old  officers,  and  the  Marquis  of  Guiscard,  commanded  the  regiment 
Normandy,  sustained  by  those  of  Bourgogne,  Languedoc,  Vendôme,  and  Dampierre. 

Rabenhaupt  had,  since  the  month  of  July,  made  himself  master  of  the  posts 
likely  to  facilitate  the  enemy's  communications.  By  means  of  friends  within 
they  made  an  attempt  to  retake  Fort  Ravesteyn,  but  the  traitors  were  discovered 
and  punished.  The  Meuse  only  remained  to  the  besieged  to  pass  their  soldiers 
across  to  forage  on  the  other  bank.  Several  engagements  took  place  with  the 
horsemen,  who  attempted  to  pass  the  river  in  order  to  destroy  a  dyke  which  was 
in  their  way.  Colonel  Huudebek  bravely  defended  it.  Four  hundred  cannon- 
shots  were  fired  upon  him  in  a  single  day,  doing,  however,  little  harm,  the  balls 
passing  above  him.  The  entire  cavalry  within  the  town,  sustained  by  four  hun- 
dred and  fifty  infantry,  made  a  sortie  to  carry  th«i  guard  off,  stationed  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Velp,  but  mot  such  a  vigorous  resistance  that  they  were  obliged  to  retiro. 
Nine  French  officers,  who  had  dined  with  Count  de  Chamilly,  desirous  of  sig- 
nalizing their  debauchery  by  something  extraordinary,  advanced  as  far  as  the 
dyke  with  twenty  soldiers.  Animated  by  the  fumes  of  wine,  they  at  first  over- 
threw the  opposing  force  ;  but  Colonel  Hundebek  having  arrived  to  the  succor  of 
his  retreating  men,  the  attacking  party  took  refuge  within  the  church  of  Velp; 
but  seeing  that  the  building  was  about  to  be  set  on  fire,  they  were  not  foolhardy 
enough  to  remain  in  it,  preferring  rather  tg  surrender  than  to  be  burnod  alive. 
Another  still  more  audacious  performance  took  place.  Three  huudred  horsemen» 
with  as  many  footmen  mounted  behind  them,  in  full  daylight,  made  a  sorti» 
toward  Velp,  overthrew  the  company  of  Rainmaker,  there  on  guard,  took  the 
greater  part  of  the  officers  prisoners,  and  would  have  caused  much  more  disorder 
had  not  General  Spaen  obliged  them  to  retreat  iuto  the  city.  Rabenhaupt,  who 
had  his  head-quarters  at  Balgoyen.  pushed  the  attack,  threw  shells,  red-hot  balls, 
and  fire-pots  into  the  city.  Ho  erected  ;i  battery  with  which  he  destroyed  th* 
#t-   j  lu  and  a  numbt.r  cf  h  opus  ;  <-rd*red  i"Joli§t*jn  to  tak»  a  position,  with  flva 

18 


206  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

regiments  and  five  field-pieces,  at  Overaeselt,  to  harass  the  besieged  from  that 
quarter;  and  Colonel  Winbergen  to  pass  the  Mense  with  eight  hundred  men,  and 
to  encamp  within  musket^-range  of  the  town.  Count  do  Chamilly  ordered  a  sortie 
with  two  hundred  and  fifty  footmen  to  drive  those  near  Colonel  Hundobek's 
quarters  from  the  tronche?.  DuPas,  who  had  been  Governor  of  Narde,  took  part 
in  this  action,  and  sought,  by  extraordinary  bravery,  to  effaco  the  disgrace  of  hiK 
condemnation.*  He  charged  with  such  courage  that  he  drove  away  those  who 
defended  the  approaches  ;  but  Colonel  Litzau,  on  guard  near  head-quarters,  camo 
promptly  to  their  succor  ;  the  French  were  in  their  turn  repulsed,  and  Du  Pas  loft 
there  a  life  which  had  become  insupportable  to  him,  and  which  he  sold  dearly. 
The  besiegers  battered  with  such  success  the  ravelin  on  his  side  of  the  Meuse,  that 
Count  de  Chamilly,  foreseeing  an  assault  which  his  men  would  not  be  able  to  sus- 
tain, ordered  them  to  retire  after  haviug  sprung  the  mine,  and  to  entice  the  Hol- 
landers; but  the  latter  took  the  precaution  to  wait  until  it  had  exploded,  and  only 
six  or  seven  men  perished.  Upon  this  ravelin  a  battery  to  bombard  the  platform 
upon  the  bank  of  tho  Meuse  was  ejected.  Tho  besieged,  fearing  that  their  gun 
upon  this  platform  might  fall  into  the  river,  withdrew  it,  which  rendered  the 
position  useless,  and  gave  greater  scope  to  the  besiegers.  Throe  rows  of  palisades 
would  have  to  be  forced  before  they  could  become  masters  of  the  entrenchments. 
It  was  done;  but  the  besieged,  having  sent  succor  promptly  forward,  regained  and 
alternately  lost  it  three  times.  Finally,  when  the  Hollanders  pressed  the  regiment 
Bourgogne  heavily,  which  held  the  position,  it  retired,  springing  a  mine  which 
killed  several  persons  and  throw  the  remaining  troops  into  confusion.  Chamilly, 
profiting  from  this  disorder,  ordered  the  regiment  Normandy  to  advance,  which 
drove  the  Hollanders  from  every  position  they  had  occupied.  The  engage- 
ment lasted  until  nine  in  the  evening.  The  following  day  a  suspension  of  arms 
was  agreed  upon,  to  inter  the  large  number  of  tho  dead.  The  horses  had  been 
killed,  as  forage  was  scarce  in  the  town;  still  there  wore  plenty  of  provisions  left 
for  the  men. 

While  Grave  was  thus  Invested  from  all  sides,  Chamilly  did  not  cease  to  receive 
news  from  without,  by  means  of  swimmers  who  passed  the  Meuse  below  the 
water,  but  even  money  to  pay  and  animate  his  garrison,  which  began  to  fear  that 
the  siege,  which  had  lasted  too  long  already,  would  be  prolonged  indefinitely. 
They  were  in  this  inquietude  when  the  Princo  of  Orange  arrived  at  camp  with  <i 
cuccor  of  more  than  ten  thousand  men.  (October  9.)  The  forces  before  Grave 
amounted  now  to  more  than  twenty  thousand.    The  prince  reanimated  the  dis- 


•  DuPas  had  been  appointed  Governor  of  Narde  upon  the  recommeudation  of 
Turenne,  in  the  preceding  year;  a  place  badly  provisioned  and  fortified,  with  a 
garrison  of  three  thousand  men,  and  but  eighteen  guus,  some  of  which  were  not 
mounted. 

The  Prince  of  Orange  shortly  afterward  invested  it  with  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  and  four  days  after  the  trenches  had  been  opened  DuPas  capitulated. 

Louis  XIV,  irritated  at  this  feeble  defence,  disbauded  all  tho  troops  engaged  in 
it,  and  broke  the  officers. 

The  governor  was  treated  much  more  severely.  He  was  placed  before  a  council 
of  war;  condemned  to  be  dishonored;  the  hangman  publicly  broke  his  sword 
upon  liis  back;  and  ho  was  sent  a  prisoner  into  Grave,  where  Count  Chamilly, 
enraged  at  the  treatment  this  bravo  man  had  received,  offered  to  return  him  his 
sword.  Thic  DuPas  declined,  until  ho  sbculd  lm&  regained  hie  hener  by 
bravery. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  207 

heartened  soldiers  by  his  presence  ;  the  bombardment  was  redoubled,  and  as  many 
as  two  thousand  shots  were  counted  on  both  sides  in  two  days.  Three  Dutch 
regiments  attacked  the  entrenchments,  which  the  besieged  had  constructed  upon 
the  dyke  outside  of  the  Bruges  gate;  the  regiment  Vendôme,  which  guarded  them, 
at  first  took  to  flight;  but  Count  de  Chamilly,  sword  in  hand,  forced  them  to 
retarn  to  the  combat,  and  supported  them  by  the  regiments  Languedoc  and  Dam- 
pierre,  posted  near  them  expressly  for  that  purpose.  However,  fearing  their 
being  forced,  he  ordered  the  mines  to  bo  fired,  which,  springing  too  soon,  nearly 
buried  as  many  of  his  own  men  as  of  tho  Dutch.  Lastly,  to  preserve  this  post,  he 
advanced  the  greater  portion  of  his  troops,  who  obliged  the  assailants  to  abandon 
their  enterprise,  after  having  lost  some  good  officers,  among  whom  the  nephew  of 
Rabenhaupt.  On  the  part  of  tho  besieged,  Count  Quiscard  was  wounded  while 
visiting  the  parapet  of  the  covered-way,  but  the  wound  was  slight. 

During  the  night  of  the  13th  of  October  the  prince  ordered  the  attack  of  the 
couuterscarp  simultaneously  upon  the  Bruges  gate,  the  dyke  of  Ravesteyn,  and 
Bastion  Prince  Maurice  ;  when  a  fierce  combat  onsued,  until  two  Dutch  squadrons, 
having  passed  the  bridges  across  the  moat,  formed  in  battle  order  upon  the  glacis. 
The  French,  surprised  to  see  themselves  attacked  in  that  quarter,  abandoned  the 
counterscarp  ;  and  two  captains,  with  forty-eight  soldiers,  having  passed  tho  palir 
sades,  penetrated  to  the  covered-way.    De  Chamilly,  apprehensive  of  their  further 
advance,  detached  eight  troopers  from  each  company,  who,  however,  were  obliged 
to  retire  after  a  single  discharge.    Du  Fail,  a  captain  of  cavalry,  having  been 
wounded  in  the  thumb  at  the  commencement  of  the  action,  went  to  the  town  to 
have  his  wound  bandaged,  and  the  surgeon  not  being  able  to  attend  to  him  as 
promptly  as  he  desired,  he  had  his  thumb  cut  off,  and  returned  to  the  fight  with 
intrepid  courage.    The  regiment  Normandy,  sent  to  dislodge  the  besiegers  from 
the  covered-way,  engaged  them  so  vigorously  that  they  were  obliged  to  beat  a 
retreat;  and,  meeting  the  same  degree  of  resistance  upon  all  other  points,  they 
abandoned  the  counterscarp,  leaving  behind  several  prisoners  and  many  dead. 
Tho  next  day  an  attack  was  made  in  full  daylight  upon  the  gate  of  Bruges, 
where  the  regiment  Languedoc  resisted  so  bravely  that    they  abaudoned  the 
attempt,  after  a  furious  combat.    Colonel  Goldsteyn,  undismayed,  returned  to  the 
charge,  carried  the  entreuchments  on  that  side,  and  established  himself  upon  the 
glacis,  whilo  Hundebek  made  himself  master  of  those  of  Ravesteyn;  then,  having 
carried  the  moat  in  front  of  tho  covered-way,  he  effected  a  lodgment  there.  Forty-five 
troopers  repulsed  them  three  times,  but  their  number  being  reduced  to  fifteen,  they 
were  obliged  to  retreat  to  the  city  and  permit  the  besiegers  to  perfect  their  lodgment. 
Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  of  October  they  advanced  from  the  same  side 
to  the  Place  d'Armes.    There  two  pieces  of  cannon  of  the  besieged  killed  many 
men;  and  when  they  were  about  being  stormed,  the  French  sprang  a  mine,  which 
buried  a  portion  of  the  assailants.    One  of  their  captains  was  found  half-buried 
without  having  received  any  injury,  aud  taken  to  the  city.    The  others  returned  to 
charge  the  French,  gained  and  lost  four  successive  times  tho  entrenchments  upon 
.     the  glacis,  but  were  finally  driven  back  to  the  approaches.    It  would  be  difficult  to 
cite  a  siege  more  bloody,  or  a  place  better  defended.     No  day  passed  without 
several  engagements.    The  besiegers  were  often  repulsed,  but  tho  works  progress- 
ed. Without  tntermlMlon,  for  a  general  assault.    On  the  25th,  the  besiegers  having 
Kprunga  niinewhi-h  they  discovered  in  their  sapping  operations,  a  quantity  of 
grenades,  whirh  the  besieged  had  near  the  gate  of  Bruges,  exploded,  and  made  a 
great  breach  in  the  covered-way. 
As  tho  number  of  dead  and  wounded  was  very  large,  a  suspension  of  arms  was 


208  THE    SPIRIT    OF    MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS. 

agreed  upon,  during  which  Count  de  Chamilly  offered*to  surrender  the  place  if  an 
honorable  capitulation  should  be  accorded  to  him.  Some  time  before  he  had  sent 
one  of  his  swimmers  to  Maseik,  who  returned  with  an  order  from  the  king  to  sur- 
render the  place  to  the  Frince  of  Orange.  The  besieged  were  short  of  provisions  ; 
the  soldiers  reduced  to  drink  water  and  to  eat  half-rations.  The  garrison  was 
fatigued  and  reduced,  and  the  place  so  breached  that  it  could  have  held  out  but  a 
few  days  longer.  One  of  the  principal  articles  of  capitulation  was  to  permit 
Chamilly  to  carry  off,  with  the  French  arms,  twenty-four  pieces  of  cannon. 

Thus  Count  de  Chamilly  surrendered  Grave,  by  the  express  order  of  the  king, 
to  the  Prince  of  Orange,  on  the  26th  of  October,  1674,  after  a  siege  of  ninety-three 
days. 


PART    FOURTH. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  WAR. 


CHAPTER    I. 

MORALS  OF  SOLDIERS,  AND  HOW  TO  FORM  THEM.    FORMER  ARMIES  AND 
THOSE  OF  THE  PRESENT  TIME.l 

Elements  of  valor — Means  of  development — Discipline — Corporeal  puuishment — 
Inadmissible,  in  which  armies — Power  of  public  opinion  in  French  army — 
Praise  and  censure  ;  emulation — Dignity  of  man  respected  when  punishing  a 
soldier — Contempt  shown  only  to  a  coward — In  what  consists  valor — Different 
gradations — Severity — Confidence — Power  easily  exercised  in  peace — Difficult  in 
danger — Confidence  gives  energy — Duty  of  chief  toward  soldier — Sublime  im- 
pulses of  the  heart — Two  facts — Activity — Health — Military  exercises— Instruc- 
tion; utility  of  great  manœuvres — Emulation — Public  works — Association  of 
soldiers  with  them — Egypt,  Holland,  Dalmatia — Names  of  rogiments,  etc.,  In- 
scribed upon  public  works — Great  camps  of  instruction — Their  importance — 
Their  effect  upon  the  army  of  1805 — Must  be  made  permanent — Countries  with- 
out cultivation — Three  months'  exercises — Algeria — Regular  armies  of  Europe 
— F«udal  state — Sovereigns  dependent  upon  vassals — Finances — Free  companies 
— Regular  revenues — Order  and  economy — Armies  means  of  civilization — Obsta- 
cles created  by  lords — Voluntary  enlistment — Disorder  favorable  to  them — Pro- 
fession of  soldier  a  resource — Often  results  in  large  fortunes — Visconti,  Sforza, 
Scaligeri,  Norman  adventurers — They  became  agents — Regiments,  a  speculation 
— Ferdinand  II — Wallenstein — Regiment,  a  property — Origin  of  proprietary — 
Recruiting — Voluntary  enrolment  insufficient— Why — Great  effect  upon  civili- 
zation— Blood-tax — Salutary  influence — Comparative  morality  of  armies  com- 
posed of  citizens'  sons  and  vagabonds — Two  systems  of  distributing  men  in 
armies— Usage  in  France  and  Russia— The  best — Council  of  war  of  1828. 

Notes. — 1.  Success  in  organizing  the  Confederate  army.  General  Samuel  Cooper, 
Confederate  army.  Confederate  soldiers  and  United  States  Boldiers.  2.  Duke 
Wallenstein. 

Three  things  are  essential  to  impart  valor  to  troops  :  love  of  order, 
habit  of  obedience,  and  confidence  in  one's  self  and  others.  Such  are, 
in  their  moral  aspect,  the  principles  upon  which  the  structure  of  an 
army  reposes.  Bereft  of  these,  an  assemblage  of  men  has  no  consist- 
ence whatever;  it  will  realize  not  even  the  slightest  expectations,  and  is 
sufficient  for  no  possible  requirement. 
18* 


210  Till;   SPIRIT   OF 

Nothing,  therefore,  should  be  neglected  to  develop  these  three  prin- 
ciples in  the  soldier's  heart,  and  to  unite  to  the  morals  of  military  men 
those  customs  which  I  shall  designate  by  the  name  of  military  virtues. 

It  is  requisite  that  discipline,  which  is  submission  to  regulations  and 
to  the  will  of  the  legal  chief,  be  observed  without  any  relaxation  ;  and 
that  each  one,  in  the  rank  which  he  holds  iu  the  military  organization, 
bo  unceasingly  mindful  of  the  fact  that  he  can  only  command  his  sub- 
ordinates by  virtue  of  the  title  which  his  own  obedience  to  his  superi- 
ors confers  upon  him. 

Although  discipline  must  always  bo  severe,  when  a  grave  failuro  has 
been  committed,  it  should,  nevertheless,  have  its  gradations  in  its  dif- 
ferent applications. 

In  countries  whero  elevation  of  sentiment,  delicacy  of  manners,  and 
dignity  of.eharacter  forbid  the  application  of  corporeal  punishments,  it 
is  important  to  unite  the  influence  of  moral  power  as  much  as  possible 
with  punishments. 

The  French  army,  in  particular,  has  always  offered  to  an  intelligent 
chief  frequent  opportunities  to  make  this  resource  useful.  Praise  and 
censure,  distributed  in  the  proper  manner,  and  the  application  of  the 
talent  to  excite  a  useful  and  noble  emulation  in  the  breast  of  the  soldier, 
have  always  been  sufficient  for  all  requirements.  Punishments  and  re- 
wards, based  upon  moral  power,  have  a  wonderful  influence,  and  are 
susceptible  of  infinite  modes  of  application,  of  which  each  will  act 
strongly  upon  generous  hearts. 

Punishment,  whatever  it  bo,  should  never  be  attended  by  any  ex- 
pression of  contempt,  except  when  for  an  act  of  flagrant  cowardice. 
Whatever  degrades  and  tarnishes  the  reputation  of  the  soldier,  will 
likewise  diminish  his  valor  ;  while  everything  which  exalts  him  in  his 
own  estimation  will  add  to  his  good  qualities.  There  are  a  thousand 
different  ways  to  vary  the  expression  of  such  sentiments  ;  a  skilful  chief- 
will  always  choose,  with  discernment,  the  means  best  adapted  to  impress 
the  particular  character  of  the  soldier  he  wishes  to  act  upon,  and  as  are 
suitable  to  the  circumstances  attending  the  case,  i 

In  some  armies  severity  is  pushed  to  excess  for  omissions,  the  extra- 
ordinary reprobation  of  which,  when  looked  upon  with  the  eyes  of 
reason,  appears  quite  futile.  Without  designing  any  censure,  I  can  not 
approve  the  importance  which  is  attached  to  it.  When  only  concern- 
ing some  slight  matter  of  dress,  or  some  momentary  breach  of  immo- 
bility under  arms,  too  severe  punishment  is  not  reasonable  ;  but  when 
inflicted  with  moderation,  and  when  viewed  as  affecting  the  soldier's 
manners,  its  aim  is  useful.  Then,  a  spirit  of  order  and  respect  for 
regulations  will  really  be  shown;  and,  as  it  is  with  education  and  the 
formation  of  the  habits  of  a  lifetime,  they  will  be  always  adhered  to. 
A  soldier  whose  deportment  is  defective  may  undoubtedly  fight  as  well 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  211 

as  one  whose  conduct  is  beyond  reproach  ;  but,  less  exact  in  the  per- 
formance of  his  daily  duties,  he  will,  most  probably,  be  loss  submissive 
to  the  voice  of  his  chief. 

The  existence  of  an  army  is  a  matter  so  astonishing  and  artificial, 
that  nothing  which  contributes  to  give  to  its  customs  a  habit  of  order 
and  submission  can,  without  peril,  be  neglected.  But  it  is  the  duty  of 
tho  chief  to  look  upon  matters  in  a  proper  light,  and  not  to  exaggerate 
their  importance. 

It  is  of  the  greatest  moment  that  commanders  should  seek,  with 
particular  care,  to  inspire  their  soldiers  with  confidence;  without  this 
close  bond  nothing  can  with  certainty  be  expected.  In  times  of  re- 
pose, and  during  peace,  the  regular  power  is  easily  respected  and 
obeyed  ;  but  in  the  midst  of  disturbances,  which  in  periods  of  danger 
are  always  sure  to  come,  the  slightest  natural  obstacle  may  become  in- 
surmountable. At  such  a  period  confidence  in  one's  self  and  others — 
this  powerful,  innate  voice — gives  an  extraordinary  degree  of  energy, 
which  will  lead  to  success. 

The  chief  must,  furthermore,  provide  for  the  well-being  of  the  soldier; 
he  must  know,  on  important  occasions,  how  to  partake  of  his  sufferings 
and  privations;  he  must  watch  over  the  maintenance  of  order  and  dis- 
cipline ;  punish  when  necessary,  and  seize  with  eagerness  every  occa- 
sion to  bestow  rewards  ;  but  those  rewards  must  be  just,  since  the 
reliance  of  a  soldier  upon  the  justice  of  the  chief  is  the  very  basis  of 
the  degree  of  esteem  and  the  sentiments  which  his  subordinates  enter- 
tain for  him.  The  instinct  of  the  soldier  is  very  skilful  in  discovering 
whether  a  chief  be  worthy  of  his  regards  or  not.  Then  severity  has 
nothing  in  itself  which  could  either  frighten  or  wound,  it  being  the  rep- 
resentative of  legal  power;  and  power,  when  the  sincere  interpreter 
of  the  laws,  ensures  to  every  one  the  efficacious  protection  of  his  rights. 
Even  those  who  experience  its  harshness  feel,  in  their  inmost  heart, 
that  it  is  necessary,  salutary,  and  to  be  respected. 

While  maintenance  of  order  should  bo  at  all  times  a  subject  of  con- 
stant attention  on  the  part  of  chiefs  of  all  grades,  love  for  their  soldiers 
should  not  be  the  less  deeply  graven  into  their  hearts.  I  have  already 
said  that  this  meritorious  class  of  men,  so  severely  treated  if  we  con- 
sider the  entire  aspect  of  their  condition,  can  not  be  governed  with  too 
much  affection.  They  are  obliged  to  accustom  themselves  to  every  kind 
of  privation;  their  lives  are  but  so  many  sacrifices;  the  most  beautiful 
portion  of  their  existence  is  passed  in  the  midst  of  toilsome  labors,  and 
in  dangers  which  incessantly  recur;  and,  in  |gite  °f  a^  ih'^.  are  devot- 
edly attached  to  their  chiefs,  if  those  latter  will  only  love  and  esteem 
them.  Soldiers  are  good  by  nature.  If  their  attainments  do  not  give 
to  them  the  right  of  being  placed  in  the  front-ranks  of  society,  they 
would  merit  it  through  the  sentiments  by  which  they  ;ire  animated.    The 


212  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

habit  of  order  imparts  a  greater  degree  of  morality.  Life  full  of  dan- 
gers develops  the  noblest  instincts  of  the  heart,  and  inspires  a  senti- 
ment of  devotion — a  sentiment  which  is  a  heavenly  gift.  Returned  to 
his  home,  the  soldier  is  nearly  always  the  very  example  of  that  portion 
of  society  in  which  he  is  called  upon  to  live.  I  have  seen  him,  in  the 
■midst  of  disorders  and  atrocities,  sometimes  the  fruits  of  war,  distin- 
guish himself  by  acts  of  saintly  piety  and  of  evangelical  charity.* 
Shame  and  disaster  upon  the  nation  which  does  not  honor  the  soldier, 
and  which  does  not  make  every  effort  in  its  power  to  ameliorate  and 
sweeten  his  existence  ! 

Another  duty,  which  should  never  bo  neglected,  is- to  keep  soldiers  in 
the  greatest  activity.  It  should  become  to  them  second-nature.  Like 
nearly  all  men,  they  are  disposed  to  be  lazy;  to  change  this  disposition 
is,  then,  equivalent  to  rendering  them  a  great  service.  Rest  and  idleness 
diminish  the  strength  and  lessen  the  courage.  Health,  energy,  and 
moral  valor  ordinarily  increase  by  a  life  hardened  with  fatigues  and 
devoted  to  mobility. 

Military  exercises  are  the  first  elements  of  the  activity  I  have  just 
spoken  of;  but  they  are  not  such  alone.  A  soldier  must  at  first  acquire 
a  most  complete  instruction;  after  he  has  obtained  this,  to  occupy  him 
with  details  he  already  knows,  and  from  the  repeated  exercise  of  which 
he  can  derive  no  further  benefit,  will  only  render  his  profession  dis- 
tasteful to  him. 

Only  great  field-manoeuvres,  since  they  offer  a  fine  spectacle,  are 
alone  constantly  to  his  taste;  but  his  interest  may  be  newly  awakened 
by  exciting  in  his  breast  the  desire  to  excel  in  plays  of  different  kinds. 
He  might  likewise  be  employed  upon  important  public  works,  and,  as  a 
recompense,  the  history  of  those  regiments  who  have  contributed  to 
their  execution  might  be  associated  with  them  by  being  named  after 
the  regiments.  Thus  grand  and  splendid  works  could  be  economically 
erected,  and  at  the  same  time  those  ideas  of  glory  and  immortal  great- 
ness would  thereby  be  developed  which  can  not  be  too  much  fostered  in 
the  warrior's  heart. 

In  the  course  of  my  military  life  I  have  never  permitted  any  occasion 
to  escape  me  which  presented  an  application  of  this  principle,  and  I 
had  certainly  reason  to  be  satisfied,  as  much  with  the  immediate  suc- 
cess as  with  the  increased  health  and  spirit  of  the  troops.     But  I  took 

*  I  could  cite  many  such  traits  ;  I  now  only  recall  one.  During  the  campaign  of 
Egypt  a  village  revolted;  a  mAitary  execution  became  necessary  to  set  an  example. 
The  village  was  set  on  Are,  and  nearly  all  the  inhabitants  were  executed. 

A  soldier  who,  undoubtedly,  had  fulfilled  his  task  of  cruelty,  was  struck  at  th»  • 
sight  of  a  child  stretching  its  arms  out  toward  him.    He  took  it  up,  procured  a 
goat  to  nourish  it,  carried  tin;  child  for  eight  days,  the  goat  following  him,  when 
he  found  an  Arab  woman  who  adopted  it. — Note  of  Author. „ 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  213 

oare  never  to  go  beyond  certain  limits,  and  not  to  compromise  in  any 
manner  the  military  spirit  of  the  soldiers,  the  conservation  and  devel- 
opment of  which  should  ncvor  cease  to  be  the  aim  of  all  the  efforts  of  a 
commander.  Egypt,  Holland,  and  Dalmatia  still  show  such  monu- 
ments of  our  past  greatness  and  former  manners.  In  the  last-named 
country  two  hundred  and  forty  miles  of  splendid  roads,  through  the 
wildest  countries  and  in  the  midst  of  the  greatest  natural  obstacles, 
have  left  to  the  inhabitants  honorable  testimonials  of  ours  that  will 
never  perish.  Inscriptions  graven  into  the  rocks  no  doubt  still  tell  the 
traveller  that  these  works  were  executed  by  such  regiments,  and  under 
guch  colonels.  And  whenever  these  brave  soldiers,  whose  remembrance 
is  so  dear  to  me,  quitted  their  spades  to  take  up  their  weapons,  with 
what  spirit  they  appeared  upon  the  field  of  battle  !  What  strength  and 
energy  they  showed  during  the  longest  marches  and  the  greatest  fa- 
tigues ! 

As  a  complementary  means  for  the  formation  of  troops,  I  would 
place  in  the  first  rank  the  establishment  of  large  camps  of  instruction. 
They  alone  give  to  troops,  in  times  of  peace,  that  habit  and  degree  of 
instruction  most  suitable  to  them.  Military  spirit  is  only  developed  in 
the  midst  of  the  dangers  of  war,  and  in  those  assemblages  which  may 
be  called  its  image.  Camp  life,  with  its  activity  and  mixture  of  the 
different  arms — that  peculiar  state  of  existence  so  little  resembling  civil 
society — is  the  very  element  of  glory  and  success,  which  can  only  bo 
created  by  an  assemblage  of  some  duration  and  in  the  midst  of  public 
prosperity.  I  do  not  speak  of  momentary  gatherings,  which  sometimes 
occur  in  different  countries,  and  the  object  of  which  is  rather  to  offer  a 
magnificent  spectacle  than  to  give  instruction  and  to  develop  the  quali- 
ties of  soldiers  ;  but  I  mean  such  camps  as  existed  during  my  younger 
years,  and  from  which  came  the  finest  and  best  army  of  modern  times, 
and  which,  if  it  ever  be  equalled,  can  never  be  surpassed;  I  allude  to 
the  army  which  was  encamped  for  two  years  on  the  coast  of  the  British 
channel,  and  which  fought  at  Ulm  and  Austerlitz. 

By  force  of  this  example,  and  convinced  by  my  reflections,  I  would 
wish  that  such  pormanent  establishments  were  formed  in  provinces  but 
indifferently  cultivated — as,  for  instance,  the  Champagne — and  that 
durable  barracks  for  thirty  thousand  men  would  be  erected.  They 
should  be  occupied  during  three  months,  or  a  less  time,  by  the  same 
troops.  Three  similar  establishments  would  suffice  to  give  and  to  pre- 
serve the  military  spirit  of  the  French  army,  and  to  impart  to  it  such  a 
degree  of  instruction  as  would  constantly  keep  it  iu  a  fit  state  for  war. 
But  wo  have  at  the  present  time  a  still  vaster  ground  for  military  exer- 
cises—Algeria— which,  if  it  costs  us  dearly,  repays  us  even  more  richly, 
when  its  influence  upon  the  matters  of  which  I  have  just  spoken  is 
considered. 


214  THE    SURIT    OF 

I  can  not  finish  this  chapter  without  entering  into  some  detailed 
account  how  regular  armies  were  formed  in  Europe.  It  is  curious  to 
perceive  how  much  former  armies  differed,  in  regard  to  their  composi- 
tion, from  present  armies.  The  results  drawn  from  this  comparison 
will,  hy  themselves,  be  presented  to  our  reflection. 

After  the  invasion  of  the  barbarians  and  the  destruction  of  Roman 
power,  every  special  kind  of  military  organization  had  disappeared 
from  Europe.  During  many  centuries  armies  had  no  other  basis  than 
that  of  feudal  institutions.  When  experience  had  amply  demonstrated 
the  weakness  of  such  temporary  unions  of  men,  assembled  in  haste, 
and  without  any  rules,  which  were  suddenly  broken  up — either  owing 
to  the  caprice  of  the  lords  or  to  their  necessities — and  which  thus  ren- 
dered any  operations,  dependent  upon  calculations,  impossible,  people 
began  to  think  of  creating  powerful  bodies,  regularly  and  permanently 
organized. 

The  sovereigns,  though  invested  with  the  right,  had  no  real  power 
over  their  vassals.  To  free  themselves  of  this  dependence,  and  as  soon 
as  the  state  of  their  finances  permitted  them  to  do  so,  they  entertained 
the  desire  to  keep  troops  themselves,  and  thus  originated  the  so-called 
Free  Companies. 

But  regular  revenues  being  necessary  to  constantly  maintain  troops 
under  arms,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  regular  revenuos  being  only 
obtained  by  a  system  of  order  and  a  certain  administrative  organiza- 
tion, the  creation  of  arnfies  became  thus,  at  the  same  time,  the  cause 
and  the  means  of  the  beginning  of  civilization. 

Since,  however,  feudal  rights  gave  to  the  lords  the  sole  disposition  of 
their  population,  the  former  were  very  far  from  favoring  the  establish- 
ment of  troops  designed  to  overthrow  their  power  ;  and  the  sovereigns, 
being  able  to  dispose  of  their  private  domains  alone,  thus  greatly 
restricted  and  reduced  to  voluntary  enlistments,  obtained  the  samo  by 
means  of  money. 

The  disorders  existing  throughout  Europe,  the  constant  wars  waged, 
and  the  multitude  of  little  sovereigns  that  existed,  rendered  the  people 
miserable,  and  the  profession  of  soldier  was  presented  to  them  as  a 
resource.  The  morals  of  the  times,  besides,  led  each  one  to  the  indul- 
gence of  the  hopes  of  unlimited  ambition. 

A  soldier  in  those  days  could  aspire  to  everything;  and  all  his 
plans  had  but  one  object — personal  interest.  He  was  not  moved,  as  the 
soldier  of  to-day,  by  the  only  thought  of  discharging  a  duty  he  owed 
to  his  sovereign;  to  defend  his  country,  and  to  acquire  renown,  that 
noble  reward  of  public  opinion,  so  glorious  in  our  times.  Private  and 
captain  both  wished  for  riches,  and  oftentimes  carried  their  pretensions 
as  far  as  a  sovereignty.  The  Visconti,  Sforza,  Escales,  Ecelini,  and  many 
others,  had  no  other  origin  ;  and  before  them  kingdoms  had  already 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  215 

been  the  spoils  of  Norman  adventurers.  To  facilitate  the  exocution  of 
their  projects,  sovereigns  wore  always  compelled  to  employ  as  agents 
such  military  men  as  had  acquired  renown  and  reputation,  and  who, 
having  devoted  themselves  to  the  profession  of  arms  from  early  youth, 
had  a  large  acquaintance  among  men  capable  of  assisting  them,  and 
who  were  disposod  to  unite  their  fortunes  with  them. 

Every  one  of  those  men,  in  his  sphere,  had  his  clients,  and  regiments 
were  raised  by  contract  and  competition. 

Ferdinand  II  sent  for  Wallenstein2  and  demanded  an  army.  The 
conditions  were  discussed  and  the  treaty  concluded.  The  latter  called 
upon  the  officers  in  his  confidence  and  asked  for  their  regiments,  asso- 
ciating them  with  himself  as  participants  in  his  own  benefits.  The 
latter  conferred  with  their  captains,  who  undertook  to  find  soldiers  and 
form  companies  ;  and  the  army  was  created.  In  like  manner,  nowadays, 
a  sovereign  negotiates  a  loan  with  some  rich  banker,  who  distributes 
the  larger  portion  among  his  correspondents,  associating  them  with  the 
profits  ho  couuts  upon  ;  and  these  again  look  for  the  money  which  they 
may  need  in  the  pockets  of  capitalists. 

It  is  easily  seen  that  a  similar  organization  gave  to  the  colonel  who 
had  formed  a  regiment  the  character  of  ownership  of  the  same. 

From  this  comes  the  name  •'•' proprietary,'' which  they  received  and 
retained  in  Austria,  where,  although  having  become  regiments  belong- 
ing to  the  sovereign,  as  in  every  other  country,  they  have  still  some- 
what preserved  their  primitive  character,  with  their  peculiar  constitu- 
tion and  privileges.  The  system  there  pursued  harmonizing,  as  it 
does,  these  institutions  with  the  interests  and  customs  of  the  state, 
offers,  at  the  same  time,  a  tit  and  noble  reward  to  generals  whose  lives 
have  been  illustrated  by  glorious  services,  and  guarantees  to  the  sover- 
eign the  choice  of  proper  officers  and  a  good  esprit  de  curpn. 

We  can  now  properly  appreciate  the  vast  difference  presented  in  the 
composition  of  our  armies  and  those  of  the  past  centuries.  Our  armies 
are  created  by  forced  recruiting.  It  is  so  in  every  Continental  state  ex- 
cept in  England,  where  particular  circumstances  explain  the  maintenance 
of  a  system  which  exists  no  longer  anywhere  else.  The  armies  of  our 
time  are  too  numerous,  and  voluntary  recruiting  would  not  supply  their 
wants;  besides,  there  is  no  longer  so  large  a  mass  of  men  existing 
whose  necessities  would  force  them  to  eugage  in  military  service;  pub- 
lic order,  which  now  everywhere  is  reigning  for  the  benefit  of  humanity, 
has  greatly  diminished  their  number.  Lastly,  the  chances  of  fortune 
in  the  military  career  are  now  too  restrained  to  actuate  any  valuable 
member  of  society  voluntarily  to  engage  in  military  service  in  any  such 
manner.  Other  outlets  are.  opened  for  the  development  of  industry  to 
every  cno  possessing  perseverance  and  intelligence,  and  fortune  may 
■ao-a-V-  loqnircd  without  the  rijk  of  danger      Forced  enlistment  .iç  p?Qr« 


216  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

then  the  only  way  of  creating  the  necessary  means  for  defending  the 
state  ;  and  thus  it  is  that  a  tax  upon  blood  has  become  one  of  the  publio 
burdens  everywhere. 

The  spirit  of  armies  has  been  greatly  lessened  through  it;  but,  despite 
appearances,  it  is  far  from  having  lost  anything.  Voluntary  recruiting, 
with  terrible  discipline,  may  sometimes,  as  in  England,  have  given  good 
troops  :  but  can  we  compare,  in  point  of  morality,  an  army  composed  of 
the  sons  of  families  elevated  by  a  spirit  of  order  and  obedience  to  the 
laws,  to  one  which  perhaps  has  in  its  ranks  some  individuals  who-are 
animated  by  a  love  of  war  and  of  glory,  but  the  great  majority  of  which 
is  composed  of  vagabonds,  whose  bad  morals  keep  them  strangers  to  a 
quiet  and  laborious  life  ? 

How  much  better  is  public  interest  secured,  if  those  to  whose  hands 
it  is  entrusted  look  upon  military  service  as  a  noble  and  important 
duty!  The  young  man  whose  lot  it  is  to  be  conscripted,  peaceful  as  ho 
is  in  his  habits,  may  leave  his  family  with  regret,  and  with  pain  even  ; 
but  a  warlike  spirit,  so  natural  to  mankind,  and  particularly  to  French- 
men, will  soon  inspire  him.  He  will  henceforth  entertain  noble  ideas  ; 
he  will  be  exalted  in  his  own  estimation,  and  he  becomes  a  faithful  and 
devoted  soldier,  who  finds  in  the  good  opinion  which  his  command- 
ers and  companions  have  of  him  a  reward  for  all  his  sacrifices,  labors, 
and  dangers.  Such  is  the  European  soldier  of  to-day — for  the  system 
is  alike  everywhere. 

It  remains  still  to  be  determined  which  is  the  preferable  system  of  the 
two  :  Whether  to  place  in  the  same  regiment  the  recruits  from  the  same 
portion  of  the  country,  or  to  distribute  them  into  different  corps.  Tho 
first  one  is  adopted  in  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Germany;  the  second,  in 
France  and  Russia.  Each  has  its  advantages  and  its  difficulties;  but  I 
am  in  favor  of  the  first  system. 

T<>  commence  with  its  difficulties.  This  system  gives  to  tho  soldier 
local  and  provincial  ideas,  which,  after  so  many  revolutions  through 
which  we  have  passed,  would  not  be  without  danger,  easily  to  be  fore- 
seen, should  like  events  again  take  place;  perhaps  it  likewise  dimin- 
ishes military  spirit  in  times  of  peace,  and  tends  to  make  a  union  of 
peasants  rather  than  of  soldiers  :  but  these  difficulties  may  be  easily 
remedied  if  the  number  of  assemblies  be  increased,  and  tho  duration  of 
the  time  devoted  to  camps  of  instruction  be  prolonged. 

As  to  the  advantages,  they  are  great  and  incontestable.  With  regard 
to  the  administration,  the  recruiting  is  more  easily  accomplished;  the 
uilicers  of  the  corps  have  the  means  to  superintend  the  men  absent  on 
leave,  and  the  transfer  from  peace-footing  to  war-footing  is  wonderfully 
simplified.  In  the  moral  aspect,  to  the  sentiments  of  honor  which  make 
every  soldier  a  part  of  the  glory  of  his  own  regiment,  and  individually 
responsible  for  the  same,  ^o  add,  at  the  same  time— and  the  effect  is  by 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  217 

no  means  unimportant — the  obligation  of  defending  the  reputation  of 
the  province  in  which  he  is  born.  It  is  an  additional  motive  and  anew 
encouragement. 

Furthermore,  a  soldior  who  has  distinguished  himself  is  rewarded  for 
his  good  conduct  by  the  esteem  which  he  enjoys  in  his  corps  ;  while,  by 
the  system  followed  in  France,  he  is  deprived  of  this  advantage  upon 
his  retirement  from  service.  Returned  to  his  home,  his  achievements 
are  no  longer  known;  he  thus  loses  that  prize  held  highest  in  his  life — 
the  enjoyment  of  the  good  fame  he  has  won.  It  would  follow  him,  on 
the  contrary,  if,  amid  the  scenes  of  his  childhood,  he  could  gather  around 
him  the  companions  of  his  youth  ;  he  would  then  be  surrounded  by  the 
halo  which  his  well-merited  and  conquered  honors  shed  around  him  to 
the  day  of  his  death.* 

NOTES. 

1.  Success  in  organizing  the  Confederate  Army— General  Samuel 
Cooper,  C.  A.— Confederate  soldiers  and  United  States  soldiers. — 
The  most  remarkable  instance,  without  doubt,  in  modern  times,  of  the  rapid  and 
successful  raising  of  an  army,  under  most  difficult  circumstances,  is  to  be  found  in 
that  of  the  Confederate  States. 

In  Europe,  where  military  organization  is  so  complete — where  standing  armies 
have  been  since  the  time  of  Charles  VII  of  France — where  everything  needed  for  the 
raising  and  equipping  of  large  bodies  of  men,  in  all  branches,  is  so  abundant,  and 
where,  even  in  the  most  peaceable  times,  a  great  nucleus  of  old  soldiers  may  always 
be  found — the  feet  of  raising  a  large  army  presents  nothing  remarkable. 

Even  in  times  of  exhaustion,  as  was  the  case  with  Prussia  in  1813,  or  with  Franco 
in  1814  and  1815,  there  was  still  a  powerful  nucleus  around  which  every  man  able  to 
bear  a  musket  could  bo  rallied. 

The  instance  which  may  be  likened  to  the  Confederate  States  was  the  rapid  for- 
mation of  a  Polish  army  in  1830,  complete  in  its  organization  ;  but  there  again  we  find 
a  nucleus  of  thirty-two  thousand  men,  splendidly  organized  and  disciplined,  who  at 
once  embraced  the  causo  of  their  country. 

That  which  would  mostly  seem  to  resemble  the  case  of  the  Confederacy  appears 
the  Army  of  tho  United  States,  but,  upon  examination,  nothing  could  be  further  from 
the  truth. 

The  Unitod  States  had  over  twenty  thousand  regular  troops.  The  large  depots  of 
arms  and  ammunition,  the  great  military  and  naval  arsenals  of  construction,  built 
up  with  Southern  gold,  were  within  their  territories.  The  navy,  without  the  ex- 
ception of  one  man-of-war,  was  theirs.  Tho  trade  with  tho  world  stood  open  to 
them.  Manufactories  of  every  kind  were  at  work  to  fill  tho  requisitions  of  the 
array.  What  they  could  not  themselves  supply,  England  was  only  too  glad  to 
furnish. 

*  The  Council  of  War  in  1828  was  occupied  by  this  question.  General  d'Ambru- 
çiac,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  officers  of  the  army,  the  reporting  member  of 
the  Committee  on  Inlantry,  had  presented  a  mixed  system  which,  by  creating  an 
excellent  reserve,  solved  the  question  in  a  perfectly  satisfactory  manner.  Fate  or- 
dained that  nearly  all  the  labors  of  that  council,  in  which  military  questions  were 
profoundly  and  carefully  debated,  '-ame  to  no  conclusion. — Kite  of  Au'  )  r 

19 


218  THE   SPIRIT   OF 

The  Confederate  States  found  almost  nothing  with  which  to  create  an  army,  save 
their  heroic  sons,  and  about  a  hundred  thousand,  mostly  old-fashioned,  muskets;  no 
artillery,  no  ships,  no  manufactories.  Everything  had  to  be  created  and  to  be  de- 
veloped. There  was  no  nucleus  around  which  to  rally,  save  the  love  of  country  and 
the  few  old  and  tried  officers  who  have  since  raised  the  name  of  the  South  so  high  as 
to  be  the  theme  of  admiration  upon  the  lips  of  every  tyranny-despising  man.  Tbo 
commerce  of  the  world  was  shut  to  us.  What  was  freely  granted  to  our  enemies, 
to  us  was  denied.       • 

No  people  has  ever  been  more  willing  to  sacrifice  everything  for  the  cause  of  lib- 
erty than  ours;  but  an  army  could  not  be  created  and  organized  without  expe- 
rienced men,  and,  happily,  they  wore  found. 

Out  of  a  very  chaos  of  men,  with  valor  certainly,  but  with  only  little  notion  of  dis- 
cipline, by  a  wise  system  of  gradual  tuition  and  organization,  armies  have  been  made, 
the  most  wonderful  structures  of  human  society.  For  now  three  years  they  have 
gallantly  checked  tho  invaders  upon  a  hundred  bloody  fields;  but  they  still  exist. 
A  population  of  less  than  six  millions  of  people  have  now  had  for  three  years  an  army 
which  bore  upon  its  lists  at  no  timo  less  than  half  a  million  of  combatants;  the 
fourth  year  is  approaching,  and  still,  to-day,  as  wo  are  assured  by  the  highest  au- 
thority, an  army  confronts  our  foes  which  is  as  strong,  as  brave,  better  disciplined, 
and  as  ready  to  die  for  the  country,  than  any  we  have  had  before.  Tho  men  may  be 
often  ragged  and  barefooted,  but  their  guns  are  shining,  their  bayonets  are  sharp, 
and  they  have  plenty  of  ammunition.   . 

In  Richmond  there  is  a  department,  so  quietly  managed  that  a  passer-by  would 
hardly  suspect  its  existence,  but  for  the  large  number  of  uniformed  men  which  may 
be  seen  to  come  and  go.  Over  this  department  presides  General  Samuel  Coopor, 
Adjutant  and  Inspector-General  of  our  armies — one  of  the  chief  agents  who  have 
achieved  all  this.  With  a  talent  for  organization  unrivalled  in  the  annals  of  war, 
he  has  discharged  the  tremendous  task  devolving  upon  him.  President  Davis  hap- 
pened once  to  be  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  United  States,  and  he  went  out  of 
office  with  the  reputation  of  having  been  the  most  efficient  they  ever  had.  There 
he  acquired,  no  doubt,  that  large  experience  of  judging  men  in  that  army,  for  which 
he  has  since  been  remarkable.  Thero  he  likewise  learned  the  value  of  General 
Cooper.  True  to  the  principles  of  liberty  upon  which  the  former  Union  reposed, 
General  Cooper  could  not  bo  brought  to  violate  thorn.  He,  therefore,  joined  us, 
giving  up  high  rank,  friends,  and  home,  for  an  uncertain  future,  but  for  a  glorious 
cause;  and  from  the  day  he  was  appointed  tho  first  general  in  our  army  bis  labor* 
have  been  unremitting  and  severe. 

To  discharge  his  duties,  justice,  delicacy,  firmness,  intense  application,  and  sagacity 
were  required.  General  Coopor  has  beon  successful  in  each  ;  and  the  highest  praise 
which  can  be  given  to  any  public  officer  ho  has  won:  namely,  there  is,  perhaps,  no 
officer  of  the  army  who  is  so  universally  esteemed  and  respected  by  those  under 
him  as  he.  He  is.no  longer  in  the  prime  of  manhood,  but  still  in  the  full  vigor  of 
mind.  In  military  service  for  now  fifty  years,  he,  nevertheless,  may  be  seen  hard  at 
work  early  in  the  day  and  late  at  night.  The  application  to  duty  of  one  so  advanced 
in  years  would  shame  thousands  of  men  not  one-half  his  age. 

When  the  names  of  those  shall  be  enumerated  by  a  grateful  posterity  who,  by 
their  wisdom  and  experience,  haw  guided  our  people  to  the  goal  of  independence, 
General  Cooper  will  not  be  the  last,  for  his  services  have  been  among  the  first. 

He  has  been  likened  to  Berthier,  the  celebrated  adjutant-general  of  tho  first  Na- 
poleon. He  may  bo  compared  to  that  marshal  as  regards  bis  capacity  f:v  'Tgcniza- 
ticn;  in  erery  other  respect  he  is  vastly  superior. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  !19 

W  hen  we  consider  the  chief  difference  between  the  Confederate  and  United  States' 
armies,  nothing  could  better  express  it  than  the  remarks  of  Marshal  Marmont  in 
the  preceding  chapter  :  "  Can  we  compare,  in  point  of  morality,  an  army  composed 
of  the  sons  of  families  elevated  by  a  spmt  of  order  and  obedience  to  the  laws,  to . 
one  which,  perhaps,  has  in  its  ranks  some  individuals  who  are  animated  by  a  love  of 
war  and  of  glory,  but  the  great  majority  of  which  is  composed  of  vagabonds,  whose 
bad  morals  'keep  them  strangers  to  a  quiet  and  laborious  life?" 

The  character  of  the  Federals  did  not  stand  very  high  long  before  this  war  had 
prominently  brought  out  their  most  abominable  traits.  It  is  curious  now  to  read 
some  remarks  which  have  been  made,  long  ago,  to  illustrate  it.  Dr.  Robert  Jack- 
son, for  instance,  in  his  "  View  of  the  Formation,  Discipline,  and  Economy  of  Ar- 
mies," a  late  inspector-general  of  English  army  hospitals,  and  who  had  ample  oppor- 
tunity of  judging,  having  been  attached  to  the  English  forces  in  America  during  the 
Revolutionary  war,  gives  a  very  unimpassioncd  account  of  his  impressions.  He 
does  not  think  them  M  Capablo  of  leaving  their  homes  for  ho\iseless  liberty  in  the 
woods.  The  majority,  particularly  those  wbose  ancestors,  if  not  banished  from 
Great  Britain  for  evil  deeds,  had  been  adventurers  in  pursuit  of  fortune,  had  little 
attachment  to  the  country  unconnected  with  its  productiveness  ;"  hence,  he  says, 
''It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  it  was  more  in  irritation  from  violence  committed 
on  property  by  arbitrary  taxation,  from  hopes  of  getting  rid  of  British  debts,  or 
from  a  factious  spirit  among  themselves,  than  from  a  real  desire  of  independent  lib- 
erty," that  they  revolted.  "They  talk  boastingly  when  danger  is  distant;  they  are 
not  in  general  bold  and  resolute  when  tho  hand  of  power  grasps  closely."  He  be- 
lieves them  to  be  "easily  affected  by  fear"  and  a  resolute  front;  but  " always  ready 
to  bribe  themselves,"  they  are  "sufficiently  shrewd"  whenever  this  practice  is  at- 
tempted upon  them. 

"  Though  not  daring  in  close  combat,  they  were  not  without  courage.  It  was  a 
courage  of  circumstance,  the  direct  combat:  front  to  front  was  supported  with  res- 
olution, the  retrograde  was  precipitate  when  the  flanks'  were  turned,  when  the  de- 
sign of  turning  them  was  discovered,  or  when  a  front  attack  Avas  threatened  by  tho 
bayonet.  Accustomed  to  circumvent,  and  to  shoot  from  behind  cover,  they  were 
themselves  afraid  of  being  circumvented  ;  and  impressed,  perhaps,  with  the  idea  of 
circumvention,  they  moved  off  precipitately  at  the  appearance  of  suspicious  manoeu- 
vres being  practiced  against  them;  they  had  not,  as  a  soldier  ought  to  have,  a  face 
for  flank  and  rear." 

The  Federals,  like  the  Russians,  then,  appear,  in  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Jackson,  not 
proof  against  the  bayonet;  and,  like  the  Austriaus,  have  always  a  wholesome  dread 
against  rear  attacks;  two  hints  which  can  not  be  too  much  acted  upon  by  Confed- 
erate generals. 

Agreeing  with  Marmont,  he  pronounces  them  "  Speculators  after  gain,  rather  than 
patient  and  industrious  as  simple  laborers."  He  considers  them  deficient  in  two 
qualities  that  are  essential  to  the  formation  of  military  force,  "Namely,  the  subordi- 
nation which  submits  patiently  to  such  forms  of  moulding  and  discipline  as  renders 
the  human  race  a  machine,  obedient  to  the  will  of  a  general,  to  whatever  point  it 
may  be  directed,  or  to  whatever  purpose  it  may  lie  applied;  or.  secondly,  the  ardent 
luve  of  country  which,  rising  to  enthusiasm,  produces  acts  of  individual  heroism 
beyond  the  calculations  of  tacticians,  and  superior  to  the  acts  of  mere  mechanism." 

An  English  writer  very  recently  compares  thus  the  Northern  and  Southern 
armies: 

••The  Southern  army,  compared  with  thai  of  the  North,  is  supposed  in  Europe  to 
be  physically  Inferior.    That  opinion,  so  far  at  least  as  it  applies  to  the  troops  met 


220  THE    SPIRIT   OP 

with  along  the  route  from  Culpeper  Court-house  to  Richmond,  is  a  mistake.  Tall, 
straight,  muscular,  the  Confederates  are  in  general  as  fiue  a  material  for  war  as 
any  men  in  the  world.  These  Virginians,  particularly,  make  a  magnificent  soldiery. 
One  of  the  most  marked  différences  between  the  two  armies  is  that  between  the 
men's  faces.  The  countenance  of  the  rank  and  file,  on  each  side,  differ  so  much  as 
to  present  a  strong  contrast.  The  stolid  expression  which  one  observes  in  faces  at 
the  military  posts  along  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railway,  compares  unpleasantly 
with  the  expression  of  the  frank,  genial,  intelligent  countenances  in  the  ranks  of 
the  South.  The  distinction  is,  to  a  very  groat  extent,  one  of  class,  but  is  referable 
partly  to  differences  of  race.  The  Celtic  and  Teutonic  casts  are  not  so  pleasant  to 
behold  as  that  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  ;  and  the  Virginians,  save  so  far  only  as  they 
partake  of  a  Huguenot  mixture,  are  of  almost  purely  the  same  stock  as  that  of 
England. 

"  The  Virginians  are  British  in  their  blood  and  in  their  habits.  Their  sympathies 
have  always  been  strongly  conservative  and  English.  In  the  time  of  Cromwell 
they  protested  against  the  usurpation  of  the  Parliament,  in  their  declaration  to 
support  the  Stuarts — the  '  Old  Dominion.'  " 

It  would  be  a  profitable  and  useful  task  to  elucidate  the  chief  characteristics 
which  distinguish  the  Northern  and  Southern  soldier;  but  it  is  be}rond  the  scope 
of  these  notes.    We  only  trust  that  an  abler  pen  will  undertake  it. 

But  we  can  not  omit  to  remark  the  exposition  of  our  enemy's  cruelties,  in  the 
masterly  Address  of  Congress  to  the  People  of  the  Confederate  States.  It  should 
be  scattered  broadcast  all  over  the  world,  anil  in  all  languages.  A  portion  of  it  we 
can  not  neglect  to  cite  here  : 

First,  the  picture  of  our  army  : 

"  Our  army  is  no  hireling  soldiery.  It  comes  not  from  paupers,  criminals,  or  emi- 
grants. It  was  originally  raised  by  the  free,  unconstrained,  unpurchaseable  assent 
of  the  men.  All  vocations  and  classes  contributed  to  the  swelling  numbers.  Aban- 
doning luxuries  and  comforts  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed,  they  submitted 
cheerfully  to  the  scanty  fare  and  exactive  service  of  the  camps.  Their  services 
above  price,  the  only  remuneration  they  have  sought  is  the  protection  of  their  al- 
tars, firesides,  and  liberty.  In  the  Norwegian  wars  the  actors  were,  every  one  of 
them,  named  and  patronymically  described  as  the  king's  friend  and  companion.  The 
same  wonderful  individuality  has  been  seen  in  this  war.  Our  soldiers  are  not  a  con- 
solidated mass — an  unthinking  machine — but  an  army  of  intelligent  units.  To  des- 
ignate all  who  have  distinguished  themselves  by  special  valor,  would  be  to  enumerate 
nearly  all  in  the  army.  The  generous  rivalry  between  the  troops  from  different 
states  has  prevented  any  special  pre-eminence,  and  hereafter,  for  centuries  to  come, 
the  gallant  bearing  and  unconquerable  devotion  of  Confederate  soldiers  will  inspire 
the  hearts,  and  encourage  the  hopes,  and  strengthen  the  faith,  of  all  who  labor  to 
obtain  their  freedom." 

And,  then,  the  picture  of  the  enemy's  atrocities  : 

"Not  content  with  rejecting  all  proposals  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  con- 
troversy, a  cruel  war  of  invasion  was  commenced,  which,  in  its  progress,  has  been 
marked  by  a  brutality  and  disregard  of  the  rule  of  civilized  warfare,  as  stand  out  in 
unexampled  barbarity  in  the  history  of  modern  wars.  Accompanied  by  every  act 
of  cruelty  and  rapine,  the  conduct  of  the  enemy  has  been  destitute  of  that  forbear- 
ance and  magnanimity  which  civilization  and  Christianity  have  introduced  to  miti- 
gate the  asperities  of  war.  The  atrocities  are  too  incredible  for  narration.  Instead 
of  a  regular  war,  our  resistance  of  the  unholy  efforts  to  crush  out  our  natural  exist- 
ence is  treated  as  a  rebellion,  and  the  settled  international  rules  between  belliger- 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  221 

• 

ents  are  ignored.  Instead  of  conducting  the  war  as  betwixt  two  military  and  politi- 
cal organizations,  it  is  a  war  against  the  whole  population.  Houses  are  pillaged  and 
burned.  Churches  are  defaced.  Towns  are  ransacked.  Clothing  of  women  and 
i  nfants  is  stripped  from  their  persons.  Jewelry  and  mementos  of  the  dead  are  stolen. 
Mills  and  implements  of  agriculture  are  destroyed.  Private  salt-works  are  broken 
up.  The  introduction  of  medicines  is  forbidden.  Means  of  subsistence  are  wantonly 
wasted  to  produce  beggary.  Prisoners  are  returned  with  contagious  diseases.  The 
last  morsel  of  food  has  been  taken  from  families,  who  were  not  allowed  to  carry  on  a 
trade  or  branch  of  industry.  A  rigid  and  offensive  espionage  has  been  introduced 
to  ferret  out  '  disloyalty.'  Persons  have  been  fbrced  to  choose  between  starvation 
of  helpless  children  and  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  a  hated  government.  The 
cartel  for  exchange  of  prisoners  has  been  suspended,  and  our  unfortunate  soldiers 
subjected  to  the  grossest  indignities.  The  wounded  at  Gettysburg  were  deprived  of 
tlieir  nurses,  and  inhumanly  left  to  perish  on  the  field.  Helpless  women  have  been 
exposed  to  the  most  cruel  outrages,  and  to  that  dishonor  which  is  infinitely  worso 
than  death.  Citizens  have  been  murdered  by  the  Butlers,  and  McNeils,  and  MilroyH, 
who  are  favorite  generals  of  our  enemies.  Refined  and  delicate  ladies  have  been 
seized,  bound  with  cords,  imprisoned,  guarded  by  negroes,  and  held  as  hostages  for 
the  return  of  recaptured  slaves.  Unoffending  non-combatants  have  been  banished 
or  dragged  from  their  quiet  homes  to  be  immured  in  filthy  jails.  Preaching  the 
Gospel  has  been  refused  except  on  condition  of  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance.  Par- 
ents have  been  forbidden  to  name  their  children  in  honor  of  '  rebel  '  chiefs.  Prop- 
erty has  been  confiscated.  Military  governors  have  been  appointed  for  states, 
satraps  for  provinces,  and  Haynaus  for  cities." 

2.  Duke  "Wallenstein. — Wallenstein,  Duke  of  Mecklenburg  and  Count  of 
Waldstein,  is  a  name  conspicuously  distinguished  in  the  military  operations  of  Eu- 
rope during  the  early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  especially  in  the  "  Thirty 
Years'  "War."  The  family  of  Waldstein  had  belonged  to  the  nobility  of  Bohemia  for 
many  centuries,  and  the  hero  of  this  memoir  was  born  in  his  father's  Castle  of  Her- 
manie,  in  September,  1583.  In  his  youth  he  pursued  his  studies  at  Pavia  and  Bo- 
logna, where  he  acquired  an  extensive  knowledge  of  languages,  mathematics,  and 
other  sciences  connected  with  the  military  art.  Waldstein,  anxious  to  signalize 
himself  by  military  deeds,  went  to  Hungary,  and  served  in  the  imperial  army  against 
the  Turks.  After  the  Peace  of  Sitvatowk,  in  1606,  Waldstein  returned  to  Bohemia, 
and  married  an  aged  but  wealthy  widow,  who  died  in  1614,  and  left  him  large  estates 
in  Moravia.  In  1617  he  raised  a  body  of  two  hundred  dragoons,  with  which  ho  as- 
sisted the  Archduke  Ferdinand  of  Austria,  who  was  at  war  with  the  Venetians.  In 
a  short  time  he  saw  himself  at  the  head  of  several  thousand  men;  and,  after  the 
successful  conclusion  of  the  campaign,  toward  the  end  of  1617,  the  Emperor  Ma- 
thias  made  him  his  chamberlain  and  colonel  in  his  armies,  and  created  him  count. 
Immediately  afterward  he  married  the  daughter  of  Count  Harrach,  and  the  emperor, 
on  this  occasion,  conferred  upon  him  the  dignity  of  a  Count  of  the  Holy  Roman  Em- 
pire. The  States  of  Moravia  appointed  him  commander  of  the  Moravian  militia; 
but  on  his  refusal  to  join  the  Bohemians  against  the  emperor  they  deprived  him  of 
his  command,  and  confiscated  his  estates.  Waldstein  was  now  appointed  quarter- 
master-general of  the  imperial  army,  and  in  the  course  of  the  following  campaign, 
by  his  timely  relief  of  Boucquoi,  who  was  attacked  by  Counts  Mansfield  and  Thurn, 
near  Tegu  (10th  of  June,  1619),  he  saved  the  emperor  from  being  made  a  captive  in 
his  own  capital.  It  seems  that  the  resources  of  the  emperor  being  exhausted,  Wald- 
stein gave  large  sums  for  the  rapport  of  his  master.    After  the  overthrow  of  King 


222  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

Frederick  of  Buhemia  the  estates  of  his  adherents  were  confiscated,  and  the  reward 
of  Waldstein  was  the  lordship  of  Friedland,  and  other  property  of  immense  value. 
Waldstein  was  neither  intoxicated  by  his  triumph  nor  by  his  wealth.  In  1621  he 
took  the  field  against  Betlen  Gabor,  the  Prince  of  Transylvania,  and  forced  him  to 
sue  for  peace,  which  was  granted  on  condition  that  he  should  give  up  his  claim  to 
the  crown  of  Hungary.  During  the  two  ensuing  years  Waldstein  was  principally 
occupied  with  the  management  of  his  estates;  but  Betlen  Gabor  having  again  taken 
up  arms  against  the  emperor,  Waldstein  hastened  to  Hungary,  and  arrived  just  in 
time  to  save  the  imperial  army,  which  was  besieged  in  the  camp  at  Goding,  on  the 
frontiers  of  Moravia.  As  a  reward  for  this  victory  the  emperor,  toward  the  close 
of  1623,  conferred  upon  him  the  title  of  prince,  and  in  the  following  year  (1624) 
created  him  Duke  of  Friedland  and  Prince  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  On  the  de- 
claration of  war  of  th«  Union  of  Lower  Saxony,  headed  by  Christian  IV,  King  of 
Denmark,  which  put  the  emperor  into  great  embarrassment,  Waldstein  raised,  at 
his  own  expense,  twenty-eight  thousand  men,  with  whom  he  marched  toward  tho 
Lower  Elbe.  Tho  renown  of  his  military  skill,  his  wealth,  and  his  liberality  was  so 
great,  that  men  flocked  to  his  camp  from  all  parts  of  Europe,  whom  the  iron  hand 
of  their  commander  kneaded  into  a  well-united  mass.  The  results  of  this  campaigu, 
so  glorious  for  the  imperialists,  belong  to  the  history  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.  Tho 
campaign  was  begun  and  finished  in  1626.  Waldstein  lost  twenty  thousand  men  by 
disease  and  fatigue;  but  in  the  beginning  of  1627  he  was  again  at  the  head  of  fifty 
thousand  men.  On  the  1st  of  August,  1627,  he  was  at  Troppau.  On  the  30th  ho 
took  Domitz,  in  Mecklenburg,  after  a  rapid  march  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles. 
The  Danish  war  was  finished  by  the  Peace  of  Lubeck  (13th  of  May,  1629).  Waldstein'^ 
reward  was  the  Duchies  of  Mecklenburg.  He  chose  Wismar  for  his  residence,  and 
obtained  from  the  emperor  the  title  of  Admiral  of  tho  Baltic  and  the  Oceanic  Sea 
(the  German  Sea).  His  plan  was  to  form  a  navy  with  the  assistance  of  the  Hanse- 
atic  towns,  and  to  prevent  Gustavus  Adolphus,  the  King  of  Sweden,  from  choosing 
Germany  for  the  theatre  of  his  ambition.  No  sooner  was  Waldstein  invested  with 
Mecklenburg  than  his  numerous  secret  enemies  changed  their  calumnies  and  in- 
trigues into  open  accusations.  Maximilian.  Duke  of  Bavaria,  and  Tilly,  were  among 
the  most  powerful  of  his  enemies.  Maximilian  at  length  declared  to  the  emperor 
that  he  and  all  Germany  would  be  ruined  if  "the  dictator  imperii"  remained  longer 
at  the  head  of  the  imperial  armies.  Ferdinand,  after  long  hesitation,  dismissed 
Waldstein  from  his  command  in  1630,  at  the  very  moment  when  Gustavus  Adolphus 
left  the  coast  of  Sweden  for  the  invasion  of  Germany.  Waldstein  then  retired  to 
Bohemia,  and  resided  alternately  at  Prague  and  at  Gitschin,  where  he  lived  with 
such  splendor  as  to  make  the  emperor  himself  jealous.  The  empire  was  on  the 
brink  of  ruin,  and  there  was  only  one  man  who  could  save  it.  This  man  was  Wald- 
stein. When  he  at  last  yielded  to  the  supplications  of  the  emperor  to  resume  the 
command,  he  showed  that  he  felt  all  his  importance.  Among  his  other  conditions 
ho  demanded  that  he  should  have  sovereignty  of  the  provinces  that  he  might  con- 
quer, and  that  the  emperor  should  give  him,  as  reward,  one  of  his  hereditary 
states  (Bohemia?),  of  which  he  should  bo  the  sovereign,  though  as  a  vassal  of  the 
emperor.  The  campaign  of  Waldstein  against  Gustavus  Adolphus  was  unsuccessful. 
After  losing  the  Battle  of  Liitzen  he  punished  with  death  many  generals,  colonels, 
and  inferior  officers,  who  had  not  behaved  well  in  the  engagement,  ne  soon  re- 
paired his  losses,  and  his  arms  were  victorious  in  Saxony  and  Silesia.  But  his 
haughtiness  became  insupportable,  and  he  openly  manifested  his  design  to  make 
himself  a  powerful  member  of  the  empire.  His  old  enemies,  among  whom  was  the 
Duke  of  Bavaria,  now  conspired  against  him.    They  represented  him  as  designing 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  223 

to  overthrow  Ferdinand's  power  in  Germany,  and  tho  emperor  was  the  more  ready 
to  believe  the  accusation  as  it  became  known  that  France  had  offered  to  Waldstein 
to  aid  him  in  obtaining  the  crown  of  Bohemia.  The  emperor  ordered  him  to  with- 
draw from  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  and  to  take  up  his  winter-quarters  in  Lower  Sax- 
ony (December,  1633)  ;  but  Waldstein  neither  would  nor  could  obey  his  order,  which 
he  regarded  as  a  violation  of  the  conditions  on  which  he  had  resumed  the  command. 
Finding,  however,  that  tho  emperor  was  resolved  to  dismiss  him,  he  prepared  to  re- 
sign the  command.  His  faithful  lieutenants  urged  him  not  to  abandon  them,  and, 
in  order  to  prove  their  invariable  attachment,  they  signed  a  declaration  at  Pilsen, 
12th  of  January,  1634,  in  which  they  promised  to  stay  with  Waldstein  as  long  as 
he  would  be  their  commander.  This  is  the  famous  declaration  which  has  always 
been  represented  as  a  plot  against  the  emperor.  Piccolomini,  Gallas,  and  several 
other  Italian  and  Spanish  officers  availed  themselves  of  the  occasion  to  ruin  Wald- 
stein, and  induced  the  emperor  to  sign  an  order  by  which  Waldstein  was  deprived 
of  his  command  and  declared  a  rebel.  Piccolomini  and  Gallas  were  commissioned 
to  take  Waldstein,  dead  or  «live.  Waldstein  ultimately  took  rofuge  in  the  Castle  of 
Eger,  whence  he  tried  in  vain  to  negotiate  with  his  onomies.  It  was  through  tho 
treacheryof  some  of  his  own  officers,  who  had  been  bribed  by  the  emperor,  that  ho 
was  destined  to  die.  On  the  25th  of  February,  1634,  the  commandant  of  Eger  gave 
a  splendid  entertainment  to  Waldstein's  officers,  at  which  tho  duke  was  not  present, 
on  account  of  his  ill-health.  After  dinner  an  armed  band  rushed  into  the  room, 
and  the  friends  of  Waldstein  fell  beneath  their  swords.  Captain  Devereux,  at  tho 
head  of  thirty  Irishmen,  then  rushed  into  the  apartment  of  Waldstein,  who  receiv- 
ed his  death  calmly  from  the  hands  of  their  leader,  as  he  stood  in  his  night-dress,  in 
an  utterly  defenceless  state. 


CHAPTER    II. 

MILITARY  SPIRIT  AND  DIFFICULTIES  OF  COMMANDING. 

A  mystery — Danger — Instinct  of  preservation — Relative  activity — Soldier  and  gen- 
eral have  the  same  sentiment — Nobility  of  profession — Friendship — Fear — Disci- 
pline^— Imitation — Rewards  for  true  courage— Bravery — Three  degrees — Which 
most  ran? — Its  rewards — Reciprocal  confidence — New  armies  not  possessed  with 
it — National  guards — Appreciation  of  the  enemy's  character — Napoleon's  real 
genius — Confidence,  discipline,  instruction,  necessary  to  constitute  an  army — Two 
different  kinds  of  soldiers — Their  relative  value — Why  do  we  go  to  war — Com- 
mand— Profession  and  genius — Authority — Predestination — Napoleon — Qualities 
requisite  for  the  command — Will — Mind,  character — The  predominating  element 
— Equation — Historical  names — Decision — Counsellors  ex  officio—  Painful  duty  of 
command — Responsibility — Resume — Inferior  commands — Note — General  who  is 
alBO  sovereign — General  Bonaparte  has  more  merit  than  Emperor  Napoleon — 
Parallel — Whom  to  prefer  for  command,  sovereign  or  general. 

Not;:.— CalmneHH  of  generals  after  having  made  all  dispositions  for  tho  battle. 

A  union  of  one  hundred  thousand  men  in  the  same  spot,  far  a'.-ay 
from  thtir  lamiliea.  property,  and  interest?  :  tho  exhibition  of  their  do- 


'Zl\  TUE    SPIRIT   OF 

cility,  obedience,  mobility,  and  state  of  preservation:  finally,  the  ex- 
istence of  a  spirit  which  animates  them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  lead 
them  to  throw  themselves  with  pleasure  into  the  most  imminent  dangers, 
in  which  many  of  them  will  find  death  itself,  at  the  mere  signal  of  a 
single  man — is  assuredly  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  spectacles  which 
could  be  presented  in  the  society  of  mankind;  it  is  a  phenomenon,  the 
cause  and  principle  of  which  can  only  be  found  among  the  mysteries  of 
the  human  heart. 

It  is  a  part  of  our  nature  to  seek  and  love  emotions  :  the  idea  of  dan- 
ger pleases  us,  although  there  are  but  few  men  who,  at  the  most  threat- 
ening moment,  would  not  be  disconcerted.  But  we  feel  the  necessity  of 
comparing  ourselves  with  other  men  :  emulation  is  natural  to  us  ;  every 
ofîe  loves  to  believe  himself  and  to  see  himself  superior  to  his  associates. 
Such  is  the  motive  power,  by  virtue  of  which  our  instinct  of  conserva- 
tion gives  way  to  the  noblest  impulsss  of  courage. 

The  sphere  of  activity  in  which  self-love  moves  depends  upon  the 
situation  of  the  individual.  Every  one  wishes  to  be  seen  and  admired. 
Man,  placed  in  a  crowd  of  men,  finds  his  horizon  in  the  immediately 
surrounding  mass;  in  a  more  elevated  position,  the  extent  of  the  hori- 
zon is  enlarged;  and  he  who  attains  the  very  pinnacle,  looks  down 
upon  the  world. 

This  sentiment,  so  honorable  to  mankind,  inspires  the  most  generous 
actions.  It  is  the  stimulus  iu  the  simple  private's  breast  as  well  as  in 
the  general's.  Thus,  in  every  grade,  is  the  profession  of  the  soldier  a 
noble  one,  since  it  consists  of  sacrifices  for  all,  which  are,  beyond  any- 
thing else,  rewarded  by  public  esteem  and  glory.  To  speak  disdainfully 
of  those  who  compose  the  great  body  of  armies,  is  nearly  akin  to  blas- 
phemy ;  to  speak  of  them  with  indifference,  is  not  to  understand  the 
conditions  of  our  own  nature. 

The  sentiment  I  have  just  painted  resembles  and  is  compatible  with 
another  sentiment  equally  noble — namely  :  friendship. 

Common  dangers,  glory,  and  common  interests,  ostablish  the  strong- 
est and  sincerest  bands;  and  as  everything  is  connected  and  united  in 
the  great  mystery  of  society,  it  is  precisely  in  a  state  of  war  and  in  the 
midst  of  perils — that  is,  when  society  stands  most  in  need  of  such  bands 
— that  friendships  are  most  habitually  formed;  or,  in  other  words,  that 
habit  of  companionship,  the  enprit  de  corps,  to  which  public  opinion  at- 
taches so  much  importance. 

An  exchange  of  rendered  services,  some  reciprocal  aid  received  or 
given,  doubles,  nay  augments  tenfold,  the  strength  and  security  of  each 
individual.  Thus,  a  strong  appreciation  calls  forth,  develops,  and  ex- 
alts man's  virtues  in  measure  as  circumstances  render  their  practice 
more  necessary,  whenever  self-preservation  renders  their  exercise  of 
importance. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  225 

But  the  heart  of  man  is  ever  changing,  and  the  host  sentiments  are 
combated  by  others  springing  from  the  same  principle,  but  only  con- 
sidered in  a  different  light.  I  brave  a  danger  in  order  to  save  my  com- 
rade, because  I  count  upon  him  in  a  like  instance;  but  should  the  im- 
mediate danger  appear  to  me  too  pressing,  and  fear  be  superior  to  the 
interest  by  which  I  am  attached  to  tho  individual  in  danger,  the  instinct 
of  my  future  preservation  vanishes  in  my  eyes  before  the  power  of  the 
present  peril,  and,  fleeing  from  danger,  I  forget  all  the  motives  which 
should  have  led  me  to  brave  it.  The  sentiment  which  determines  my 
conduct  in  this  instance,  and  which  is  called  fear,  is  not  of  rare  occur- 
rence in  face  of  a  real  danger:  it  is  even  more  common  than  could  be 
believed,  and  exercises  a  greater  influence  in  the  case  of  a  large  body  of 
men.  It  is,  therefore,  precisely  in  order  to  oppose  this,  and  to  strength- 
en contrary  sentiments,  that  the  power  of  discipline  has  been  called  to 
the  assistance  of  authority  ;  and  as  example  exercises  a  great  influence 
upon  mankind,  and  since  brave  men,  above  all  others,  often  carry  away 
their  comrades,  those  who  act  differently  from  the  common  rule  can  not 
be  too  much  rewarded  in  every  possible  way,  in  order  to  carry  their 
generous  dispositions  to  a  still  higher  degree  ;  because,  upon  these  very 
men,  the  fate  of  battles  oftentimes  depends. 

Bravery,  in  the  present  armies  of  Europe,  and  particularly  in  the  case 
of  officers,  may  be  classed  thus  : 

Bravery  which  prevents  an  officer  from  dishonoring  himself,  and 
which  leads  him  to  perform  his  duty  rigorously;  it  is  not  of  any  rare 
occurrence. 

That  which  urges  a  man  even  beyond  the  requirements  of  his  duty  ; 
it  is  much  less  common.  . 

Finally,  that  which  decides  a  man  to  risk  his  life  without  hesitation 
in  order  to  ensure  a  success  to  which  he  has  been  charged»to  contribute; 
it  is  of  the  rarest  occurrence.  Thus,  whenever  this  degree  of  bravery 
is  shown,  honors,  riches,  and  great  consideration  should  be  its  reward; 
and  the  opportunity  of  bestowing  such  recompenses  being  limited  and 
scarce  enough,  there  can  be  no  fear  that  the  expenses  might  become  a 
heavy  charge  upon  tho  treasury  of  a  state. 

The  sentiments  of  which  I  have  just  spoken  are  not  the  only  ones 
which  should  find  a  home  in  the  breast  of  military  men.  To  impart  to 
troops  the  whole  valor  of  which  they  are  susceptible,  it  is  necessary 
that  confidence  exist  among  all  those  composing  an  army.  Tho  soldier 
must  believe  in  the  valor  of  his  comrade.  He  must  be  convinced  that 
his  officer,  equally  brave,  is  superior  to  him  in  experience  and  in  instruc- 
tion ;  he  will  suppose  his  general  to  be  as  brave  as  any,  and  possessing 
much  more  science  and  talent.  If  this  be  the  case,  then  the  army  forms 
a  bundle  of  fasces  which  nothing  can  break.  In  it  we  must  seek  for  the 
first  requirement  of  the  strength  of  armies,  and  the  first  element  of 
success. 


226  I  HI    ri±*lRlT    OF 

But  this  fuudainontal  principle,  which  we  call  confidence,  is  only  in- 
herent in  old  and  tried  troops,  and  not  in  new  troops,  who  do  not  know 
each  other  as  yet.  Hence  the  absurdity  of  a  system  of  national  guards 
designed  to  replace  troops  of  the  line.  Even  supposing  national  guards 
to  consist  of  the  bravest  men  in  the  world,  they  will,  nevertheless,  bo 
worth  nothing  at  their  first  trial — since  the  valor  and  the  capacity  of 
each  individual  can  only  be  appreciated  by  the  others  after  some  actual 
experience.  The  first,  encounters,  therefore,  will  be  made  without  tho 
assistance  of  confidence,  and  will  most  probably  lead  to  great  and  irre- 
parable disasters. 

For  a  general  the  entire  moral  aspect  of  war  consists  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  movements  which  animate  the  minds  of  military  men,  and 
in  the  correctness  of  his  judgment  of  the  same,  combined  with  the  ap- 
plication he  makes  of  knowledge  thus  obtained  in  the  various  chances 
of  war.  This  knowledge  must  embrace  both  tho  troops  of  the  enemy 
he  has  already  once  met  and  expects  to  engage,  as  well  as  his  own 
soldiers. 

Here  is,  then,  a  faculty,  independent  of  the  profession  proper,  and  it 
is  nothing  less  than  the  inheritage  of  genius.  All  great  generals  have 
possessed  it;  and  never  any  man  in  the  world  in  a  higher  degree  than 
Napoleon. 

Discipline,  which  is  the  auxiliary  of  courage,  is  likewise  necessary  as 
a  means  of  order.  Its  whole  importance  is  at  once  felt  when  wo  reflect 
upon  the  mechanism  of  an  army,  and  ask  ourselves  how  a  like  multitude 
is  able  to  exist,  both  when  moving  and  when  at  rest. 

To  constitute  an  army  it  is  not  sufficient  to  unite  men  in  a  greater  or 
less  number;  they  must  also  -be  organized.  I  have  already  explained 
by  what  mechanism  obedience  is  secured — namely  :  by  bringing  him  who 
commands,  according  to  the  different  grades  of  military  organization, 
into  contact  with  a  limited  number  of  men,  upon  whom  his  powers  are 
easily  exercised. 

As  soon  as  this  division  was  set  at  work  and  the  organization  com- 
pleted, discipline  commenced  its  operations;  that  is  to  say,  the  subor- 
dinates were  accustomed  to  a  passive  deference  toward  their  superiors. 

After  it  came  instruction. 

Thus  we  see  three  different  operations  are  necessary  to  make  of  a 
mass  of  assembled  men  an  army  : 

1.  To  organize  them  ; 

2.  To  discipline  them  : 

3.  To  instruct  them. 

And  the  complement  of  organization,  of  discipline,  and  of  instruc- 
tion, is  confidence.  It  is  tho  essential  element,  whoso  absence  de- 
prives an  army  of  the  greater  part  of  its  valor.  This  confidence  should 
extend  to  all  and  each  one;  soldiers  should  have  confidence  among 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  227 

each  other  in  all  reciprocal  relations  ;  and  every  soldier  and  officer 
should  confide  in  the  superior  chiefs,  and,  above  all,  in  the  supreme 
chief. 

This  precious  element,  which  influences  every  result  in  so  powerful 
a  manner,  incroases  proportionately  in  its  eftects  with  the  greater  in- 
telligence of  the  soldiers — because  this  confidence,  being  founded  upon 
a  knowledge  of  men  and  things,  is  not  a  sentiment  which  has  been  but 
indifferently  considered,  nor  a  blind  faith. 

Soldiers  without  intelligence  have  but  little  mobility,  and  vary  less 
than  others  who  are  more  lively  and  greater  reasoners.  The  command 
of  the  former  is  moro  easily  excroisod,  and  there  is  less  risk  in  giving  it 
to  a  general  of  but  limited  capacity;  the  latter  soldiers,  on  the  contrary, 
will  have  moro  or  less  valor,  with  the  greater  or  less  worth  of  the  gen- 
eral placed  at  their  head. 

Tu  speaking  of  these  two  kinds  of  soldiers,  I  have  especial  reference 
to  the  Germans  and  French.  The  Germans  have  often  obtained  suc- 
cesses with  vory  mediocre  chiefs;  the  French  are  worth  ten  times  their 
number  if  they  are  commanded  by  a  chief  whom  they  love  and  osteem. 

They  will  be  below  all  comparison  with  a  general  who  can  neither 
inspire  them  with  esteem  nor  with  confidence.  They  have  proven  this 
at  Hochstett,  in  1704;  before  Turin,  in  1706;  and  in  1813,  at  Vittoria. 
The  reason  of  this  is  a  simple  one.  War  is  not  made  for  us  to  be  killed  ! 
The  objoct  is  always  to  conquer  the  enemy;  and  if  one  runs  the  risk  of 
dying,  it  is  conditional  that  the  sacrifice  of  one's  life  to  which  one 
submits  may  be  of  some  use.  Whenever  the  moment  comes  that  an 
intelligent  mass  of  men  see  no  probability  at  all  of  victory  before  them, 
there  is  no  further  chance  of  a  glorious  engagement  ;  from  that  very 
time  they  will  hesitate  to  compromise  their  lives,  and  seek  to  preservo 
them  for  a  time  when  the  sacrifice  shall  be  attended  with  some  useful 
result. 

J  havo  sought  to  explain  the  divers  movements  which  pass  in  the 
soldiers'  heart — movements  which,  in  tho  opinion  of  the  ignorant,  ap- 
pear to  result  in  contradictory  phenomena,  and  who,  by  considering 
meu  as  so  many  passive  machines,  do  not  at  all  compchond  tho  varia- 
tions of  which  thoy  arc  susceptible.  I  come,  now,  to  the  consideration 
of  the  command,  and  I  will  essay  to  establish  its  necessary  qualifica- 
tions. 

The  art  of  war  is  composed  of  two  distinct  parts:  tho  profession 
proper,  and  the  moral  part,  which  is  an  appendix  of  genius.  I  have 
already  considered  war  in  its  moral  aspect,  and  I  will  but  add  a  word 
or  two  as  to  the  qualities  which  give  authority  to  a  chief  over  those 
surrounding  him. 

There  are  soma  persons  who  have  an  innate  faculty  of  acting  upon 
the  minds  of  other?,  a  natural  r orer  of  exerting  their  authority,  ^bioh 


228  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

mnkcs  obedience  to  them  an  easy  matter.  This  authority  is  a  particu- 
lar gift,  and  springs  from  hidden  causes  beyond  the  comprehension  of 
our  mind.  One  who  obeyed  yesterday  and  is  called  upon  to  command 
to-day,  handles  his  power,  from  the  very  moment  even  in  which  he  be- 
comes invested  with  the  same,  with  as  much  facility  us  if  he  had  al- 
ways been  entrusted  with  it.  On  the  other  hand — and  the  examples  are 
frequent — another  exercises  authority  over  his  equals  which,  though 
not  contested,  does  not  seem  to  repose  upon  any  right,  and  he  may  not 
be  endowed  even  with  any  superiority  of  mind  ;  this  faculty  is  one  of 
the  effects  of  a  proper  organization.  The  legal  chief,  possessing  this 
faculty,  imbues  those  who  have  to  obey  with  salutary  fear.  lie  pass- 
es for  a  severe  man,  and  the  very  severity  which  is  supposed  to  be  part 
of  his  character  makes  its  application  unnecessary.  One  glanco,  a  sin- 
gle word,  acts  upon  the  minds  of  others  with  irresistible  ascendency. 
These  men  are  specially  selected  by  Provideuce  to  command. 

But  as  such  natural  and  powerful  influences  over  equals  are  but  rare- 
ly met  with,  it  has  been  necessary  to  prepare  the  structure  of  obedi- 
ence by  accustoming  subordinates  to  honor  and  to  respect  their  chiefs. 
This  structure  is  composed  of  military  grades;  they  determine  the 
rights  of  command,  and  give  a  social  position,  distinct  and  constant,  to 
those  who  are  invested  with  it.  Upon  elevated  grades  public  honors 
have  been  conferred,  to  act  upon  the  mind  and  to  speak  to  the  imagi- 
nation. Finally,  nothing  has  been  neglected  to  exalt  these  deposita- 
ries of  power  in  public  opinion,  in  order  to  secure  obedience  the  more 
readil}7.  Obedience  is  easy  in  ordinary  times,  when  no  obstacles  oppose 
themselves  to  preserve  regularity  and  order,  but  it  becomes  difficult  in 
times  of  danger,  suffering,  and  passion.  When  the  general  has  the 
reputation  of  courage  and  ability,  osteem  and  confidence  are  at  once 
excited  in  the  breasts  of  his  soldiers,  and  his  power  over  them  is  there- 
by augmented;  should  he  join  to  this  the  great  consideration  of  illus- 
trious birth,  by  which  his  social  position  is  a  very  elevated  one,  he  will 
be  still  more  exalted  in  the  eyes  of  the  multitude.  The  greater  the 
power  and  reputation  of  him  who  is  invested  with  authority,  tho  more 
easily  will  ho  be  obeyed. 

All  these  requirements,  being  united  in  the  person  of  Napoleon, 
greatly  favored  his  successes.  They  made,  if  I  may  express  myself 
thus,  the  necessary  elements  of  the  command.  But  what  are  the  per- 
sonal qualities  which  the  exercise  of  command  requires  ?* 

*I  have  above  stated  the  qualities  most  favorable  for  the  exercise  of  command  ; 
and  it  results  therefrom  that,  when  a  general  is  at  the  same  time  the  sovereign, 
everything  conspires  to  come  to  his  assistance.  As,  for  instance  :  absolute  liberty  in 
his  projects,  movements,  and  operations;  accumulation  of  means  and  resources; 
absence  of  responsibility;  liberty  to  engage  in  hazardous  combinations,  which, 
with  great  dangers,  may  lead  also  to  great  successes;  certainty  of  being  always 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  229 

The  art  of  war,  considerod  as  a  profession,  wholly  rosts  upon  combi- 
nation and  calculation.  I  have  already  enterod  into  circumstantial  de- 
tails when  speaking  of  strategy  and  tactics.  But  that  the  combinations 
may  lead  to  favorable  results,  it  is  necessary  that  a  strong  will  direct 
them  ;  because  the  chango  of  measures  already  resolved  upon,  if  tho 
motives  leading  to  such  a  change  arc  not  sufficien-tly  explained,  has 
many  difficulties,  and  oftentimes  results  in  great  disasters. 

Two  things  a  genoral  must,  therefore,  possess:  Mind  and  character. 

obeyed,  whatever  may  happen,  and  to  be  served  with  zeal,  etc.  When  compared 
with  a  position  so  advantageous,  a  simple  general  has  only  the  most  limited 
powers  at  his  disposition.  Whatevor  these  powers,  he  can  only  exercise  them 
within  certain  limits.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  him  to  perforin  his  duties  in  a  satis- 
factory manner,  hut  ho  must  for  ever  be  prepared,  aud  in  advance,  to  justify  his 
undertakings.  Lastly,  difficulties  may  occur  in  obtaining  the  obedience  which  is 
duo  his  grade  ;  and  rivalries,  hate,  and  intrigues  may  conspiro  to  become  as  pow- 
erful an  auxiliary  for  his  overthrow  as  tho  enemy  ho  has  to  fight. 

The  two  positions  can  not  be  compared;  and  the  merit  attached  to  a  successful 
general  is  much  greater  than  that  of  a  sovereign.  Thus,  the  glory  which  Napo- 
leon acquired  in  Germany  is  not  at  all  equal  to  that  of  General  Bonaparte  in 
Italy.  In  the  first  campaigns,  without  name,  without  experience  in  the  command 
of  armies,  with  the  most  feeble  and  incomplete  resources,  an  inferior  and  badly- 
provided  army,  he  obtained  glorious  successes,  conquered  Italy,  and  maintained 
himself  there.  In  tho  other  campaigns,  if  we  leave  out  of  consideration  the 
series  of  splendid  combinations  they  developed,  tho  magnitude  of  resources  of 
all  kinds,  their  accumulation  and  abundance  alone,  it  would  appear,  should 
have  enabled  a  general  to  gain  the  victory  without  any  application  of  genius. 

The  chances  of  success  being  more  numerous  with  the  military  sovereign  than 
with  a  general,  it  appears  desirable  that  the  former  should  command  ;  it  is,  how- 
ever,, different  in  reality. 

In  the  first  place,  who  will  be  the  competent  judge  of  the  sovereign's  talent? 
and  who  can  be  the  guarantee  that  his  illusions  will  not  inspire  him  with  fatal 
confidence?  Supposing,  even,  that  he  did  not  assume  the  supreme  command 
until  after  numerous  trials,  there  will  be  another  great  danger  to  the  state, 
namely:  should  he  be  unsuccessful,  public  confidence  in  tho  very  stability  of  his 
power  will  be  shaken — a  vast  social  disaster  !  Besides,  public  interest  requiros 
that  the  commanders  of  armies  be  controlled  by  some  other  power.  Whatovor 
may  be  tho  latitude  conferred  upon  a  chief,  there  are  certain  limits  which  he 
should  not  be  permitted  to  exceed  :  and  should  a  general  be  left  entirely  free  to 
act,  who  can  warrant  that  he  would  he  moderato  in  the  chances  presented  to 
him?  The  greatness  of  catastrophes  is  in  proportion  to  the  accumulation  of 
means  and  the  extent  of  the  enterprises,  and  then  society  may  be  shaken  to  its 
very  foundation.  The  faults  of  a  general  may  always  be  repaired  in  a  powerful 
country;  those  of  the  BOYereign,  who  is  exalted  in  public  esteem  and  conse- 
quence, will  lead  to  its  complete  ruin.  Therefore  the  sovereign  should  content 
himself  to  govern  and  control  the  administration,  to  create  resources,  and  to 
make  them  abundant  ;  he  should  likewise  bestow  unlimited  confidence  upon  him 
who  is  worthy  of  it.  and  reward  with  magnificence  and  without  jealousy:  but  ho 
should  never  assume  the  charge  and  responsibilities  of  the  actual  command  of  the 
«rmios  — S">:tr  of  Avthcr 
20 


230  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

Mind — because,  without  it,  no  combinations  can  be  made;  one  surren- 
ders without  any  defence.  Character — because,  without  a  strong  and 
obstinate  will,  the  execution  of  conceived  plans  will  never  be  secured. 
But  here  the  relative  qualities  prevail  over  the  absolute  qualities,  and 
character  should  control  mind.  In  this  state  we  find  the  element  of 
success.  If  every  quality  could  be  expressed  by  figures,  I  would  prefer 
a  general  having  five  parts  of  mind  and  ten  parts  of  character,  to  one 
who  has  fifteen  parts  of  mind  and  eight  parts  of  character.  Whenever 
character  has  the  ascendency  over  mind,  and  the  latter  is  of  a  certain 
extent,  the  chances  are  that  an  object  determined  upon  will  be  attained. 
But  if  mind  is  superior  to  character,  the  judgment,  projects,  and  the  di- 
rection are  being  continually  changed,  because  a  man  of  vast  intelli- 
gence considers  questions  at  every  instant  in  a  new  aspect.  If  strength 
of  will  does  not  interpose  between  these  continual  changes,  we  float  for 
ever  between  two  parts,  irresolute  which  one  to  take.  We  end  by 
choosing  none  whatever  (which  is  worse  still);  and,  instead  of  approach- 
ing our  object,  an  uncertain  march  brings  us  further  from  it,  and  we  are 
lost  in  a  wilderness. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  very  wrong  conclusion  to  suppose  that  much 
mind  is  not  requisite  to  achieve  great  things.  We  nowhere  meet  with 
any  generals  who  possessed  a  mediocre  mind  in  ancient  and  modern 
times,  among  any  of  the  names  which  have  become  historical — Alexan- 
der, Hannibal,  Scipio,  and  Caesar.  They  all  possessed  the  most  distin- 
guished faculties  of  intelligence.  The  same  we  find  to  be  the  «ase  with 
the  great  Condé,  Luxembourg,  the  great  Eugene,  Frederic,  and  Napo- 
leon. But  every  one  of  these  great  men  joined  to  superior  qualities  of 
mind  a  still  higher  degree  of  character. 

This  necessity  of  possessing  a  character  outbalancing  the  mind,  is  felt 
by  him  who  is  called  upon  to  command,  at  almost  every  instant;  be- 
cause, in  that  position,  it  becomes  frequently  of  moment  to  take  a  deter- 
mined part  and  to  come  to  some  speedy  decision.  Hence  that  which 
men  deprived  of  character  dread  most  is  to  arrive  at  a  determination  ; 
a  fatal  instinct  leads  them  to  postpone  a  resolution,  oftentimes  of  great 
urgency,  and  which,  when  at  last  made,  is  of  no  further  avail  because 
it  was  delayed,  and  sometimes  even  becomes  disastrous. 

This  remark  authorizes  me  to  proclaim  this  principle  :  A  general  is 
justified  in  receiving  counsel  when  he  feels  the  want  thereof;  but  to  be 
habitually  led  by  counsels,  unless  he  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  the  su- 
preme chief,  can  never  be  attended  with  success. 

The  necessity,  therefore,  of  coming  to  a  resolution  is  the  most  pain- 
ful duty  of  a  commander.  In  that  moment  responsibility  rises  before 
him  with  its  imposing  cortege — all  the  duties  with  which  he  is  charged, 
and  all  that  is  dear  to  him  in  the  inmost  depths  of  his  heart,  are  vividly 
before  his  mind.     The  responsibility  toward  those  dependent  upon  him, 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  231 

the  discharge  of  the  responsibilities  assumed  toward  the  public  welfare, 
toward  himself,  and  his  conscience;  in  its  complete  aspect,  a  responsi- 
bility so  immense  and  terrible  in  proportion  as  the  general  is  penetrated 
with  the  consciousness  of  the  duties  devolving  upon  him.  There  is  but 
one  way  to  support  this  weight;  he  must  have  enough  strength  and 
resolution  to  place  himself  above  all  consequences— sure  to  find,  in  his 
conscience  and  his  intentions,  a  generous  approbation  of  all  his  actions, 
after  having  devoted  to  them  all  the  capacity  and  the  intelligence  of 
which  he  is  capable.  But  there  are  very  few  men  able  to  rise  to  such  a 
height.  This  necessity  of  coming  to  a  decision  is  both  of  the  greatest 
importance  and  of  the  greatest  difficulty  to  him  who  commands.  But 
whenever  the  part  has  been  chosen  so  as  to  admit  of  no  further  modifi- 
cation, and  the  cannon  begin  to  thunder,  when  the  battle  has  begun, 
and  every  one  has  received  the  indication  of  the  part  allotted  to  him  in 
the  opened  drama.,  then  a  commander-in-chief  may  rest  tranquil.  He 
has  again  found  the  security  and  repose  of  mind  of  which  he  was  de- 
prived before  the  battle  opened. 

We  have  seen,  then,  that  a  general  unites  all  the  qualities  promising 
success,  when  he  possesses  the  mind  to  see,  judge,  and  combine,  and  the 
character  to  execute;  when,  furthermore,  he  has  a  complete  knowledge 
of  men,  their  leading  passions,  and  their  secret  motives,  of  which  war 
calls  forth  so  many;  when,  besides,  danger,  far  from  paralyzing  his 
faculties,  causes  them  to  augment  and  to  show  forth  with  renewed  en- 
ergy ;  when,  finally,  he  loves  his  soldiers  and  is  beloved  by  them,  and 
when  he  unceasingly  thinks  of  their  preservation,  their  interests,  and 
well-being  as  a  father  should  of  his  children.  I  have  only  said  that 
success  is  then  promising,  and  not  secured;  because  war  has  such  va- 
ried chances,  and  is  subjected  to  so  many  hazards,  that  nothing  is  cer- 
tain before  actual  success  has  been  comple'ted. 

In  treating  of  the  necessary  qualities  for  the  exercise  of  command,  I  ' 
have  intended  to  speak  of  the  chief  command.  Any  other  command, 
however  extended  it  be,  cau  not,  at  the  moment  of  its  becoming  subor- 
dinate, be  at  all  compared  to  a  chief  command,  however  limited  the  lat- 
ter may  be,  considering  the  number  of  troops— because  there  the  same 
difficulty,  which  I  have  sought  to  make  comprehended,  does  no  longer 
interpose,  namely:  the  necessity  of  resolution.  J  have  commanded 
under  Napoleon  both  armies  of  different  strength  and  corps  d'armée. 
Only  ten  thousand  men,  left  to  the  sole  control  of  their  chief,  require 
much  more  solicitude,  and  leads  to  much  greater  embarrassments,  than 
the  command  of  fifty  thousand  men  belonging  to  an  army  of  two  hun- 
dred thousand  men.  In  the  last  case  they  are  moved,  march,  and  fight 
according  to  given  orders  and  a  fixed  object— comparatively  easy  mil- 
ters; and  whenever  the  engagement  or  the  march  is  terminated  and  the  ' 
camp  is  established,  the  general  can  repose  as  the  lowest  soldier  does, 
and  has  nothing  to  do  but  to  nwait  ordors.     At  that  very  time,  on  the' 


232  THE    SPTRTT    6  F. 

contrary,  ïa  tbe  commander-in-chief  harassed  the  most  hy  troubles  and 
providential  measures  of  all  kinds. 

NOTE. 

Calmness  of  Generals  after  having  made  all  dispositions  for  the 
Battle. — This  calmness,  so  well  described  by  Marmont.  appears  to  have  been  one 
of  tbe  chief  characteristics  of  all  great  generals. 

Frederic  the  Great,  after  his  dispositions  had  been  made,  frequently  threw  him- 
self upon  a  bed  of  straw  to  take  some  rest,  or,  seated  before  a  camp-fire,  would 
quietly  muse  and  fall  asleep. 

Napoleon  never  rested  until  even  the  slightest  matters  had  beeu  carried  out  to 
his  satisfaction,  and  during  the  night  preceding  the  battle  would  himself  receive 
all  the  reports;  when  this  was  done,  he  was  soon  enjoying  a  few  hours'  rest  in  the 
midst  of  his  faithful  guards,  until  Berthier  would  wake  him  to  mount  on  horse- 
back on  the  morning  of  the  battle. 

Just  before  the  Siege  of  Rodrigo,  when  the  proximity  of  the  allies  to  Marmont's 
army  placed  them  in  considerable  danger  by  reason  of  the  non-arrival  of  their 
flank  divisions,  a  Spanish  general  was  astonished  to  find  Wellington,  the  English 
commander,  lying  on  the  ground  in  front  of  his  troops,  serenely  and  iniperturba- 
bly  awaiting  the  issue  of  the  peril.  "Well,  general,"  said  the  Spaniard,  "you 
are  here  with  two  weak  divisions,  and  you  seem  to  be  quite  at  your  ease  ;  it  is 
enough  to  put  one  in  a  fever."  "  I  have  done  the  best,"  the  duke  replied,  "  that 
could  bo  done,  according  to  my  own  judgment,  and  hence  it  is  that  I  don't  disturb 
myself  either  about  the  enemy  in  my  front,  or  about  what  they  may  say  in  Eng- 
land."— Edinburgh  Review,  July,  1859. 

In  General  A.  S.  Johnston  and  Lieutenant-General  Jackson,  of  our  army,  we 
remark  the  same  characteristic  feature. 


CHAPTER    III. 

PICTURE  OP  A  GENERAL  WHO  ANSWERS  TO  ALL  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
OF  THE  COMMAND. 

His  bravery — His  calmness — His  sang-froid — His  dash — He  must  have  an  estab- 
lished reputation — If  not,  he  must  eagerly  seize  the  opportunity  to  establish  it 
— His  physical  qualities — Privileges  of  youth  when  called  to  command — He 
knows  the  value  of  time — His  activity  is  without  limit — Ho  must  be  everywhere 
— His  severity — His  sentiment  of  order — Kindness  united  to  severity — Merited 
punishments — He  must  çespect  the  uniform  of  soldier — His  gravity — Does  not 
exclude  affability — Facility  of  access  to  him — He  must  attend  to  everything  at 
once — His  magnificence — In  what  it  ought  to  consist — His  topographical  knowl- 
edge—Campaign of  Marengo — Fort  of  Bard — How  to  deceive  the  enemy — How 
to  discover  the  enemy's  intentions — The  general's  entire  independence  necessa- 
ry— A  general  not  to  be  absolutely  dependent  upon  the  government. 

A  review  of  the  life  and  character  of  the  late  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston, 
Confederate  Army. 

I  will  here,  in  a  few  words,  group  together  the  qualities  and  the  bear- 
ing which  should  characterize  a  general  called  to  a  chief  command. 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  233 

He  is  a  brave  man,  and  recognized  as  such  by  the  whole  arniy  ;  his 
courage  can  not  be  one  moment  called  in  question,  or  become  the  object 
of  the  slightest  doubt.  His  bearing  is  characterized  by  calmness  and 
sang-froid,  without,  however,  excluding  that  dash  and  impetuosity  so 
well  calculated  to  inspire  and  carry  with  it  those  who  witness  the  sairie. 
If  his  reputation  in  this  respect  be  not  sufficiently  established,  hé 
should  seek  and  seize  the  opportunity  of  giving  to  it  an  incontestable  ba- 
sis ;  otherwise  he  will  never  be  able  to  exercise  upon  his  generals,  offi- 
cers, and  soldiers  that  power,  commanding  respect  and  esteem,  which 
is  so  indispensable  to  success. 

This  reputation  once  achieved,  he  must  avoid  being  prodigal  of 
his  life,  without,  however,  being  too  much  concerned  about  its  preser- 
vation. 

His  mind  is,  as  has  heretofore  been  established,  subordinate  to  his 
character. 

His  bodily  strength  is  proof  against  the  greatest  fatigues,  and  con- 
siderations of  health  never  prevent  him  from  inspecting  personally  the 
most  important  matters;  since  even  the  best  made  reports,  and  the 
accounts  of  the  cleverest  persons,  will  never  have  the  same  precision 
acquired  by  a  personal  investigation. 

If  nature  has  endowed  him  with  superior  faculties,  it  is  desirable  that 
he  be  called  to  the  chief  command  at  an  early  age.  By  it,  his  successes 
will  be  sooner  secured.  He  will  then  possess  that  wonderful  energy 
and  confidence  in  himself  which  doubles  his  strength.  An  object  of 
sympathy  and  good-wishes  to  every  young  soldier  of  his  army,  he  will 
at  the  same  time  never  be  wanting  in  that  great  deference  due  to  age, 
and  he  will  be  personally  endowed  with  sufficient  experience.  There 
are  matters,  a  just  knowledge  and  judgment  of  which  is  only  acquired 
by  time  and  by  experience,  and  which  can  never  be  divined.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  too  prolonged  habit  of  obedience  diminishes,  rather 
than  develops,  the  qualities  requisite  for  command. 

It  is  especially  necessary  that  he  should  have  seen  war  when  very 
young,  and  shortly  after  entering  upon  his  career;  if  this  be  not  tho 
case,  he  will  only  slowly  and  with  difficulty  acquire  that  tact  and  in- 
stinct which  an  early  acquaintance  with  war  creates,  and  by  which  its 
difficulties  are  singularly  simplified. 

He  will  continually  be  impressed  by  the  fact  that  a  surprise  can  only 
be  the  consequence  of  culpable  negligence, 'and  that  a  surprised  general 
is  dishonored.  By  guarding  against  derelictions  of  duty,  he  will  not 
only  shelter  himself,  but  all  of  his  subordinates,  against  any  reproach. 

Knowing  the  value  of  time,  the  only  treasure  which  can    never  be 

again  recovered,  he  will  dispense  with  writing  much,  by  leaving  it  to 

those   in  whose  sphere  of  duty  it  is  to  transmit  his  orders;  he  will  only 

reserve  to  himself  their  revision  and  approval.     A  good  general   has 

20« 


23-4  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

never  written  much  in  the  field  ;  the  head  and  not  his  hand  ?hould  be 
busy;  he  employs  his  time  more  usefully  by  giving  verbal  instructions, 
and  to  turn  it  to  account  by  preserving  the  freedom  of  his  judgment 
to  inspect  whether  his  iutentious  have  been  carried  out  in  the  proper 
spirit,  and  in  the  meditation  of  new  combinations. 

His  activity  must  be  with  but  limits;  by  his  often  unexpected  pres- 
ence he  will  keep  every  one  in  foar  of  being  caught  when  wanting  iu 
the  discharge  of  his  duties,  and  in  this  way  he  will  keep  alive  the  zeal 
of  all. 

Every  one  of  his  decisions  will  be  ruled  by  impartial  justice;  he  will 
be  severe  in  the  maintenance  of  order  and  discipline;  thus  warranting 
to  the  soldiers  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights,  and  the  greatest  degree  of 
welfare  compatible  with  their  situation. 

If  severity  is  one  of  his  duties,  there  is  another  one,  discharged  with 
much  more  pleasure,  and  which  is  not  less  important.  I  allude  to  the 
rewards  due  to  glorious  actions  and  good  conduct.  lie  must  not  be 
prodigal  nor  parsimonious  in  their  distribution;  he  must  make  it  his 
own  business  to  obtain  them;  and  ho  should  place  even  more  impor- 
tance in  their  acquisition  than  he  would  in  his  own  personal  recom- 
pense Let  him,  however,  reflect  well  that  he  award  them  to  those  only 
who  have  a  right  to  their  claim;  because  a  reward  justly  made  is  an 
encouragement  to  the  heart  of  the  generous,  while  an  unmerited 
recompense  destroys  all  emulation,  and  is,  moreover,  productive  of 
intrigues.  The  instinct  of  the  men.  and  their  innate  love  of  justice, 
will  quickly  see  through  the  spirit  which  influenced  the  manner  of  the 
distribution  of  rewards. 

If  the  general  is  true  to  these  principles,  if  ho  satisfies  the  conditions 
just  enumerated,  he  will  bo  the  object  of  respect,  esteem,  and  affection 
on  the  part  of  his  troops.  The  necessity  of  order  is  so  vividly  felt  bjr 
military  men,  that  they  always  love  a  general  whose  severity  is  the 
warrant  of  that  order;  they  confidently  trust  him,  because  firmness 
and  equity  characterize  all  his  decisions. 

Kindness  without  severity  leads  to  nothing  ;  it  is  mistaken,  both  by 
impression  and  in  reality,  for  feebleness — which  makes  a  chief  the  play- 
thing of  surrounding  influences.  But  kindness,  accompanied  by 
severity,  resting  upon  principles,  makes  the  general  the  idol  of  his 
soldiers.  Rigor,  however  great,  is  based  upon  laws,  and  i*estricted  to 
certain  limits,  which  should  prevent  it  from  becoming  injurious.  A 
man  easily  resigns  himself  to  a  merited  punishment,  but  injury  is  irri- 
tating. The  greater  the  calmness  with  which  a  punishment  is  inflicted, 
the  greater  will  be  its  effect.  If  a  chief  is  violent,  he  can  not  complain 
if  his  subordinates  murmur.  A  general  should  also  treat  every  one 
who  wears  a  soldier's  uniform  with  consideration.  There  is  something 
so  noble  in  their  profession,  the  sacrifice  of  life  is  so  sublime,  that  those 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  235 

who,  by  reason  of  their  calling,  are  always  ready  to  offer  it,  have  a  right 
to  command  consideration,  even  if  they  have  merited  severe  punish- 
ment. 

A  general  should  be  habitually  grave  in  his  manners  whenever  he 
comes  into  contact  with  his  subordinates;  still,  these  manners  do  not 
forbid  a  sort  of  familiarity  and  dignified  gaiety,  as  they  will  inspire 
affection  and  esteem.  A  feeling  of  fraternity  is  naturally  excited  among 
military  men  by  common  dangers,  privations,  and  fatigues:  nor  is  this 
manifestation  in  any  way  incompatible  with  the  regulations  of  military 
subordination  and  the  maintenance  of  discipline.  The  less  a  general 
appears  to  be  conscious  of  his  superiority,  the  more  is  the  soldier  awaro 
of  the  same.     A  general  should  be  accessible  to  everybody. 

Despatches  which  he  receives  should  bo  at  once  opened,  forgetful  of 
any  personal  inconvenience.  Should  he  even  bo  roused  twenty  times 
in  one  night,  amid  the  fatigues  of  a  campaign,  to  receive  reports  of 
little  consequence,  he  should  never  prohibit  his  being  called  up  again. 
News,  in  war,  may  be  of  such  importance,  and  a  delay  of  but  two  hours 
may  prove  so  fatal,  that  the  safety  of  an  army  sometimes  depends  upon 
it. 

A  general's  mode  of  living  should  bo.  as  magnificent  as  his  fortune 
may  permit.  His  first  luxury  will  be  the  keeping  of  a  great  number  of 
horses;  he  should  have  a  number  of  them  sufficient  for  any  possible 
emergency.  The  second  object  of  his  magnificence  should  be  a  house, 
adapted  for  the  exercise  of  the  greatest  hospitality.  An  officer  whose 
duties  carry  him  to  head-quarters  during  war,  should  never  leave  it 
without  having  experienced  proofs  of  his  general's  hospitality.  It  is 
not  only  an  act  laudable  in  itself,  but  staff-officers,  or  officers  finding 
themselves  at  a  great  distance  from  their  corps,  would,  if  the  general 
did  not  take  care  of  them,  be  reduced  to  great  stress-  for  their  subsist- 
ence, and  might  even  be  compelled  to  suffer.  To  this  consideration  of 
humanity  may  be  joined  another,  which  even  affects  the  good  of  tho 
service.  The  officer,  charged  with  some  mission,  hastens  his  arrival, 
knowing  in  advance  that  lie  will  be  hospitably  received.  He  accelerates 
his  march  because  he  is  kindly  disposed  toward  his  chief,  and  for  his 
own  interest;  and  time  is  so  important  *a  consideration  during  war,  • 
that  we  should  economize  it  as  much  as  possible. 

A  general  should  neglect  nothing  to  obtain,  beforehand,  a  minute 
knowledge  of  the  country  into  which  ho  proposes  to  carry  his  opera- 
tions. He  will  procure  the  best  statistics;  he  will  know  in  what  the 
resources  of  all  kinds  constat,  if  he  study  the  topography  of  his  field  of 
operations  but  carefully.  The  least  negligence  in  the  pursuit  of  this 
study  may  lead  to  tho  gravest  consequences.  We  can  not  too  much  re- 
flect upon  all  matters  belonging  to  the  characteristics  of  a  country,  and 
to  be  able  to  turn  every  resource  to  account.     By  procuring  at  any  price 


236  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

the  very  best  maps,  and  by  looking  at  them  continually,  even  sometimes 
in  a  vague  manner,  he  will  be  sure  to  acquire  happy  ideas,  which  may 
become  of  immense  value  to  his  operations. 

The  insufficiency  of  information  of  this  nature  nearly  occasioned  the 
miscarriage  of  the  immortal  campaign  of  Marengo  in  1800,  at  its  very 
outset,  and  led  to  many  difficulties.  The  First  Consul  did  not  know  of 
the  existence  of  the  Fort  of  Bard,  and  its  means  of  resistance;  it  would 
have  been  an  easy  matter  for  us  to  seize  it,  had  we  attached  to  the  first 
bodies  of  troops  some  pieces  of  sufficiently  heavy  calibre.  The  fact 
that  the  Little  Saint-Bernard,  which  debouches,  like  the  Great  Saint- 
Bernard,  into  the  valley  of  Aosta,  was  also  practicable  for  artillery,  had 
been  ignored;  the  passage  of  the  mountains  would  have  been  much 
more  prompt,  and  would  not  have  presented  so  many  obstacles,  the  con- 
quering of  which  may  justly  be  considered  as  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able operations  of  our  epoch. 

Every  one  of  his  projects  demands  the  profoundest  secresy  ;  a  general 
should  communicate  them  to  those  only  who  are  called  upon  to  execute 
them,  and  not  until  the  moment  when  this  knowledge  becomes  necessa- 
ry. How  many  well-conceived  enterprises  have  miscarried  because 
they  were  known  to  the  enemy  !  On  the  other  hand,  nothing  is  more 
favorable  to  success  than  to  permit  a  belief  to  gain  ground,  contrary  to 
what  we  wish  to  execute;  by  deceiving  those  who  surround  him,  a  gen- 
eral will  most  surely  deceive  the  enemy. 

But  it  is  of  quite  as  much  importance  for  him  to  inquire  into  the 
projects  of  the  enemy  as  it  is  to  hide  his  own;  a  general  will  neglect 
nothing  in  this  respect.  Without  reposing  a  blind  faith  in  his  spies,  he 
will  well  pay  and  entertain  them.  It  is  especially  useful  to  procure 
intelligence  from  those  employed  near  the  enemy's  head-quarters. 

To  succeed  in  this,  the  first  one  of  his  cares  will  be  to  know  the  de- 
tail of  the  organization  of  the  different  corps  composing  the  army  of 
the  enemy,  and  the  names  of  the  commanding  generals.  With  this  aid, 
and  that  of  light  troops,  well  commanded,  who,  constantly  engaging 
the  enemy,  make  prisoners,  he  has  important  documents  at  his  disposal 
relative  to  the  enemy's  movements.  The  capture  of  a  single  soldier  of 
such  and  such  a  regiment  announces  the  presence  of  a  certain  division 
which  belongs  to  a  certain  corps,  and  from  it  a  general  perceives  the 
spirit  and  the  object  of  the  manœuvres  and  operations  of  his  adversary. 
It  will  be  scarcely  believed  how  much  candor,  simplicity,  and  truth  are 
contained  in  the  answers  of  a  prisoner,  without  his  suspecting  the  range 
of  the  questions  he  is  asked,  and  without  his  believing  in  the  least  that 
he  harms  the  cause  he  has  served  with  zeal,  and  which  he  is  very  far 
from  wishing  to  compromise. 

Finally,  the  general  who  holds  his  glory  dear  must  keep  himself  aloof 
from  any  absolute  dependence,  in  any  of  his  operations;  it  will  always 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  237 

bo  fatal.  An  enlightoned  government  does  not  assume  the  pretension 
to  direct  everything;  its  rôle  is  limited  to  the  indication  of  the  object, 
after  having  determined  the  nature  of  the  means  and  their  quota.  To 
the  general  alone  it  belongs  to  determine  the  system  to  be  pursued  and 
the  combinations  to  be  followed,  since  he  is  placed  in  the  face  and  the 
midst  of  the  surrounding  difficulties.  Rather  than  submit  to  any  too 
direct  action  of  the  government,  the  general  should  abandon  a  com- 
mand which  he  is  not  permitted  to  exercise  in  its  whole  plenitude;  it  is 
either  necessary  that  the  government  renounce  the  entertaining  of  dif- 
ferent views  from  the  general,  and  still  accord  him  its  confidence — or 
that  the  genoral  be  deprived  of  the  command,  if  it  be  believed  that  he 
is  following  a  bad  system.  The  government  should  only  act  upon  a 
general  who  has  its  confidence  through  the  influence  of  counsels  which 
do  not  bear  the  character  of  imperative  orders;  it  will,  above  all,  take 
care  not  to  place  near  him  any  counsellor  ex  officio:  since  there  is 
nothing  more  absurd  than  such  a  system;  and,  as  I  have  already  said, 
its  results  can  not  but  be  always  fatal.  A  general  may  very  properly 
provoke  discussions,  and  consult  enlightened  persons;  he  may  even  ac- 
cept counsels  if  he  thinks  it  useful  ;  but  he  should  never  be  compelled 
to  ask  for  and  submit  to  them.  A  general  at  the  head  of  an  army  has 
but  two  rôles  to  play — to  obey  or  to  command.  Let  the  government 
give  the  command  of  its  armies  to  those  it  believes  to  be  worthiest,  and 
let  it  accord  to  them,  at  the  same  time,  an  unreserved  confidence  ;  if  not, 
let  the  generals  be  displaced. 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE  LIFE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  THE  LATE 
GENERAL  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON,  C.  S.  A. 

I. 

Two  foreign  officers,  in  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States,  were 
ordered  to  report  for  duty  to  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  in  the 
month  of  October,  1861.  When  leaving  his  head-quarters  at  Bowling 
Green,  in  the  State  of  Kentucky,  having  then  seen  and  spoken  with  him 
for  the  first  time,  they  simultaneously  exclaimed,  when  outside  of  the 
enclosure  of  the  unpretending  quarters  :  "He  is  the  very  beau  ideal  of 
a  general  !" 

To  one  of  these  officers,  who  now  feebly  attempts  to  pay  this  hum- 
ble tribute  to  the  memory  of  the  departed  hero,  this,  his  first  impulsive 
exclamation,  has  become  the  basis  of  the  greatest  veneration  of  which 
he  is  capable. 

In  the  prime  and  vigor  of  genius,  and  upon  the  outset  of  a  brilliant 
career,  at  the  period  of  manhood  when  the  maturity  of  powers  has 
been  reached,  such  as  are  attained  through  a  course  of  trials  and  of  hard 


238  TJIE    SPIRIT   OF 

service  falling  to  the  lot  of  the  American  officer  of  the  frontier;  emi- 
nentl}'  fitted  for  the  most  responsible  position  that  man  can  be  called 
upon  to  fill — the  command  of  thousand  of  human  beings — making  him 
one  of  the  pillars  upon  which  the  fortunes  of  a  country  reposed,  and 
the  hopes  and  liberties  of  a  nation  rested — General  Johnston,  too  soon, 
ito  our  clouded  perception,  met  the  death  which  it  is  a  true  soldier's 
highest  honor  to  covet — the  death  upon  the  field  of  battle,  when  the 
legions  which  he  had  led  were  marching  to  victory. 

Others,  whose  names  are  as  dear  to  Southern  soldiers  as  that  of  Al- 
bert Sidne}7  Johnston,  have,  indeed,  risen  higher  and  higher  from  those 
cohorts  which  form  the  Army  of  the  Confederacy,  since  his  fall,  and 
some  have  shared  his  fate;  but  there  is  no  one  whose  name  calls  forth 
greater  sorrow  in  the  national  bosom,  or  is  destined  to  shine  more  illus- 
triously, than  that  of  the  chief  who  fell  upon  the  bloody  ground  of  Shiloh. 

The  full  character  and  glory  of  such  a  man  can  neither  be  perceived 
nor  established  amid  the  agitation  of  a  struggle  for  life  and  liberty  such 
as  that  in  which  we  are  engaged.  New  reputations  arise  every-day  ;  a 
few  will  be  lasting,  but  the  majority  (and  some,  it  may  be,  whieh  at  this 
very  time  cast  a  shadow  over  the  truly  great)  will  sink  into  obscurity 
before  the  scrutinizing  researches  of  serene  and  unimpassioned  history. 
Asperity,  jealousy,  and  ambition — more  developed,  perhaps,  among  mili- 
tary men  than  in  any  other  class  of  mankind — will  then  have  run  their 
course.  Now,  every  rising  name  is  more  or  less  subject  to  such  bale- 
ful influences  ;  and  some  persons  (and  they  are  the  most  ungenerous 
of  all)  even  continue  their  aspersions  after  the  victim  is  no  more  ;  and 
can  we  say,  in  truth,  that  the  memory  of  Johnston,  even  after  his  form 
is  cold  and  he  is  sleeping  his  last  sleep,  has  been  unassailed  or  justly 
dealt  with  ? 

MVe,  who  have  witnessed  the  prominent  men  of  our  struggle  moving 
upon  the  theatre  of  action,  and  who  have  been  inspired  through  them, 
can  only  furnish  the  materials  from  which,  long  after  we  have  ceased 
to  breathe,  the  future  historian  will  erect  the  monuments  of  their  glory, 
or  pronounce  the  verdict  of  their  shame,  and  consign  them  to  tombs  of 
utter  forgetfulness. 

General  Johnston  was  born  in  the  old  Pioneer  State  of  Kentucky — a 
commonwealth  which  has  given  to  us  some  of  the  most  illustrious  men. 
Appointed  from  Louisiana,  he  entered  the  United  States  Military  Acad- 
emy of  West  Point.  The  severe  discipline  and  exactions  of  that  for- 
merly celebrated  training-school  of  Southern  soldiers  (now,  no  doubt, 
suffering,  alike  with  every  Northern  national  institution,  from  the  in- 
fluences of  a  corrupt  government)  brought  out  his  military  traits.  Un- 
like hundreds  of  cadets  who,  after  a  short  probation,  had  to  succumb 
and  to  make  room  for  more  worthy  competitors,  he,  at  the  expiration 
of  the  usual  period  of  rigid  application,  graduated  the  eighth  among  a 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  239 

'class  of  forty-one;  and  when  we  now  look  at  the  slender  list  remaining, 
we  entertain  no  doubt  that  he  will  be  for  ever  the  leader  of  his  class. 

Upon  his  leaving  West  Point  General  Scott  tendered  to  him  the  posi- 
tion of  an  aide-de-camp  on  his  staff.  But  General  Johnston,  with  a  true 
soldiçr's  aspirations,  rather  sought  the  hardships  of  the  camp  and  the 
dangers  of  warfare  in  preference  to  the  easy  life  and  continuous  round 
of  pleasures  of  the  metropolis  of  North  America,  and  left  for  the  field 
as  a  lieutenant  in  the  Second  infantry. 

From  this  time  commences  a  series  of  arduous  duties  on  the  fron 
thprs  of  the  United  States — operations  which  form  a  connecting-link 
between  peace  and  war — services  which  may  justly  be  compared  to  the 
celebrated  achievements  of  the  French  army  in  the  sandy  plains  of 
Algeria,  and  to  the  hardships  of  the  Russian  army  among  the  rockj; 
mountains  of  the  Caucasus.  The  chieftains  of  both  these  nations,  many 
years  after,  met  upon  the  shores  of  the  Crimea,  and  there  they  practi- 
cally demonstrated,  when  confronting  each  other  with  highly  disci- 
plined armies,  how  far  they  had  profited  from  warfare  against  savage 
and  uncivilized  nations.  So  with  us  has  the  continuous  warfare  against 
an  unfortunate  but  barbarous  race  resulted  in  lasting  benefits  to  our 
officer.",  which  have  been  amply  shown  in  our  struggle. 

Continued  service  of  this  kind,  however,  without  the  inducements  of 
distinction  greater  than  is  offered  againqf,  bands  of  savage  guerillas,  had 
the  natural  effect  of  making  the  majority  of  officers  of  the  late  United 
States  army  neglectful  of  completing  the  structure  of  military  science 
and  acquirements  other  than  mere  duties  of  routine,  the  foundation  of 
which  had  been  laid  in  the  military  school;  nor,  indeed,  did  they  have, 
in  many  cases,  the  opportunity  of  prosecuting  their  studies  amid  the 
ever- recurring  changes  from  post  to  post,  often  thousands  of  miles 
from  the  belt  of  civilization.  This  neglect,  so  common  among  them, 
must  have  been  seriously  felt  when  their  view  had  to  embrace  many 
thousands  of  men,  and  when  their  mettle  was  being  tested  by  "grand 
operations"  quite  different  from  the  contracted  nature  of  partisan 
warfare.  But  such  neglect  can  not  be  imputed  to  General  Johnston. 
Indeed,  his  reputation  for  skill  and  learning  was  at  that  early  day 
spreading  among  his  companions-in-arms — a  reputation  gloriously 
vindicated  by  his  future  career. 

Nor  was  his  experience  in  the  field,  in  the  old  service,  of  slender  pro- 
portions. We  see  him  mentioned  with  distinction  in  the  so-called  Black 
Hawk  war,  in  the  wide  Western  territories,  as  the  adjutant  of  the  Sixth 
United  States  infantry.  In  that  war  we  find  General  Johnston,  Gen- 
eral Taylor,  and  President  Davis  all  serving  together.  There,  most 
probably,  was  begun  that  deep  and  lasting  friendship,  which,  outliv- 
ing all  the  attempts  of  slander  and  of  envy,  still  lingers  over  the  tomb 
of  tho  noble  soldier,  and  which  throws  unfading  hsnor  o-er  him  who 


240  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

did  not  withdraw  the  light  of  his  trust  and  affection  from  the  darkened 
path  of  a  friend,  upon  whom  were  heaped  tho  reproaches  of  nearly  an 
entire  nation.  As  a  singular  coincidence  we  may  mention  that,  in  that 
same  war,  figured  Abraham  Liricoln,  the  valorous  captain  of  a  company 
of  militia,  distinguished  for  cowardice  and  utter  inefficiency  in  the  po- 
sition he  had  assumod  ;  and  whose  military  fame,  then  so  auspiciously 
begun,  has  since  spread  in  so  remarkable  a  manner  that  we  have  no 
further  need  to  revert  to  it. 

Fired  by  a  cause  which  strongly  appeals  to  every  generous  bosom, 
General  Johnston,  during  the  memorable  struggle  of  Texas  for  inde- 
pendence, united  his  fortunes  with  those  of  the  infant  republic.  The 
people  of  Texas  were  not  slow  to  discern  and  to  employ  the  experience  of 
pne  quite  willing  and  ready  to  serve  in  tho  capacity  of  a  private  soldier 
for  tho  vindication  of  tho  sacred  principle  of  self-government;  and 
from  the  position  of  adjutant-general  of  tho  Texas  forces  he  rose  to  that 
of  senior  brigadier-general  of  the  army,  and  subsequently  was  Secretary 
of  War  until  tho  year  1840  ;  thus  giving  four  years  of  undivided  service 
to  a  state  which  now  points,  with  proud  distinction,  to  him  as  the  first 
of  her  honored  sons. 

Thus,  the  gallant  sons  of  three  great  states — Kentucky,  Texas,  and 
Louisiana — are  united  with  his  history,  and  are  called  upon  to  vindi- 
cate and  avenge  his  death.  In  Kentucky  stands  the  home  of  his 
childhood,  Texas  guards  the  spot  where  he  had  gathered  around  him 
a  devoted  family,  and  in  Louisiana  repose  his  ashes.  Alas  !  not  even 
these  have  been  left  untouched,  by  the  sacrilegious  hands  of  our 
enemies.  Though  the  fortunes  of  war  have  temporary  separated 
these  states  from  the  main  portion  of  the  Confederacy,  their  sons  will 
still  find,  in  the  life  and  example  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  a  new 
and  lasting  incentive  to  pursue  steadfastly  the  glorious  path  they  have 
heretofore  trodden. 

Upon  the  broaking  out  of  the  war  with  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  he  served  as  colonel  of  a  Texas  regiment  until  it  was  disband- 
ed, and  afterward  on  the  staff  of  Major-General  W.  0.  Butler,  as 
inspector-general,  at  the  storming  of  Monterey,  in  whose  report  of 
that  action  he  was  most  favorably  mentioned.  During  the  campaign 
he  was  greatly  trusted  by  General  Taylor — who,  indeed,  paid  to  the 
young  soldier  the  high  compliment  of  sending  for  him  before  the  Battle 
of  Palo  Alto  for  consultation.  There  Zachary  Taylor,  A.  S.  Johnston, 
and  Jefferson  Davis  were  a  noble  trio  among  the  many  rising  men,  but 
no  soldier  was  more  revered  and  trusted  than  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 
He  was  then  regarded  as  the  great  military  man  of  the  United  States 
army.  Many  reputations  went  down  in  that  war;  and  the  great  glories 
gained  by  sonie  while  it  lasted  have  since  faded,  and  are  eclipsed  by 
the   deed»   of  men  who   were  then  but   in   subordinate  rank,  such   aa 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  241 

Beauregard,  Joseph  B.  Johnston,  Bragg,  Lee,  Davis,  and  Albert  Sid- 
ney Johnston. 

There  is  no  task  more  pleasing,  and  yet  more  sad,  than  to  turn  over 
the  leaves  of  official  documents — now  almost  forgotten  in  the  greater 
grandeur  of  the  present — which  illustrate  past  deeds  of  arms,  and  to 
meet  the  names  of  those  who,  then  giving  promise  of  great  actions  to 
come,  have  sinco  boen  inscribed  by  a  grateful  nation,  with  letters  of 
gold,  upon  the  tablet  of  fame.  While  we  mourn  ovor  the  departed 
heroes,  we,  with  proud  and  swelling  hearts,  bid  God-spoed  to  those 
who  have  hitherto  been  spared.  And  there  wc  road  their  own  modest 
accounts  of  actions  which  havo  made  them  famous — strongly  in  con- 
trast, when  we  turn  the  pages,  with  those  written  in  the  spirit  of  self- 
laudation  and  evident  consciousness  of  their  own  glories,  by  men 
whose  achievements  have  sunk  into  oblivion,  because  there  was  no 
element  of  greatness  to  be  found  in  them  ;  and  on  other  pages  we 
encounter  the  records  of  gratified  commanders,  expressed  in  terms  of 
praise,  which  now  sound  almost  prophetic. 

There  we  see  nearly  all  the  names  which  our  history  has  since  made 
great.  There  are  the  documents — results  of  laborious  duties,  constant 
dangers,  severe  privations,  and  hard  studies — which  have  become  the 
foundation  of  the  edifice  of  martial  honor,  and  to  which  the  historian 
will  ever  recur  with  fond  satisfaction.  And  that  which  strikes  the 
reader  most  is  the  unpretending,  unembellished,  and  modest  character 
of  these  papers — the  stamp  of  true  greatness.  When  we  contrast  them 
with  documents  of  a  like  nature  of  renowned  commanders  of  other 
nations,  the  same  feature  may  there  be  found;  content  to  receivo  what 
will  voluntarily  be  given,  they  lavishly  bestow  all  credit  upon  those 
who  wore  led  by  their  genius  alone.  A  true  soldier,  though  stern  and 
unyielding  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties,  is  not,  therefore,  the  loss 
modest,  and  has  no  grain  of  that  overbearing  manner  which  strongly 
marks  those  characters  who  find  all  the  satisfaction  they  desire  in  the 
contemplation  of  their  own  greatness. 

Every  one  who  in  the  least  reflects  upon  the  character  of  General 
Johnston,  must  be  penetrated  with  the  conviction  that  this  noble  trait 
was  one  of  his  most  admirable  qualities.  The  higher  he  rose  upon  the 
ladder  of  military  advancement,  the  more  honors  and  friends  his  sta- 
tion gathered  around  him,  the  more  is  it  apparent.  Unmoved  by  the 
increasing  responsibilities  of  his  various  positions,  and  the  applause  of 
friends,  or  the  words  of  interested  flatterers — the  Scylla  upon  which 
many  a  fair  reputation  is  wrecked — his  modesty  was  the  same. 

Intimately  linked  to   it  was  a  degree  of  forbearance  and  charity, 

rarely  attained  by  mortal  man.  and  without  its  equal  in  the  history  of 

modern  times.     The  letter  to  President  Davis,  in  explanation  of  his 

abandonment  of    Kentucky — which,  though  written  in  private  eoofi- 

21 


242  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

dence  to  an  unwavering  friend,  has  since  become  the  property  of  the 
nation — magnanimously  uttered  in  the  very  midst  of  condemnation 
heaped  upon  him,  will  not  fail  to  carry  sorrow  to  our  hearts  for  ever, 
and  is  a  solemn  warning  to  the  nation,  as  well  as  to  individuals,  not  to 
pass  judgment  with  clouded  vision. 

In  the  expedition  against  the  Mormons,  for  the  command  of  which 
he  was  singled  out  from  many  distinguished  United  States'  officers, 
some  other  of  his  prominent  traits  appeared  :  moderation  and  firm- 
ness. To  them  the  honorable  success  of  that  expedition  must  be 
mainly  ascribed.  Reviewing  the  condition  of  affairs  in  a  despatch  to 
General  Scott,  commanding  the  United  States  army,  he  says,  January 
20,  1858  : 

"My  information  respecting  their  conduct  since  is,  that  their  troops 
are  organized  to  resist  the  establishment  of  a  territorial  government 
by  the  United  States;  and,  in  furtherance  of  that  object,  they  have 
erected  works  of  defence  in  the  mountain-passes  and  near  Salt  Lake 
City.  Knowing  how  repugnant  it  would  be  to  the  policy  or  interest  of 
the  government  to  do  any  act  that  would  force  these  people  into 
unpleasant  relations  with  the  Federal  government,  I  would,  in  con- 
formity with  the  views  also  of  the  commanding  general,  on  all  proper 
occasions  have  manifested  in  my  intercourse  with  them  a  spirit  of  con- 
ciliation; but  I  do  not  believe  that  such  consideration  for  them  would  be 
properly  appreciated  now,  or  rather  would  be  wrongly  interpreted  ;  and, 
in  view  of  the  treasonable  temper  and  feeling  now  pervading  the  lead- 
ers and  the  greater  portion  of  the  Mormons,  I  think  that  neither  the 
honor  nor  the  dignity  of  the  government  will  allow  of  the  slightest 
concession  being  made  to  them. 

"  They  should  be  made  to  submit  to  the  constitutional  and  legal 
demands  of  the  government  unconditionally.  An  adjustment  of  exist- 
ing difficulties  on  any  other  basis  would  bo  nugatory. 

"Their  threat  to  oppose  tho  march  of  the  troops  in  the  spring  will 
not  have  the  slightest  influence  in  delaying  it  ;  and  if  .they  desire  to 
join  issue,  I  believe  it  is  for  the  interest  of  the  government  that  they 
should  have  the  opportunity." 

General  Scott,  who  appears  to  have  been  chafed  by  tho  refusal  of 
General  Johnston  to  serve  on  his  staff,  did  not  forgive  him  for  many 
years.  Only  after  the  general  had  been  appointed  colonel  of  the 
Second  United  States  cavalry,  and  his  splendid  administration  of  the 
Department  of  Texas  had  forced  General  Scott  to  testify  the  regard 
which  no  man  can  withhold  from  real  worth,  the  relations  of  the  two 
soldiers  became  more  cordial;  and  during  the  period  of  the  expedition 
to  Utah  General  Scott  appears  to  have  been  a  warm  friend  of  General 
Johnston,  and  he  repeatedly  gave  evidence  of  the  favorable  opinion 
be  entertained  of  him.  In  a  despatch  directing  him  to  take  command, 
he  saya : 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  243 

"No  doubt  is  entertained  that  your  conduct  will  fully  meet  the 
moral  and  professional  responsibilities  of  your  trust,  and  justify  the 
high  confidence  already  reposed  in  you  by  the  government." 

And  upon  some  other  occasion  the  adjutant-general  of  General 
Scott,  Irvin  McDowell,  of  Bull  Run  memory,  writes  to  him  : 

"  The  general  directs  me  to  add  that  he  has  equal  confidence  in  your 
judgment,  discretion,  zeal,  and  gallantry  ;  and  in  the  delicate  and 
responsible  duty  with  which  you  are  charged  he  desires  to  leave  you 
as  little  trammelled  as  possible." 

But  such  was  General  Scott's  desire  to  earn  some  further  laurels, 
that  he  felt  ill  at  ease  to  permit  one  of  his  able  lieutenants  alone  to 
reap  the  harvest,  and  he  gravely  announced  to  General  Johnston, 
through  his  aide-de-camp,  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  W.  Lay  : 

"The  general-in-chief  himself  will  set  sail  for  the  Pacific,  in  the 
steamer  of  the  5th  proximo"  (February  5,  1858),  "clothed  with  full 
powers  for  an  effective  diversion  or  co-operation  in  your  favor  from  that 
quarter." 

The  Mormons  probably  never  knew  in  what  serious  danger  their 
rear  at  one  time  was  ;  and  it  must  be  considered  lucky  for  them,  Gen- 
eral Scott,  and  the  final  success  of  the  expedition,  that  this  "effective 
diversion  "  was  soon  after  relinquished. 

Before  that  little  army,  which  was  to  penetrate  through  the  bound- 
less plains  of  the  West,  to  enforce  obedience  to  civil  authority,  lay  a 
distance  larger  and  fraught  with  greater  obstacles  than  was  presented 
to  the  French  in  their  memorable  onward  march  to  Russia.  When 
compared  with  that  marvellous  host,  it  was  indeed  but  a  handful  of 
mcu  which  thus  was  determined  to  brave  the  difficulties  of  a  march 
through  regions  which,  for  the  most  part,  were  bereft  of  any  comforts 
whatever,  and  which  might  have  become,  through  the  interposition  of 
the  powers  of  nature  and  the  failure  of  supplies,  as  disastrous  to  them 
as  the  return  of  the  French  from  Russia  had  been  in  1812.  Every- 
thing sustaining  man  and  beast  had  to  be  transported  over  a  distance 
of  more  than  a  thousand  miles.  For  two  years  the  greatest  burden 
to  which  any  general  is  subjected— the  provision  of  bread,  and  many 
other  anxious  cares — were  sustained  by  General  Johnston  in  a  manner 
which  at  once  stamped  him  a  leader  entitled  to  the  highest  honors. 
All  reports  concur  in  pronouncing  that  little  army  to  have  been  a 
model  of  discipline,  efficiency,  and  confidence  in  themselves  and  their 
leader.  Those  wild  and  silent  plains  will  probably  never  again  see 
such  a  body  of  men  :  and  when  we  compare  what  the  character  of  the 
Army  of  the  United  States  was  then,  and  what  it  has  become  since, 
the  contemplation  excites  a  shudder,  and  forces  the  conviction  upon  us 
that  a  final  dissolution  is  indubitable,  and  can  not,  in  ihe  natural 
course  of  events,  called  forth  through  the  utter  disregard  of  all  the 


244  THE    SPIRIT   OP 

laws  of  society,  be  very  distant.  The  condition  of  the  Army  of  Utah, 
under  difficulties  and  embarrassments  such  as  are  only  presented  by 
the  existence  in  a  wilderness,  showed  the  administrator  acquainted 
with  even  the  most  minute  details  of  the  service  ;  and  it  gave  prom- 
ise of  greater  things  to  come. 

Speaking  of  this  gallant  little  army,  and  the  United  States  army  in 
general,  Mr.  Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  annual  report  of  1858, 
to  President  Buchanan,  says: 

"  These  regiments  have  accomplished  within  the  year  a  march,  aver- 
aging for  each  the  extraordinary  distance  of  twelve  hundred  and  thir- 
ty-four miles.  These  marches,  in  the  main,  have  been  made  through 
the  uninhabited  solitudes  and  sterile  deserts  which  stretch  away 
between  the  settlements  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts,  upon  routes 
which  afforded  nothing  to  facilitate  the  advance,  except  only  the 
herbage  which  the  beasts  of  burden  might  pluck  by  the  wayside. 

"Every  item  of  supply,  from  a  horseshoe-nail  to  the  largest  piece  of 
ordnance,  has  been  carried  from  the  depots  along  the  whole  line  of 
those  tedious  marches,  to  be  ready  at  the  exact  moment  when  necessity 
might  call  for  them.  The  country  traversed  could  yield  nothing.  * 
*  No  disaster  has  befallen  the  army,  *  *  and  the  privations, 
hardships,  toils,  and  dangers  to  which  it  has  been  continually  subject- 
ed, have  been  borne  without  a  murmur." 

And,  in  another  place  : 

"The  conduct  of  both  officers  and  men  attached  to  the  Army  of 
Utah  has  been  worthy  of  all  praise.  The  commander,  Brevet  Brigadier- 
General  A.  S.  Johnston,  who  joined  his  command  at  a  time  of  great 
trial  and  embarrassment,  with  a  calm  and  lofty  bearing,  with  a  true  and 
manly  sympathy  for  all  around  him,  infused  into  his  command  a  spirit 
of  serenity  and  contentment  which  amounted  to  cheerfulness,  amidst 
uncommon  hardships  and  privations  which  were  unabated  throughout 
the  tedious  and  inclement  season  of  winter.  The  destruction  of  our 
trains  by  the  Mormons,  the  disasters  which  necessarily  flowed  from  it, 
drove  General  Johnston  to  the  necessity  of  sending  a  detachment  of 
men  to  New  Mexico  for  supplies  essential  to  preserve  the  whole  com- 
mand from  the  greatest  extremity,  and  to  enable  him  to  prosecute  his 
march  with  all  practicable  despatch." 

Again,  one  year  after,  Secretary  Floyd  said,  in  his  annual  report  : 

"  I  can  not  commend  in  terms  too  high  the  wise  prudence  and  officer- 
like conduct  of  the  general  commanding  the  army  in  Utah.  The  dis- 
cipline of  his  command  is  admirable,  and  its  efficiency  is  unsurpassed. 
Much  has  been  done  through  the  army  under  command  of  General 
Johnston  toward  improving  the  roads  in  Utah,  and  to  give  to  the  public 
fuller  knowledge  of  the  condition  of  the  territory." 

When,  finally,  through  his  moderation,  wisdom,  and  firmness,  the 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  245 

difficulty  was  nearly  settled,  and  the  restraints  of  military  power  could 
with  safety  be  relaxed,  he  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  Mormons,  in 
which  he  assured  them  that  "  No  person  whatever  will  be  in  anywise 
interfered  with  or  molested  in  his  person  or  rights,  or  in  the  peaceful 
pursuit  of  his  avocations  ;  and,  should  protection  be  needed,  that  they 
will  find  the  army  (always  faithful  to  the  obligations  of  duty)  as  ready 
now  to  assist  and  protect  them  as  it  was  to  oppose  them  while  it  was 
believed  they  were  resisting  the  laws  of  their  government." 

Such  wore  the  noble  sentiments  and  forbearance  of  a  Southern  soldier 
toward  a  sect  of  fanatics  who  had  dono  all  in  their  power  to  harm  him, 
and  who  acknowledged  no  obligations  either  to  God  or  man,  but  what 
they  themselves  had  decreed.  Though  he  wielded  the  terrible  scourge, 
which  at  his  bidding  would  have  destroyed  and  carried  in  its  train  a 
thousand  horrors,  he  was  firm  against  temptations  of  martial  fame  as 
long  as  there  remained  a  chance  to  perform  the  more  glorious  part  of 
pacificator.  For  the  interests  of  humanity  he  thus  achieved  every- 
thing; for  himself  he  claimed  nothing,  save  the  honor  of  having  scru- 
pulously discharged  his  duty. 

In  all  of  his  numerous  correspondence  he  but  a  single  time,  in  his 
official  despatches  to  army  head-quarters,  alluded  to  his  personal  feel- 
ings or  affairs,  or  asked  any  indulgence.  When  his  task  was  complet- 
ed he  wrote  the  following  to  General  Scott,  showing  thereby  another 
shining  quality — his  unceasing  devotion  to  public  duty  : 

"On  the  arrival  of  General  Harney  or  Colonel  Sumner,"  he  said,  "I 
desire  to  be  ordered  to  join  my  regiment.  If  that  can  not  be  granted, 
I  request  that  the  general  will  grant  me  a  furlough  for  four  months, 
with  leave  to  apply  for  an  extension.  I  have  had  no  relaxation  from 
duty,  not  for  a  day,  for  more  than  nine  years." 

II. 
We  come  now,  with  hesitation,  to  review  the  latter  portion  of  his  life. 
With  hesitation,  because  many  things  are  now  obscure  which,  in  the 
interest  of  the  country,  can  not  be  cleared  up,  although  strong  and  con- 
vincing testimony,  now  available,  could  be  brought  forward.  Conform- 
ing to  the  spirit  of  our  remarks  in  this  volume,  we  must  leave,  and  we 
gladly  do  so,  the  task  of  revelation  to  those  who,  from  their  position 
and  knowledge,  may  be  most  competent,  when  our  independence  shall 
have  been  established,  and  harm  can  no  longer  result  by  untimely  criti- 
cism ;  nay,  when  Truth  and  History  imperatively  demand  that  nothing 
be  withheld.  We  do  so  with  hesitation,  because  it  is  felt  what  restraints 
this  necessity  imposes  upon  the  desire  to  do  full  justice.  And  gladly 
would  the  memory  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  have  been  left  to  slumber 
in  the  silent  admiration  of  a  nation  to  that  glorious  day  when  ringing 
bells  (if,  indeed,  they  have  not  all  disappeared  for  the  casting  of  can- 
21* 


-46  TUE    SPIRIT    OF 

non)  shall  proclaim  the  advent  of  peace,  did  we  not  strongly  feci  that 
it  has  hitherto  been  somewhat  neglected.  There  is  no  danger  that  it 
conld  ever  pass  away;  but  it  behooves  us  to  bring  the  traits  aud  charac- 
ter of  our  lamented  leadors  ever  prominently  forward  for  the  emulation 
of  our  soldiers  as  much  as  the  welfare  of  the  country,  and  our  honor 
requires  that  we  judge  with  charity  those  who  are  living. 

When  the  separation  took  place  which  inaugurated,  on  the  part  of 
tho  Xorth,  a  relentless  war,  the  Southern  olliccrs  of  the  former  United 
States  army,  with  but  few  exceptions  (who,  whatever  their  achievements 
have  been  since,  in  a  wicked  attempt  of  subjugation,  will  be  consigned 
to  eternal  shame)  hastened  to  tender  their  swords  to  their  native  states. 
Among  these  was  General  Johnston,  then  commanding  the  Department 
of  the  Pacific.  The  anxiety  is  well  remembered  with  which  his  arrival 
was  anticipated,  who,  from  the  distant  shores  of  the  Western  ocean,  was 
known  to  be  on  his  way  to  cast  his  lot  with  his  native  South.  With  the 
knowledge  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  which,  through 
the  medium  of  General  Scott,  had  already  offered  him  the  chief  com- 
mand of  an  army,  to  be  in  rank  second  only  to  the  Lieutenant-General 
of  the  United  States — which  offer  was  answered  by  his  resignation — 
would  most  probably  lay  difficulties  in  his  way,  should  he  choose  the 
easy  and  comfortable  route  by  steamer  from  San  Francisco,  ho  at  once 
resolved  to  undertake,  with  but  few  companions,  the  tedious  journey, 
full  of  hardships,  known  as  the  overland  route,  and  arrived  safely 
within  the  territory  of  the  Confederate  States  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
summer  of  1S61,  entering  New  Orleans  on  the  last  day  of  August. 
Those  who,  at  the  time  of  his  arrival  at  Richmond  (September  5),  were 
in  that  city,  will  not  have  forgotten  the  deep  impression  which  his 
matchless  figure  and  noble  demeanor  made  upon  the  people.  He  did 
not  pass  the  streets  without  being  the  object  of  general  notice  aud 
national  pride — an  interest  so  unusually  awakened  in  republican  coun- 
tries. He  was  at  once  assigned  to  the  Department  of  the  West — an 
appointment  received  with  satisfaction  throughout  tho  country. 

The  enemy  had  just  been  disastrously  checked  in  his  first  attempt 
upon  Richmond  in  July,  1861,  through  tho  native  prowess  of  Southern 
volunteers — who,  upon  that  field  so  well  auguring  for  Southern  arms, 
had  begun  to  record  the  long  story  of  their  glories,  bravery,  and  forti- 
tude under  reverses,  since  so  splendidly  illustrated.  The  anxiety  and 
uncertainty  felt  by  the  people  at  the  opening  of  a  war,  the  result  of 
which  could  not  be  foreseen  by  mortal  man,  before  yet  the  sullenly 
opposing  armies  had  met  in  the  shock  of  battle,  had  given  way  to 
consciousness  of  strength  ,•  but,  alas  !  in  the  train  of  that  unexpectedly 
complete  victory  followed  the  exaggerated  contempt  for  the  bravery 
and  endurance  of  our  adversary,  and  a  dangerous  degree  of  confidence, 
penetrating  alike  the  people  and  the  army,  and  to  which  the  reverses 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  247 

soon  following  can  plainty  be  traced.  There,  at  Manassas,  the  battle 
had  been  fought  against  troops  from  New  England  and  the  North-east- 
ern states,  descendants  of  men  who  already,  in  the  times  of  Washington, 
had  been  notorious  for  inefficiency  and  cowardice  in  the  field.  Upon  a 
different  arena  were  shortly  to  be  met  the  hardy  sons  of  the  West,  by 
nature  and  education  alike  differing  from  their  effeminate  companions- 
in-arms  of  the  East. 

At  that  early  period  already  the  importance  of  the  Western  states 
and  territories,  intersected  by  the  affluents  of  the  Missouri  and  Missis- 
sippi rivers,  loomed  up  in  the  distance.  The  power  in  men  and  internal 
resources  of  the  enemy  there  threatened  us  most  where  the  great  valley 
of  the  Mississippi  spreads,  in  teeming  beaut}',  the  most  magnificent 
portion  of  the  Southern  states.  By  means  of  the  streams,  each  vicing 
in  grandeur  with  the  most  renowned  of  Europe,  which  descend  the 
western  slopes  of  the  Alleghany  mountains,  and  which,  rolling  through 
the  most  fertile  states  of  the  former  Union,  unite  their  waters  with  those 
of  the  Farther  of  Waters,  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  penetrate  into  the 
very  centre  of  our  Western  states.  The  check  at  Manassas  had  directed 
the  full  attention  of  the  enemy  to  these  vital  points;  and  while  wo 
wore  glorifying  ourselves  he  was  vigorously  preparing  for  the  great 
onward  movement  which,  temporarily  checked  at  Shiloh,  has  since 
been  fraught  with  never-ceasing  disasters  to  the  Confederacy,  and  still 
calls  for  a  victorious  general  to  drive  back  the  hordes  of  the  enemy 
'across  the  Ohio  river,  and  .redeem  what  we  have  lost.  The  general 
who  shall  accomplish  it  will  be  the  saviour  of  his  country  ;  for  upon 
successes  in  that  quarter  alone  may  we  build  the  hopes  of  a  speedy 
termination  of  the  war. 

Unfortunately,  the  wavering  course  of  Kentucky,  which  has  since 
been  bitterly  repented  by  that  unhappy  state,  now  controlled  by  a  des- 
potism worse  than  that  of  the  Czar,  prevented  us  from  at  once  seizing 
the  mouths  of  two  of  these  great  affluents,  the  Tennessee  and  Cumber- 
land rivers,  both  upon  Kentucky's  soil,  in  the  north-western  corner  of 
the  state,  and  as  one  glance  upon  the  map  will  show,  the  key  and  the 
most  remarkable  strategical  position  of  Central  North  America.  Could 
these  have  been  secured,  through  a  spontaneous  and  hearty  co-operation 
of  the  people  of  Kentucky  with  their  Southern  brothers,  and  the  line  of 
the  Ohio  been  ours,  this  war  would  have  been  checked  long  ago.  As  it 
was,  our  scrupulous  regard  for  the  rights  of  a  sister  state  was  miserably 
rewarded,  and  would  have  well-nigh  worked  our  destruction  but  for  the 
incomparablefortitude  nf  the  South.  We  had  then  no  meansof  arresting 
or  impeding  the  naval  armaments  upon  the  Ohio,  in  view  of  the  southern 
borders,  almost  within  hearing  of  the  workmen's  hammers,  who  were  to 
forgo  the  chains  for  the  people  of  the  Confederate  Btatei  und  of  Ken- 
tucky; and  thus  we  were  compelled  to  see  the  formidable  fleet  of  gun- 


248  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

boats  rapidly  completing  which  was  soon  to  penetrate  to  the  very  heart 
of  Tennessee,  and  to  the  confines  of  Alabama  and  Mississippi. 

When  our  eyes  were  being  opened,  and  Kentucky's  neutrality  became 
a  myth,  Major-General  Polk,  with  great  promptitude  and  the  coup  d'osil 
of  a  soldier,  on  the  4th  of  September  seized  and  occupied  Columbus,  in 
Kentucky,  on  the  Mississippi,  to  protect  that  river.  This  remarkable 
position  was  at  once  made  impregnable  against  an  attack  by  water,  and 
its  rear  was  secured  by  a  camp  of  observation  at  Feliciana,  thirty  miles 
cast  of  Columbus,  and  which  held  the  enemy  at  Paducah  in  check — thus 
establishing  the  left  of  a  line  of  defence.  Nearly  thrco  hundred  miles 
to  the  east,  amid  the  wild  mountains  of  Eastern  Kentucky,  and  forming 
the  extreme  right  of  the  line,  Brigadier-General  Zollikoffer  had  taken  a 
position  at  Mill  Springs,  where  the  mountains  of  White  Oak  creek  rest 
upon  the  Cumberland  river,  to  protect  the  remarkable  defile  called  Cum- 
berland Gap,  where  three  states  meeting,  the  mountains  effectually  bar 
the  advance  to  the  invader  save  through  a  gorge  easily  defended. 
Upon  the  centre  of  the  line  which  unites  these  two  points  the  railroad 
from  Louisville  to  Nashville  passes  through  a  country-town,  Bowling 
Green,  nestled  between  hills,  and  in  the  narrow  valley  of  Barren  river. 
This  town  had  been  occupied  by  Brigadier-General  Buckner  with  a 
force  of  four  thousand  Kentuckians,  a  portion  of  the  State  Guard,  the 
nucleus  of  a  body  of  refugees,  who  thus  early  raising  the  standard 
against  Northern  oppression,  have  since  made  glorious  the  name  of  the 
Pioneer  State  in  Confederate  annals.  To  protect  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee  rivers,  the  State  of  Tennessee  had  constructed  two  forts.  One, 
Fort  Henry,  was  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tennessee — the  other,  Fort 
Donelson,  near  Dover,  on  the  Cumberland  ;  both  as  high  up  as  the 
boundary  of  the  state  permitted,  hastily  and  unsatisfactorily  construct- 
ed, and,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  heavy  ordnance,  but  indifferently 
armed. 

This  was  the  situation  of  affairs  when  General  Johnston,  on  the  28th 
of  October,  1861,  assumed  command  of  the  Department  of  the  West, 
with  head-quarters  at  Bowling  Green.  Weeks  before  this  event  hap- 
pened the  people  of  the  Confederacy  generally  were  impressed  with  the 
idea  that  powerful  forces  had  already  been  collected  at  every  point  of 
the  line  for  a  triumphant  march  upon  the  City  of  Louisville,  the  capital 
of  Kentucky,  and  that  nothing  was  wanting  but  that  General  Johnston 
should  give  the  order  for  the  deliverance  of  the  state  from  Yankeo 
thraldom. 

Instead  of  this  visionary  force  he  found  but  a  small  body  of  troops, 
and  an  advance  upon  Louisville  with  much  less  than  twelve  thousand 
men  was  out  of  the  question,  especially  when  the  enemy,  roused  by  his 
presence,  was  already  concentrating  the  main  body  of  his  forces  in 
front  of  Bowling  Green.     Nothing  remained,  then,  to  be  done  but  to 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  249 

make  his  defensive  line  as  strong  as  circumstances  and  the  means  at  his 
command  permitted. 

The  means  at  his  command  wero  very  small,  and  the  difficulties  of 
organization  very  great.  Nevertheless,  by  the  end  of  November,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  garrisons  established  upon  intermediate  points  of  the  im- 
mense line,  he  was  enabled  to  concentrate  some  thirteen  thousand  men 
at  Bowling  Green.  The  exaggerated  estimates  of  his  strength,  while 
checking  the  enemy  with  salutary  effect,  of  course  in  the  same  ratio 
enhanced  the  confidence  of  our  people;  yet  this  could  not  bo  avoided. 
But  urgent  representations  were  made  to  all  the  governors  immediately 
interested  in  the  maintenance  of  the  line  of  Kentucky,  and  nothing  was 
from  them  concealed.  The  aid  given  was  very  feeble.  The  State  of 
Mississippi  alone  nobly  responded,  and  sent  to  General  Johnston  a  re- 
spectable force,  with  part  of  which  Major-General  Polk  was  enabled  to 
relieve  a  division  of  well-organized  and  disciplined  troops  undor  Colonel 
(late  Major-General)  Bowen,  and  send  them  to  Bowling  Green.  Briga- 
dier-General Hardee  had  brought  a  further  accession,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Floyd  joined  with  his  brigade  from  Western  Virginia. 

Considerable  accession  to  the  force  of  General  Johnston  would  no 
doubt  have  resulted,  had  the  people  of  these  different  states  responded 
to  the  demands  of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  enlisted  for  the  war. 
The  scarcity  of  arms  was  so  great  that  the  government  did  not  feel 
authorized  to  arm  twelve-months'  men,  when  the  war-troops  enlisting 
could  barely  be  supplied.  But  the  people  indulged  in  the  most  disas- 
trous delusions,  and  could  not  be  brought  to  turn  from  the  contemplation 
of  the  glories  of  Manassas. 

In  these  endeavors,  steadily  pursued,  General  Johnston  did  not  neg- 
lect the  demands  of  the  hour.  Everything  that  could  be  done  was  done 
promptly  and  vigorously.  Out  of  a  mass  of  undisciplined  volunteers 
were  moulded  steady  soldiers.  The  departments  of  the  army  were  ad- 
ministered with  rigid  economy.  The  fortifications  were  strengthened; 
Bowling  Green  strongly  defended  by  a  cordon  of  detached  forts;  new 
works  were  erected  at  Clarksville,  on  the  Cumberland,  while  in  the 
rear  the  Town  of  Nashville  was  commenced  to  be  fortified,  should  the 
difficulty  of  subsistence  or  other  causes  make  a  position  behind  the 
line  of  the  Cumberland  more  desirable.  An  important  railroad,  easily 
assailable,  and  the  only  direct  line  of  communication  with  Major-Gen- 
eral Polk,  was  maintained. 

The  result  of  all  this  was  unshaken  confidence  on  the  part  of  im 
troops  in  their  commander.  But  what  endeared  him  most  to  his  soldiers 
was  the  great  justice  which  was  the  basis  of  all  his  decisions,  the  prompt- 
ness with  which  wrongs  were  rectified,  and  the  facility  of  access  to  the  chief 
commander,  as  well  as  the  genuine  cordiality  and  dignity  with  which  every 
one  was  met  by  him.     Heavy  labors  on  forts  in  mid-winter  were  endured 


250  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

without  a  murmur,  since  every  soldier  knew  that  General  Johnston 
would  never  hesitate  to  expose  himself  whenever  necessary.  His  head- 
quarters were  a  model  of  order,  simplicity,  and  prompt  despatch  of 
business.  His  decisions  to  personal  applications  were  immediate  and 
final.  His  bearing  was  that  of  a  knight  of  the  olden  times.  The  writer 
will  never  forget  the  shouts  which  greeted  the  general  whoncver  the 
troops  passed  in  review. 

With  the  most  vigorous  exertions  and  appeals  General  Johnston, 
upon  the  beginning  of  the  year  1862,  found  himself  at  the  head  of  some 
twentj'-three  to  twenty-four  thousand  troops,  while  the  enemy  was  con- 
fronting him  with  a  force  consisting  of  one  hundred  and  seven  regiments, 
numbering  at  least  sixty-live  thousand  men. 

The  demonstrations  of  the  enemy  had  begun  on  the  7th  of  November, 
1861,  twelve  days  after  General  Johnston  assumed  command,  against 
the  forts  of  Columbus.  There  Major-General  Polk,  with  greatly  inferior 
forces,,  defeated  Major-General  Grant  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, by  crossing  his  troops  from  the  left  bank — a  victory  which, 
while  giving  us  increased  confidence,  so  disconcerted  the  enemy  that  he 
suspended  any  further  operations  against  that  point.  Another  column, 
the  vanguard  of  Buell's  forces,  next  appeared  in  front  of  the  centre,  at 
Woodsonville,  a  point  some  twenty  miles  north  of  Bowling  Green,  on 
the  17th  of  December. 

They  met  with  our  grand-guards,  and  were  checked  by  the  gallant 
attitude  of  our  troops  under  Breckinridge  and  Hindman.  Thus  baffled 
upon  two  points  of  the  line,  a  concentrated  movement  was  made  against 
our  extreme  right,  under  Major-General  Crittenden,  on  the  19th  of  Janu- 
ary, 1862,  at  Mill  Springs.  Major-General  Crittenden,  with  quick  reso- 
lution, under  difficulties  which  deserved  a  better  rosult,  did  not  await 
the  junction  of  the  enemy's  two  columns  in  his  front,  and  marched 
against  one — when,  after  a  gallant  struggle,  he  was  compelled  to  desist 
in  his  attack,  and,  under  great  hardships,  crossed  the  Cumberland  during 
the  night. 

The  enemy  had  only  been  awaiting  the  completion  of  the  fleet  of 
gunboats  to  make  demonstrations  by  water.  Long  before  Fort  Henry 
fell,  in  view  of  the  disappointments  to  which  General  Johnston  had 
been  subjected,  he  was  fully  aware  that  his  line,  unless  it  was  strongly 
reinforced,  could  not  be  held  ;  and  in  the  mouth  of  January,  1862, 
when  one  day  looking  with  Colonel  Bowen  upon  a  map,  showing  the 
course  of  the  Tennessee  river,  these  memorable  and  prophetic  words 
fell  from  his  lips,  when  pointing  out  a  spot  marked  "  Shiloh  Church"  : 
"  Here  the  great  battle  of  the  South-west  will  be  fought." 

Toward  the  latter  part  of  .January  General  Beauregard  arrived  at 
head-quarters.  He  was  astonished  that  General  Johnston,  with  so 
small  a  force  at  his  command,  could  have  so  long  held  so  large  a  line. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  251 

In  a  conferonoe  ho  fully  coincided  with  hig  plan  of  future  operations, 
namely:  tho  withdrawal  from  Kentucky,  and  the  necessity  of  deciding 
the  fate  of  Nashville  and  of  Tennessee  at  Fort  Donelson. 

After  Major- G  encrai  Crittenden's  defeat,  events  rapidly  followed 
each  other.  Fort  Henry,  garrisoned  by  twenty-one  hundred  men,  fell. 
Thle  commanding  officer^  Brigadier-General  Lloyd  Tilghman  (late 
Major-General),  after  having,  with  a  few  cannoniers,  worked  his  guns 
to  the  last — thus  giving  to  the  entire  infantry,  under  the  junior  com- 
mander, Colonel  Heiman,  a  brave  foreigner,  the  chance  of  escape  to 
Fort  Donelson,  nobly  preferring,  with  his  stout  little  band,  to  share  a 
long  and  painful  captivity — surrendered  when  the  last  gun  could  no 
longer  bo  fired.  With  its  fall  the  roar  of  General  Johnston's  line  was 
at  the  power  of  the  enemy. 

Major-General  Grant  now  rapidly,  on  the  13th  of  February,  had 
completed  the  investment  of  Fort  Donelson,  and  oommenoed  the  at- 
tack. Of  the  troops  at  Bowling  Green  General  Johnston  had  detachod 
twelve  thousand  men,  under  Brigadier-Generals  Floyd,  Pillow,  and 
Buckner  to  sustain  the  garrison.  After  three  days  of  severe  and  ob- 
stinate defenco,  Brigadier-Generals  Floyd  and  Billow  having  with- 
drawn on  the  night  of  the  15th,  with  a  small  portion  of  the  troops, 
Brigadier-General  Buckner  surrendered  himself  and  the  entire  remain- 
ing garrison.  Thus  the  left  of  the  line  of  defence  was  severed  from 
the  centre. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  preliminary  orders  had 
been  given  for  the  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  and  for  tho  march  of 
its  garrison,  eleven  thousand,  upon  Nashville.  The  magazines,  heavy 
armament,  and  the  subsistence  stores  were  quietly  removed  before  even 
the  troops  knew  that  the  town  was  to  be  given  up.  When  Major- 
General  Hardee,  the  immediate  commander  of  the  Army  of  Central 
Kentuky,  left  his  head-quarters,  the  shells  of  the  baffled  enemy  were 
dropping  in  the  midst  of  his  escort,  and  the  last  train  had  barely  left 
when  the  advance  forces  of  the  onemy  entered,  fired  the  town,  and  in- 
discriminately let  loose  the  horrors  of  war  upon  the  inhabitants  of  the 
once  quiet  and  peaceful  country-town. 

When  the  advance  brigade  of  the  troops  marching  upon  Nashville, 
under  Colonel  Bowen,  was  within  half  a  day's  march  of  the  city,  the 
spirit  of  the  troops  was  raised  to  the  highest  pitch  of  enthusiasm  upon 
hearing  the  news  from  an  aid  of  the  commanding  general,  Colonel  Wil- 
liam Preston,  that  the  brave  garrison  of  Fort  Donelson  was  still  hold- 
ing out.  But  when  the  troops  entered  the  capital  of  Tennessee,  on 
Sunday,  the  16th  of  February,  the  dejection  of  the  citizens  assembled 
upon  the  public  square  at  once  told  the  stor}'  of  the  fall  of  the  fort, 
and  that  it  had  already  been  resolved,  as  a  matter  of  military  neces- 
sity, to  abandon  the  indefensible  position  of  the  city,  and  leave  it  to  the 
mercy  of  the  invader». 


252  THE    SPIRIT   OF 

Nashville  is  situated  upotf  the  left  of  the  Cumberland,  upon  a  slight 
plateau,  gradually  rising  from  the  river  bank.  Had  this  plateau  been 
unassailable  from  the  heights  which  encircle  it,  a  defence  might  have 
been  made;  but  the  attempt  was  useless  with  a  force  of  only  eleven 
thousand  men,  and  the  prospect  of  seeing  fifty  thousand  men  debouch 
upon  the  city  from  every  road  to  the  west,  no|^h,  abd  oast,  not  consider- 
ing the  auxiliary  of  the  enemy's  gunboats,  the  arrival  of  which  was 
every  moment  to  be  expected. 

The  demoralization  existing  among  the  Tennessee  troops,  aided  by 
the  depression  which  had  seized  the  citizens,  would,  moreover,  have  de- 
feated any  idea  of  defence.  Before  their  eyes  was  the  prospect  of  at 
once  abandoning  their  state  and  all  they  held  dear.  Unschooled  in  the 
trials  of  war,» as  our  troops  are  now,  this  was  to  them  appalling.  But 
few  untried  troops  will  remain  steady  under  such  influence?,  and  it 
required  all  the  energy  of  the  more  brave  to  control  and  keep  their  men 
in  ranks.  Here  was  apparent  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  volunteer 
troops,  led  by  men  elected  by  themselves,  and  who,  no  matter  how 
estimable  in  common  life,  were  not  proof  against  the  storms  of  adver- 
sity. Their  bad  influence  over  their  men  was  felt  to  an  extent  which 
would  have  been  disastrous  to  the  whole  army  but  for  the  steadiness 
and  cheerfulness  shown  by  the  general  commanding,  and  the  vigorous 
exertions  of  those  selected  by  him. 

At  this  dark  hour  in  the  general's  life,  when  from  every  quarter  the 
voices  of  ignorant  assailants  were  heard — when  a  portion  of  his  troops, 
stimulated  by  those  whose  sacred  duty  it  was  to  check  and  command 
them,  openly  denounced  him — and  when  a  hasty  press  did  all  to  under- 
mine the  reputation  of  a  man  whom  it  should  have  sustained  in  the 
difficult  task  before  him — General  Johnston's  character  roso  above  all 
the  din  and  clamor,  and  shone  forth  with  immortal  lustre.  No  com- 
plaint, no  accusation  ever  escaped  him;  there  was  no  weariness,  no 
wavering,  or  indecision  under  his  heavy  burden.  In  those  cold,  stormy 
days  of  mid-winter,  so  well  recollected  by  thoso  who  endured  their 
rigor,  when  men  and  nature  appeared  to  conspire  against  him,  his 
mind  was  ever  active  and  his  vision  clear;  unceasingly  working  for 
the  good  of  his  country,  striving  to  unite  discordant  elements,  and  to 
encourage,  when  all  was  dark  to  even  the  bravest,  with  an  unfaltering 
faith  in  God,  and  a  reliance  that  He  would  vindicate  His  servant,  he 
conceived  and  determined  upon  that  brilliant  movement,  by  a  rapid 
march,  closely  followed  by  the  converging  columns  of  the  enemy  on 
his  flank  and  rear,  to  advance  upon  the  Tennessee,  cross  the  river,  and 
behind  its  line  to  concentrate  his  forces  with  those  of  General  Beaure- 
gard, at  or  near  Corinth,  in  Northern  Mississippi — a  manœuvre  which 
will  associate  his  name  with  those  great  commanders  who,  in  tho 
midst  of  gloom,  gloriously  issued  from  seemingly  insurmountable  diffi- 
culties. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  253 

One  of  General  Johnston's  great  qualities  was  the  knowledge  of  the 
value  of  men,  and  the  faculty  of  assigning  to  them  the  position  most 
suitable  to  their  talents — a  quality,  it  must  be  confessed,  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  a  commander.  This  was  illustrated  in  the  selection  of 
the  officers  of  his  staff.  Unlike  some  Confederate  generals  we  might 
mention,  he  sought  to  associate  with  himself  men  who  were  prominent 
in  their  profession  and  noted  for  their  military  attainments,  and  not 
those  wiiose  only  recommendation  was  the  personal  claims  they  might 
have  upon  him.  General  Johnston's  staff  was  composed  of  men  who 
would  have  been  an  honor  to  any  staff  of  any  country,  and  such  as  no 
general  need  hesitate  to  confer  with  in  moments  of  danger  and  in  deli- 
cate situations. 

When  he  had  determined  to  effect  a  junction  with  General  Beaure- 
gard, two  of  the  most  trusted  officers  of  his  staff,  as  he  himself  has  re- 
corded, decidedly  opposed  the  attempt,  deeming  it  too  hazardous  and 
impracticable.  But  such  was  General  Johnston's  firmness  that  noth- 
ing could  influence  him  when  once  he  had  deliberately  decided  upon 
his  course.  We  shall  see  how,  in  a  similar  case,  he  rejected  advice 
coming  from  even  more  weighty  sources. 

Before  him  lay  a  distance  of  over  two  hundred, and  thirty  miles,  to 
be  traversed  in  mid-winter,  by  troops  unaccustomed  to  the  hardships  of 
prolonged  marches  and  to  privations,  and  who  had  hitherto,  for  the 
most  part,  lived  in  comparative  ease  during  their  career  as  soldiers. 

At  Murfreesboro',  Tennessee,  a  halt  was  made,  and  the  command  was 
reorganized  and  augmented  by  Major-General  Crittenden's  division  and 
the  fugitives  from  Donelson.  Confidence  in  themselves  and  their  leader 
was  rapidly  re-established  in  the  forces  ;  on  the  22d  of  February — that  is, 
six  days  after  the  fall  of  Donelson — the  reorganization  of  the  army  was 
completed  and  the  orders  issued,  and  the  march,  after  all  the  munitions  of 
war  had  been  removed,  was  resumed  through  Shelbyville  and  Fayette- 
ville  upon  Decatur,  on  the  Tennessee,  where  tho  troops  crossed  in  safe- 
ty, and  were  rapidly  established  in  cantonments  along  the  line  of  the 
railroad  to  Corinth;  and  finally,  toward  the  end  of  March,  tho  army  of 
Genoral  Johnston,  20,000  strong,  united  with  General  Beauregard  at 
Corinth,  which  brought  his  force  to  nearly  50,000  men. 

The  main  points  of  the  Western  campaign  of  1861-62  have  been  here 
rapidly  sketched  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  fully  and  forcibly  illus- 
trate the  disadvantages  and  disheartening  circumstances  in  which 
General  Johnston  found  himself  from  the  very  day  when  he  arrived  at 
Bowling  Green,  and  to  vindicate  his  memory,  with  reference  to  his  con- 
duct under  these  circumstances,  from  any  doubts  remaining. 

Even  while  he  was  yet  making  his  way  across  the  Western  plains,  a 
train  of  events  had  occurred  which  ever  afterward  disastrously  operated 
against  him.     We  do  not  know  which  to  admire  most — hie  masterly 
22 


254  THE    SPIRIT    OF 

check  of  the  enemy's  columns,  while  they  were  yet  seeking  the  weak 
points  of  his  lino  of  over  three  hundred  miles,  and  the  splendid  disposi- 
tion ho  made  with  his  handful  of  men  by  which  it  was  covered,  ere  yet 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  had  given  way — the  fall  of  one  exposing  his 
rear,  and  that  of  the  othor  severing  his  left  from  the  centre — or  the  for- 
titude and  the  resources  of  military  genius  he  displayed  in  the  midst  of 
reverses  such  as  alone  would  have  been  sufficient  to  sink  any  general 
not  of  the  highest  order,  even  if  these  reverses  had  not  been  attended 
by  premature  and  criminal  judgment  against  him  on  the  part  of  his 
traducers.  None  but  a  general  of  the  first  rank  could  have  maintained 
an  army  of  volunteers,  restored  its  confidence,  and  with  it  resumed  the 
offensive,  under  like  circumstances.  History  furnishes  many  exam- 
ples where  the  morale  of  armies,  composed  even  of  regular  troops,  was 
entirely  destroyed  by  causes  much  less  potent  than  those  which  oper- 
ated against  General  Johnston  ;  not  even  Frederic  II,  after  the  great 
disaster  of  Hochkirch,  displayed  greater  genius  ;  but  only  few  instances 
can  be  cited  where  an  army  was  managed  with  more  fortitude  and  suc- 
cess than  that  which  followed  the  leadership  of  the  lamented  hero. 

When  the  chief  officers  of  his  staff  advised  against  his  march  to  join 
the  forces  under  General  Beauregard,  he,  with  the  resources  of  a  master 
of  strategy,  who  with  one  glance  embraces  the  great  points  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  a  genius  unexampled  in  our  war,  had  already  planned  the 
great  change  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive,  and  the  glorious  bat- 
tle of  which  that  march  was  but  the  prelude. 

It  was  not,  then,  mere  obstinacy,  or  any  undue  regard  of  unfavorable 
chances,  which  caused  him  to  insist  upon  a  movement  which  was  to  be 
but  a  link  of  a  great  strategical  combination  ;  but  a  rigid  execution  of 
a  plan  which  he  felt  could  alone  save  his  country  and  his  own  fame; 
and  with  invincible  resolution  he  steadily  pursued  the  programme 
which,  foreshadowed  by  his  remarkable,  well-authenticated  words  to 
the  late  gallant  Major-General  Bowen — " Here  the  great  battle  of  the 
South-west  will  be  fought" — ripened  into  life,  and  became  a  monument  of 
history — alas  !  at  the  expense  of  a  life  too  precious  for  the  nation  to  be 
sacrificed  for  even  so  magnificent  a  battle. 

Nor  was  his  sole  aim  the  mere  possession  of  the  battle-ground  of  Shi- 
loh.  His  vision  reached  further.  On  the  morning  of  the  eventful  6th 
of  April,  when  he  was  informed  that  the  enemy  had  permitted  himself 
to  be  surprised,  he  said  to  a  staff-officer,  with  now  significant  import, 
"  To-night  we  will  water  our  horses  in  the  Tennessee." 

Clear  and  full,  like  a  map  in  his  mind,  as  he  had  ordered,  that  battle 
was  developed  as  a  game  of  chess.  With  overwhelming  forces  he  over- 
threw everything  before  him.  At  a  critical  moment,  when  the  enemy 
offered  an  obstinate  resistance,  and  when  the  possession  of  the  contest- 
ed point  became  the  turning-point  of  the  battle,  th«  last  resarvos  had 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  255 

been  brought  into  action,  and  it  became  a  sacred  duty,  at  any  cost,  to 
restore  the  battle,  his  knightly  form  was  seen  leading  his  troops  to  the 
combat.  "  Fix  bayonets  !"  rang  his  clear  voice  ;  onward  they  charged, 
and  the  field  was*  won. 

During  the  latter  portion  of  March  the  .troops  occupied  the  chief 
points  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio,  and  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroads, 
which  unite  at  Corinth,  Mississippi,  where  head-quarters  were  estab- 
lished ;  the  right  was  at  Iuka,  Mississippi,  eight  miles  from  the  Tennes- 
see river,  under  command  of  Major-General  Crittenden  ;  the  centre  at 
Corinth,  some  twenty-two  miles  from  the  river;  and  the  left  rested 
upon  the  Memphis  road,  still  further  from  the  stream.  This  line  pro- 
tected the  Gulf  states  from  any  further  advance.  Still,  various  attempts 
were  made  by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  right,  by  attacking  the  batteries 
of  Eastport,  which,  however,  were  promptly  checked  by  the  forces  of 
Major-General  Crittenden  and  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge. 

The  enemy,  in  the  meantime,  had  concentrated  a  heavy  force,  under 
Major-General  Grant,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  near  Pittsburg 
Landing,  opposite  our  centre,  threatening  Corinth,  with  the  intention 
of. awaiting  the  arrival  of  Major-General  Buell,  who,  by  forced  marches, 
was  hastening  to  effect  a  junction  with  Grant.  In  perfect  security 
against  the  formidable  opponent  they  deemed  to  have  entirely  discom- 
fited, they  reposed  upon  the  beautiful  banks  of  the  river,  leisurely 
awaiting  the  command  of  the  senior  general  hastening  to  their  support. 
A  change— "one  of  the  most  delicate  operation  of  war,"  as  Napoleon 
has  said— was  hero  determined  upon  by  General  Johnston  :  the  transi- 
tion from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive,  against  an  enemy  flushed  with 
success. 

.  Now,  for  the  first  time,  he  had  an  army  with  which  ho  was  confident 
he  could  teach  a  lesson  to  the  enemy.  With  the  junction  of  his  force 
to  the  disciplined  corps  of  Pensacola,  under  Major-General  Bragg,  and 
the  troops  of  General  Beauregard  and  Major-General  Polk,  full  confi- 
dence animated  every  regiment  of  the  army,  and  it  burned  for  the 
opportunity  to  hurl  back  the  invaders.  As  soon  as  the  preparations 
and  the  laboVs  of  organization  could  be  completed,  he  had  resolved  to 
march  upon  tho  enemy,  to  surprise  and  defeat  him  near  the  river,  and, 
with  a  victorious  army,  to  meet  Buell.  With  the  zealous  co-operation 
of  his  generals,  the  different  columns  were  reported  ready  on  the  1st  of 
April. 

General  Beauregard,  to  whom  the  immediate  command  of  the  troops 
had  been  offered,  declined  on  account  of  his  ill-health  ;  but  Major- 
General  Bragg  consented  to  take  upon  himself,  in  addition  to  the  com- 
mand of  his'corps  d'urm/r,  the  arduous  duties  of  chief  of»the  general 
staff.  The  army  was  divided  into  four  corps,  commanded  by  Major- 
Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  Hardoe,  and  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge, 
respectively — the  corp?  of  the  latter  acting  as  a  reserve. 


256  THE    SPIRIT   OP 

The  three  first-named  corps  marched  from  Corinth,  the  last  from 
Burnsville,  a  point  between  the  centre  and  right  of  the  line,  upon 
Farmington.  The  corps  of  reserves,  having  the  longest  march  to  per- 
form, upon  roads  made  impassable  by  drenching  rains  which  had  over- 
taken the  troops  in  ^rivouac,  found  almost  insuperable  difficulties  to 
arrive  in  time  at  the  common  rendezvous  at  Monterey,  and,  in  fact, 
could  not  reach  there  before  twelve  hours  after  the  appointed  time.  The 
artillery  of  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge,  fast  in  the  mud,  was  only 
relieved  after  great  difficulties  by  large  detachments  sent  to  the  rear 
from  the  regiments  composing  the  corps.  The  perplexities  were  so 
great  that  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge  reported  his  situation  to  the 
general.  "Let  a  new  road  be  cut"  was,  according  to  Major  Hayden, 
the  laconic  reply  the  messenger  received. 

The  attack  was  to  have  been  made  on  the  morning  of  Saturday,  the 
5th  of  April,  and  the  troops  were  ordered  to  march  from  Monterey — a 
few  homesteads,  surrounded  by  woods,  and  some  eleven  miles  from  the 
river — at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  But  a  heavy  rain  falling 
during  the  night  upon  worn-out  troops,  retarded  the  preparations  for 
the  march  of  the  army  until  about  seven  o'clock.  Then,  when  in  ser- 
ried ranks  and  upon  many  lines,  overhead  gloomy  clouds  charged  with 
rain,  in  the  morning  mist,  at  the  head  of  every  regiment,  the  general's 
last  battle-order  was  read. 

"  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,"  said  he,  "  I  have  put  you 
in  motion  to  offer  battle  to  the  invaders  of  your  country.  With  reso- 
lution and  disciplined  valor,  becoming  men  fighting  as  you  are  for  all 
that  is  worth  living  or  dying  for,  you  can  but  march  to  decisive  victo- 
ry over  the  agrarian  mercenaries  who  have  been  sent  to  despoil  you  of 
your  liberties,  your  property,  and  your  honor. 

"  Remember  the  precious  stake  that  is  involved  in  this  contest  ; 
remember  the  dependence  of  your  mothers,  your  wives,  your  sisters, 
and  your  children  is  upon  the  result. 

"Remember  the  fair,  broad,  abounding  land,  the  happy  homes, 
and  the  ties  that  would  be  dissolved  and  desolated  by  your  defeat. 

"  The  eyes  and  hopes  of  eight  millions  of  people  re'st  upon  you. 
You  are  expected  to  show  yourselves  worthy  of  your  race  and  your 
lineage;  worthy  of  the  women  of  the  South,  whose  noble  devotion  in 
this  war  has  never  been  exceeded  at  any  time. 

.  "  With  such  incentives  to  brave  deeds,  and  in  the  trust  that  God  is 
with  you,  your  generals  will  lead  you  confidently  to  the  combat,  fully 
assured  of  ultimate  and  glorious  success." 

When  the  reading  was  concluded  there  rose  from  every  line  such 
successive:  shouts  of  determination  and  patriotic  devotion,  as  gave 
unmistakable  evidence  of  victory. 

But,  owing  to  the  difficult  march  over  rough  roads,  and  the  immense 
host  assembled  in  one  spot,  delays  occurred  which  retarded  the  arrival 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  257 

of  the  rear  column  at  Mickey's  house,  six  miles  from  the  river,  until 
near  four  in  the  afternoon.  General  Johnston  had  advanced  on  a  per- 
sonal reconnoissance  within  two  miles  of  Shiloh  Church,  and  would 
have  hcgun  the  attack  that  evening  but  for  the  greatly  fatigued  con- 
dition of  the  troops.  In  such  proximity  to  the  enemy  it  was  greatly 
to  be  feared  that  he  would  become  aware  of  and  prepare  for  the  im- 
pending danger. 

In  tho  ovening  of  Saturday  a  council  of  war  was  held.  Several 
commanders  called  the  attention  of  the  commanding  goncral  to  tho 
long  delay  of  thirty-six  hours,  which  should  have  given  ample  time  to 
the  enemy  to  reçoive  the  shock  ;  and  one  of  the  general  officers  there 
assembled  strongly  urged  a  rctroat.  But  General  Johnston  decided 
upon  and  ordered  the  attack  for  the  coming  morning. 

He  followed  thus  the  maxim  of  Napoleon,  that  "When  once  tho 
offensive  has  been  assumed,  it  must  be  sustained  to  the  last  extremity. 
However  skilful  the  manœuvres,  a  retreat  will  always  weaken  the 
morale  of  an  army  ;  because,  in  losing  the  chances  of  success,  these  last 
are  transferred  to  the  enemy.  Besides,  retreats  cost  always  more  men 
and  material  than  the  most  bloody  engagements,  with  this  difference: 
that  in  a  battle  the  enemy's  loss  is  nearly  equal  to  your  own,  whereas 
in  a  retreat  the  loss  is  on  your  side  only." 

The  wisdom  of  General  Johnston's  decision  was  apparent  the  follow- 
ing morning,  when  Major-General  Hardee,  with  his  corps,  surprised 
and  overthrew  the  advance  forces  of  the  enemy.  From  that  moment 
he  never  doubted  a  complete  victory,  and  the  speedy  recovery  of  all 
the  territory  he  had  lost — a  result  destined  to  remain  unfulfilled  by  the 
interposition  of  the  hand  of  death. 

Wo  do  not  here  design  to  record  the  character,  events,  failures,  and 
consequences  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  but  only  wish  to  confine  ourselves 
to  those  facts  immediately  bearing  upon  the  illustrious  name  heading 
this  paper.  For  this  purpose  we  are  sure  we  could  offer  no  more  accept- 
able and  interesting  account  than  that  which  flowed  from  the  pen  of 
Colonel,  now  Major-General,  William  Preston,  the  intimate  friend  of 
General  Johnston,  given  in  a  letter  to  the  general's  son,  Colonel  W. 
Preston  Johnston,  aide-de-camp  to  President  Davis,  dated  "  Corinth, 
April  18,  1862." 

"The  country  from  Corinth  to  Pittsburg,"  says  Colonel  Preston, 
"passes  over  low  and  swampy  lands,  poor  and  uncultivated,  to  Mon- 
terey, eleven  miles  from  the  former  place.  The  road  then  passes  north- 
ward to  a  farm-house  called  Mickey's  for  about  four  miles,  and  a  num- 
ber of  country  roads,  through  hilly  and  wooded  uplands,  some  seven 
miles  to  the  Tennessee  river.  Owl  creek  flows  nearly  east  into  the 
Tennessee  near  Pittsburg,  and  Lick  creek  in  a  general  parallel  direc- 
tion about  five  miles  distant  to  the  south.  Tho  ridge xlividing  the  small 
22* 


258  the  spirit  of 

branches  and  tributaries  of  these  creeks  lies  from  Mickey's  north-cast- 
ward  to  the  river,  and  country  roads  traversing  hills  becoming  bolder 
and  more  difficult  as  you  approach  the  river,  pass  by  Shiloh,  a  little 
country  chapel  thrco  miles  from  Pittsburg.  Occasional  fields  and  cab- 
ins intervene,  but  the  clearings  are  not  numerous  or  extensive.  The 
enemy  were  encamped  near  Shiloh,  before  Pittsburg,  on  the  verge  of 
some  -woodlands,  half  a  mile  from  the  river,  and  near  the  fields.  *  *  * 

"  The  morning  of  the  6th  of  April  was  calm,  bright,  and  beautiful. 
We  were  in  the  saddle  before  the  dawn  was  clear,  and  a  fire  between 
skirmishers  opened  in  the  front  on  the  line  of  Hardee's  advance.  Be- 
tween dawn  and  sunrise  sharp  volleys  were  heard,  and  the  general,  with 
his  staff,  rode  to  the  verge  of  the  wood  near  a  field  where  Hindman's 
brigade  was  suffering  under  a  heavy  fire.  Some  of  the  men  were  break- 
ing ranks,  and  there  were  many  dead  and  wounded.  The  general,  in 
person,  rallied  the  stragglers,  and  I  rode  forward,  where  I  found  Gen- 
eral Hindman  animating  and  leading  on  his  men.  He  informed  mo 
that  he  desired  support,  and,  having  reported  it  to  the  general,  he  re- 
quested me  to  order  General  Bragg  to  advance.  General  Bragg,  when 
found  by  me,  stated  that  the  order  had  been  given  ten  minutes  before. 

"  General  Hindman  pushed  on  in  the  direction  of  the  advanced  camp 
of  the  enemy,  occupied  by  the  13th  and  18th  Wisconsin  regiments,  and 
other  troops,  from  which  there  was  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artil- 
lery. 

"  General  Johnston  then  passed  to  the  left  at  a  point  in  front  of  the 
camps,  near  two  cabins,  subsequently  used  as  a  hospital.  A  field  of  an 
hundred  acres,  fringed  with  forest,  extended  to  the  north-east.  Through 
this  General  Cleburne's  brigade  moved  in  beautiful  order,  and  with  loud 
and  inspiring  cheers,  in  the  direction  of  the  centre  of  the  advanced 
camp.     Heavy  firing  was  heard  as  they  neared  it. 

"  General  Johnston  then  went  to  the  camp  assailed,  which  was  carried 
between  seven  and  eight  o'clock.  The  enemy  were  evidently  surprised. 
The  breakfasts  were  on  the  mess-tables,  the  baggage  unpacked,  the 
knapsacks,  arms,  stores,  colors,  and  ammunition  abandoned.  I  took 
one  stand  of  colors  from  the  colonel's  tent,  which  was  sent  by  me,  next 
morning,  through  Colonel  Gilmer  to  General  Beauregard. 

"  General  Hardee  reported  his  men  still  advancing  at  this  camp  about 
nine  o'clock,  and  conferred  with  General  Johnston,  who  was  reconnoi- 
tring a  second  line  of  camps  near  the  river,  where  the  enemy  were  post- 
ed in  force.  They  then  commenced  shelling  the  first  camp,  apparently 
attracted  by  the  presence  of  the  stall'  and  escort;  the  distance  being,  I 
should  think,  six  or  eight  hundred  yards,  and  shells  from  the  gunboats, 
of  large  size,  were  thrown.  General  Johnston  received  a  report  and 
rough  draft  at  this  timo  from  Captain  Lockett,  stating  that  the  enemy 
were  strongly  posted  on  the  left  in  front  of  our  right.     Hoavy  muskotry 


MILITARY   INSTITUTIONS.  259 

firing  and  cannonades  indicated  that  Bragg  and  Hardee  were  success- 
fully advancing  on  our  left. 

"General  Johnston  rode  down  the  hill  to  escape  the  shells,  and  his 
escort  back  toward  the  woods.  This  was  about  half-past  nine.  After 
pondering  a  little  while  he  determined  to  bring  forward  Breckinridge's 
reserve,  and,  feeling  his  way  to  the  river,  to  turn  the  enemy's  left.  The 
brigade  of  Chalmers  was  moved  to  our  extreme  right:  Botfen's  next, 
eight  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  Chalmers',  and  Statham's  eight  hundred 
yards  in  rear  of  Bowen's,  in  an  echelon  of  brigades.  Statham's  bri- 
gade, under  the  immediate  command  of  Breckinridge,  then  assailed  the 
camp  near  the  river,  when  they  wore  vigorously  met,  and  a  fierce  strug- 
gle ensued. 

"  General  Johnston  then  deployed  Bowen's  brigade,  and  advanced  to 
the  support  of  Breckinridge.  Batteries  were  brought  forward,  and 
Chalmers'  extended  on  the  right  to  the  river.  The  enemy's  left  flank 
was  completely  turned.  A  few  minutes  afterward  he  was  struck  by  a 
ball,  and  passed  on.  His  horse  was  wounded  in  two  places,  and  a  minie 
ball  severed  the  artery  of  his  leg  :  but  still  riding  on,  concealing  his 
wound,  he  fell  at  length  from  exhaustion.  Governor  Harris  was  near 
him.  I  found  him  a  few  minutes  after  he  was  shot,  and  asked  him  to 
speak  to  me.  I  could  find  no  wound  on  his  body.  He  breathed  for  a 
little  while,  but  did  not  speak,  or  recognize  me,  and  expired  without  a 
pang— his  countenance  bearing  the  same  noble  serenity  in  death  that  it 
had  done  in  life. 

"After  his  death  we  bore  his  body  back  to  the  camp,  concealing  his 
death,  and  roporting  to  General  Beauregard,  with  whom  we  remained 
until  the  close  of  the  day;  and  the  remains  were  afterwards  conveyed 
to  Now  Orleans  and  deposited  in  the  Cemetery  of  St.  Louis." 
#  *  *  *  *  •  •  * 

Thus  fell  a  soldier  who  united,  in  ft  remarkable  degree,  the  attributes 
of  a  general  as  he  should  be  ;  and  who  offers,  in  the  completeness  of 
his  character,  the  most  worthy  subject  of  study  and  emulation  to  the 
Confederate  army. 

Thus  fell  a  citizen  in  the  defence  of  his  country,  unswerving  in  his 
devotion  and  patriotism.  Just,  pure,  and  good,  his  name  will  become 
a  household-word  in  every  family  ;  and  as  years  roll  onward,  and  much 
that  now  is  will  be  obscured  or  forgotten  in  the  mists  of  the  past,  his 
eminent  virtues  will  grow  more  and  more  in  brilliancy. 

Thus  died  a  martyr  in  the  defence  of  what  nations  hold  most  dear, 
and  which  it  is  most  wicked  to  undermine  and  attack — the  sacred  right 
of  self-government— the  independence  of  one's  country— the  security 
and  sanctity  of  our  homes,  and  all  that  man  loves  and  cherishes— with- 
out which  life  is  but  a  burden,  and  death  a  heavenly  favor. 


260  THE   SPtRIT   OF 

CHAPTER    IV. 

REPUTATION  OF  GENERALS. 

Marshal  Brune— Three  great  epochs  of  his  life — Switzerland,  Holland,  Italy — De- 
spite exceptions,  merit  should  be  judged  by  success — Classification  of  generals — 
The  first  class — In  antiquity  and  modern  times — The  second  class — Is  more  nu- 
merous— The  third  clasB — Generals  composing  it  are  rare — The  fourth  and  last 

class. 

Note. — Marshal  Bi  une. 

I  will  terminate  this  work  by  some  reflections  upon  the  reputation  of 
generals,  and  the  reasons  which  should  establish  the  same. 

Generals  sometimes  attach  their  names  to  successes  to  which  they  are 
strangers  ;  these  arc  successes  obtained  either  despite  their  bad  disposi- 
tions, or  in  consequence  of  received  and  properly-followed  counsels. 

I  have  known  several  which  come  under  this  category — among  which 
the  most  notable  is  Marshal  Brune,*  who,  judged  by  this  standard,  was 
of  great  mediocrity.  Nevertheless,  his  name  i3  associated  with  three 
glorious  souvenirs  :  With  the  successes  of  the  French  army  against  the 
Swiss,  in  1798  ;  against  the  English  and  Russians,  in  1799  ;  and  against 
the  Austrians  in  Italy,  in  1800. 

In  Switzerland,  the  superiority  of  our  forces  and  the  divisions  exist- 
ing in  that  country,  necessarily  decided  the  question  in  his  favor.  In 
Holland  he  was  not  at  the  engagement  of  Berghen  ,•  the  Battle  of  Be- 
wervich  was  brought  about  by  accident,  and  suddenly  fought  without 
any  plan  of  conduct  or  any  aim.  The  follies  and  the  stupidity  of  the 
Duke  of  York  alone  led  to  any  definite  results.  In  1800,  in  Italy,  after 
brilliant  successes,  to  which  the  gencral-in-chief  was  nearly  a  stranger, 
we  were  in  a  condition,  had  wo  but  had  another  man  at  our  head,  to  de- 
stroy the  hostile  army  entirely. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  could  cite  examples  where  the  efforts  of  men  of 
•great  talent  were  wholly  unattended  by  fortune. 

But  these  different  examples  do  not  prevent  us  from  judging  by  re- 
sults, and  this  is  the  justest  manner  of  appreciating  the  value  and  the 
merit  of  generals. 

To  assume  a  different  basis,  and  to  support  one's  judgment  by  the 
opinion  alone  which  one  has  formed  of  a  general's  mind  and  talents, 
would  be  to  enter  into  an  inextricable  labyrinth,  and  would  often  lead  to 
error — since  every  one  would  then  but  look  through  the  prism  of  preju- 
dice, friendship,  and  passions.     If  we  are  sometimes  mistaken  by  judg- 

•  Dospite  his  private  qualities  and  his  deplorable  end,  we  can  not  but  point  out 
Marshal  Brune  as  one  of  the  most  singular  aud  striking  instances  of  the  caprices 
of  fortune. — Note  of  Author. 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  261 

ing  upon  the  basis  of  facts,  we  will  err  much  more  frequently  by  solely 
reposing  our  judgment  upon  a  personal  knowledge  of  the  individuals* 
Fortune  may  once  or  twice  overwhelm  a  man  with  its  favors  who  is  not 
worthy  of  them,  and  it  may  betray  the  highest  combinations  of  genius 
and  humiliate  a  noble  character;  but  when  the  strife  is  prolonged  and 
events  are  multiplied,  then  a  man,  complete  in  all  the  requirements  of  a 
general,  will  infallibly  succeed  ;  and  if  continuous  reverses  succeed  each 
other  we  may  boldly  conclude  that,  despite  a  superior  mind  and  quali- 
ties which  have  dazzled  us,  one  defect  of  harmony  in  his  qualities  will 
destroy  the  charm. 

I  may  class  generals  in  four  categories. 

In  the  first  I  place  generals  who  have  gained  every  battle  they  fought. 
The  very  first  place  in  public  opinion  incontestably  belongs  to  them. 
But  their  number  is  so  small  that  we  can  barely  find  their  names.  In 
antiquity  I  see  but  Alexander  and  Caesar.  The  Grecian  generals  whose 
names  have  become  illustrious,  as  Miltiades  and  Epaminondas,  owe 
their  celebrity  to  one  or  two  actions. 

In  modern  times  I  see  only  Qustavus  Adolphus,  Turenne,  Condé, 
Luxembourg,  and  Napoleon  until  1812;  because  I  place,  with  reason, 
among  the  number  of  reverses  for  which  a  general  is  accountable,  the 
destruction  of  armies,  the  cause  of  which  was  a  want  of  care  and  an  ex- 
ceeding improvidence. 

In  the  second  category  I  place  generals  who,  having  often  gained  bat- 
tles, sometimes  lost  them  aftor  they  had  disputed  them  obstinately. 
They  are  among  those  whose  greatest  number  is  inscribed  in  the  temple 
of  memory.  Perhaps  there  are  some  among  them  worthy  to  figure 
among  those  of  the  preceding  class  ;  because,  between  two  equally  meri- 
torious generals,  while  the  victory  must  be  decided  in  favor  of  one  of 
them,  it  will  be  but  a  dearly-bought  one,  and  its  results  will  be  limited. 

In  the  third  category  will  be  those  generals  who,  habitually  unlucky 
in  war,  and  sustaining  frequent  reverses,  have  never  been  destroyed  or 
discouraged,  but  have  always  maintained  an  imposing  and  respecf-in- 
spiring  front  toward  the  enemy. 

These  generals  are  rarely  met  with,  since  they  must  have  a  great  as- 
cendency over  those  who  surround  them.  Such  have  been  in  antiquity 
Sertorius  and  Mithridates,  and  in  modern  times  the  celebrated  Wallen- 
stein,  and  William  III,  King  of  England. 

Finally,  in  the  fourth  category,  wo  naturally  find  those  who  lose  their 
armies  without  fighting,  and  without  making  the  enemy  win  hia  victory 
through  a  vigorous  resistance.  Their  names  can  be  easily  recalled,  for 
each  country  and  every  epoch  has  furnished  instances  of  them. 

NOTES. 

Marshal  Brune. — Guillaume  Marie  Anne  Brune,  born  on  the  13th  of  May, 
17G3.    This  officer  entered  th»  French  army  in  1791.  and  was  at  once  appointed 


262  THE    SPIRIT    OP 

adjutant-major.  He  continued  attached  to  the  adjutant-general's  departiuont 
until  1797.  when  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  division-general.  In  this  distin- 
guished position  he  successively  commandeer  the  Armies  of  Italy,  Holland,  the 
West,  and  the  Reserve.  In  December,  1801,  he  was  appointed  a  state  councillor, 
and  in  September,  1802,  was  sent  on  an  embassy  to  Turkey.  On  the  19th  of  May, 
1804,  General  Brune  received  a  marshal's  bâton.  In  the  following  year  be  com- 
manded the  coast  army,  and  in  December,  1806,  he  was  appointed  Governor  General 
of  the  Hanseatic  towns.  During  the  Empire  he  passed  through  the  degrees  of  the 
Legion  of  Honor  ;  and  as  he  declared  his  adhesion  to  the  Bourbon  cause  after  the 
Battle  of  Toulouse,  he  was,  in  1814,  honored  with  the  cross  of  a  Chevalier  de  St. 
Louis,  created  a  peer  of  France,  and  governor  of  the  eighth  military  division  In 
1815.  He  did  not  long  survive  the  fortunes  of  his  great  master.  Napoleon,  or  his 
own  new  honors.  In  August,  1815,  he  was  brutally  murdered  by  an  infuriated 
mob  at  Avignon,  instigated  by  some  malicious  leaders,  who  accused  him  of  having 
been  an  active  participator  in  the  massacres  of  1792,  when,  in  fact,  he  was  at  the 
time  serving  on  the  frontiers. 


CONCLUSION. 

From  all  that  precedes,  I  believe  we  are  able  to  draw  the  following 
conclusions  : 

1.  The  fundamental  principle  of  the  organization  of  an  army  is 
found  in  the  united  spirit  which  influences  an  assemblage  of  men,  and 
which,  through  it,  becomes  a  compact  mass  and  a  unit,  infusing,  by 
means  of  a  skilful  and  ingenious  system  of  mechanical  movements,  an 
extraordinary  degree  of  mobility  into  all  the  different  parts  of  which 
the  army  is  composed. 

2.  The  several  parts  forming  the  elements  of  this  whole  must  have 
dimensions,  a  form,  and  limits,  which  are  the  necessary  consequences 
of  the  faculties  of  the  man  and  the  arms  he  uses. 

3.  Nothing  is  arbitrary  in  tho  organization  of  troops  and  the  move- 
ments of  armies.  Everything,  on  the  contrary,  should  depend  upon 
rulos,  which  themselves  are  derived  from  certain  laws.  Their  applica- 
tion at  the  right  time  and  in  the  proper  manner  forms  the  whole  science 
of  military  operations. 

4.  An  army  is  composed  of  its  material  and  the  men.  There  are 
natural  and  determined  relations  between  these  two  elements,  which, 
however,  vary  with  the  circumstances  and  the  end  proposed.  These 
proportions  do  not  depend  upon  caprice,  but  solely  upon  the  nature  of 
things. 

5.  The  greater  or  lesser  efficiency  of  these  two  elements  powerfully 
influences  tho  result,  and  tho  quantity  of  each  mostly  depends  upon 
its  quality. 

6.  A  third  element  influences  the  value  of  troops — it  is  the  moral 


MILITARY    INSTITUTIONS.  263 

element.  It  alone  oftou  surpasses  all  others  in  importance,  although 
the  latter  influence,  to  some  exteut,  the  efficiency  of  a  body  of  troops, 
because  it  is  requisite  that  tho  body  be  in  existenoe  before  the  spirit 
can  animate  it. 

Thus,  beyond  a  certain  limit,  the  real  strength  of  an  army  is  not  aug- 
mented by  reason  of  the  number  of  its  soldiers  and  the  resources  in 
material,  but  much  more  by  reason  of  the  spirit  by  which  it  is  ani- 
mated. 

7.  To  develop  the  spirit  of  an  army,  to  augment  its  confidence,  to 
speak  to  its  imagination,  to  exalt  tho  soul  of  the  soldier — such  should 
be  the  constant  object  of  a  general's  cares  and  efforts. 

8.  Military  spirit  has  for  its  element  the  esprit  de  corps  ;  it  is  a  pow- 
erful resort  which  can  never  be  fostered  too  much.  In  the  opinion  of 
each  soldier  the  army  to  which  ho  belongs,  and  the  general  under  whom 
ho  serves,  should  appear  invincible;  ho  should  constantly  maintain 
that  his  division  is  the  best  one  in  tho  army,  and  his  regiment  the 
bravest  and  most  glorious  one  in  tho  service.  With  these  convictions, 
his  strength  and  his  courage  will  be  tenfold  augmented. 

9.  Lastly,  every  warrior  should  be  profoundly  imbued  with  the  idea 
of  his  country's  glory,  and  devotion  to  his  chief  magistrate,  who  is  tho 
representative  and  exponent  of  its  grandeur.  He  should  constantly  re- 
member, that  love  for  his  country,  the  divine  sentiment  by  Providence 
graven  into  the  heart» of  every  human  being,  will  sustain  him  «always, 
will  make  him  a  great  man,  and  that  it  will  place  him  absve  all  even- 
tualities. But  this  sentiment  should  not  be  a  vain  expression — it  must 
bo  sincere,  serious,  and  energetic  ;  its  reality  should  be  proven,  when- 
ever necessary,  by  every  sacrifice.  History  of  every  age  has  transmitted 
to  us  examples  ;  even  if  they  are  rare,  they  are  sublime,  and  their  re- 
sults have  astonished  mankind. 

10.  The  best  army  is  the  one,  therefore,  which  most  fully  satisfies 
the  conditions  above  enumerated;  their  "  ensemble  "  and  their  accord 
constitute  its  true  value.  As  these  conditions  are  almost  ever  changing 
ani  of  difficult  appreciation — because  the  mind  can  not  embrace  all 
possible  combinations  at  once — no  one  can  in  advance  determine  the 
effective  power  of  an  army  in  any  rigorous  and  dofinite  manner;  we 
can  only  judge  of  an  army  before  it  has  been  tried,  by  a  sort  of  instinct 
which  is  not  very  far  from  the  truth.  But  at  a  later  period  this  value 
can,  with  certainty,  bo  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  performances 
of  an  army,  and  their  results. 

My  labors  come  here  to  a  close.  This  sketch  suffices  for  the  fulfil- 
ment of  the  object  I  have  had  in  view.  To  give  to  each  part  of  which 
it  is  composed  all  the  finish  of  which  it  would  be  susceptible,  requires 
too  extended  labors,  which  I  have  neither  the  strength  nor  the  wish  to 
undertake.     I  ha/*,  however,  aaid  en  mgh  to  lead  the  minds  of  «oldier» 


264  THE   SPIRIT   OF 

to  reflect  upon  their  calling,  and  to  show  to  them  that  our  sublime  pro- 
fession is  based  upon  certain  principles  which  ought  never  to  be  disre- 
garded ;  and  that  when  they  are  respected,  they  impart  the  greatest 
possible  value  to  the  means  of  action  they  control,  which,  in  fact, 
should  be  the  constant  aim  of  him  who  is  called  upon  to  command. 


APPENDIX. 


EXPOSITION  OF  THE  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  ART 

OF  WAR. 

AZ^f„7'  rencraJ  Jo;,m's  ce,cbratetI  *"*<«»  ™^> 

l.y        Tu    „  e"  ara"de°  W"»™»  mttaire.»    From 

the  French,  by  Colonel  Fn«K  Schaller,  Confederate  Army. 

There  have  existed,  in  all  time,,  fundamental  principles  upon  which 
the  correct  combmations  of  war  repose,  and  to  which  they  shou  d  all 
be  compared,  to  enable  us  to  judge  of  their  true  merit. 

The» principle.  are  immutable,  independent  of  the  kind  of  arms   of 

ations  of  winch  tbe.r  application  is  susceptible.     For  thirty  centuries 

IZZ  h"  Tr'S  Wh°  haVe'  m°re  °r  ""  ha^«^  applied      em 
J™,  Ha,nn'b,al  ™re  «™*  «>>«»»;  Greece  and  Rome  have  fur- 

shed  several  ;  Alexander  oftentimes  manoeuvred  with  skill;  fesar 
did  no  less  successfully  lead  to  wars  of  invasion  and  great  „pc  at  in" 
Tamerlane  even,  of  whom  we  know  so  little,  has  left  institution  which 
.llnstrate  upon  every  page,  that  natural  genius  which  knows  how  to 
command  men  and  to  triumph  over  every  obstacle.  When  we dm 
pare  the  causes  of  the  victories  of  antiquity  with  those  of  moder" 
we  are  ,„„te  surpnsed  to  find  that  the  Battles  of  Wagram,  of  Ph,,  .  ' 
and  Cannae  were  gained  through  the  same  first  cause  ' 

However,    through  some   fatality  difficult  to  be  comprehended    the 
greater  part  of  writers  who  have  treated  upon  the  miHtary  ar   ann  ar 

sory  detads  the  proper  direction  of  great  operations,  or  the  wise  em- 
ployment of  masses  on  the  day  of  battle.  The  resuit  has  been  a  hosHf 
work.  ,„  wh.ch  the  authors  by  arranging,  i„  their  own  manner    inl 

::  :.;•  n  t  s'at:bvcun"oubtediy  proven  a  <™ai  °f  -^  «« 

crud.ton     but  at  the  expense  of  obscuring  a  science  which  they  had 
he  mtenfon  to  place  within  the  reach  of  every  one:  several  of  them 

The  An  of  War     to  the  manner  in  which  officer,  should  carry  their 
sword,  and  to  the  shape  of  goa-rMinxU. 


266  AFFENDIX. 

The  result  of  these  fatiguing  dissertations  has  been  to  persuade  many 
military  men,  otherwiso  very  estimable,  that  there  are  no  rules  what- 
ever in  warfare  ;  an  absurd  and  unsustainable  error.*  Undoubtedly, 
there  exists  no  system  of  war  exclusively  good,  because  they  all  arc  tho 
results  of  hypothetical  calculations.  A  system  is  a  combination  of  the 
human  mind,  subject  to  deceive  itself,  and  which  oftentimes,  by  the  aid 
of  high-sounding  phrases  and  technical  words  artfully  arranged,  gives 
to  the  falsest  ideas  the  color  of  truth.  But  it  is  entirely  different  with 
principles.  They  aro  invariable;  the  human  mind  can  neither  modify 
nor  destroy  them. 

To  give  exact  notions  of  war  it  was,  therefore,  necessary  that  authors, 
instead  of  creating  absurd  systems,  which  destroy  each  other,  should 
have  begun  by  establishing  the  principles  with  which  all  combinations 
may  be  reconciled.  This  would  have  been  a  greater  and  moro  difficult 
labor — but  one  which  would  have,secured  some  fixed  result.  We  would 
not  now  find  so  many  persons  incredulous  about  the  real  state  of  the 
science.  Mack  would  not  have  written,  in  1793,  that  the  longest  lines 
were  the  strongest;  Billow,  in  his  chapter  of  eccentric  retreats,  would 
not  have  pretended  that  a  beaten  army,  to  save  itself,  ought  to  be  di- 
vided into  as  many  corps  as  there  are  roads  to  retreat  upon,  should  it 
even  never  succeed  in  reassembling  its  columns  thus  broken  ;  neither 
would  a  system  of  cordon  have  been  introduced,  which  scatters  an 
army  upon  all  the  different  roads,  at  the  risk  of  being  taken,  as  Turenne 
did  with  that  of  Bournonvillc  in  Alsatia. 

Frederic  hrad  wisely  written  that  the  talent  of  a  great  captain  con- 
sisted in  forcing  his  enemy  to  divide;  and,  fifty  years  thereafter,  sever- 
al generals  thought  it  an  admirable  manœuvre  to  divide  their  own 
forces  as  much  as  they  could.  Such  a  subversion  of  ideas  could  not 
fail  to  be  the  consequence  of  that  uncertainty  which  controlled  individ- 
ual opinions;  in  fact,  the  grossest  errors  would  not  have  thus  been  ad- 
vanced, and  the  most  eminent  truths  of  the  art  would  not  have  been 
misconstrued  by  military  men,  if,  instead  of  laying  down  vague  suppo- 
sitions and  uncertain  calculations,  military  writers  had  endeavored  to 
demonstrate  incontestable  principles,  and  to  give  a  common  regulator 
to  opinions  till  thon  divergent. 


•  I  heard  a  general  of  a  certain  reputation  say,  at  the  Château  of  Austerlitz, 
when  speaking  of  a  cavalry  charge  :  "  I  would  like  very  much  the  famous  tacti- 
cians to  explain  to  me  by  what  rule  we  came  out  of  that  charge,  where  the  squad- 
ron of  both  parties  were  mixed  together."  Undoubtedly,  in  a  incite  of  cavalry, 
where  the  troops  are  already  too  much  engaged  to  think  of  manoeuvring,  the  only 
rule  is  to  sabre;  but  is  there  anything  proved  by  this  truth?  What  was  that  charge 
by  itself  in  the  grand  ensemble  of  the  battle?  Napoleon,  who  ordered  it,  has  ex- 
plained it  already;  it  was  the  action  of  a  secondary  mans  to  restrain  an  effort  of 
the  enemy,  while  the  g\^t  blcrw  wan  Struck  upon  a  different  portion  oi  the  field. 


.       APPENDIX.  207 

I  have  dared  to  undertake  this  dilficult  task  without,  perhaps,  pos- 
sessing the  necessary  talent  for  its  complete  solution;  but  it  has  ap- 
peared to  me  of  importance  to  lay  down  the  basis,  whose  development 
would  have  been  much  longer  postponed,  had  we  not  been  enabled  to 
profit  by  circumstances  in  order  to  establish  them. 

The  only  means  to  arrive  at  ray  aim  was  first  to  indicate  the  princi- 
ples, and  theu  to  show  their  application  and  their  proofs  by  the  history 
of  twenty  celebrated  campaigns.  This  history  [General  Jomini  is  here 
speaking  of  his  history  of  the  wars  of  Frederic  II,  the  wars  of  the  Rev- 
olution, and  of  those  of  the  Empire]  should,  then,  present  a  strong  and 
rational  criticism  of  every  operation  which  would  be  contrary  to  es- 
tablished rules.  Had  I  approved  of  what  was  in  opposition  with  these 
rules,  I  would  have  been  guided  by  blâmable  and  unworthy  motives 
in  the  work  I  have  undertaken.  Whatever  were  the  personal  qualities 
of  a  general  and  the  reputation  which  ho  enjoyed,  I  have  frankly  re- 
vealed every  fault  he  has  committed;  I  have  not  even  hesitated  an 
instant  to  come  into  collision  with  my  private  affections.  After  such 
an  avowal,  my  reflections  can  neither  be  attributed  to  envy  nor  to  per- 
sonal enmity;  the  cause  will  be  entirely  in  the  interest  of  the  art. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  all  military  combinations  consists  in 
making,  with  the  largest  mass  of  one's  forces,  a  combined  effort  upon  the 
decisive  point. 

It  will  be  well  understood  that  a  skilful  general  can,  with  sixty  thou- 
sand men,  beat  one  hundred  thousand  men,  if  he  succeeds  in  throwing 
fifty  thousand  men  into  action  upon  a  single  portion  of  tho  line  of  the 
enemy.  The  numerical  superiority  of  the  troops  not  engaged  becomes, 
in  such  a  case,  more  hurtful  than  advantageous,  because  it  can  not  but 
increase  the  disorder,  as  tho  Battle  of  Leuthen  has  proved. 

The  means  of  applying  this  maxim  are  not  very  numerous  ;  I  am 
going  to  attempt  to  indicate  them  : 

I.  The  first  means  is  to  tako  the  initiative  of  the  movements.  Tho 
general  who  succeeds  in  placing  this  advantage  on  his  side  is  master, 
to  employ  his  forces  where  ho  deems  it  suitable  to  carry  them;  the  one, 
on  the  contrary,  who  awaits  tho  enemy  can  not  be  master  of  any 
combinations,  since  he  subordinates  his  movements  to  those  of  his 
adversary,  and  because  he  has  it  no  longer  in  his  power  to  arrest  the 
latter's  designs  when  they  are  in  full  execution.  The  general  who 
takes  the  initiative  knows  what  he  has  to  do  ;  ho  conceals  his  march; 
surprises  and  overwhelms  an  extremity  and  a  weak  part.  The  one 
who  waits  is  beaten  upon  one  of  his  parts,  before  he  is  even  informed 
of  the  attack. 

II.  The  second  means  is  to  direct  one's  movements  upon  that  weak 
part  which  it  is  most  advantageous  to  carry.  The  choice  of  this  part 
depends  upon  tho  position  of  tho  enemy.     The  most  important  point 


268  APPENDIX. 

will  always  be  the  one  whose  occupation  will  procure  the  most  favor- 
able chances  and  the  greatest  results.  Such  will  bo,  for  example,  those 
positions  which  aim  at  gaining  the  communications  of  the  enemy  with 
the  base  of  his  operations,  and  to  crowd  him  back  upon  some  insur- 
mountable obstacle,  such  as  a  sea,  a  large  river  without  any  bridge,  or 
a  great  neutral  power. 

In  double  and  disunited  lines  of  operations,  it  is  requisite  to  direct 
one's  attacks  upon  the  points  of  the  centre;  by  throwing  thither  the 
mass  of  one's  forces  the  isolated  divisions  which  guard  those  points 
are  overwhelmed.  The  scattered  corps  upon  the  right  and  the  left  can 
no  longer  operate  in  concert,  and  are  forced  to  make  those  eccentric 
retreats,  whose  terrible  effects  have  been  felt  by  the  armies  of  Wurm- 
ser,  of  Mack,  and  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick.  In  simple  lines  of 
operations  and  in  contiguous  lines  of  battle  the  weak  points  are,  on 
the  contrary,  upon  the  extremities  of  the  line.  Indeed,  the  centre  is 
within  reach  of  being  simultaneously  sustained  by  the  right  and  the 
left;  while  one  extremity,  when  attacked,  would  be  overthrown  before 
sufficient  means  could  arrive  from  the  other  wing  to  support  it,  because 
its  means  would  be  much  too  far  distant,  and  could  not  be  employed 
except  one  after  another. 

A  deep  column,  attacked  upon  its  head,  is  in  the  same  situation  as  a 
line  attacked  upon  its  extremity  ;  they  will  both  be  successively 
engaged  and  beaten,  as  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  defeats  of  Ross- 
bach  and  Auerstedt.  However,  it  is  easier  to  make  new  dispositions  in 
the  case  of  a  deep  column,  than  it  would  be  with  a  line  of  battle  which 
would  find  itself  attacked  upon  one  extremity. 

In  executing,  by  strategy,  a  general  movement  upon  the  extremity 
of  the  line  of  operations  of  the  enemy,  not  only  can  we  act  in  masses 
upon  a  weak  part,  but  we  can,  from  this  extremity,  easily  gain  the  rear 
and  the  communications  with  either  the  base  or  with  the  secondary  lines. 
Thus  Napoleon  by  gaining,  in  1805,  Donauwerth  and  the  line  of  the 
Lech,  had  established  his  masses  upon  the  communications  of  Mack 
with  Vienna,  which  was  the  base  of  that  general  with  Bohemia,  and 
he  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  join  the  Russian  army,  which  was  his 
most  important  secondary  line.  The  same  operation  took  place  in 
1806,  upon  the  extreme  left  of  the  Prussians,  about  Saalfeld  and  Gera. 
It  was  again  repeated  in  1812,  by  the  Russian  army  in  its  movements 
upon  Kaluga  and  Krasnoï,  and  in  1813  by  the  Allies,  when  they  direct- 
ed their  march  across  Bohemia,  upon  Dresden  and  Leipzig,  against  the 
right  of  Napoleon.* 

•  It  has  been  remarked  that  central  lines  did  not  save  Napoleon  in  the  direction 
of  Dresden  in  1813,  nor  in  the  Champagne  in  1814;  but  I  may  observe,  in  my  turn, 
that  he,  nevertheless,  owed  to  this  system  his  momentary  successes  in  both  of 
these  campaigns.  The  cause  of  his  reverses  consisted  in  the  inequality  of  the 
strife  and  the  secondary  means;  in  the  difference  of  the  nature  of  his  troops  ;  iu 


APPENDIX.  269 

III.  The  result  of  the  preceding  truths  proves  that,  if  it  be  requisite 
to  attack  by  preference  the  extremity  of  a  line,  it  is  likewise  necessary 
to  beware  of  attacking  both  extremities  at  the  same  time,  at  least  if 
one  hare  not  very  superior  forces.  An  army  of  sixty  thousand  men, 
which  forms  two  corps  of  about  thirty  thousand  combatants  each,  by 
attacking  both  extremities  of  an  army  equal  in  numbers,  deprives 
itself  of  the  means  of  striking  a  decisive  blow  by  uselessly  multiply- 
ing the  number  of  the  means  of  resistance  which  the  enemy  can  oppose 
to  its  two  detachments.  It  even  exposes  itself,  by  an  extended  and 
disunited  movement,  to  the  assemblage  of  its  adversary's  masses  upon 
one  point,  and  to  be  annihilated  by  tho  terrible  effect  of  their  superior- 
ity. Multiplied  attacks  upon  a  larger  number  of  columns  are  still 
more  dangerous,  and  more  contrary  to  the  great  principle  of  the  art, 
especially  as  they  can  not  enter  into  action  at  the  same  instant  and 
upon  the  same  point. 

It  follows  from  this  maxim  that  it  is  suitable,  on  the  contrary,  when 
we  have  masses  much  superior  to  those  of  the  enemy,  to  attack  upon 
both  extremities  ;  we  thus  succeed  to  bring  into  action  more  men 
than  he  upon  each  one  of  his  wings,  while  by  koeping  very  superior 
forces  upon  one  single  point  tim  adversary  might  deploy  his,  and  force 
us  to  combat  with  equal  numbers.  Care  should  be  taken  in  such  a  case 
to  throw  the  heavy  portion  of  one's  forces  upon  that  wing  where  the 
attack  would  promise  the  most  decisive  results.  This  we  have  demon- 
strated by  the  relation  of  the  Battle  of  Hochkirch,  in  the  Seven  Years' 
War. 

placing  Bohemia  and  Bavaria  in  the  rear  of  his  extreme  right,  and,  so  to  say, 
upon  his  own  communications.  For  the  rest,  I  may  still  add  that  the  system  of 
central  masses  had  not  been  applied  until  then  but  by  armies  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  to  two  hundred  thousand  men  at  most,  and  as  it  would  be  useless  to  concen- 
trate more  forces  upon  the  same  line,  since  it  is  already  a  difficult  matter  to  en- 
gage as  many  troops  on  the  same  day  and  upon  the  same  battle-field. 

Nor  have  I  given  any  exclusive  preference  to  central  operations,  since  I  have 
often  presented  those  upon  one  extremity  of  the  enemy's  line  as  most  advanta- 
geous. Besides,  we  must  not  confound  a  central  line  of  operations  opposed  to  two 
parties  upon  one  single  front  (for  example,  that  of  Archduke  Charles  against 
Moreau  and  Jourdan  in  1796),  with  a  line  of  operations  totally  surrounded  by 
enemies;  these  last  are  much  less  favorable;  they  may  even  become  dangerous, 
when  the  masses  of  the  enemy  are  more  numerous. 

Finally,  I  may  say,  in  resuming,  that  one  mass  surrounded  by  all  Europe  risen 
against  it,  composed  of  heterogeneous  parts,  famished  by  its  own  greatness,  and 
by  light  troops  such  as  have  never  before  been  seen,  could  not  have,  by  means  of 
a  central  position  alone,  escaped  the  fate  which  struck  Napoleon  in  Saxony.  But 
one  exception  alone  does  not  destroy  a  rule  or  a  general  maxim:  and,  in  all  ordi- 
nary ware,  a  power  which  will  fight  with  equal  chances — that  is  to  say,  with  equal 
means — by  applying  this  system  will  inevitably  triumph,  if  its  enemies  follow 
a  contrary  system.  I  appeal  to  the  most  distinguished  general  officers  of  all 
armies,  and  cite  as  proofs  the  best  feats  of  arms  in  modern  history. 


270  APPENDIX. 

IV.  To  make  a  combined  effort  with  a  large  mass  upon  one  single 
point,  it  is  requisite,  in  strategic  movements,  to  keep  one's  forces  upon 
a  space  very  nearly  square,  that  they  may  be  more  disposable.*  Large 
fronts  are  as  contrary  to  good  principles  as  broken,  disunited  lines, 
great  detachments,  and  isolated  divisions,  unable  to  maintain  them- 
selves. 

V.  One  of  the  most  efficient  means  to  apply  the  general  principle 
which  we  have  indicated  is,  to  make  the  enemy  commit  faults  con- 
trary to  that  principle.  With  several  small  bodies  of  light  troops,  we 
can  give  him  uneasiness  upon  several  important  points  of  his  commu- 
nications. It  is  likely  that,  not  knowing  their  strength,  he  will  oppose 
to  them  numerous  divisions,  and  break  up  his  masses  ;  these  light  troops 
contribute  likewise  to  protect  the  army  perfectly  against  any  kind  of 
danger. 

VI.  It  is  very  important,  if  we  take  the  initiative  of  a  decisive  move- 
ment, to  neglect  nothing  concerning  the  enemy's  positions,  and  the 
movements  which  he  would  be  enabled  to  make.  Espionage  is  a  useful 
means,  whose  perfection  can  not  be  too  highly  estimated;  but  what  is 
still  more  essential  is,  to  have  always  a  perfect  system  of  reconnois- 
sances  by  partisan  rangers.  A  general  should  scatter  small  parties  in 
every  direction,  and  their  number  must  be  increased  with  as  much  care 
as  this  system  must  be  avoided  in  great  operations.  To  this  end  sever- 
al divisions  of  light  cavalry  will  be  organized,  which  never  enter  into 
the  lists  of  combatants.  To  operate  without  these  precautions  wouM 
be  to  march  in  darkness,  and  to  be  exposed  to  disastrous  chances  which 
a  secret  movement  of  the  enemy  would  produce.  They  have  been  too 
much  neglected,  because  the  department  of  espionage  has  not  been  suf- 
ficiently organized  beforehand,  and  officers  of  light  troops  have  not  al- 
ways the  necessary  experience  to  conduct  their  detachments/}" 

*  By  this  it  must  not  be  understood  that  it  is  necessary  to  form  a  regular  squared 
column,  but  that  the  battalions  should  bo  disposed  upon  the  ground  so  as  to  bo 
able  to  march,  with  the  same  degree  of  promptitude,  from  all  points  toward  the 
one  which  would  be  assailed. 

f  The  immense  advantages  which  the  Cossacks  have  given  to  the  Russian 
armies  are  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  this  article,  written  in  1806.  These  light  troops, 
insignificant  in  the  shock  of  a  great  battle,  are  terrible  in  the  pursuit.  They  are 
the  most  formidable  enemy  of  all  the  combinations  of  a  general,  since  he  is  never 
sure  whether  his  orders  have  been  received  and  executed,  as 'his  convoys  are 
always  compromised,  and  his  operations  uncertain.  As  long  as  an  army  possesses 
only  a  few  regiments  of  them,  their  whole  value  is  unknown;  but  if  their  number 
is  from  fifteen  to  twenty  thousand,  their  whole  importance  has  been  felt,.especially 
in  countries  whose  population  is  not  opposed  to  them. 

As  soon  as  they  have  once  carried  off  a  convoy,  it  is  necessary  to  escort  them  all, 
and  that  the  escort  be  a  numerous  and  well-conducted  one.    We  are  never  certain 


APPENDIX.  271 

VII.  It  is  not  sufficient,  for  the  proper  operations  in  war,  to  skilfully 
throw  our  masses  upon  the  most  important  points  ;  wo  must  also  know 
how  to  engage  them  there.  When  wc  are  onco  established  upon  these 
points,  and  remain  there  in  inaction,  then  is  the  principle  forgotten. 
The  onemy  is  enabled  to  make  counter-manoeuvres,  and,  in  order  to 
deprive  him  of  this  means,  it  is  necessary,  as  soon  as  we  have  gained 
his  communications,  or  one  of  his  extremities,  that  wo  march  upon  him 
and  engage  him.  It  is  at  that  time  particularly  that  a  well-combined 
and  simultaneous  employment  of  our  forces  is  of  importance  The 
masses  present  do  not  decide  any  battles,  but  the  masses  in  action.  Tho 
first  decide  in  the  preparatory  movements  of  strategy  ;  tho  last  deter- 
mine the  success  of  the  action. 

To  obtain  this  result,  a  skilful  general  must  seize  the  instant  when  it 
becomes  necessary  to  carry  the  decisive  position  of  the  battle-field,  and 
he  must  combine  the  attack  so  as  to  engage  all  of  his  forces  at  tho  same 
time,  with  the  sole  exception  of  the  troops  retained  to  form  the  corps 
of  reserves. 

When  an  effort  based  upon  such  principles  will  not  be  successful  in 
procuring  the  victory,  it  need  not  be  expected  from  any  other  combina- 
tion, and  the  only  remaining  hope  will  be  to  strike  a  last  blow  with  this 
corps  of  reserves,  in  concert  with  the  troops  already  engaged. 

VIII.  All  the  combinations  of  a  battle  may  be  reduced  to  three  sys- 
tems : 

The  first,  which  is  purely  defensive,  consists  in  awaiting  the  enemy 
in  a  strong  position,  without  any  other  aim  than  to  maintain  ourselves 
there  ;  of  such  a  nature  were  the  dispositions  of  Daun  at  Torgau,  and 
of  Marsin  within  the  lines  of  Turin.  These  two  events  sufficiently  de- 
monstrate how  vicious  such  combinations  are. 

The  second  system,  on  the  contrary,  is  entirely  offensive;  it  consists 
in  attacking  the  enemy  wherever  we  can  find  him,  as  Frederic  did  at 
Lcuthcn  and  at  Torgau,  Napoleon  at  Jena  and  Ratisbon,  and  the  Al- 
lies at  Leipzig. 

of  any  tranquil  inarch,  because  we  never  know  where  the  enemy  is.  These  mean 
jobs  require  immense  forces,  and  tho  regular  cavalry  is  soon  put  "  liars  de  service" 
by  fatigues  which  it  can  not  bear.  The  Turkish  militia  was  nearly  as  effectivo 
against  the  Russians  as  the  Cossacks  were  against  other  Europoan  armies:  tho 
convoys  are  not  more  secure  in  Bulgaria  than  they  were  in  Spain  and  Poland.  As 
for  the  rest.  1  believe  that  in  the  other  armies  several  thousands  of  volunteer  hus- 
sars or  Lancers,  raised  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  well-conducted,  and  operating 
where  their  chiefs  WOnld  conduct  them,  would  neatly  answer  the  same  end;  but 
they  must  always  be  considered  as  "tnfaSM  ptrdtu"  because,  should  they  receive 
their  orders  from  the  adjutant-general's  office,  they  would  no  lonj  sr  !"•  partisans. 
It  is  true  tbej  would  not  have  the  same  qualities,  and  would  not,  in  the  long  run, 
light  as  woll  a?  Oos6acks>.  but  to  si,  inevitable  evil  we  mu^f  oppose  every  possible 
idy. 


272  APPENDIX. 

The  third  system,  lastly,  is  somewhat  the  mean  between  the  two 
others;  it  consists  in  selecting  a  field  of  battle  whose  strategical  con- 
veniences and  advantages  of  "terrain  "  are  perfectly  known,  in  order 
to  await  the  enemy  there,  and  to  choose,  during  the  day,  the  very  mo- 
ment most  suitable  for  taking  the  initiative,  and  to  fall  upon  the  adversa- 
ry with  every  chance  of  success.  The  combinations  of  Napoleon  at 
Rivoli  and  at  Austerlitz,  those  of  Wellington  at  Mont-Saint-Jean  and 
in  most  of  his  defensive  battles  in  Spain,  must  be  ranked  in  this  class. 

It  would  be  a  difficult  matter  to  give  fixed  rules  to  determine  the  em- 
ployment of  these  two  last  systems,  which  arc  the  only  ones  suitable.  Re- 
gard must  be  had  to  the  moral  state  of  the  troops  of  each  party,  to  the 
national  character,  whether  it  be  more  or  less  phlegmatic  or  impetuous, 
and,  lastly,  to  the  obstacles  which  are  presented  by  the  field  of  battle. 
It  is  therefore  seen  that  these  circumstances,  above  all  others,  must  di- 
rect the  genius  of  a  general,  and  these  truths  may  be  reduced  to  the 
threo  following  points  : 

1.  That  with  troops  well  accustomed  to  war  and  upon  ordinary 
ground,  the  absolute  offensive  or  the  initiative  of  the  attack  is  always 
most  suitable. 

2.  That  upon  grounds  of  difficult  access,  either  by  nature  or  owing 
to  other  causes,  and  with  disciplined  and  submissive  troops,  it  is  per- 
haps more  advantageous  to  permit  the  enemy  to  arrive  in  a  position 
previously  well  known,  in  order  to  take  thereafter  the  initiative  against 
him,  when  his  troops  are  already  exhausted  by  their  first  efforts.* 

3.  That  the  strategical  situation  of  the  two  parties  may,  nevertheless, 
require  that  we  sometimes  attack  with  strong  force  the  positions  of  our 
adversary,  without  permitting  any  local  consideration  to  prevent  us 
from  so  doing — such  are,  for  examplo,  the  circumstances  in  which  it 
would  be  requisite  to  prevent  the  junction  of  two  hostile  armies,  to  fall 
upon  a  detached  part  of  the  enemy's  army,  or  upon  an  isolated  corps 
beyond  a  stream,  etc. 

IX.  The  orders  of  battle,  or  the  most  suitable  dispositions  to  conduct 
troops  into  combat,  should  have  for  their  object  to  give  to  the  troops  at 
the  same  time  mobility  and  solidity.  It  appears  to  me  that,  to  satisfy 
both  of  these  conditions,  troops  remaining  upon  the  defensive  might  be 
partly  deployed  and  partly  in  column,  as  was  the  Russian  army  at  Ey- 
lau  ;  but  the  corps  disposed  in  order  to  attack  a  decisive  point  must  be 
composed  of  two  lines  of  battalions;  each  battalion,  instead  of  being 
deployed,  would  be  formed  in  column  by  divisions  in  the  following 
manner  :")" 


*  The  Battle  of  Kvmersdorf,  which  offers  many  points  of  resemblance  with  that 
of  Mont-Saint-Jean,  additionally  justifies  this  train  of  reasoning. 

+  A  division  of  two  platoons  :  thus,  the  battalion  having  six  companies  or  six 
platoons,  will  have  three  divisions;  which,  in  fact,  will  form  it  upon  three  lines. 


6  th. 

5th. 

APPENDIX. 
4th.                 3d. 

2d. 

273 

1st  batt. 

• 

12th. 

11th. 

10th.               9th. 

8th. 

7  th. 

This  order  offers  infinitely  more  solidity  than  a  deployed  line,  whose 
wavering  prevents  the  impulsion  so  necessary  for  such  an  attack,  and 
which  hinders  the  officers  from  leading  their  commands.  However>  to 
facilitate  the  march,  to  avoid  the  too  great  depth  of  the  mass,  and  to 
augmont,  on  the  contrary,  the  front,  without  at  the  same  time  lessening 
its  consistence,  I  believe  it  to  bo  suitable  to  place  the  infantry  in  two 
ranks.  The  battalions  will  thus  become  more  mobile,  since  the  march 
of  the  second  rank,  pressed  between  the  first  and  the  third,  is  always 
fatiguing,  wavering,  and  in  consequence  less  lively.  They  will,  be- 
sides, have  all  the  strength  desirable,  as  the  three  ployed  divisions  will 
present  six  ranks  in  depth,  which  is  already  more  than  sufficient. 
Finally,  the  front,  augmented  by  one-third,  will  have  a  greater  fire,  in 
case  it  should  avail  itself  of  it,  and  at  the  same  time  it  will  greatly 
impose  upon  the  enemy,  and,  by  showing  to  him  moro  men,  it  will  give 
less  play  to  his  artillery. 

X.  Upon  grounds  of  difficult  access,  such  as  vineyards,  enclosures, 
gardens,  and  entrenched  heights,  the  defensive  order  of  battle  should 
be  composed  of  battalions  deployed  in  two  ranks,  and  covered  by 
numerous  platoons  of  skirmishers.  But  tho  attacking  troops,  as  well 
as  the  reserve,  could  not  be  better  placed  than  in  columns  of  attack  in 
the  centre,  as  we  have  indicated  it  in  the  preceding  article,  because  the 
reserve,  before  being  ready  to  fall  upon  tho  enemy  at  the  decisive  mo- 
ment, should  be  prepared  to  do  it  with  forco  and  vivacity — that  is  to 
say,  in  columns.*     This  reserve  may,  however,  be  partly  deployed  until 

*  It  has  been  said  that  Lord  Wellington  fought  nearly  always  deployed.  This 
may  he  true  in  the  case  of  troops  which  romain  always  upon  the  defensive  ;  hut 
in  the  case  of  offensive  and  manoeuvring  wings,  I  believe  that  it  is  necessary  to 
form  columns.  In  the  contrary  case  it  will  bo  entirely  the  fault  of  the  beaten 
army  if  it  permits  itself  to  be  conquored  by  such  a  system,  because  a  general 
ought  to  desire  no  hotter  chance  than  t.>  have  an  adversary  who  always  gives 
battle  witii  deployed  lin^s. 

I  once  more  appeal]  in  regard  t"  this  subject)  to  the  générale  who  have  been 
engaged  in  the  great  European  wars.  It  remain*  only  to  add  that,  by  considering 
one  order  of  battle  M  th*  m  -  it  is  not  intended  to  say  that 

24 


274  ÀrrENDix. 

the  moment  of  attack,  in  order  to  be  imposing  to  the  enemy  by  its 
extent. 

XL  If  the  art  of  war  consists  in  concerting  a  superior  effort  of  one 
mass  against  the  weakest  parts,  it  is  incontestably  necessary  to  push  a 
beaten  army  in  a  lively  manner. 

The  strength  of  an  army  consists  in  its  organization,  and  in  the 
"ensemble"  resulting  from  the  bond  of  all  parts  with  the  central  point 
which  causes  them  to  mo™.  After  a  defeat,  this  "ensemble"  exists  no 
longer  ;  the  harmony  between  the  head  which  combines  and  the  corps 
which  should  execute  is  destroyed — their  relations  are  suspended  and 
nearly  always  broken.  The  entire  army  is  one  weak  part  ;  to  attack 
the  same  is  equivalent  to  marching  to  a  certain  triumph.  What  proofs 
of  these  truths  we  find  in  the  march  upon  Roveredo  and  the  gorges 
of  the  Brenta,  to  complete  the  ruin  of  Wurmser;  in  the  march  from 
Ulm  upon  Vienna — in  that  from  Jena  upon  Wittenberg,  Custrin,  and 
Stettin  [*  This  maxim  is  often  neglected  by  mediocre  generals.  It 
seems  that  the  whole  effort  of  their  genius  and  the  goal  of  their  am- 
bition is  limited  to  become  masters  of  the  field  of  battle.  A  victory  of 
this  kind  is  nothing  but  a  mere  shifting  of  troops  without  any  real 
utility. 

XII.  To  render  decisive  the  superior  shock  of  one  mass  of  troops, 
it  is  necessary  that  the  general  do  not  in  any  degree  attend  less  to  the 
moral  condition  of  his  army.  What  would,  in  fact,  be  the  value  of 
fifty  thousand  men  placed  in  line  of  battle  before  twenty  thousand,  if 
they  were  not  possessed  of  the  necessary  impulsion  to  engage  and 
overthrow  the  enemy?  Not  only  the  soldier  is  thereby  affected— it 
influences  still  more  particularly  those  who  are  called  upon  to  lead  him. 
All  troops  are  brave  when  the  chiefs  give  the  example  of  a  noble  emu- 
lation and  of  a  proper  devotion.  A  soldier  must  not  face  the  fire  by 
reason  of  fear  alone,  which  a  rigorous  discipline  inspires  ;  it  is  neces- 
sary that  he  cheerfully  confront  it,  imbued  with  that  self-love  which 
impels  him  not  to  cede  anything  to  his  officers  in  point  of  honor  and 
bravery,  and  especially  through  that  confidence  in  the  wisdom  of  his 

victory  would  be  entirely  impossible,  if  it  bo  not  strictly  applied;  localities,  gen- 
eral causes,  superiority  of  numbers,  the  moral  condition  of  the  troops,  and  the 
generals,  all  are  considerations  to  be  weighed  in  the  general  aspect.  And  when 
we  reason  upon  a  general  maxim,  it  must  be  admitted  that  every  one  of  these 
chances  are  of  equal  weight. 

*  This  chapter  was  published  in  1806.  Since  then  the  Russian  army  has  fur- 
nished a  renewed  proof  of  this  truth,  by  the  activity  and  the  perseverance  with 
which  it  followed  up  its  successes  toward  the  close  of  the  year  1812.  The  Emperor 
Alexander  has  likewise  made  a  brilliant  application  of  this  principle  in  1814. 


APPENDIX.  275 

chiefs  and  the  courage  of  his  companions-in-arms  with  which  his  supe- 
rior has  succeeded  in  inspiring  him.* 

A  general  must  he  enabled  to  rely,  in  his  calculations,  upon  the  devo- 
tion of  his  lieutenants  to  the  honor  of  the  national  arms.  It  is  neces- 
sary that  he  be  perfectly  secure  that  a  vigorous  shock  will  take  place 
wherever  he  has  ordered  that  it  be  executed.  The  first  means  to  arrive 
at  this  end  is  to  make  himself  beloved,  esteemed,  and  feared;  the 
second  means  is  to  entrust  into  the  hands  of  this  general  the  choice 
and  the  fate  of  his  lieutenants.  If  the  latter  have  arrived  at  their 
respective  grades  by  the  right  alone  which  seniority  confers,  it  may  be 
decided  beforehand  that  they  scarcely  ever  will  be  possessed  of  the 
necessary  qualities  to  completely  discharge  the  important  functions  of 
their  rank.  This  circumstance,  by  itself,  may  lead  to  the  failure  of  the 
very  best  conceived  enterprises. 

It  is  seen,  by  this  rapid  exposition,  that  the  scienoe  of  war  is  com- 
posed of  three  general  combinations,  each  of  which  offers  but  a  small 
number  of  subdivisions  and  chances  of  execution.  The  only  perfect 
operations  would  be  those  which  would  present  the  application  of  these 
three  combinations,  since  that  would  be  the  permanent  application  of 
the  general  principle  before  indicated.! 


*  The  rules  undoubtedly  vary  according  to  the  different  nations,  and  all  the 
lesser  lights  and  shadows  illustrative  of  the  point  of  honor  are  not  applicable  to 
every  army,  as  the  Austrian  military  journal  has  with  reason  remarked,  when 
speaking  of  one  of  my  chapters.  But  whatever  this  journal  may  advance  in  this 
respect  it  is  certain  that  the  rigors  of  discipline  did  not  alone  make  the  legions 
of  Suwarrow  so  brave,  but  because  he  had  the  talent  to  electrify  them  in  his  own 
manner.  Despite  the  criticism  of  the  writer  of  that  article,  I  still  persist  in 
believing  that  corporeal  punishment  is  entirely  unfit  to  act  as  an  incentive.  Its 
effects  may  be  to  modify,  soften,  and  amend  the  disposition  of  the  soldier,  but  it 
will  never  mako  him  a  good  one,  any  more  than  the  declamations  which  have, 
perhaps,  become  too  general  against  this  punishment.  There  are  other  means  to 
excite  the  morale  of  an  army,  and  I  will  cite  an  example  for  illustration.  At  the 
affair  of  Culm,  a^rgeant  of  the  regiment  of  Devaux,  when  delivering  to  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  ^standard  which  he  had  taken,  explained  to  this  marshal  the 
re-entering  and  salient  angles,  formed  by  a  streamlet  and  the  Tillage  which  had 
been  attacked  by  the  corps  of  Colloredo.  An  officer  of  engineers  could  not  have 
spoken  better,  and  the  prince  himself  was  struck  by  it.  This  brave  man  had 
been  a  non-commissioned  officer  for  nine  years;  ho  was  handed  two  ducats  (about 
six  dollars),  aud  the  hope  of  a  medal  was  held  out  to  him  for  his  standard,  and  his 
truly  didactic  narrative.  Ought  ho  not  have  merited  -another  recompense,  and 
was  he  not  fit  to  command  a  company  ? 

f  National  wan,  where  we  are  obliged  to  combat  and  conquer  an  entire  people, 
alone  make  an  exception  to  these  rules;  in  wars  of  this  kind  it  is  a  difficult  mat- 
ter to  bring  a  people  to  subjection  without  dividing  our  forces— since,  whenever  wo 
assemble  them  to  give  battle,  we  expose  ourselves  to  lose  the  provinces  already 
conquered. 

The  means  to  guard  against  these  inconveniences  is  to  have  an  army  continually 


27G  APPENDIX. 

The  first  of  these  operations  is  the  art  of  encompassing  the  lines  of  op- 
erations in  the  most  advantageous  manner  ;  this  is  precisely  what  is  com- 
monly and  improperly  called  a  ]>lan  of  a  campaign.  I  really  do  not  see 
what  is  meant  by  this  denomination,  since  it  is  a  matter  of  impossibilit)' 
to  make  a  general  plan  for  the  whole  of  a  campaign,  the  first  movement 
of  which  may  overthrow  the  whole  scaffolding,  and  in  which  it  would 
be  impossible  to  see  beyond  the  second  movement. 

The  second  branch  is  the  art  to  carry  one's  masses,  in  the  most  rapid 
manner  p>ossible,  upon  the  decisive  point  of  the  primitive  line  of  operation, 
or  upon  the  accidental  line.  This  is  what  is  vulgarly  meant  by  "strate- 
gy." But  strategy  is  merely  the  means  of  execution  of  this  second 
combination  ;  its  principles  may  be  found  in  the  above-mentioned 
chapters. 

The  third  branch  is  the  art  to  combine  the  simultaneous  employment  of 
one's  greatest  mass  upon  the  most  important  point  of  a  field  of  battle; 
this  is,  properly,  the  art  of  combats,  which  several  authors  have  desig- 
nated by  the  name  of  "order  of  battle,"  and  which  others  have  pre- 
sented under  the  name  of  "tactics." 

And  here  we  have  the  science  of  war  in  a  few  words.  It  was  for 
having  forgotten  this  small  number  of  principles  that  the  Austrian  gen- 
erals have  been  beaten  from  1793  until  1800  and  1805  ;  it  was  for  the 
same  cause  that  the  French  generals  lost  Belgium  in  1793,  Germany  in 
1796,  Italy  and  Swabia  in  1799. 

I  need  not  observe  to  my  readers  that  I  have  treated  here  of  the  prin- 
ciples only  which  relate  to  the  employment  of  troops,  or  of  the  purely 
military  part  of  the  art  of  war;  other  no  less  important  combinations 
are  indispensable  for  the  proper  conduct  of  a  great  war,  but  they  belong 
to  the  science  of  governing  empires  rather  than  to  that  of  commanding 
armies. 

To  be  successful  in  great  enterprises  it  is  not  only  requisite  to  calcu- 
late the  state  of  the  respective  armies,  but  also  that  of  the  means  of  the 
second  line,  which  is  designed  to  act  as  a  reserve,  and  to  replace -the 
losses  of  all  kinds,  both  in  personnel  and  materiel.  It  sfclso  necessary 
to  know  how  to  judge  of  the  interior  state  of  the  nations  according  to 
what  they  have  already  previously  sustained,  and  of  the  relative  situa- 
tion of  their  neighbors.  Nor  is  it  any  less  required  to  place  into  the 
balance  the  passions  of  the  peoples  against  whom  the  war  will  be  waged, 
their  institutions",  and  the  attachment  they  have  for  them.  The  situa- 
tion of  the  provinces  must  likewise  be  taken  into  account,  as  well  as  the 

in  the  field,  and  independent  divisions  for  the  purpose  of  organization  in  the  rear. 
These  divisions  should  be  commanded  by  well-iuformed  generals,  good  administra- 
tors, firm  and  just  at  the  same  time,  because  their  individual  labors  may  as  much 
contribute  to  the  submission  of  the  provinces  entrusted  to  their  care  as  the  fore» 
of  arms. 


APPENDIX.  277 

distance  of  the  power  which  it  is  intended  to  attack,  because  the  disad- 
vantages of  the  aggressor  are  multiplied  in  measure  as  he  increases  the 
depth  of  his  line  of  operations.  Lastly,  it  is  necessary  to  judge  of  the 
nature  of  the  country  into  which  the  war  is  going  to  be  carried,*  and 
the  solidity  of  the  alliances  which  may  be  mado  for  a  distant  enterprise. 

In  a  word,  it  is  indispensable  to  know  that  science,  a  mixture  of  pol- 
itics, administration,  and  of  war,  the  bases  of  which  Montesquieu  has  so 
well  laid  down  in  his  work  upon  the  causes  of  the  grandeur  and  tho  de- 
cadence of  the  Romans.  It  would  be  difficult  to  assign  to  this  science 
any  fixed  rules,  and  even  any  general  principles  ;  history  is  the  only 
school  in  which  we  may  find  some  good  precepts;  and  it  is  likewise  very 
rarely  that  we  encounter  any  circumstances  which  resemble  each  other 
sufficiently  to  be  taken  for  our  guidance  at  a  certain  epoch,  and  to  shape 
our  actions  according  to  what  was  done  several  centuries  beforo.  .  Tho 
passions  of  men  exercise  so  great  an  influence  upon  events  as  to  make  it 
a  matter  of  impossibility  to  prevent  the  failure  of  any  undertaking,  even 
when  others,  in  similar  circumstances,  have  succeeded. 

Napoleon  may,  perhaps,  have  known  this  science,  but  his  contempt 
for  men  caused  him  to  neglect  its  application.  It  was  not  any  ignorance 
of  tho  fate  of  Cambyses  or  of  the  legions  of  Varus  which  caused  his  re- 
verses ;  nor  was  it  any  forgetfulness  of  the  defeat  of  Crassus,  or  of  the 
disaster  of  Emperor  Julian,  and  the  result  of  the  Crusades;  it  was  the 
opinion  which  he  had  that  his  genius  would  secure  to  him  incalculable 
means  of  superiority,  and  that  his  enemies,  on  the  contrary,  possessed 
none  whatever.  He  is  fallen  from  the  pinnacle  of  his  grandeur  for 
having  forgotten  that  mind  and  strength  of  man  have  also  their  limits, 
and  that,  the  more  enormous  are  the  masses  set  in  motion,  the  more  is 
the  power  of  genius  subjected  to  the  imprescriptible  laws  of  nature,  and 
the  less  it  controls  events.  This  truth,  which  has  been  demonstrated  by 
the  results  of  the  affairs  of  Katzbach,  Dennewitz,  and  even  of  Leipzig, 
would  by  itself  make  an  interesting  subject  of  study. 

It  does  not  enter  into  my  plan  here  to  repeat  the  important  precepts 
which  Montesquieu  and  Machiavel  have  left  to  us  upon  the  great  art  of 
directing  the  movements  of  empires.  In  the  course  of  the  narrative  of 
these  celebrated  campaigns  some  reflections  will  bo  suggested  upon  the 
change  which  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  have  caused  in  the  ideas  upon 
the  organization  and  the  manner  of  displaying  national  forces,  upon 
their  employment,  and  the  consequences  which  will  probably  result 
therefrom  in  the  future  revolutions  of  the  body-politic.  Armies  are 
no  longer  composed  to-day  of  troops  recruited  voluntarily  from  the 
superfluity  of  a  too  numerous  population;  they  are  riations  entire,  call- 

*  This  led  me  to  write,  as  long  ago  as  1805,  volume  v,  chapter  iv,  that  the  system 
of  Napoleon  was  not  applicable  either  to  Russia  or  Sweden, 


278  APPENDIX. 

ed  to  arms  by  law;  and  they  no  longer  fight  for  some  demarcation  of  a 
frontier,  but,  in  some  sort,  for  their  existence. 

This  state  of  things  throws  us  back  to  the  third  and  fourth  centuries, 
and  recalls  to  us  those  shocks  of  immense  peoples  which  disputed  among 
each  other  the  European  continent;  and  if  legislation  and  a  new  inter- 
national law  do  not  interpose  to  limit  these  levies  en  masse,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  foresee  where  these  ravages  may  stop.  War  will  become  a 
plague  more  terrible  than  ever,  since  the  population  of  civilized  nations 
will  be  gathered  in,  not,  as  in  the  Middle  Ages,  in  order  to  resist  savage 
hordes  and  devastators,  but  for  the  sorry  maintenance  of  a  political 
balance,  and  in  order  to  determine,  at  the  end  of  a  century,  whether 
such  and  such  a  province  ought  to  have  a  prefect  from  Paris,  Petersburg, 
or  from  Vienna,  who  wourd  govern  it  with  about  the  same  laws  and 
usages.  It  would  be,  however,  high  time  that  the  cabinets  should  arrive 
at  more  generous  ideas,  and  that  henceforth  blood  should  no  longer 
flow  save  in  the  defence  of  the  great  interests  of  the  world. 

If  this  wish,  truly  European,  must  be  consigned  to  banishment  with 
the  beautiful  dreams  of  perpetual  peace,  let  us  deplore  the  little  passions 
and  interests  which  lead  enlightened  nations  to  cut  each  others'  throats 
more  pitilessly  than  barbarians;  let  us  deplore  the  progress  in  arts, 
sciences,  morals,  and  politics,  which,  far  from  bringing  us  any  nearer 
to  the  perfection  of  the  social  state,  appear  to  carry  in  their  train  the 
centuries  of  the  Huns,  the  Vandals,  and  the  Tartars. 


